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ABSTRACT 
The Bolsa Família (BF) is considered to be a well-targeted cash transfer programme 
for poor families, with benefits conditional on meeting health and educational 
requirements.  Extreme poverty in Brazil is concentrated in rural areas, and is highest 
among those who rely on agriculture in historically underprivileged areas of the semi-
arid interior.  Although there is no comprehensive study of chronic poverty in Brazil 
due to lack of longitudinal datasets, one can infer that, the more remote small, poor 
rural municipalities are, the higher is the probability of persistent and severe poverty.  
Therefore, it is questionable whether the BF, with conditionalities attached to 
frequently limited services, is the most appropriate social protection policy for 
reaching the working-age able-bodied rural poor living in isolated areas.   
I identified the rural poor in remote and non-remote municipalities using geographical 
information systems.  In this thesis, through four pieces of analytical work, I thus 
investigate how effectively the BF programme reaches the persistently poor in remote 
and non-remote rural municipalities.  
First, I used quantitative methods to investigate whether BF participation rates are 
higher in poor remote rural municipalities.  Second, based on a qualitative analysis of 
eight interviews at the federal administration level, I investigated the question of 
whether the policy design and national implementation considered how to reach the 
persistently poor in remote rural areas.  Third, I examined how local administration 
ensured that the persistently poor were given priority in the implementation.  I 
conducted 14 interviews in four case studies, two in remote and two in non-remote 
poor rural municipalities.  Lastly, I analysed how the rural poor took up benefits with 
22 household interviews in rural villages.  
This thesis concludes that, despite the BF’s cost-efficiency, it does not effectively 
address the needs of the persistently poor living in remote rural municipalities, where 
services are non-existent, difficult to access, and of low quality.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
And if we Severinos 
are all the same in life, 
we die the same death, 
the same Severino death. 
The death of those who die 
of old age before the thirty, 
of an ambuscade before twenty, 
of hunger a little daily. 
(The Severino death  
from sickness and from hunger 
attacks at any age 
even the unborn child.) 
 
We are many Severinos 
and our destiny’s the same 
(…) to try to bring to life 
a dead and deader land, 
to try to wrest a farm 
out of burnt-over land. 
But, so that Your Excellencies 
Can recognize me better 
(…) I will be the Severino 
You’ll now see emigrate. 
(Melo Neto 1963 p.10) 
  
  
João Cabral de Melo Neto’s poem pictures the lives of the persistently poor living in 
rural areas in the Northeast of Brazil.  For some, Melo Neto’s description may come 
as a surprise, as it might seem to be more appropriate for poor countries, rather than 
Brazil which is a middle-income country with improving social indicators, and one of 
the emerging economies, with a GDP among the top ten in the world and a large 
democracy and one of the BRICS
1
.  However, his description, although more than 
half a century old, continues to show similarities with the first-hand accounts reported 
in this thesis.   
This thesis deals with several aspects of the poem: life accounts of the extended 
duration of severe poverty, inter-generational transmission of poverty, small farming 
in the semi-arid interior, migration and unfulfilled human potential – all of this related 
directly or indirectly to the land and location in which the rural poor live.  As part of 
the social policy and development fields, this thesis analyses the role of the state in 
providing social assistance.  It specifically investigates the Bolsa Família
2
 
programme in assisting the persistently poor living in remote rural poor areas.   
This topic is of particular interest for several reasons.  Although progress has been 
made in reducing poverty and achieving the United Nations Millennium Development 
Goals, more than two-thirds of the 1.4 billion in extreme poverty worldwide live in 
rural areas of developing countries (IFAD 2010 p.9).  One-third of the extreme poor 
                                               
1 Brazil, Russia, China, India and South Africa. 
2 Bolsa Família means Family Grant. 
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are also chronic poor (Shepherd et al. 2014 p.15). The chronic or persistently poor are 
difficult to reach and generally live in resource-depleted areas.  The incidence of 
poverty in Brazil is five times higher in rural than in urban areas.  The semi-arid 
region of northeast Brazil has the “single largest concentration of rural poverty in 
Latin America” (IFAD 2011 p.2).   
Chronic poverty is a “portmanteau” term, different disciplinary backgrounds and 
schools of thought can influence the way the terminology is used (Hulme & Shepherd 
2003 p.404).  In this thesis, chronic poverty is understood more broadly, as a contrast 
to transient poverty.  There is an emerging body of literature that investigates chronic 
poverty focusing on the duration and persistency of multidimensional poverty and 
deprivations, differentiating between the “always/usually poor” from “the 
churning/occasionally poor” (CPRC 2005,2008a,2008b; Hulme et al. 2001; Hulme & 
Shepherd 2003).  The focus of this work is on the rural poor who live in long-term, 
chronic, enduring, persistent, structural poverty in remote geographical areas.   
The empirical identification of who the chronic poor are is still under-researched 
(Hulme & Shepherd 2003).  In general, information on poverty dynamics is acquired 
through panel data methods, one-off indicators (e.g. nutritional indicators) or 
qualitative retrospective data (such as those used in participatory poverty 
assessments) (Addison et al. 2009).  In this thesis, I do not use chronic poverty 
methods to investigate my hypothesis - i.e. that the long-term severe poverty in rural 
remote areas is likely to influence the effective implementation Bolsa Família 
programme - for the reasons outlined in subsequent paragraphs.  I rely, instead, on 
four empirical pieces of research based on cross-sectional datasets and qualitative 
interviews in order to test, observe and produce evidence relating to this hypothesis.  
The research is based on the premise that persistent severe structural poverty is 
predominantly located in rural and remote areas of small municipalities in the 
Northeast of Brazil.  This premise has been consistently validated through historic 
analysis of the implications of the Brazilian colonisation and republican processes 
(the exploratory sugar cane colonies of the Northeast, the establishment of the 
Portuguese Royal family in Rio, the rise of coffee plantations and the politics of 
oligarchies from the Southeast of Brazil) as well as contemporary social policy 
research based on cross-sectional datasets (Censuses, social indicators and surveys).  
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Since I do not use panel data or one-off indicators that would strictly identify the 
chronic poor, I opt to use instead the terminology “persistent” poverty throughout the 
thesis. 
The intersection between chronic or persistent poverty and remote rural areas of 
Brazil has not been extensively researched for several reasons.  First, there is a lack of 
quantitative longitudinal data.  There are no panel data in Brazil that capture the 
duration of poverty for this sub-group.  Existing surveys, like the National Household 
Surveys (PNADs
3
), are representative of states and macro-regions, not small 
municipalities.  Municipalities are clustered, which is not informative for addressing 
problems of rural isolated small municipalities.  Only the Census would have the 
level of geographical detailed required but it does not provide information on income 
or expenditure.   
Another reason, based on my own experience, is the difficulty in researching rural 
remote areas.  Investigating these areas is time- and resource-consuming.  Rural 
remote areas, in general, do not provide services or offer facilities to ease the 
researcher’s work.  There were no hotels or restaurants in some of the rural villages, 
even municipalities, I visited.  Trust and empathy were needed to build interpersonal 
relationships in order to start the research process.   
Another reason may be the influence of the free-market schools of economic thought 
that underpin the neoliberal prescriptions of the 1980s.  Those schools hold that less 
state interference in economic affairs would allow markets to redistribute goods and 
services in the most efficient way.  The general economic improvement would 
“trickle down” to society, and areas that are lagging behind would eventually catch-
up.  The focus of analysis, therefore, should be on how to generate, improve and 
sustain economic growth.  It should not be on regional development state-led 
initiatives.  
The quest for public efficiency and economic growth led to the monitoring of 
aggregate averages and short-term measurable outputs.  With this rationale, rapid 
urbanisation has shifted the policy attention to urban areas.  However, the current 
levels of poverty in rural areas calls for rapid and emergency policy attention.  
                                               
3 Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios. 
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Aggregate averages and short-term analysis do not provide the informational basis 
and the time-frame for dealing with rural poverty.   
I do not disregard the role of economic growth or the need to address society’s 
aggregate/average illnesses.  This thesis, though, brings an alternative social policy 
analysis to the prevailing evaluations that measure success by looking at averages, 
government efficiency and short-term measurable outputs.  Going beyond averages 
and unveiling local policy effects and households’ histories to understand the 
effectiveness of these programmes in addressing the local needs, mainly in these 
“hard to reach” places, are also important elements of policy analysis.  
As Titmuss (1974) states, 
the end-results of the work of administrators and professionals in the social 
services are less susceptible (if susceptible at all) to quantification and 
measurement than the work of managers in the private sector. (Titmuss 1974 
p.52) 
Titmuss also questions how to measure the success of policies that complement other 
policies.  For example, success in exiting poverty may demand more social-assistance 
services.  Thus, human needs are not often addressed by a single intervention with the 
aims of efficiency and immediacy.  Titmuss’ thoughts in social policy remain avant-
garde.   
There are several programmes that the Brazilian Government has used to address 
poverty specifically in rural areas.  The rural pension, established by the 1988 
Constitution, is a non-contributory pension to rural workers.  As for the working-age 
rural poor, the government has supported small farming through the Food Acquisition 
Programme (PAA- Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos) since 2003.  PAA 
purchases food from small farmers and cooperatives to use it in food banks, 
community kitchens or popular restaurants.  Another initiative is the National 
Programme to Strengthen Small Farming (PRONAF - Programa Nacional de 
Fortalecimento da Agricultultura Familiar), which aims to increase access to credit 
to small farmers.   
In this thesis, I use the case study of the Bolsa Família (BF) programme.  The focus 
of this thesis is on rural working households, excluding, therefore, the recipients of 
social pensions or disability pensions (Benefício de Prestação Continuada).  The BF 
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is the main social assistance programme that addresses the able-bodied working-age 
poor households.  Although the BF is not a benefit specific for rural areas, it has a 
national coverage, encompassing a broader benefit base than the above-cited anti-
poverty programmes.  In addition, the rural poor may not be necessarily linked to 
small farming activities, such as the focus given by the PAA and PRONAF.  
Other important reasons to justify the focus on the BF programme are the 
international recognition of this programme as an exemplary programme to combat 
poverty and the international use of conditional cash transfer as a global anti-poverty 
social protection instrument.  In 2013, the BF won the International Social Security 
Association Award for Outstanding Achievement in Social Security - a prestigious 
recognition for the Brazilian Government.  As sub-section 2.3.1 investigates, 
international development banks are increasingly using conditional cash transfers in 
developing countries, where the successful experience of the BF programme can be 
adapted and replicated.   
The Bolsa Família (BF) is a social-assistance non-contributory programme that 
provides income to households conditional on educational and health behaviour 
requirements (i.e. “conditionalities”).  It is targeted to poor households, and therefore, 
subjected to means testing.  It started in 2003 as an amalgamation of previous social 
programmes and it rapidly evolved to become the largest conditional, cash-transfer 
programme in the world, reaching more than 13 million households.  It operates in all 
three administrative levels – e.g. local, state and federal.  It also brings together 
different sectors (health, education and social assistance) into this umbrella 
intervention. 
In 2004, the number of potential beneficiaries was established using the Census and 
the PNAD.  From 2004 to 2010, these numbers were updated using subsequent 
PNADs.  As described, PNADs are not representative of the small rural 
municipalities investigated in this thesis.  Discrepancies between the number of 
potential beneficiaries obtained from the PNADs, and the number of potential 
beneficiaries locally registered at the national database, called Cadastro
4
, became a 
topic in publications (de la Brière & Lindert 2005; Rocha 2013 pp.101-127; Soares et 
                                               
4 Cadastro Único para Programas Sociais do Governo Federal (Single Registry for Social 
Programmes of the Federal Government).  
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al. 2010b).  It is important to investigate whether these discrepancies have 
implications for small municipalities. 
Another important theme, despite receiving little attention, is the issue of national 
quotas.  Although some researchers and public officials talk about the universal 
coverage of the BF (Lindert et al. 2007 p.72; TCU 2009b p.145), there are caps at 
national, state and local levels which limit the number of households who can receive 
benefits.  This situation has created a category of eligible families who are not 
beneficiaries (Rocha 2013 pp.101-127; Soares 2012a p.6).  Given the premise that 
persistent poverty is predominantly associated with rural remote small municipalities, 
the findings above led me to ask:  Is the PNAD a suitable frame for allocating limited 
benefits to small poor rural municipalities?  Is there a possibility that the persistently 
poor in rural remote areas, who may need this benefit the most, are excluded?  These 
questions were the primary motivation behind this research. 
As noted, this study analyses the BF through different lenses than those generally 
researched: I use neither the methods based on the PNAD to derive local poverty 
headcounts and benefits allocation, nor measurements of programme success based 
on targeting analyses.  I use poverty maps, based on small area estimation techniques, 
although these techniques also have their limitations, further explained in Chapter 3.  
I also focus on the analysis of trends in programme participation rates.  I look at 
whether the BF reaches the persistently poor in remote municipalities; how the BF 
expanded in remote and non-remote municipalities from 2004 to 2009; and, how 
policy-design took into consideration the heterogeneity of poverty and rural areas.  
The considerations above refer to the effectiveness of the BF in reaching out to the 
persistently poor in rural areas.  However, the concept of effectiveness I use is more 
specific than simply the analysis of a policy achieving its objectives.  I use the 
concept of “maximizing effectiveness”.  As Titmuss (1968 p.67) states “In terms of 
maximizing effectiveness, the real challenge lies in the problem of ‘how to reach the 
difficult to reach in our societies’” or, in the case studied, how to reach those living in 
persistent poverty in rural remote areas.  For Titmuss (1989), the concept of 
maximising effectiveness also includes the effective delivery of public services to 
those difficult to reach and how the policy design meets the beneficiaries’ needs.  
This is the concept of effectiveness that I use throughout this thesis. 
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The secondary motivation for this thesis is the investigation of how remoteness 
constrains local implementation of the BF, how it affects households’ participation, 
and how the BF meets the needs of the rural poor in remote and non-remote rural 
municipalities.  I investigate whether those facing persistent poverty are given 
priority.  The narratives of the rural poor are important for a cash-transfer programme 
that attaches behavioural conditions to areas with lower service provision.  This study 
sheds lights on programme and household dynamics and their relation to geographical 
location.    
This thesis contributes to the literature in two ways: to BF analyses; and to the 
literature on conditional cash transfers (CCTs) for persistent rural poverty.  
Underlying these two contributions is consideration of the role of the state in actively 
promoting social justice. 
First of all, this thesis is a policy analysis of the application of the BF programme to a 
sub-group of the population not analysed before.  This thesis innovates by 
investigating the role of remoteness in BF participation rates, local implementation 
and household participation.  Using poverty maps and geographical information 
systems I create a typology to identify remoteness.  This typology drives the selection 
of the qualitative case studies as well as the analysis of the BF programme at the 
national, local and household levels.   
Second, it brings to the debate the role of the state in addressing the complex needs of 
the persistently poor through CCTs.  By bringing together top-down policy analyses 
(at federal and local levels) with bottom-up household life accounts, the study moves 
the social assistance, cash transfer and conditionality debates beyond household 
compliance and administrative targeting levels.  This research highlights the 
challenges of poor rural local administrations in implementing the programme.  It 
also shows the immediate impact of the BF on households’ lives, as well as its 
limitations for addressing the long-term needs of the persistently poor.  
This research is timely, as Brazil is developing and consolidating its social protection 
systems.  The analysis of social-assistance policies for the persistently poor provides 
interesting insights.  There is an urgent need to encourage Brazilian society and 
politicians to adopt new approaches to social policy: neither charitable and sporadic 
 Page 22 of 356 
 
during periods of drought, nor focused on meeting short-term outputs.  This thesis 
illustrates some of the structural and deep-rooted problems of persistent poverty that 
demand social solidarity and a long-term policy focus.   
Furthermore, the use of targeted and conditional social assistance policies is 
increasingly popular in both developing and developed countries.  Programmes like 
the BF are attractive to governments because of their affordability, the impact it is 
suggested they have on poverty reduction, and their measurable outputs in terms of 
conditional attendance at social services.  Low-income countries are increasingly 
using cash transfers.  Developed countries are increasingly using conditionalities.  
Several countries also have problems with service provision in poor remote rural 
areas.  The analysis of the BF in poor remote rural municipalities may provide some 
useful insights.   
Based on the premise that the persistently poor are those predominantly living in rural 
remote municipalities, I formulate the following hypothesis that the location of the 
rural poor’s municipality is likely to influence the effective implementation of the 
Bolsa Família programme.  Effectiveness is understood in terms of “maximizing 
effectiveness” or how the policy reaches out to the ‘hard to reach’ and how it meets 
their needs.  This hypothesis translates into the following research question (RQ1): 
RQ1:  “How effectively does the Bolsa Família reach the rural poor in remote 
and non-remote poor rural municipalities?”  
RQ2: If it is not effective, why not? 
a) Reasons related to the policy design at the national level 
b) Reasons related to the local implementation at the municipal level 
c) Reasons related to the households’ participation at the community level 
The rest of the thesis is organised in the following way.  Chapter 2 reviews the key 
literature on this topic and details the research questions.  Chapter 3 introduces the 
methods that guided the investigation.  Chapter 4 presents descriptive statistics 
aiming to answer RQ1.  Chapter 5 shows the results pertaining to the design of the 
policy at national level (RQ2a).  Chapter 6 analyses the implementation of the 
programme at the local level (RQ2b).  Chapter 7 reports on the in-depth study of the 
locations and how remoteness affects household opportunities to diversify livelihood 
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strategies, including participation in the BF programme.  Chapter 8 investigates 
evidence of programme participation from the household perspective (RQ2c).  
Chapter 9 concludes this thesis by presenting implications for policy and future 
research. 
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2. CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS FOR ADDRESSING RURAL POVERTY 
IN BRAZIL 
Each person possesses an inviolability founded on 
justice that even the welfare of society as a whole 
cannot override. (Rawls 1971 p.3) 
This chapter aims to place this thesis in a dialogue with the relevant wider literature.  
It is not my objective to provide a comprehensive review on poverty, the role of the 
state or the Bolsa Família (BF) programme, but instead to locate the potential 
contribution of this thesis to the fields of social policy and rural development in 
Brazil.  
This thesis is part of two specific contemporary debates: a national debate aimed to 
consolidate the social protection system in Brazil, and a broader international debate 
on the use of social assistance programmes.  This thesis aims to contribute modestly 
to both debates.  The national debate is about the future of the BF: whether or not the 
BF should be integrated into a universal social protection system (Soares 2012a).  
Internationally, the use of transfers, with or without conditions, whether cash or in-
kind, is in the forefront of anti-poverty social policies in development.   
Chapter 1 introduces some of the main motivations to research the BF in rural poor 
municipalities.  It concludes by outlining the structure of the thesis and stating the 
research questions below:  
RQ1:  “How effectively does the Bolsa Família reach the rural poor in remote 
and non-remote poor rural municipalities?”  
RQ2: If it is not effective, why not? 
a) Reasons related to the policy design at the national level 
b) Reasons related to the local implementation at the municipal level 
c) Reasons related to the households’ participation at the community level 
In this Chapter, I analyse in more detail predominant debates on the literature, I 
identify gaps and areas for research investigation, which justify the enquiry into the 
research questions above.  First, I critically engage with debates on poverty and state 
practices of social assistance to the poor both nationally and internationally (Sections 
2.1 and 2.2).  Then, I contextualise the emergence of the BF as a historical process 
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both in Brazil and internationally.  I also consider how this background influences the 
BF design (Section 2.3).  I critically assess the current BF evaluations and the use of 
conditional cash transfers as a social assistance strategy to fight poverty (Sections 
2.3.4 and 2.4).  Finally, I conclude with a critical analysis of how the body of 
literature presented gives rise to the formulation of the proposed research questions 
(Section 2.5).     
2.1 Poverty debates in social policy and development: international and 
Brazilian perspectives     
In this section, I outline key debates on poverty focusing on the social policy and 
international development literature.  The first part addresses the literature 
internationally; the second part addresses the Brazilian context.  In both sub-sections, 
I conclude with the relevant texts related to the issues of chronic or persistent poverty 
and rural remote areas, the focus of this thesis. 
2.1.1 International debates and practices: poverty, chronic and persistent poverty 
and spatial dimensions 
 Debates on poverty 
Seebohm Rowntree (1902), in his seminal work Poverty: a study of town life, defines 
“primary poverty” as subsistence – “an estimate of minimum necessary expenditure 
for the maintenance of merely physical health” (p.87).  The author uses the lower 
estimate of the minimum necessary to meet a list of necessities such as food, clothing, 
fuel, and household sundries.  His work was inspired by Charles Booth’s Life and 
Labour of the People in London, first published in 1889.  This study produced the 
first poverty map of London. 
The concept of an estimated income threshold as a measurement of poverty (or 
absolute poverty line) is very influential.  It helped to establish the means tests still 
used nowadays for eligibility for welfare benefits.  It is also the concept behind the 
international yardstick, the World Bank’s “dollar a day” poverty line, based on 
purchasing power parity and calculated in a dollar value
 5
(Hall & Midgley 2004 p.47) 
                                               
5 Currently measured as US$1.25 a day in 2005 prices. 
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Peter Townsend (1962) was a critical opponent of this static and absolute concept of 
poverty.  Townsend argued that minimum requirements for subsistence are arbitrary, 
and they are set so low that they give a picture of poverty distorted by over-
conservative estimates.  The absolute poverty definition is a measure of income 
inequality instead (Townsend 2006).  Poor people suffer from inequality of 
distribution and from unfulfilled social needs relative to the standards in a given 
society (“relative deprivation”) (Townsend 1962).   
Townsend’s work was very influential for the theoretical advancement of the concept 
of relative poverty.  Poverty is no longer understood as a static binary concept but 
rather a continuum of measurement that requires relational judgement and 
comparisons in time and space.  Absolute poverty is equated to acute, severe and 
multiple levels of deprivation or, in other words, the bottom end of the continuum.   
In 1990, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) released its first 
“Human Development Index” with the launch of the Human Development Report.  
This first report, whose principal author was Mahbub ul Haq
6
, introduced the concept 
of human development “as a process of enlarging people’s choices” (UNDP 1990 
p.10).  The Human Development Index provided an alternative to the “dollar-a-day” 
line, adding to the international poverty debate dimensions beyond income measure, 
such as “to lead a long and healthy life”, to be educated and to enjoy a “decent 
standard of living” (p.10). 
Debates on poverty and human development were brought to the forefront of the 
international development agenda in the 1990s.  In 1995, the United Nations 
convened a World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen.  Governments 
pledged their commitment to social and human development, including objectives of 
eradicating absolute poverty, supporting full employment, equality and equity and the 
protection of human rights (UN 1995).    
In 2000, the United Nations Millennium Declaration agreed on targets known as the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  The first MDG is to halve by 2015 
extreme poverty rates (measured by the dollar-a-day poverty line) and hunger, 
measured by 1990 levels.  The goal of having the extreme poverty rates was globally 
                                               
6 Influenced by Amartya Sen’s work on capabilities. 
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met by 2010 (UN 2014).  Discussions on the post-2015 Development Agenda are 
currently being conducted, and the focus on extreme poverty reduction is likely to 
continue on the national and international agendas
7
.   
 Poverty lines are generally measured by cross-sectional surveys.  They do not 
capture an important and recognised characteristic of poverty – the dynamics 
associated with the life cycle.  Longitudinal surveys, which differentiate between 
those who live in chronic poverty and those who live in transient poverty, are used to 
capture these poverty dynamics
8
.  
Studies of chronic and persistent poverty gained international prominence through the 
work of the Chronic Poverty Research Centre (CPRC), which began a ten-year 
programme in 2001, involving a partnership of universities, research centres and non-
governmental organisations, located in Manchester, United Kingdom.  CPRC was 
established in 2000-1 as an international partnership of universities, research 
institutes and non-governmental organisations to address the “other half” of the first 
goal of the MDG (Hulme 2003; Shepherd 2011).  As Hulme and Shepherd (2003) put 
it:  
While earlier ages sought to help the ‘deserving poor’ the contemporary focus 
is on the ‘easy to assist poor’ (a focus that is encouraged by the MDGs).  This 
group desperately needs support, but not at the price of ignoring those whose 
poverty is more problematic. (Hulme & Shepherd 2003 p.404) 
 Chronic and persistent poverty  
The chronic poor are defined by the fact that their poverty is of long-term duration 
and may even persist through generations (CPRC 2005; Hulme & Shepherd 2003).  
As explained in Chapter 1, chronic poverty is an umbrella term and it differs from the 
static definitions of extreme and severe poor.  The chronic or persistently poor are the 
“usually poor” or the “always poor” (Hulme & Shepherd 2003 p.405) who suffer 
deprivation in several dimensions that result in their being hard to reach: low income; 
few or no assets; low human capital; and social/political exclusion over long periods.    
                                               
7 On December 4th, 2014, the UN released The Synthesis Report of the Secretary-General on the Post-
2015 Agenda.  At the top of the Sustainable Development Goals table are to end poverty and hunger, to 
achieve food security and to promote sustainable agriculture. 
8 Cross-sectional surveys can be used to identify the chronic poor through proxies such as low health 
status and low education levels, which can give an idea of past living conditions. See McKay and 
Lawson (2003). 
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Poverty experts have agreed on the need to investigate persistent poverty to inform 
policy prescriptions (CPRC 2005).  The chronic or the persistently poor need 
different policies from those prescribed to lift the average number of the aggregate 
poor out of poverty (Bird et al. 2002).  For a country or a region with transient poor 
(i.e. poor for only short periods of time), micro-credit and training may enable them 
to return to the market; to combat persistent poverty, policies focused on 
redistribution, identification of structural bottlenecks and access to basic services may 
be more effective (CPRC 2005; Hulme & Shepherd 2003).   
During the time that these studies in persistent or chronic poverty were being carried 
out, there was a shift in development discourse.  Social protection, seen as an 
instrument to address vulnerability, became mainstreamed by international 
institutions and development aid: it became a third pillar addressing poverty 
reduction, along with economic growth and human development (Shepherd 2011). 
This shift was a result of a combination of factors: an emerging consensus by 
multilateral institutions on the need to establish social protection for developing 
countries; an ideological match between the “narrow” understanding of social 
protection and the World Bank’s targeted and residual social policy addressing risks 
in the event of a shortfall of living standards; and the electoral advantages for 
governments of the low cost of social protection programmes  (Barrientos et al. 2005; 
Hall in press).  This change in discourse is further analysed in section 2.3. 
 Persistent poverty and spatial dimensions of poverty  
“[C]hronic poverty remains mainly a rural phenomenon” (CPRC 2008a p.6).  
However, this association between persistent poverty and rural areas is not causal.  
Although extremely likely, not every household that lives in a rural area is necessarily 
among the persistently poor; there are also the transient poor and the non-poor.  Other 
areas can be also associated with higher chronic poverty, such as politically 
marginalised areas and areas affected by conflict (CPRC 2005,2008b; Hulme 2003; 
Hulme & Shepherd 2003).   
Persistent poverty can also be concentrated in “spatial poverty traps”, where poverty 
is persistently high and there are multiple levels of deprivation across many years 
(CPRC 2005 p.26).  These are geographical areas with low levels of capital, i.e. 
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economic, physical, natural, human, social, environmental and political, that make 
exiting from poverty a difficult task (Bird et al. 2010a; Reardon & Vosti 1995; Scherr 
2000).   
Jazairy et al. (1992) seminal publication The State of the world rural poverty: an 
inquiry into its cause and consequences acknowledged the association between 
poverty and spatial dimensions.  This IFAD report classified the poverty found in this 
association into two types: peripheral poverty, i.e. that found in remote areas with 
poor communications; and endemic poverty, i.e. that present in areas with a poor 
resource base reflecting low income and poor nutrition/health.  
In the 2001 Rural Poverty Report, IFAD reinforced that “generally the poorest of the 
poor live in remote rural areas” (2001 p.21).  Today, several studies on the spatial 
dimensions of poverty attempt to disentangle social from geographical disadvantages 
(Bird et al. 2010a; CPRC 2005,2008b; Jalan & Ravallion 1997; Ravallion & Wodon 
1997; Sen 2003; Shepherd 2011).  Reasons given for the link between persistent 
poverty and remote rural areas (RRA) include: location specificities (spatial poverty 
trap); difficulties preventing residual population from migrating out of the area; 
higher risks, vulnerability and social exclusion due to imperfect markets; and reduced 
public social service provision (Bird et al. 2002).   
Several studies empirically analyse the link between RRA and chronic or persistent 
poverty.  Bird and Shepherd (2003) found an association between remoteness and 
lower public and private investment in four districts in the semi-arid region of rural 
Zimbabwe.  This is an important finding for programmes like the BF, which ties 
beneficiaries to conditional behaviours such as school and health care attendance.  It 
is, therefore, important to investigate whether remoteness of rural remote areas 
reduces public investments affecting the access, existence and quality of services in 
the particular case of Brazil.  
Bird et al. (2010b) constructed an index of isolation based on remoteness, using 
1999-2000 Uganda household surveys.  The index showed a strong correlation 
between remoteness and chronic poverty.  Remoteness is also associated with lower 
livelihood diversification, lower remittances, higher reliance on agriculture and less 
access to services.   
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In terms of determinants of chronic poverty, Okwi et al. (2007) conducted a spatial 
regression analysis to understand chronic poverty in small rural geographical 
locations in Kenya.  The authors found that agro-climatic factors influenced the 
geographical distribution of poverty.  They identified a significant positive effect 
between average travel time and poverty incidence.  Recurrent themes in determining 
poverty in different provinces were: distance to centres; road quality; and soil 
conditions.  Building on these findings, I was able to include distance to centres and 
road quality in the construction of the variable “remoteness” I used in this thesis.  
This is further explained in Chapter 3.  
Adding to Okwi et al. study, Ravallion and Wodon (1997), using two cross-sectional 
surveys in Bangladesh, found that poor areas were poor not only because of a 
concentration of poor households with particular characteristics, but also because of 
the location where the household lived.  Geographical differences in living standards 
cannot be attributed only to household characteristics.   
The studies above conducted in different countries using different methods and 
datasets conclude that there is an association between the type of poverty in rural 
areas and the geographical location where the poor live.  Most importantly, the 
association between persistent poverty and rural remote areas cannot be attributed 
solely to household characteristics but location influences the existence of long-term 
structural poverty, the access to public services and the reduced opportunities to exit 
poverty. 
Nevertheless, there have been a number of criticisms of the use of spatial poverty 
analysis in developing countries.  Burke and Jayne (2010), in a longitudinal study in 
Kenya, demonstrated that spatial factors and household characteristics explained 
variations in wealth, but that spatial factors did not “trap” households in poverty.  
Nord et al.(1995), using USA microdata, found that the causes of poverty differed 
from their spatial concentration.  Migration patterns restore the equilibrium condition 
and addressing area-poverty would only redistribute poverty spatially.  However, the 
former study has evidence to support the claim of spatial poverty, whereas the 
migration equilibrium hypothesis of the latter study is difficult to hold, as there are 
social, economic and physical barriers to migration (cf.Ravallion & Wodon 1997).  
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There is, nonetheless, a long-held tradition that policy prescriptions based on 
geographical location are misguided.  On one hand, sociologists like Peter Townsend 
– whose work is based on location – do not prescribe policies based on geographical 
location because they understand that geographical inequalities are a structural feature 
of capitalism (Glennerster et al. 1999).  On the other hand, free-market economists 
argue that poorer areas will eventually be integrated to the economy – they are best 
left to themselves (Nord et al. 1995).  
The international development response of institutions like the World Bank 
subscribes to the latter view.  Although the 2000-1 World Development Report 
(WDR) recognised that “isolation and lack of education can create poverty traps that 
persist over generations”  (World Bank 2001b p.124), the 2009 WDR held that spatial 
disparities were inevitable, and advocated against geographical targeting and in 
favour of the concentration of production and economic integration.  As income rises, 
the World Bank argued, living standards and services within different geographical 
regions will slowly converge (2009c).  However, the 2005 WDR supported 
government intervention in basic aspects of the market such as infrastructure, 
property rights, taxation and some regulation (World Bank 2004b).  The problem 
with this minimal intervention argument is that, in my view, it gives rise to the 
question “What level of intervention is acceptable”?  If intervention is permissible, 
even of the most minimal kind, the case for no geographical intervention becomes 
weak.  
Although Townsend did not prescribe area-based policies, he did not dismiss them 
out of hand.  Glennerster et al. (1999 p.7) emphasised the word “cardinal” in 
Townsend’s comments: “an area strategy cannot be the cardinal means of dealing 
with poverty”.  There is, therefore, the possibility that area-based initiatives could 
minimise the concentration of those factors that cause and reinforce household and 
intra-regional inequalities and result in long-term poverty.   
The type and location of poverty are also concerns of rural development specialists.  
Proponents of the sustainable livelihoods approach suggest that exiting rural poverty 
can be done sustainably through access to various livelihood resources (natural, 
economic, human and social capitals and assets), using diversified livelihood 
strategies (agricultural intensification, migration, diversification), and by emphasising 
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civil society and stakeholder participation in policy outcomes (Bebbington 1999; 
Chambers & Conway 1991; Scoones 1998; Sen 2003; Thomson 2000).   
As well as the sustainable livelihoods approach, linkages between rural and urban 
areas can be explored as factors that either help or hinder rural poverty-reduction 
initiatives.  The interconnectedness of rural and urban locations, and the resulting 
flow of peoples, resources and services, create rural-urban processes that cannot be 
overlooked (Tacoli 1998,2007).  This may be especially important in rural remote 
areas (Bird et al. 2002). 
In the 1980s, Integrated Rural Development approaches, which addressed regional 
development for RRA, came to a halt.  After the 1990s the international rural 
development approach consisted of livelihood resources and strategies (Ellis & Biggs 
2001).  However, the potential of linkages and sustainable livelihoods approach were 
not fully explored.  As Bird et al. (2002 pp. 3, 48) argue, the focus on livelihoods 
development did not take into consideration the severe marginalisation of RRAs, and 
the result was a “widespread ‘policy failure’ in RRAs.”  
The rural poverty literature resonates with the chronic poverty literature on the issue 
of whether or not the international community is overlooking the other half of the 
poor, that is, the persistently poor living in rural areas.  Despite declining rural 
populations, 70% of the extreme poor are rural and a large proportion of them are 
children and women.  This situation in rural areas is very likely to remain even with 
urbanisation (IFAD 2010 p.16).  Forty per cent of the rural poor in developing 
countries live in remote areas or in areas with low economic potential (CPRC 2005 
p.28).  IFAD Rural Poverty Reports (IFAD 2001,2010)  have continuously shown the 
low levels of international support in agriculture and rural economies – international 
aid resources are not directed to where the majority of the extreme poor live and 
work.   
In this sub-section, I have demonstrated the importance of researching rural poverty 
and remoteness given its association with the type of poverty that is chronic, severe 
and persistent throughout generations.  By shifting attention to national policies and 
monitoring aggregate numbers, both international and national policies are failing to 
address chronic poverty and RRA (Bird et al. 2002).  Area-based analysis and 
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regional development initiatives are being given less emphasis, despite the growing 
evidence that geographical factors do influence, to a certain degree, households’ 
abilities to exit poverty.  In sum, the type of poverty and the type of place where the 
poor live matter.  
2.1.2 Brazilian debates and policies: poverty, persistent poverty and spatial 
dimensions 
 Poverty measurements in Brazil 
Studies on poverty in Brazil are primarily guided by availability of existing data.  As 
a consequence, as Osorio et al. (2011b p.18) state, “one should avoid dogmatic 
considerations about the numbers of poor and of extreme poor” in Brazil.    
From the 1970s to 1990s, researchers used the minimum wage as a poverty line proxy 
(Rocha 1996,1997).  However, the use of income indicators, such as the minimum 
wage, has several shortcomings, as Rocha (1996,2001) indicates: (i) per capita 
income does not show the effects of household economies of scale; (ii) minimum 
wages are lower than the cost of necessities; (iii) irregular indexation and the short 
Brazilian economic cycles have devalued the real value of the minimum wage; (iv) it 
does not take into consideration local variations in prices; and (v) it underestimates 
the urban poverty headcount and overestimates rural poverty.   
Other studies using different methods to calculate poverty have been conducted in 
Brazil, but the income threshold to measure poverty, based on the yearly National 
Household Surveys (PNAD – Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios), is still 
commonly used.  Although PNAD allows for a broader index of poverty than income, 
including household conditions, official population statistics are generally reported 
utilising the minimum wage.  Other proxies for poverty analyses are the eligibility 
thresholds for social assistance programmes like the BF and the Benefício de 
Prestação Continuada (BPC) – a social pension for the elderly and people with 
disabilities
9
 
10
.  Therefore, because calculations of poverty in Brazil vary, different 
studies may not be comparable. 
                                               
9 The BF poverty line is frequently updated. The eligibility for the BPC is one-quarter of the minimum 
wage per capita monthly family income.   
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 Poverty trends and policies  
Rocha’s study (2012 p.2) analysing long-term poverty rates from the 1970s to 2011 
shows that absolute poverty declined from 68.3% in 1970 to 20.1% in 2011 (Figure 
1)
11
.  Although the findings in the literature on poverty rates in the 1980s are mixed, 
there is a consensus that poverty rates declined from 1993 to 1995 due to 
macroeconomic stabilisation, and also from 2003 to 2010, the period analysed in this 
thesis.  
Figure 1: Poverty trends in Brazil, 1970-2011 
 
Source: Reprinted from Rocha (2012 p.3). 
 
Poverty in Brazil fell significantly from 2003 to 2010.  In 2003, Brazil had 12% of 
the population living on less than U$1.25 dollars/day; in 2008, this was down to 4.8% 
(IPEA & SIP/MP 2010 p.22)
12
.  This is a remarkable achievement.  Whatever the 
absolute numbers in any particular study, which are dependent upon the methodology 
used by researchers, poverty shows an overall reduction (IPEA 2011; Rocha 2012).  
The literature suggests that the important factors contributing to this reduction are 
                                                                                                                                      
10 The Chronic Poverty Report 2004-5 identifies two groups that generally experience chronic poverty 
– people with disabilities, and those who are able-bodied but who cannot escape from poverty due to 
lack of assets, unemployment (or under-employment) and/or discrimination.  The latter group is the 
focus of this thesis. 
11 Rocha’s studies are based on regionalised consumption poverty lines. 
12 Poverty calculated as a percentage of the population living with less than US$1.25 per day.  These 
calculations  exclude the rural population of the North of Brazil. 
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more rapid economic growth, greater employment and the impact of social protection 
policies.   
Economic growth, with an average of 4.2% per year during this period from 2003 to 
2010, contributed to an increase in formal employment.  During this period, there was 
an average of 1.6 million jobs created per year (Rocha 2012 p.15).   
The labour market is linked to demographic patterns that may also have contributed 
to the reduction of poverty and inequality, both before and during this period.  
Population aging, and changes in fertility and the resulting lower ratio of young 
dependents to working-age adults in a household, may have helped to reduce 
inequality within household groups in the same income bracket (Medeiros et al. 2006; 
Neri 2011; Schwartzman 2006).  However, recent studies show that even though there 
was an increase in average years of schooling for the working age population, and a 
reduction in illiteracy levels, these changes had little influence on inequality (Osorio 
et al. 2011b). 
The Brazilian Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA) (2011 p.5) has shown 
that there was a substantial change in the composition of income due to the policy of 
real value increases in the minimum wage.  Studies based on PNAD demonstrate the 
importance of real gains in the minimum wage for those in formal employment and 
for those receiving social assistance benefits (IPEA 2011; Osorio et al. 2011b; Rocha 
2012; Schwartzman 2006).  In 2009, it is highly unlikely that those households with 
one minimum wage would be in the extreme poor category, unless it had a large 
number of dependents (Osorio et al. 2011b). 
In addition to the role of the labour market (i.e. formal employment) in reducing 
poverty through the minimum wage (Rocha 2012; Schwartzman 2006), there is the 
importance of social assistance policies, mostly those tied to minimum wages (IPEA 
2011; Osorio et al. 2011b).  Medeiros et al. (2006) attribute 50% of the reduction in 
inequality between 2001 to 2004 to income derived from work, and 35% to non-work 
income.  Among the latter, 30% were public transfers: 16% received income from the 
BPC and social pensions, and 14% from the BF (p.52).     
Furthermore, by 2010 Brazil had seen an unprecedented reduction in inequality.  
Using PNADs, Neri (2011 p.43) calculated that the real incomes of the poorest 10% 
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grew by 69% from 2003 to 2009, whereas the top 10% saw their real incomes grow 
by just 12.8%.  From 1995-2004, the BPC and BF contributed 28% of the reduction 
of inequality (Soares et al. 2006 p.4).  Nonetheless, income inequality remains very 
high.  The fast rate of inequality reduction would need to continue for the next 20 
years, for the poorest two deciles of the population of Brazil to have an average 
income comparable to those living in countries with similar GDP per capita (p.20).  
Yet how are these advances in poverty reduction reflected in the regions?  How is 
rural poverty and persistent poverty being reduced? This is what I turn to next. 
 Regional poverty, rural poverty and persistent poverty 
The first and foremost issue we need to keep in mind is the following: 
Obviously, part of the extreme poor living in a situation of chronic poverty 
remained in it from 2004 to 2009.  However, the best estimates of the 
population in chronic poverty in Brazil are still very rough estimates due to 
the lack of panel data with national coverage and to the incomplete income 
information.  These shortcomings challenge the identification and the study of 
successful strategies to overcome poverty. (Osorio et al. 2011b p.19) 
 
The above extract highlights the challenges of studying chronic poverty in Brazil, due 
to lack of longitudinal datasets, as well as the importance of studying persistent 
poverty as this thesis proposes.  It also shows that no study has identified poverty 
dynamics in Brazil for rural or for remote areas.  The datasets are cross-sectional and 
unrepresentative of the population I address in this thesis; and the definition of rural 
areas used in my research differs from those used by Brazilian researchers
13
.  
Therefore, my research does not directly address the findings presented below; and 
these findings themselves may not necessarily be relevant for the analysis of 
persistent poverty in rural remote areas.   
There are two important debates on poverty in Brazil.  The first one is the importance 
of rural poverty, while the second relates to the geographical location of poverty.  
Although these themes overlap, it is important to keep in mind that neither all rural 
areas nor all remote areas have high poverty rates.   
Rocha (2012 p.9) claims that rural poverty is less important now that there are high 
rates of urbanisation and agricultural modernisation (1980 – 1993) and that, therefore, 
                                               
13 More details in the next chapter. 
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the debate should be about the urbanisation or peri-urbanisation of poverty.  The 
author also believes that problems of urban poverty are more complex than the 
problems of rural poverty, because metropolitan areas are where “violence, exclusion 
and lack of social cohesion are combined” (Rocha 2012 p.22).   
I disagree with Rocha on (i) the claim that rural poverty problems are less complex 
than urban problems, and (ii) the treatment of rural and urban poverty as binary 
variables, without considering their linkages.  This thesis shows the complexity of 
rural poverty and the need to link rural-urban analysis.   
In general, researchers tend to focus either on binary exclusive categories of rural and 
urban, or solely on urban themes.  This is partly a consequence of methodological 
issues in Brazilian surveys
14
, but it is also a result of what Veiga (2001) calls two 
serious mistakes in the Brazilian rural debate.  The first is the myth of Brazil’s speedy 
urbanisation.  Urban areas are defined by municipal law, which does not take into 
account population density.  The second is the idea that rural Brazil does not include 
services or industry, but only agriculture and livestock.  This results in data analysis 
divided by occupation that does not consider the multiple livelihood strategies for 
income diversification
15
 in the dynamic reality of rural space.   
Furthermore, there is conflicting evidence on rural poverty.  IFAD (2011 p.2) 
reported that Brazil has the “largest rural poor population in the western hemisphere”, 
and that northeast Brazil has the “single largest concentration of rural poverty in Latin 
America”.  According to IFAD, only 5% of the urban poor are facing extreme 
poverty, as opposed to the 25% of rural poor (p.3).  A World Bank study affirms that 
“contrary to popular opinion, poverty in Brazil is currently not an overwhelmingly 
urban phenomenon” (2003 p.8).  
However, some researchers have argued that there is a “rural bias” in the BF 
programme, which fails to take account of the fact that rural areas face a lower cost of 
living, and to adjust the eligibility/cut-off criteria for geographical price differences.  
                                               
14 PNADs only sampled the rural North in 2004. Other surveys, like the PME, are sampled only in 
metropolitan areas.  The introduction of the PNAD Contínua (2014) improves the precision of 
estimates in rural areas. 
15 In the Brazilian literature, this concept is referred as pluriatividade. 
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Analysing the 2009 PNAD, Higgins
16
 (2012 pp.103, 104,107) states that the decrease 
in poverty has been “substantially higher in Brazil’s most rural states”, and that the 
rural poor have a 31% chance of escaping poverty (while the urban poor only have a 
26% chance).  Thus, it may be the case that the “rural bias” of social transfers has 
significantly reduced poverty in rural areas.  
Analysis of the latest 2010 Census (MDS 2011 p.3) reveals a continuing trend of high 
poverty in rural areas
17
.  Although 46.7% of the extreme poor are rural as opposed to 
53.3% in urban areas, the former represent more than 25.5% of the rural population 
while the latter represent just 5.4% of the urban population.  On the basis of the 2009 
PNAD, researchers have concluded that small farming households are more 
represented in the extreme poverty category: they are 21% of the poor, but 36% of the 
extreme poor (IPEA 2011 p.13)
18
.  Osorio et al.(2011b p. 48) states that in 2009 97% 
of the extreme poor were working-age poor – either related to agriculture, or in 
precarious jobs or unemployed
18
.  
There are conflicting views about regional trends of poverty.  Although Rocha 
acknowledges that the North and Northeast concentrates large numbers of extreme 
poverty and deprivation, the author (2012 p.15) found that poverty was converging 
geographically in 2003: 22% rural areas, 20% urban non-metropolitan areas, and 27% 
metropolitan areas.  Neri (2011 p.15) demonstrated increases in income during the 
2003-2009 period, of 49% in rural areas, 26% in non-metropolitan areas and 16% in 
metropolitan areas.    
Osório et al. (2011b p.16) and the World Bank (2003), however, advise caution on 
the use of PNAD (as used by Rocha and Neri) for regional analysis or even macro-
regional analysis.  Even using PNAD, Osorio et al. found that little had changed in 
the spatial distribution of poverty during the 2003-2009 period.  They proposed that 
policy focus on small municipalities of the Northeast.  Small rural municipalities of 
                                               
16 Poverty is calculated based on the regionalised costs of food items to fulfil the minimum daily 
caloric intake plus non-food items (housing rental rates as proxy). 
17 The extreme poverty line was defined as R$70 per household monthly per capita in 2010 (or 
US$40.60 as of 04/01/2010).   For all calculations on exchange rates used in this thesis refer to 
BACEN (2014). 
18 The extreme poverty line was defined as R$67 per household monthly per capita in 2009 (or 
US$28.76 as of 02/01/2009).  
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the Northeast, like the ones I investigate, have a higher proportion of the extremely 
poor, and this is where extreme poverty in Brazil is located (p.39).   
Updated statistics on dimensions of poverty other than income, for example, reveal 
that, whereas 41% of the rural population (15 years old and older) were functionally 
illiterate in 2009, and 17% in urban areas; in the rural Northeast, 50% of the 
population were functionally illiterate (IBGE 2010b p.55).  Rural poverty is higher in 
the Northeast, concentrated among small farmers and located in remote areas (World 
Bank 2003).  Of those poor living in rural areas of the Northeast, 83.6% live in 
“remote, isolated, sparsely populated and low productivity areas” with little or no 
infrastructure (p.9).  Ferreira and Lanjouw (2001) show that the location of rural areas 
in relation to urban areas is an important factor determining earnings from rural 
nonfarm activity. 
In summary, this sub-section showed that despite the lack of consensus among 
Brazilian researchers about the importance of focusing on the study of rural poverty 
and despite the methodological difficulties of studying chronic and persistent poverty, 
the literature does suggest that persistent poverty in rural areas is concentrated in the 
Northeast, in small rural remote municipalities, and that location and linkages to 
urban municipalities are important sources for livelihood diversification.  
Consistently lower socio-economic indicators show that patterns of poverty are likely 
to have continued even during the recent period of economic growth, because of 
structural inequalities.  This Brazilian evidence, together with the overarching 
international literature on chronic poverty and the spatial dimensions of poverty, 
provides a strong enough basis to set as a valid premise the association between 
persistent poverty and poor rural remote areas.   
2.2 State practices: ethics and policies 
In this sub-section, I provide the background literature for state intervention in the 
form of social assistance to the poor, as well as the arguments for targeting or 
universality in granting benefits, and for making transfers conditional or 
unconditional.   
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2.2.1 Market and State: Ethics for assisting the poor and policy implications 
 Ethics for assisting the poor and policy implications 
Although some of the reasons for assisting the poor may reside in the realm of 
individual ethics – i.e. moral obligations in terms of positive or negative duties19 – I 
focus the analysis on the role of state intervention in issues of poverty, redistribution 
and social justice, following the social contract tradition.   
On one side of the debate, there are those that propose a minimal state and no 
involvement in redistribution
20
.  Free-market economists claim that neither the state 
nor individuals would understand the complexity of the economy, and that therefore, 
markets are the most efficient mechanism to reach equilibrium (Chang 2014).  Hayek, 
for example, is critical of the Welfare State in its quest to redistribute wealth and 
achieve equality and social justice.  He believed that this could only be achieved 
through coercion of individual freedoms, and would result in inflationary policies, 
loss of self-confidence, dependence, and the totalitarian state.  For Hayek, state 
involvement should be kept to a minimum (Hayek 1944; Miller 2010 p.29).   
In terms of social policy, the minimal state is captured by Titmuss’ “Residual Welfare 
Model” (1974).  In this model, the role of the state is to meet the needs of that part of 
the population who have been failed by the market and the family, but only 
temporarily.  This residual model, which lies behind targeted poverty policies, has 
links with the sociological literature on concepts of an underclass and a culture of 
poverty, which argues that the causes of poverty are behavioural. 
The underclass are the able-bodied who are persistently poor.  They are prone to 
break the rules and social norms that guide society – i.e. teenage pregnancies, 
unmarried childbearing, illiterates, joblessness, criminals and drug users (Sawhill 
1989).  For Lewis (Lewis 1998; Mead 2003), the poor who share the “culture of 
poverty” have “feeling[s] of marginality, of helplessness, of dependence, of not 
                                               
19 Positive duty refers to the individual duty to improve the welfare of others that are in need; negative 
duty refers to the obligation not to cause harm to others or to reduce the harmful effects of our actions 
on others.  For a discussion on ethics for social assistance, see Barrientos (2013b).  
20 Theoretically there are two extreme positions in this debate – absolute free-market on the one hand, 
and the abolition of markets on the other. In practice, however, what happens is an interplay of state 
and market in between these two extremist positions. 
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belonging” (Lewis 1998 p.1).  They live for the present and indulge their impulses.  
There is a duality of poor versus non-poor, us versus them, deserving versus 
undeserving.  The deserving poor are associated with the conditionalities debate, 
discussed in sub-section 2.2.2.   
In terms of international development, the Reagan-Thatcher era promoted the idea of 
minimal state involvement and the rise of neoliberalism, with the primacy of markets, 
privatisation and liberalisation supported Structural Adjustment Loans.  The low 
growth rates in developing countries during this period, together with the impact of 
structural adjustment loans on education and poverty indicators, have made some 
specialists question these policies (Chang & Grabel 2004 p.17; Cornia et al. 1987).  
From the mid-1990s onwards, the state addressed concerns of poverty reduction via 
targeted social safety nets (discussed in section 2.3).     
On the other side of the debate are those who favour the State’s participation in the 
economy.  Townsend (2004) attributes to Keynesianism the increase in acceptance of 
the establishment of the Welfare State in Europe.   Pressman (1991), reviewing 
Keynes’ writings on issues around poverty, says that Keynes was sceptical that gains 
from growth would reach those at low-income levels without intervention.  Keynes 
advocated redistributive fiscal and monetary policies, but he was also aware of the 
potential adverse impact this could have on incentives to invest and work.  Keynes 
justified redistribution on the basis of the higher marginal propensity to consume of 
lower-income families, which would increase effective demand, resulting in greater 
growth.   
Titmuss (1974,1987) differentiated social policy objectives from economic 
objectives.  Social services are not aimed to “make profit or to administer prices”, but 
to address areas that the market and family cannot or will not address (1974 p.51).  
Here, policy outcomes are less susceptible to being measured by numbers or 
efficiency concepts than the private sector.  Titmuss makes the case that the principles 
that guide markets (consumerism, affluence, efficiency) are inherently different from 
those that should guide state intervention in the quest for social justice.   
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For Titmuss (1974), the residual welfare state model would create and reinforce 
divisions in society and the stigmatisation
21
 of certain groups.  He suggests as an 
alternative an “Institutional Redistributive Model”22.  In this model, social policies 
are based on needs.  They are universal, equally available to those who work and 
those who don’t, to the poor and to those who have money.  For that reason, they are 
less invasive and less subject to judgements, such as the “deserving” poor, than 
targeted forms of social assistance.   
Some influence of Keynesianism could be observed in economic policies after the 
global financial crisis.  The use of domestic spending to curtail the effects of the 
global financial crisis in the United States by President Obama is one example.  In 
Brazil, the 1988 Citizen Constitution with a rights-based framework (further 
discussed in section 2.3), is another example of support for State spending in a 
universal system of welfare.   
 Common ground: prioritising social policies for the persistently poor 
Since this thesis analyses the persistently poor, it is important to outline the 
prioritisation argument.  I investigate the persistently poor with the understanding that 
targeted programmes, like the Bolsa Família, should efficiently reach the worst off.  
However, it is not my intention to claim that state assistance, therefore, should only 
be targeted to the persistently poor.  
For very different reasons and with opposite policy prescriptions, it is interesting to 
note that state assistance to the neediest is something pro-market and pro-state 
adherents have in common.  One reason for this is that social assistance to the poorest 
reinforces the social contract between State and citizens.   
Hayek argued that a safety net was necessary to prevent the undesirable outcome of 
people falling below certain levels, but that this minimum should not come with a 
sense of entitlement.  He understood that this would require some redistribution, but it 
                                               
21 Titmuss (1974 p.43) defined stigma as “an imputation attaching to a person’s reputation or standing.  
(…) to describe him or his behaviour in culturally offensive or unacceptable terms, for example as a 
coward, a layabout, a racist, (..), a failure…”. 
22 Titmuss (1974 p.31) cites another model called “The Industrial Achievement-Performance Model of 
Social Policy”. However, this model, along with other classifications by other social policy specialists 
(e.g. Esping-Andersen’s), are not relevant to this thesis. 
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would be with the aim of protecting the majority of the population “against the 
consequences of the extreme misery of their fellows” (Miller 2010 p.150). 
For Titmuss (1987), selective policies, based on needs, could coexist with universal 
policies.  But targeting only the extreme poor would hide structural systemic factors 
that perpetuate poverty, such as inequality, social injustice and exclusion.  Selected 
policies, therefore, should not rely on individual means testing but on other less 
stigmatising factors and promote social cohesion instead of social division.   
From recognition that the persistently poor should be assisted, it does not follow that 
the poorest should be prioritised.  Scarce resources could be allocated to the average 
utility of society – the classic utilitarianism.  So what are the bases for the 
prioritisation of the persistently poor in targeted benefits?  Considering limited 
budgets and mutually exclusive choices, should preference be given to the 
persistently poor who live in rural remote areas of Brazil, where the incidence of 
poverty is higher? Or to the urban poor in Brazil, whose numbers are greater?   
Reducing the numbers of the poor by the most effective intervention is a desirable 
end.  Sidgwick (2000 p.256) says that utilitarianism aims to produce the “greatest 
surplus of pleasure over pain”, or the net balance of satisfaction.   Utilitarian 
calculations, therefore, treat all satisfactions as comparable, and quantify them using a 
single preference scale for the whole society.  Such comparability (or impartiality) 
has historically had an element of egalitarianism, as “to count everyone’s happiness 
equally was to prioritize the interests of the majority, who were disadvantaged 
relative to a wealthy minority” (Jackson 2004 p.522).  However, everyone’s 
satisfaction counts as the same: the satisfaction the persistently poor get from eating 
to survive is the same as the satisfaction of the non-poor in purchasing a house.  Such 
impartiality can be harmful for social policies aimed to address the “lesser number”, 
i.e. the persistently poor.  
In addition, being the hardest-to-reach, the persistently poor would also be the most 
difficult to help, and the amount of resources poured into assisting them might take 
the calculation of utility towards excluding them.  This is part of the criticism against 
the MDGs raised by poverty specialists (Hulme & Shepherd 2003).  Although the 
authors do not bring the utilitarian rationale into this debate, the underlying logic is 
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easily observed in where international aid is directed (the “easy to assist poor”) 
(p.404).  
Rawls (1971) criticised the utilitarian calculus, as demonstrated by the opening quote 
of this chapter.  Utilitarianism treats society homogeneously in a quest for efficient 
administration.  Rawls proposed instead what he called the “difference principle”: 
differences in primary goods (rights, liberties, power, opportunities, income and 
wealth) are justifiable if they are for the greater benefit of the least advantaged 
members of society.  Rawls (p. 98) acknowledges some level of arbitrariness in 
determining the “least fortunate group”, but, as much as possible, the definition of the 
worst-off is appraised from a position of the equal citizenship of all (i.e. “the veil of 
ignorance”).  As such, the difference principle achieves some of the intent of the 
redress principle.   
Parfit (1997) explains the prioritisation of the worst-off based on deontological 
egalitarianism
23
.  According to deontological egalitarianism, inequality may not be 
bad in itself; it can be justified if it was previously agreed on and based on mutual 
benefit (contractarian).  However, this is not the case with the inequalities in the lives 
of the worst-off.  These are unjust because they violate the basic principles of the 
social contract.  Thus, assistance to the worst-off is justified.   
Barrientos (2010,2013b) brings this discussion to the poverty debate.  The priority 
view brings attention to poverty gaps, poverty dynamics and the worst-off  – 
understood as those “whose lives, taken as a whole, are worse than they might have 
been” (2010 pp. 10-11).   Poverty policy is, therefore, influenced by ethical 
assumptions.   
Policy decisions are based on utilitarian considerations more often than is 
acknowledged.  It is our role as social scientists to ask why this is the case.  Whilst 
targeted programmes, like the BF, should reach the worst-off, utilitarian calculations 
may result in the persistently poor being left out altogether.  After making the case for 
investigating the prioritisation of the persistently poor in the BF, we are left with the 
following debates: universal or targeted benefits? Conditional or unconditional?   
                                               
23 Parfit(1997 p.213) says that utilitarians would give priority to the worst-off as they are “likely to be 
easier to help”.  This, however, may not be the case for the chronic poor living in areas without 
services, roads or other types of infrastructure. 
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2.2.2 Targeted and conditional? 
 Universal versus selective benefits 
Although this debate is often seen to involve opposite philosophical grounds, social 
policies in general all require a degree of targeting
24
 (Atkinson 1993 pp.2-3).  Even 
universal benefits, like child allowance for example, are categorical to families with 
children.  Moreover, policy regimes are often a mix of both systems, even when the 
dominant tendency is towards targeted policies (Mkandawire 2005). 
Universalist principles are based on human rights (natural or defined by international 
law) and on human needs.  For legalists, all humans are equals, so their rights are 
universal, i.e. the same for everyone.  Human rights are inalienable and exist in all 
countries, regardless of their positive law.  The United Nations Declaration of Human 
Rights, along with other human rights legislation, legally binds the state to its 
citizens.  For the proponents of needs, humans have common needs that must be met 
in order to function as a moral agent (Munro 2010).  Doyal and Gough (1986), for 
example, identified the universality of needs related to health and autonomy that must 
be universally met.  
However, there are also human needs behind targeted social policies (Munro 2010).  
Selective interventions are targeted to those whose needs are not met by the market, 
the family or another sector.  Social protection aims to reduce risks.  The risk 
literature acknowledges imperfect information, market failures, externalities and other 
factors that would not allow for market insurance to operate.   
Proponents of universal policies argue that there are moral, economic, political and 
social justifications to implement universal programmes (Boston & St John 1999).  
Universal policies reduce the differentiation of services between those who can and 
who cannot pay.  They are based on rights and needs not on means.   
The use of means testing in selective policies raises fundamental moral issues 
(Titmuss 1987).  For example, decisions on how to compare different family 
                                               
24 Some literature considers targeting and conditionality terminologies interchangeable.  Targeted 
benefits are conditional on meeting criteria (income, age group, existence of children).  However, in 
this thesis, “conditional” benefits means transfers that are given only if the beneficiary engages in 
certain prescribed behaviours. 
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compositions, what to include in the test of means, the arbitrariness in establishing the 
income threshold, the support or penalisation of carers or of women in childbearing 
age - all of those decisions involve equity and moral values.  Universal policies are, 
therefore, less paternalistic and intrusive.  
Advocates of universal policies claim that they have better resource allocation than 
targeted policies (Boston & St John 1999; Townsend 2004).  They are not as complex 
or as administratively expensive to run.  Without the use of means-testing, universal 
policies reduce significantly type I or type II errors.  Type I errors occur when truly 
eligible individuals have their claim rejected due to errors in the process.  Type II 
error occurs when ineligible individuals apply for the benefit and have their claim 
accepted.  These errors generate incomplete take-up and poor coverage.   
Furthermore, universal policies do not carry negative work economic incentives or 
discourage savings (Townsend 2004,2007).  Targeted subsidies influence people’s 
economic behaviour, generating incentive distortions (Sen 1995).  Beneficiaries may 
be able to adjust their economic circumstances by taking less employment to avoid 
losing the benefit, resulting in economic and social costs.   
Universal policies are politically sustainable and socially integrative.  Given that they 
benefit a wider population base than selective policies, taxpayers finance programmes 
that they may have or will have benefitted from, promoting social solidarity and 
cohesion.   
Proponents of selective policies, in their turn, argue that targeted policies are 
efficient, equitable, have lower fiscal costs and promote altruism (Boston & St John 
1999).  With governments’ scarcity of resources and fiscal constraints, the lower 
amount of resources should be efficiently allocated to those in greatest needs.  Often, 
proponents argue that selective policies can enable governments to transfer to those in 
highest needs higher levels of support.  Thus, the wide base of beneficiaries makes 
universal policies inequitable, as they equally treat the poor and the non-poor.   
Universalists question the assumption that selective policies easily reach those in 
greatest needs (Standing 2007) and generate higher levels or quality of support (Sen 
1995).  Problems with the administration of benefits and means-testing as well as the 
additional costs to run the system have an impact on coverage, take-up and benefit 
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levels.  Furthermore, targeted programmes are more easily subjected to budgetary 
cuts and political interference than programmes that also benefit the middle-class 
(Skocpol 1991). 
Advocates for targeting emphasise that these policies contribute to altruism, charity 
and philanthropy in society.  Private charities can combine assistance with socially 
accepted behaviours.  They work with the “deserving poor”.  The government 
continues to have an important paternalistic role to play (Mead 1997).  The 
government has the power to withdraw benefits, to put into effect conditions or 
requirements specific to groups, and to enforce basic agreements of the social 
contract in the sphere of rights and responsibilities. 
In addition, universal programmes are inefficient and have a regressive redistributive 
impact (Boston & St John 1999).  Targeted policies are more efficient because they 
contribute more to economic growth by freeing up public expenditure and taxation 
that could increase profitability, innovation and private savings and reduce the 
dependency on the state.  Targeted policies are progressive as benefits are directed to 
the poor.  Conversely, the wide base of beneficiaries results in “middle-class 
capture”, or a high proportion of beneficiaries from the middle-class.   
However, universalists counter-argue that the redistribution assessment depends on 
how tax revenue would have been spent otherwise and on how much social assistance 
received is in relation to household income (Boston & St John 1999).  Undoubtedly, 
social assistance represents a higher proportion of the poor’s income than the rich’s 
although they may be eligible for the same amount of assistance.  Furthermore, 
vertical redistribution is not the only goal of the welfare state.  There is also 
horizontal redistribution (e.g. from employed to unemployed; from those without 
children to those with children) or non-redistributive goals, like social solidarity, 
wellbeing and social cohesion. 
Proponents of universalism have suggested that the more benefits are efficiently 
targeted, the less likely it is that poverty and inequality will be reduced - “the paradox 
of redistribution” (Korpi & Palme 1998).  Sen (1995 p.14) famously wrote that 
“Benefits meant exclusively for the poor often end up being poor benefits”; the poor 
are too politically weak to sustain quality of services.   
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However, the inverse relationship between targeting and redistribution, as claimed by 
the paradox of redistribution, has been contested more recently (Hills 2014).  Marx et 
al. (2013), using data from the Luxembourg Income Study, found that there is no 
clear relationship between targeting and redistribution for the mid-2000.  The authors 
attribute this to shifts in the countries’ positions towards universal or targeted 
policies, and the inclusion of new data points (i.e. new countries).  It is higher social 
spending that seems to influence whether targeting is associated with higher 
redistribution or not. 
Other researchers have empirically demonstrated the association between high levels 
of social expenditure and lower levels of poverty in OECD countries (Cantillon 2009; 
Townsend 2007).  Furthermore, as Cantillon suggests, it is unproven that reductions 
in government social spending can be compensated for by economic growth and 
higher levels of employment.   
Nonetheless, targeted interventions in both developed and developing countries came 
to dominate in the 1980s.  This shift to targeting reveals the “crisis of universalism” 
due to several reasons (Mkandawire 2005).   Aside from the growing support of free-
market economics, as discussed previously, other reasons are: critiques of the state’s 
capacity to redistribute; limited fiscal resources; and changes in the aid discourse for 
poverty reduction.    
Moreover, targeting specialists point to the growing body of evidence on the benefits 
of selected interventions in developing countries (Fiszbein & Schady 2009; Grosh et 
al. 2008).  The benefits of these interventions include poverty reduction, increases in 
the numbers and proportions of those targeted, and improvement in school and health 
outcomes – all with low stigma and within the limits of states’ budgets.   
However, the welfare state has many goals, and hence it is necessary that objectives 
in social protection policies are clearly identified (Atkinson 1993).  Often individual 
social policies themselves have multiple objectives.  Some of these may require 
targeted interventions; others may require a broad universal frame.   
Based on the discussion above, the current status of the debate is in favour of what 
Bird et al. (2010a) propose: a mix of targeted and universal policies, including macro 
and sectoral strategies.  Targeted policies would address specific household needs and 
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universal policies would attempt to address structural factors that contribute to high 
poverty rates, such as services, infrastructure, etc.  Universal policies also address 
broader goals of nation-building and the transfer of goods, services and ideas 
(Townsend 2007).  
 Conditional versus unconditional transfers 
Behavioural conditionalities have the underlying assumption that the reason 
individuals are in poverty is because of their actions or inactions (“underclass” and 
“culture of poverty”).  Thus, cash transfers dependent upon carrying out prescribed 
behaviour (“conditions”) are intended to lead them towards exiting poverty.   
Arguments in favour of conditional transfers can be grouped on social, economic, 
political and operational reasons.  Arguments based on social reasons tend to 
emphasise the nature of the social contract.  As part of a social contract, state and 
beneficiaries have “mutual obligations”, they are partners with “co-responsibilities”.  
Both terms used in exchange for conditionalities.  Understood as a co-share of duties 
and obligations, the benefit, therefore, is not framed as a handout or entitlement and 
the state is not perceived as a “nanny state” (Fiszbein & Schady 2009).  As Sawhill 
(1989 p.5) puts it “If they are poor despite having abided by the rules, society is much 
more likely to come to their rescue”.  In other words, assistance is more likely to be 
given to those who abide by social norms.     
The economic reasons in favour to the use of conditionalities relate to how 
conditionalities build on human capital breaking the intergenerational transmission of 
poverty.  Conditionalities act as economic incentives to address low levels of private 
investment in human capital.  The reasons why children may have lower private 
investment in human capital relates to (i) perceived lower rates of return (“misguided 
beliefs”), i.e. beliefs that the returns to education are lower than they actually are; and 
(ii) parents making decisions for their children and heavily discounting the future 
demanding less education than the children’s optimal (“incomplete altruism”) 
(Fiszbein & Schady 2009 p.9).  The long-term effects of a healthier and more 
educated work force are economic growth and poverty reduction.   
Conditional transfers contribute to intra-household efficiency gains.  Transfers to the 
female household heads empower females in the intra-household decision making and 
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help them to efficiently balance family budgets (Britto 2008; Cedeplar & SAGI 
2007). 
Conditional transfers also make the implementation of benefits politically feasible.  
Taxpayers are more willing to pay for programmes to assist the poor if payment is 
conditional upon approved behaviour (Britto 2008; Fiszbein & Schady 2009).  
Politicians are able to win votes both from the poor who now have a benefit and from 
conservative sectors of society who perceive this policy as a quid pro quo.  
Furthermore, introducing new programmes may be easier than reforming old supply-
side programmes (Britto 2008). 
Operationally, it can be argued that conditional transfers can improve service take-up 
(i.e. increased participation of children in schools and health centres) and social 
assistance intermediation (e.g. social workers coordinating policies to answer a 
particular family need) (Barrientos 2013b; Bastagli 2009; Britto 2008; Lindert et al. 
2007).  They can also act as red flags, triggering the possible use of additional public 
services, thus leading to agency coordination. 
As for international development agencies, conditionalities provide a framework for 
monitoring outputs and poverty reduction.  Monitoring school attendance and 
vaccinations, for example, are quick ways of ensuring that aid is disbursed efficiently 
and targeted to the vulnerable (Hall in press).  
Critics of conditionalities advocate unconditional transfers.  The preference for 
unconditional transfers unifies liberals and egalitarians, but with diverging arguments.  
As Mead (1997 p.23) states, conditional policies, which he sees as part of a “new 
paternalism”25, question the “competence assumption” of “individual efficacy” 
whereby people are left to make their own choices.   
Egalitarians argue that conditions are discriminatory as they apply only to those who 
receive transfers (Hanlon et al. 2010).  Conditionalities create a dual society and have 
the potential to reinforce poverty, segregation and inequality.  The poor, whom 
conditionalities are imposed upon, have a different set of rights and responsibilities 
                                               
25 This new paternalism differs from the “old” because (i) it is more linked to welfare-to-work with 
tighter means testing and behavioural conditionalities, and (ii) it is central government-led.  The 
conditions are federally-controlled, based on automated services, efficiency and evaluation techniques.  
See Mead (1997). 
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than the majority of the population.  They are regarded, therefore, as second-class 
citizens.  Townsend (2007 p.ix) points out that punitive social assistance is “counter-
productive for social cohesion”, also impacting on well-being and productivity”. 
Hall (2006) and Barrientos (2013b) highlight the need to focus on the supply-side 
reforms.  Monitoring school attendance, for example, diverts attention away from 
long-term structural social reforms, which relates to access, quality and availability of 
services to an acceptable level.  In addition, some of the administrative costs to 
implement conditionalities are too heavy for some developing countries and there is 
often limited implementation capacity (Britto 2008; Schubert & Slater 2006). 
Altman (2005) makes the case that conditionalities disregard other forms of cultural 
goods in communities, such as customary goods and services which are not usually 
commercialised.  Altman proposes a model to reconcile customary, state and market 
sectors in Australian indigenous societies (i.e. the “hybrid economy”).  
Conditionalities imposed on individuals do not capture the complexity of one’s 
relationships in a broader cultural role in society.  
Molyneux (2007)  questions the assumptions that conditional cash transfers empower 
female household heads, as they are the kinds of conditions that reinforce women’s 
traditional caring roles.  These traditional roles sit in a space where “disempowering 
gender asymmetries are reproduced” ( p.72).  Furthermore, the empowerment 
provided by being the recipient of the income disregards women’s vulnerabilities and 
their own needs to exit poverty.  Long-term insecurity, lack of support for care and 
weak market links are poorly incorporated (if incorporated at all) on the design of the 
programme.  
Lastly, there is evidence that unconditional transfers have also improved school 
enrolment, school attendance, benefit take-up, health and nutrition status of girls as 
well as reduced child labour (Case et al. 2005; Duflo 2003; Edmonds 2006).  In other 
words, conditionalities are not necessary to build on human capital.  The poor make 
sensible decisions with unconditional transfers (Hanlon et al. 2010).  The probability 
of living in poverty is more directly related to structural inequalities than to agency 
and behaviour.  
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However, targeted benefits are increasingly being used, and so are conditionalities, 
which are on the rise in both developing and developed countries (Fiszbein & Schady 
2009; Gregg 2008).  But what do evaluations of conditional transfers say? 
Fiszbein and Schady (2009) reviewed the evidence of CCTs and concluded that they 
had a positive impact on household consumption, income poverty, food consumption, 
reduction of child labour, school enrolment rates and the use of health services.  They 
were also found to have small effects in reducing fertility, and a modest effect on 
labour participation.  These results were compatible with another CCT review 
conducted by Grosh et al.(2008). 
The World Bank conducted another review of 123 cash transfers (conditional and 
unconditional) and reported that CCTs were found to have improved per capita 
consumption by between 7% and 29%, and to have had an impact on children’s 
enrolment of between 0.6% and 12.8% (Garcia & Moore 2012 pp.155, 156).  
Although the World Bank report highlights the positive impacts of CCTs, it also says 
that “most studies have been inconclusive on the exact effects of conditions” (p.115).  
The only study cited that analyses this difference in the African context (see next 
bullet point) raises questions about the trade-off between conditional and 
unconditional transfers, the report says.  It also expresses doubt about the replicability 
of the experiment.  
 A randomised control trial
26
 in Malawi (Baird et al. 2011) found that both CCTs and 
unconditional cash transfers (UCTs) reduced dropout rates, but UCTs’ effect is 43% 
as large as that of CCTs.  CCTs also showed a modest but significant advantage on 
learning outcomes.  However, UCTs resulted in lower teenage pregnancy and 
marriage rates than CCTs.  The likelihood of being pregnant or married were 27% 
and 44% lower in UCTs than in the control group, whereas the CCT group showed 
small and statistically insignificant impacts.  “Hence, the success of conditionality in 
promoting the formation of human capital among the compliers appears to be 
achieved at the cost of denying transfers to noncompliers who are shown to be 
particularly at risk for early marriage and teenage pregnancy” (p.5). 
                                               
26 In the experiment, 176 enumeration areas (comprising of approximately 250 households) were 
randomly assigned treatment (cash transfers) and control (no transfer).  Of the treatment group 88 were 
assigned transfers conditional on attending school, while another group had unconditional transfers. 
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A systematic review of reports on conditional and unconditional cash transfers was 
carried out to assess the relative effectiveness of conditionalities in educational 
outcomes in developing countries (Baird et al. 2013)
27
.  The review showed that both 
conditional and unconditional cash transfers improved the odds of children being in 
school.  The authors did not find any significant differences between conditional and 
unconditional transfers.  The effect sizes on test scores were small but on school 
enrolment, conditional transfers had larger effects than unconditional transfers.   
There is a growing consensus that middle-income countries have the administrative 
capacity and the broad supporting systems to implement conditional transfers, but 
that low-income countries are moving towards unconditional or soft/flexible
28
 
transfers (Baird et al. 2013; Garcia & Moore 2012; Schubert & Slater 2006).   
Researchers have, nonetheless, identified limitations of CCTs – they are not adequate 
for every household, and they require an adequate supply of services and additional 
social protection programmes to address other vulnerabilities (Fiszbein & Schady 
2009; Garcia & Moore 2012; Schubert & Slater 2006).  The reviews identified some 
knowledge gaps in relation to limited implementation capacity, long-term outcomes, 
cost assessments and, most importantly, on the use of conditions per se (Baird et al. 
2013; Garcia & Moore 2012).  Thus, evidence suggests positive results, but it fails to 
make a conclusive case for targeting and conditionality. 
2.3 The Bolsa Família Programme 
 
2.3.1 Conditional cash transfers in Latin America: international development 
strategies 
Developing countries have increasingly been turning to social assistance (Barrientos 
2013b)
29
.  Poverty reduction, once considered a by-product of growth, started to be 
                                               
27 The sample included 75 reports, with data from 35 studies (5 unconditional, 26 conditionals and 4 
studies that directly compared conditional with unconditional), utilising quasi-experimental designs or 
randomised control trials.   
28 “Soft” conditions are those that, if unmet, do not result in automatic cancellation; “flexible” 
conditions are those implemented on specific locations or households or that are not closely monitored. 
See Garcia and Moore (2012). 
29 Social assistance is defined as “means-tested social security programmes designed to target benefits 
to poor people”, and social insurance involves “contributory social security programmes that pool 
resources to provide benefits when needed” (2004 pp.xiii, xiv). 
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addressed with social assistance policies, mainly as a result of the realisation that 
social insurance would not address the challenges introduced by the 1980s labour 
market flexibilisation.   
However, there is a historical link between social assistance with assistencialismo
30
, 
rendering past experiences with social assistance programmes small, residual and 
highly clientelistic.  In Latin America, there was a “perverse coalition between 
paternalism and policies based on populism”, which has resulted in current social 
assistance policies still having a symbolic dimension of the compassionate paternal 
statesman helping the poor (Sposati 2007 p.438).  This is one of the challenges in 
moving the understanding of social assistance towards a citizen, rights-based 
framework. 
With such background in assistencialismo, it is no wonder that Latin America 
embraced the CCT wave.  Conditionalities reaffirm the poor’s responsibility to 
actively engage in behaviours that would lift them out of poverty, reducing the 
importance of the paternal statesman and the poor’s long-term dependence on the 
state.  The poor is categorised as deserving or undeserving to be assisted.  CCTs’ 
rationale, therefore, places social assistance even further away from an unconditional 
rights-based entitlement.   
During the last decade, the innovative approach of CCTs slowly attracted the 
attention of international donors through low budget programmes
31
 targeted to the 
education and health outcomes of poor households.  These programmes moved from 
“home grown” CCT initiatives in Brazil and Mexico in the mid-1990s (Britto 2008), 
to 27 countries in 2008, reaching 53 countries in 2013 (World Bank 2014 p.xiii).  The 
lending capacity of the World Bank, international implementation expertise, and 
intellectual research expertise, all played an important part in the global expansion of 
CCTs (Hall in press). 
In 2001, the original World Bank strategy for Social Protection and Labour was still 
recommending vouchers rather than cash handouts (World Bank 2001a p.v)
32
.  This 
                                               
30 Clientelistic political practices to influence electoral outcomes. 
31 Social safety nets averaged around 1.6% of GDP worldwide in 2014. See World Bank (2014 p. xiv). 
32 The World Bank uses “social safety net” and social assistance interchangeably. See Grosh et al. 
(2008 p.4). 
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strategy introduced the Social Risk Management Framework into poverty analysis.  
Safety nets were to be put in place to cope with shocks and to form and strengthen 
human capital so that the poor could improve their capacity to manage risks (or 
shocks), thus breaking the inter-generational transmission of poverty.  This 
Framework was intended to provide people with springboards enabling them to move 
to activities with higher returns.   
In its review of social protection and labour from 2000 to 2008, the World Bank 
(2009b) traced its movement from vouchers to conditional cash transfers.  During this 
period, safety nets grew in importance within the Bank’s Social Protection and 
Labour lending, rising from 23% in 2002 to 42% in 2007 (p.8).  In 2009, the Bank 
released a review focused exclusively on CCTs, because of their overall positive 
impacts on poverty reduction (Fiszbein & Schady 2009).  In addition, as Hall 
highlights (2008,in press), CCTs appeal to both the Bank and governments because of 
their political benefits, quick disbursements, easily monitored policy outputs and 
available technical expertise.  They also shift the focus away from the structural 
causes of poverty and the requirement for long-term interventions.  Although the 
Bank has emphasised the productive role of safety nets, there is a contradiction 
between the low transfer benefit on the one hand, and on the other, the belief that 
these same benefits can be used as springboards for productive activities through 
investment in human capital. 
The Banks’ new strategy (2012-2022) shows a substantial shift in the discourse: 
Social Protection and Labour is “a central part of the Bank’s mission to reduce 
poverty through sustainable, inclusive growth” (World Bank 2012 p.xi - emphasis 
added).  It aims to integrate social protection portfolios by addressing persistent 
poverty and promoting resilience in the vulnerable.  The Bank aims to address equity 
through targeting, and to reduce poverty through productivity and job creation.  There 
are 870 million people in extreme poverty in low-income countries without social 
assistance (World Bank 2014).    
The rise of social assistance is not only about CCTs but also about unconditional cash 
transfers (Garcia & Moore 2012; Hanlon et al. 2010).  In addition, Hanlon et al. 
(2010 p.10) propose the idea that there is a “quiet revolution” from the South that 
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breaks the development paradigm by providing broad coverage cash transfers directly 
to the poor.   
2.3.2 Historical context of social assistance for the rural poor in Brazil 
Social movements in rural areas started to emerge in the 1950s
33
, focusing on the 
most crucial historical problem for the rural poor in Brazil: land redistribution.   
Brazil continues to be highly unequal in land distribution.  Based on the 2006 
Agricultural Census data, 84.4% of rural small farming agriculture establishments 
covered only 24.3% of occupied land (MDA 2009 p.3).  Nonetheless, small-farm 
agriculture is the main supplier of food staples to the domestic market, with 87% of 
manioc, 70% of beans, and 58% dairy products produced by small farmers (MDA 
2009 pp.7,8).  Small-farm agriculture employs 74.4% of agricultural workers and it 
has 89% higher productivity (gross production value per hectare) than non-small-
scale farming agriculture (MDA 2009 pp. 5, 11).   
Unequal land distribution is a result of the power historically held by landlords, and 
the basis for the national priority given to the extensive modern export-led 
agriculture.  The military regime (1964-1985) promoted what it called “conservative 
modernisation”.  In Brazil, this referred to the pact between national elites and large 
landowners to modernise agriculture while excluding those segments of the 
population without land, working rights or capital and with limited citizenship 
(Delgado & Schwarzer 2000; Ramos 2009).  Instead of redistributing the land, 
therefore, the government used social policies to compensate small farmers, thus 
avoiding disruption of the established order (Delgado & Schwarzer 2000). 
Social insurance policies for the rural poor started with the Prorural/Funrural 
(1963/1971) and the Renda Mensal Vitalícia (RMV - Lifelong Monthly Income, 
1974/5).  Prorural/Funrural was aimed at rural workers, fishermen and miners over 60 
(Delgado & Schwarzer 2000).  The RMV was aimed at people with disabilities and 
those above 70 who could not provide for themselves (Rocha 2013).  Both policies 
                                               
33 The Catholic Church played an important role in the foundation of the peasant societies (Ligas 
Camponesas) fighting for land reform.  The National Federation for Rural Workers (CONTAG) was 
created in 1963. The Rural Worker Statute (Estatuto do Trabalhador Rural) in 1963 was insufficient to 
establish social insurance and assistance for rural workers.  The Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem-
Terra (Landless Worker’s Movement) begun in 1985 and, today, it is one of the largest social 
movements in Latin America.  It continues the fight for land reform. See Delgado (2000). 
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required contributions, albeit small, and formal engagement in work.  Thus small 
farmers were residually covered, as the majority of them were not able to contribute 
to social insurance. 
Social movements continued to emerge and they were a fundamental influence 
underpinning the 1988 Constitution (da Silva et al. 2004).  The 1988 Constitution 
secures minimum guarantees based on a human rights framework.  By promoting 
universal rights, the constitution introduces the legal framework of inclusive social 
policies rooted in citizenship principles, reducing policies guided by paternalism and 
assistencialismo (IPEA 2006).  The constitution brought together social assistance, 
social insurance and health as the three pillars of the Brazilian social security system. 
The Constitution had important implications for social assistance policies for the rural 
poor.  It introduced a new rural pension (Previdência Rural Social) and repackaged 
the RMV as the Benefício de Prestação Continuada (BPC).  The rural social 
pension
34
 levelled up rural worker’s benefits to one based on the minimum wage, and 
women were also given access to pensions (Delgado & Schwarzer 2000).  The 1993 
Lei Orgânica da Assistência Social (LOAS) regulated the BPC, which only started to 
be implemented in 1996 (Delgado & Schwarzer 2000).   
However, there is a contradiction between the 1988 Constitution on the one hand, and 
on the other, the economic framework of minimal state intervention and maximum 
economic efficiency, prescribed during the neoliberal era of the 1980s (da Silva et al. 
2004).  This contradiction led researchers to say that social policies after the 
Constitution were a form of “restricted universalisation”: an increase in public 
provision of services combined with encouraging competition of private and non-
governmental services (IPEA 2006 p.8).  These policies were also characterised by 
devolution to local municipalities and targeting of the extreme poor (da Silva et al. 
2004).   
                                               
34 The contribution requirement to the Funrural/Prorural and the subsequent changes in the structure of 
rural pensions after the 1988 Constitution (Previdência Social Rural) incorporating them to the social 
protection system (Regime Geral de Previdência Social) led to some hesitation among scholars about 
whether to reclassify rural pensions as social pensions or social assistance benefits.  Legally and 
institutionally, these programmes are assigned to social security (previdência social- segurado 
especial) but in practice their benefits are mostly non-contributory.  See different opinions in 
Barrientos (2013a) and Rocha(2013). 
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2.3.3 Background of the Bolsa Família Programme 
It was in this contradictory context of fragile attempts to implement universal policies 
based on the 1988 Constitution within a neoliberal ethos, that debates about the right 
to a guaranteed minimum income and the targeting of conditional social policies to 
the poor happened.   
One important debate occurred between Senator Suplicy and the economist J. M. 
Camargo (Britto & Soares 2010; da Silva et al. 2004; Rocha 2013).  In 1991, Senator 
Suplicy proposed a bill in the Senate for a national minimum income, the Programa 
de Garantia de Renda Mínima
35
.  This project was based on a negative income tax 
transfer, and was intended to start with individuals of low income above the age of 
60.  Meanwhile, Camargo proposed an alternative cash transfer programme aimed at 
families with school-age children.  Camargo criticised Suplicy’s proposal for 
providing negative incentives to work, and for again leaving children unprotected by 
the social protection system.    
Camargo’s proposal of a targeted intervention, conditional on school attendance, 
along with Betinho’s campaign36 mobilising civil society on poverty issues, set the 
tone for a residualist social policy.  All the elements for the Bolsa Família (BF) as a 
CCT were present: the background of “restricted universalisation” policies; the need 
to address child poverty; the harmful legacy of assistencialismo resulting in a distrust 
of social assistance policies; and a society that emphasised local participation through 
campaigns and individual agency for exiting poverty, the co-responsibility 
requirement.  
The devolution of the 1988 Constitution allowed a period of “policy experimentation” 
(Fenwick 2013) and “municipal activism” (Barrientos 2013a).  In 1995, two 
minimum-income initiatives conditional on school attendance were introduced in 
Brazil: in Brasília and Campinas.  Both initiatives were aimed at families with 
school-age children, but they differed in their objectives.  In Brasília, the programme 
                                               
35 Minimum Income Guarantee Programme, Projeto de Lei da Câmara No.2561, 1992 (PLS80/91) was 
later approved as Basic Citizenship Income (Lei No.10.835, 08/01/2004).  It has not been implemented.  
36 The sociologist Herbert de Souza (Betinho) was a leader in the National Campaign of Citizens 
against Hunger, Misery and Pro-life (Campanha Nacional da Ação da Cidadania Contra a Fome, a 
Miséria e pela Vida) in the 1990s. 
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focused on school attendance, whereas in Campinas, the programme focused on the 
role of social assistance intermediation when children did not attend school (Rocha 
2013). 
In 1996, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso created the first federal CCT – the 
Child Labour Eradication Programme – PETI (Soares 2012a).  In 2001, President 
Cardoso nationalised the successful municipal initiatives under the name of Bolsa 
Escola (School Grant).  The President also created a Bolsa Alimentação (Food 
Grant), targeted at low-income pregnant women and mothers with children up 6 years 
of age.  In 2002, he created yet another cash transfer - the Auxílio Gás (Gas Grant), 
aimed to subsidise fuel expenses.  These programmes were part of the Social 
Protection Network (Rede de Proteção Social).  
In 2003, the newly elected President Lula created the Fome Zero – a set of policies 
with the aim of addressing hunger and fulfilling his electoral promise that no 
Brazilian should go without three meals a day
37
.  President Lula formally endorsed 
the “fight against poverty” as his social policy goal.  As part of the Fome Zero 
initiative, President Lula created the Cartão Alimentação (Food Card), another CCT 
aimed at families with income per capita below half of the minimum wage –the 
threshold of all the above CCTs.   
In October 2003, the Bolsa Família (BF) programme was created by Presidential 
Decree (Medida Provisória No. 132, de 20 de Outubro de 2003) and became law in 
2004 (Lei No. 10.836, de 9 de Janeiro de 2004).  It is an umbrella programme created 
to unify all the previous cash transfer programmes
38
.  This unification into a single 
programme under a single ministry, the MDS
39
, using the single registry Cadastro, 
was intended to reduce government costs.   
The BF sidelined the Fome Zero project and became the flagship social policy 
programme during the Lula administration.  This BF was implemented amidst the 
                                               
37 “So long as one of our Brazilian brothers or sisters is hungry, we can only be overwhelmed by 
shame … As I said in my first speech after the election, if, when I conclude my term of office, all 
Brazilians can have breakfast, lunch and supper, I will have fulfilled my mission in life.”  President 
Lula’s speech in 2003. 
38 PETI was only included as part of the Bolsa Família in 2005 (Portaria No. 666, de 28 de Dezembro 
de 2005). 
39 The Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome (Ministry of Social Development and 
the Fight against Hunger) was created in 2004 
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debates of minimum income as a constitutional right, advocated previously by 
Suplicy.  The BF was seen both as part of a residual social safety net, and as a very 
first step towards the consolidation of the Basic Citizenship Income Law (Lei 
No.10.835, 08/01/2004)
40
 (Britto & Soares 2010; da Silva et al. 2004).     
Two important innovations in the Bolsa Família departed from the previous CCTs 
(Rocha 2013).  The first was to divide beneficiaries into two poverty levels: 
extremely poor families with monthly household incomes of R$50 or less, and poor 
families with monthly incomes between R$50 and R$100
41
.  While these two poverty 
levels gave priority to larger households with children, they also allowed for small 
households in extreme poverty to be included in the programme independently of the 
numbers of children.  The second important difference was the use of an 
administrative poverty line, which meant there was no indexation of the poverty line 
with the minimum wage.   
In 2004, the World Bank released the report, “Rural poverty alleviation in Brazil: 
towards an integrated strategy”, signalling international concerns about rural poverty 
in Brazil.  In another technical document to the Government of Brazil, the Bank 
recommended that the registration of eligible beneficiaries in the Cadastro take into 
account the “different local realities reflecting urban vs. rural settings (including 
population and poverty density) and diverse cultural, ethnic and racial characteristics 
of the populations” (World Bank 2004a p.2).  However, despite these 
recommendations and the historic deprivations of the rural population, no evident 
changes were made in the design and implementation of the BF to address the rural 
poor specifically.   
2.3.4 The Bolsa Família: the programme, institutional arrangements and 
evaluations 
The BF is a non-contributory programme designed to provide monthly cash payments 
to targeted households whose per capita income is below an administrative poverty 
line.  The cash benefit requires households to fulfil obligations associated with 
education and health.  Families have to enrol for the programme at their local or 
                                               
40The Basic Citizenship Income Law, although approved, was never implemented. 
41 The thresholds of R$50 and R$100 are approximately equivalent to US$17.32 and US$ 34.65, as of 
02/01/2004. 
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mobile CRAS (Centro de Referência de Assistência Social – social assistance centre).  
Cadastro gathers information about all potentially eligible beneficiaries at the 
national level.  Families receive an electronic benefits card that they use to withdraw 
their benefits at a nearby bank or similar institutions (i.e. banking correspondents
42
).  
Benefits vary according to household income and composition.  In 2009, the benefit 
reached 22.2% of the population.  The programme costs less than 0.5% of Brazil’s 
GDP (Soares 2012a p.6). 
 The programme overview 
Article 4 of the Decreto No. 5.209, de 17 de Setembro de 2004 outlines the BF 
objectives, which are:   
(i) to promote access to public services, especially health, education and social 
assistance;  
(ii) to fight poverty and promote food and nutritional security;  
(iii) to stimulate sustained exit of families out of poverty and extreme poverty;  
(iv) to combat poverty; and, 
(v) to promote cross-sector links, complementarity and synergy of social 
actions from the public sector. 
The programme is intended to be a temporary measure to promote synergies between 
different sectors helping families to exit poverty.  Article 21 of the above Decreto 
states: “granting the Bolsa Família benefit is a temporary measure and it does not 
generate vested rights”.  This is further reinforced by Decree 6.392, de 12 de Março 
de 2008, which adds the need to review the family’s eligibility every two years.   
The above legislation shows the programme’s stated role as a safety net and a residual 
policy.  The practices in the last decade towards improving targeting, monitoring of 
conditionalities, and exiting through the labour market, mark a move away from an 
unconditional minimum income (Britto & Soares 2010).  However, the legislation 
does not set an upper time limit beyond which families are ineligible for staying in 
the programme.   
In addition to the two poverty levels, there are two benefits: a basic benefit for the 
extremely poor, and an additional variable benefit depending on the number of 
                                               
42 Banking correspondents are institutions (e.g. post offices and lottery agencies) authorised by the 
Brazilian Central Bank to provide financial services in areas where banking services are limited or 
non-existent. 
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children, up to a maximum of three benefits per family
43
.  In 2008, the programme 
included teenagers in the variable benefits, up to a maximum of two per family.  
Changes in the benefit amounts and eligibility thresholds from 2004 to 2010 are 
summarised below: 
  
                                               
43 In 2011, the number of child benefits was raised to five per family (Lei No.12.512, de 14 de Outubro 
de 2011). 
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Table 1: Eligibility and benefit levels, 2004 - 2010 
Legislation 
(minimum wage) 
Eligibility 
threshold 
Benefit levels 
Extreme 
poor 
Poor Basic 
benefit
(1)
 
Variable benefit 
(2)
 
Lei No. 10.836, 2004 
 
 
R$50 
(US$17.32) 
R$100 
(US$34.65) 
R$50 
(US$17.32) 
(*)R$15 – R$45  
(US$17.32–US$15.59) 
Decreto No. 5.749, 2006 
 
 
R$60 
(US$25.67) 
R$120 
(US$51.35) 
R$50 
(US$21.39) 
(*)R$15 – R$45 
(US$6.42–US$19.26) 
Decreto No. 6.157, 2007 
 
 
R$60 
(US$28.11) 
R$120 
(US$56.23) 
R$58 
(US$27.18) 
(*)R$18 – R$54  
(US$8.43–US$25.30) 
Lei No. 11.692, 2008 
 
 
R$60 
(US$33.86) 
R$120 
(US$67.71) 
 R$58 
(US$32.73) 
(*)R$18 – R$54  
(US$10.16 –US$30.47) 
 
(†)R$30 – R$60 
(US$16.93–US$33.86) 
 
 
Decreto No. 6.491, 2008 
 
 
R$60 R$120 R$62 
(US$34.98) 
(*)R$20 – R$60  
(US$11.29–US$33.86) 
 
(†)R$30 – R$60  
 
Decreto No. 6.917, 2009 
 
 
R$70 
(US$30.05) 
R$140 
(US$60.09) 
R$68 
(US$29.19) 
(*)R$22 – R$66 
(US$9.44–US$28.33)  
 
(†)R$33 – R$66  
(US$14.16–US$28.33) 
 
(1) Basic benefit, unconditional: given to households below the extreme poverty line.  
(2) Variable benefit, conditional, given to all households according to household composition and dependent on fulfilment of 
education and health conditionalities: (*) indicates benefits associated with children up to 15 years of age , maximum 3 benefits 
per household, and (†) indicates benefits associated with teenagers between 16-17 years, up to 2 benefits per household.   
Note: changes introduced by each legislation in blue; dollar values as of 02 January each year.  After 2009, there were an 
additional two updates on the benefit levels (see Decreto No. 7.494, 2011 and Decreto No. 8.232, 2014).  
Sources: legislation cited, dollar values from BACEN (2014). 
 
Table 2 shows that increases in benefit levels were in accordance with minimum 
wage increases, and that benefits were calculated as a (small) proportion of the 
minimum wage.  
  
 Page 64 of 356 
 
Table 2: BF benefit range, 2004 - 2010 
Legislation 
(minimum wage) 
Benefit range 
(% min. wage) 
Min = 1Basic benefit 
Max = 1Basic Benefit + 3/5
(1)
 Variable Benefit 
Lei No. 10.836, 2004 
 
(R$ 260) 
R$15 – R$95  
US$5.20 – US32.92 
 (6% - 37%) 
Decreto No. 5.749, 2006 
(R$ 350) 
US$6.42 –US$40.65 
(4% - 27%) 
Decreto No. 6.157, 2007 
 
(R$ 380) 
R$18 – R$112 
US$8.43 –US$52.48 
(5% - 29%) 
Lei No. 11.692, 2008 
 
(R$ 415) 
R$18 – R$172 
US$10.16 –US$97.05 
(4% - 41%)
(1)
 
Decreto No. 6.491, 2008 
 
(R$ 415) 
R$20 – R$182 
US$11.29–US$102.70 
(5% - 44%) 
Decreto No. 6.917, 2009 
 
(R$465) 
R$22 – R$200 
US$9.44–US$85.84 
(5% - 43%) 
(1)In 2008, the variable benefit included up to two benefits per households for teenagers.    
Source: legislation cited, dollar values from BACEN (2014). 
 
Conditionalities associated with the BF have also changed over the years, although 
slightly, as outlined in Table 3.  The basic benefit is unconditional, whereas the 
variable benefit is conditional.  Lack of compliance with conditionalities does not 
result in immediate cancellation of the benefit (“soft” conditionalities).  Families are 
warned and benefits are temporarily blocked or suspended prior to cancellation.   
Table 3: Conditionalities 
Legislation Education Health 
Lei No. 10.836, 2004  85% school 
attendance (6-15 
years old) 
 Pre-natal 
 Nutritional follow-up 
 Health follow-up (not detailed) 
Decreto No. 5.209, 2004  Same as above  Pre and Post-natal assistance 
 Vaccination 
 Food and nutritional follow-up 
of children up to 7 years old 
 Child development and growth 
Lei No. 11.692, 2008 
Decreto No. 6.917, 2009 
 
 Same as above 
 75% school 
attendance (16-17 
years old) 
 Same as above 
Source: legislation cited. 
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The objective related to beneficiaries exiting the programme (Art 4, iii, Decreto No. 
5.209) gave rise to a debate on terminology in Brazil.  The World Bank frames this as 
“graduation agenda” and “exit doors” (Lindert et al. 2007).  Although the Bank 
recognises the role of the social worker as a mediator, the Bank focuses on the ideas 
of “reducing welfare dependency” and promoting “empowerment” and 
“emancipation” (p.92).  The Government of Brazil prefers the terminology of 
“entrance doors”, either to the labour market or to other programmes (Programas 
complementares) (Soares 2012a p.14).  Both discourses, however, emphasise what 
individuals themselves can do to exit poverty, disregarding the structural causes of 
poverty.   
 Institutional framework and operationalisation 
The idea that the BF is a “unifying force for social policy in Brazil” is a powerful 
representation of the programme’s complexity (Lindert et al. 2007 p.7).  The BF 
unifies both vertically by bringing together different levels of the federation, and 
horizontally by bringing different ministries together.  Federal, State and Local 
(municipal) governments all have responsibilities, while ministries and secretariats of 
health, education and social assistance must contact each other to supply information 
on conditionalities.  
The core BF institutions, analysed in this thesis, are the MDS, CAIXA and local 
municipalities
44
.  The Cadastro links local with central government.  MDS has 
several secretariats involved in the BF.  There is SENARC
45
 that oversees the 
Cadastro and the overall implementation of the BF programme in relation to 
conditionalities, social control, complementary programmes, monitoring, and support 
to the municipalities.  SAGI
46
 is responsible for evaluations of the programme.  
CAIXA is a publicly owned savings bank.  It manages the Cadastro, assigns a unique 
Social Identification Number
47
 to beneficiaries, distributes electronic benefit cards, 
                                               
44 State governments have a role supporting municipalities with training and logistic support, including 
strategic support to issue identification documents (Portaria No. 360, 12/07/2005).  
45 SENARC (Secretaria Nacional de Renda da Cidadania) is the National Secretariat of Citizen 
Income.  Its name is a result of the historic debates on basic income, previously outlined. 
46 SAGI (Secretaria de Avaliação e Gestão da Informação) stands for Secretariat for Information 
Management and Evaluation. 
47 NIS – Número de Identificação Social. 
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and makes monthly payments to beneficiaries using its extensive network of banks 
and banking correspondents.   
Local municipalities are the main players for programme implementation.  They are 
responsible for the registration of beneficiaries, the Cadastro quality, and compliance 
with conditionalities.  Important local institutions that I will refer in this thesis are the 
CRAS, where beneficiaries register, and the ICS (social councils), civil society 
mechanisms that oversee the implementation.  These two institutions are important 
for identifying the persistently poor, who may be in remote villages.   
The operationalisation of the benefit is as follows.  Local municipalities register the 
families, who then must wait for their benefit.  They will be informed by CAIXA that 
they have been selected.  Households can also check their status at the local 
administration or by calling a federal 0800 number.  CAIXA issues the card to the 
household head, preferably the mother.  In most municipalities, the card is sent to the 
household postal address and takes 45 days to arrive.  Before the card arrives, the 
mother must present identification to the CAIXA cashier in order to withdraw the 
benefit.  In small municipalities, CAIXA sends the card to the local post office.  The 
family has 20 days to pick it up, otherwise, it is sent back to the nearest CAIXA.  
Upon the receipt of the benefits card, mothers can withdraw at CAIXA and at 
banking correspondents at any municipality.  In 2009, MDS took over some of these 
responsibilities from CAIXA, including the overall payment supervision (Decreto 
No.7013, 2009).  Also in 2009, financial inclusion policies were introduced, which 
allowed benefits to be deposited directly into a beneficiary’s bank account, if they 
have one (Lei No. 11.692, 2009).    
Benefits are paid monthly to the household head registered at the Cadastro.  If the 
mother loses the card, she can only withdraw money at CAIXA.  If she cannot 
personally withdraw the benefit, she has to register a power of attorney signed by the 
Mayor’s office allowing another person to withdraw the benefit on her behalf.  If the 
benefit is not withdrawn for more than three months, it is returned to the BF federal 
account.  This is not the case when the beneficiary has a bank account.   
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 Evaluation studies  
The BF programme has been recognised by international bodies such as The World 
Bank (2009a) and The International Social Security Association (2013).  The success 
of the BF model nationally has been demonstrated by the commitment to this policy 
by different political parties, and internationally by the expansion of CCTs to other 
countries.  There is a growing literature on the topic, and I outline some of the studies 
below. 
SAGI commissioned a longitudinal evaluation study of the BF programme
48
.  Given 
that the programme was created as an amalgamation of previous programmes, there 
was no space for randomised control trials, and SAGI resorted to two waves of data 
collection to build a quasi-experimental evaluation, using treatment and control 
groups, propensity score matching and double or single difference methods (de 
Brauw et al. 2010a,2011; de Brauw et al. 2010b; MDS 2010b).   
The evaluation showed improvements in health and education.  In terms of health 
conditionalities, there were 10.7% more girls being born full term in 2009 than in 
2004 and 5% more timely vaccines of diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis and polio (of 
babies up to 6 months old).  There was an improvement of 0.2 standard deviation 
weight-for-height but no impact on height-for-age and rural households were more 
likely to receive home visits by health agents.  As for impacts on education, there was 
a 4.5 % increase in school attendance, with a larger impact for females and 
concentrated in the Northeast of Brazil.  In addition, girls aged 16 and 17 were more 
likely to progress to the next grade level and less likely to repeat grades.  
However, there are some mixed results as to how much beneficiaries understand their 
obligations to meet education and health conditionalities.  Although 89% of 
beneficiaries correctly identified education statements and 91% of beneficiaries 
correctly identified health (>91%) statements relating to the conditionalities, 41% and 
43% of respondents did not acknowledge the existence of conditionalities of 
education and health, respectively.  There were also misunderstandings about 
                                               
48 The first wave of data collection went to the field in 2005 (baseline), and the second in 2009.  In 
2005, there were 15,426 households in 269 municipalities and 23 states.  The attrition rate by 2009 was 
26% due to location problems and 18-19% of the weighted sample in both periods of time was rural 
(excluding the rural North, 2005). 
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statements like “bring your own lunch” and “grant must be used to purchase school 
supplies”.   
Let us suppose that beneficiaries fully understand the conditionalities requirements, it 
is important to point out that 53% and 78% of rural households found it difficult to 
meet education and health conditions, respectively, due to poor physical access to 
services.  Plus, even if they are able to access them, quality of education and health 
services seem to have not improved sufficiently.  Just over 50% of parents reported 
improvements in education, e.g. school registration, teacher’s attendance, 
infrastructure, and attention given to students.  The remaining parents thought that 
education services were the same.  In the case of health services, parents thought that 
they had remained the same throughout the period analysed.   
In terms of labour force participation, there were a lower proportion of recipients not 
working in 2009 than in 2005 in rural areas.  There was also some evidence that rural 
recipients worked more hours in the informal sector.  
Three-quarters of the registrations in rural areas were conducted in a government 
office, school or health post.  However, even if the rural poor register for the benefit, 
the travelling time for collection is an issue that should concern evaluators.  65.5% of 
urban beneficiaries took less than 30 minutes, whereas 54.9% of rural beneficiaries 
took more than 1 hour, 32.5% took 2 hours or more to reach the collection post. 
Another study, using mixed methods, was conducted by Ibase
49
 in 2006-2007
50
.  This 
study analysed BF impacts on food and nutritional security.  The study found that 
extremely poor families increased their consumption of staple food (rice and beans) 
but not enough to guarantee satisfactory levels of food security.  Households who 
were more vulnerable to hunger were those with mixed- or African-descendent 
household heads, who were rural, illiterate, engaged in informal work, and lacking 
sanitation.  There was an urgent need to address issues like sanitation, school meals 
for secondary education, and access to formal markets. 
                                               
49 Instituto Brasileiro de Análises Sociais e Econômicas 
50 A survey of 5,000 individuals in 229 municipalities from September to October 2007, and 15 focus 
groups (170 beneficiaries) in 15 urban areas from June to July 2006. 
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Among the findings specific for the rural population, the study found that although 
rural families engage in subsistence agriculture, 95.5% had no technical assistance, 
83.1% had not accessed agricultural credit in the last three years.  For consumption 
goods that are not produced, households living in remote areas pay higher prices at 
local shops.   
A very important finding for this thesis concerns the time and costs for rural 
households to collect the benefits.  IBASE study reaffirms the disadvantages of rural 
beneficiaries.  15% of rural beneficiaries took between 2 and 4 hours, and 23.6% took 
more than four hours. 29.5% spend between R$5−R$15 (US$2.34−US$7.03 as of 
02/01/2007), 5.7% spent more than R$15.  Using the 2007 benefit range, as described 
in Table 2, households at the minimum benefit level would have spent between 28% 
and 83% of their benefit in transportation costs, and households at the maximum level 
of benefit, between 4% and 13%. 
Based on the above, there are important rural dimensions in the implementation of the 
BF that deserve to be further investigated.   
Other areas of research are targeting and redistribution.  In general, studies of 
targeting have indicated that the BF is a well-targeted programme, coming first of 44 
programmes in the Latin America and Caribbean (Lindert et al. 2007).  Using the 
2004 PNAD, Soares, Ribas and Osório (2007 p.2) calculated inclusion targeting as 
41% and exclusion targeting of 92%; 59% of exclusion error and 49% of leakage
51
.  
Using the 2005 and 2007 Cadastro, Bastagli (2008 p.201) calculated the predicted 
probability of inclusion of the extremely poor in rural areas as 56%, and of the poor 
as 49%.  
According to Grosh et al. (2008 p.24), the role of cash transfers “in redistribution is 
obvious and can be effective”.  Targeted cash transfers are redistributive if they are 
efficiently directed to those in need.  The authors estimate that the BF reaches about a 
quarter of the population with transfers making up about a quarter of their household 
income.  
                                               
51 Inclusion targeting is the rate of poor beneficiary over the total poor.  Exclusion targeting is the 
exclusion of the non-beneficiary non-poor to the total non-poor.  Exclusion error (under-coverage) is 
rate of the non-beneficiary poor to the total poor population.  Inclusion error (leakage) is the error of 
including the non-poor over the total of the beneficiary population.   
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An OECD (2008) report drew attention to different types of impacts of social 
programmes, namely targeting, progressivity and redistribution.  According to this 
report, redistribution refers to the question, “how much does the benefit system 
actually change the distribution of household income?” (p.100) (emphasis in 
original).  Although the programme is well-targeted it does not change the 
distribution of household income.  That would require labour market insertion, or a 
larger public transfer equal to the minimum wage, such as the BPC or the rural 
pension (Osorio et al. 2011b).   
Building on this discussion, other analysts question the redistributive role of the BF, 
based on funding for social security in Brazil.  Salvador (2010 p.250) analyses the 
period of 2000 to 2007 and finds that 62.16% of the social security funding comes 
from sales taxes.  However, the author neither details the marginal changes, making it 
difficult to infer whether sales taxes were mostly responsible for the introduction of 
the BF, nor disaggregate the consumption sales taxes.  Couri (2010 pp.61,62) finds 
that the majority of the incremental changes on the social protection budget for the 
BF came from indirect taxes.  Couri states that 14.5% of the BF sources of funding 
from 2004-2009 can be considered progressive.  Although there is the need for more 
research on the topic, Salvador (2010 p.251) is categorical in affirming that “the 
analysis of revenue used to finance social security, from 2000 to 2007, reveal its 
regressive nature: workers and the poorest support it – thus, there is no income 
redistribution.”    
Lastly, the social work literature draws attention to the move towards emphasising 
social assistance in the social protection system.  Thus, social assistance is a central 
policy, and not a mediating integrative policy that guarantees access to other social 
services and rights (Mota 2007 p.130).  The social policy focus on social assistance 
hides the structural causes of poverty, precarious labour market arrangements, and 
processes of reproduction of social inequalities and capital accumulation (2010).  This 
reinforces the residual nature of the Brazilian welfare state. 
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2.4 The Bolsa Família and CCTs: long-term strategy for social assistance and 
social development? 
The study of the BF in rural and remote areas (RRA) is important not only for 
understanding how the programme addresses the persistently poor, but also for long-
term social assistance strategies in Brazil and developing countries. 
I started this chapter by outlining the international and national debates on poverty.  I 
demonstrated that there is a consensus from the right and left sides of the debate that 
the persistently poor should be assisted and even prioritised.  However, there is a 
disconnect between the many discourses about targeted anti-poverty programmes, and 
the lack of attention the international debates pay to the persistently poor in rural 
areas.  The policies for the “easy-to-assist” follow a utilitarian approach of efficiency 
in delivering results.  The persistently poor in rural areas may require a different set 
of policies from those currently being prescribed nationally and internationally. 
The evolution of the social assistance debate, both internationally and in Brazil, helps 
us to understand why the BF is framed in terms of efficiency, targeting and 
conditionalities.  I also showed the debates and tensions between the proponents of a 
minimum income and those favouring CCTs.  These debates reflect a broader 
discussion on the role of the state in promoting social welfare. 
The BF is considered a well-targeted programme, with positive impacts on poverty 
and inequality reduction, schooling and nutrition.  However, the BF anti-poverty 
reduction strategy seems to have reached its peak, leaving the extreme poor in rural 
areas with double the poverty rates of urban areas (Rocha 2013 p.173).  Research has 
also pointed out that CCTs are not a “magic/silver bullet” for anti-poverty measures – 
short-term needs must be balanced with long-term policies to address the structural 
causes of poverty (Barrientos 2013b; Hall 2006,2008).  
Hence, there is the need to investigate the topic further.  By understanding how the 
BF is reaching the persistently poor, and how it is implemented in remote rural 
conditions, I hope to shed some light on both the accomplishments and the limitations 
of the programme.  This research may find that the well-targeted BF programme is 
achieving its comprehensive objectives.  Alternatively, the BF may require further 
targeting or the persistently poor may need policies beyond CCTs.   
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The Brasil sem Miséria programme released in 2011by President Dilma Roussef is a 
move towards a new stage in targeting.  It has the stated aim of ending extreme 
poverty, but by attempting to increase the inclusion of the extremely poor in social 
assistance.  This highlights once again the importance of this thesis, which aims to 
provide inputs for policies to reach some of those who are excluded from social 
assistance.  
In the international arena, there is a wave of cash transfers, conditional or otherwise, 
used as anti-poverty instruments.  This helps to establish social protection institutions 
and policies in countries where they were absent or minimum (Barrientos 2013b; 
Bastagli 2009).  However, eradicating poverty would require pro-poor growth and a 
broader social protection system, including access to quality social services 
(Barrientos 2013b).   
There seems to be a conceptual dilemma.  On the one hand, the proponents of CCTs 
affirm that conditional transfers are appropriate for addressing chronic or persistent 
poverty, as their focus on education and health is expected to have outputs across the 
generations.  They argue: 
Because of their emphasis on long-term human capital accumulation and on 
administrative targeting, CCT programs are better suited as instruments for 
structural poverty than as responses to episodes of transient poverty. (Fiszbein 
& Schady 2009 p.196). 
It is important to note that transfers, at least public monetary transfers (in 
particular the conditional cash transfers programs that have expanded in the 
region [Latin America] during this period) were not meant to be an instrument 
for fiscal redistribution, but were aimed more at reducing chronic poverty and 
promoting human capital development. (World Bank 2011 p.1). 
On the other hand, poverty experts highlight problems with infrastructure and social 
service provision in RRAs.  BF evaluation studies (sub-section 2.3.4) demonstrated 
how the limited infrastructure in rural areas affects the real value of the benefit (e.g. 
through transportation costs), as well as affecting the access to education and health 
services.  Thus, the use of conditionalities for the persistently poor in RRAs may 
require additional social investment, without which CCTs would have little or no 
effect.  The factors that contribute to the persistence of poverty in RRAs may hinder 
the possibility of considering CCTs a long-term strategy for social development. 
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2.5 Critical assessment of the literature reviewed and implications for 
research 
The literature reviewed showed that there is persistent and chronic poverty in RRAs, 
which cannot be only attributed to household characteristics, but also to how 
geographical location influence the existence of long-term structural poverty, access 
to services and reduced opportunities to exit poverty (Bird et al. 2002; Bird et al. 
2010b; Bird & Shepherd 2003; CPRC 2005; Okwi et al. 2007).  Despite the 
recognition by international development agencies of the relationship between 
remoteness and long-term severe poverty (IFAD 2001 ; World Bank 2001b), there is 
little attention in international development practices on spatial poverty traps, 
agriculture and rural economies (IFAD 2001,2010; World Bank 2004b,2009c). 
This international debate reflects the Brazilian debate.  Several reports, quantitative 
datasets and social indicators have highlighted the long-term, persistent, structural 
poverty in specific geographical areas of Brazil, more specifically the rural semi-arid 
of the Northeast of Brazil (IBGE 2010b; IFAD 2008; IPEA 2011; MDS 2011; Osorio 
et al. 2011b; World Bank 2003).  However, despite its importance, there is no study 
of chronic poverty in Brazil due to lack of longitudinal datasets (Osorio et al. 2011b).   
In addition, little attention is paid to rural poverty in Brazil.  Some authors claim that 
rural poverty became less important with the larger concentration of population in 
urban areas and that the analysis of geographical patterns of poverty are not important 
given the convergence of poverty rates and income (Neri 2011; Rocha 2012).  
However, other researchers have demonstrated that the definition of urban areas 
questions the so-called “urbanisation” of Brazil (da Veiga 2001) and, most 
importantly, that the surveys used are not adequate to measure convergence or 
poverty, as they do not capture the heterogeneity of rural areas (Osorio et al. 2011a; 
Osorio et al. 2011b; World Bank 2003).  These arguments raise serious questions on 
the claims of convergence or of reduced importance of rural poverty in Brazil.   
Internationally, the ten year research programme on chronic poverty has provided an 
emerging body of evidence highlighting the need of universal and targeted 
interventions to assist the chronic or persistently poor  (Bird et al. 2002; CPRC 2005; 
Hulme & Shepherd 2003).  Amidst these interventions, there was an emergence of 
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social assistance programmes notably in the form of cash transfers to address poverty 
reduction (Hanlon et al. 2010).  Conditional cash transfers rapidly emerged as an 
important policy option, rapidly expanding in the international development agencies 
portfolios (World Bank 2009b,2014).    
The Bolsa Família is an international example of a successful conditional cash 
transfer programme (ISSA 2013; World Bank 2005) that covers the working-age 
able-bodied rural poor.  BF evaluations have demonstrated targeting efficiency and 
positive effects on poverty reduction, short-term education and health outcomes (de 
Brauw et al. 2010a,2011; de Brauw et al. 2010b; MDS 2010b).   
However, evaluations have also highlighted concerning findings on the 
implementation of this programme in rural areas, highlighting the disadvantage of 
rural beneficiaries.  They are related to (i) the registration of the programme in rural 
areas; (ii) the time and costs of collecting benefits for the rural poor; (iii) the higher 
costs of goods in rural remote areas; (iv) the reduced level of supporting programmes, 
such as technical assistance, to promote the exit of rural poverty; (v) the insufficient 
attention paid to benefit levels in terms of food security for those reliant on 
subsistence agriculture; and (vi) the quality and access of services provided.  In 
addition, there is no conclusive evidence differentiating the effects of conditions from 
those of cash (Baird et al. 2013; Baird et al. 2011) to justify the apparent higher costs 
borne by the persistently poor living in rural remote areas in order to comply with the 
conditions.   
This chapter has identified gaps in the rural poverty and the BF literatures.  There is 
not enough research on the chronic and persistently poor living in rural areas of 
Brazil.  Rural areas are generally treated homogeneously, aggregated in national or 
regional rural averages due to data limitations.  Research exploring rural linkages and 
their effects on policy implementation is also limited, if existent.  Lastly, there is no 
research in the intersection of issues related to persistent poverty in rural remote areas 
with the effective implementation of the BF programme.   
Considering that (i) persistent poverty in rural remote areas of Brazil is an important, 
albeit under-researched topic, (ii) the BF is both an example of an internationally 
recognised case of conditional cash transfers and of a policy that addresses the able-
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bodied working age rural population; and (iii) that BF evaluations have identified 
causes for concern in terms of the implementation of the benefit in rural areas of 
Brazil, then, an analysis of the BF with the specific lenses of how effectively the 
programme is reaching out and addressing the needs of the persistently poor living in 
remote rural areas is paramount.  Emerging from this analysis, I propose to 
investigate the following research questions:  
RQ1:  “How effectively does the Bolsa Família reach the rural poor in remote 
and non-remote poor rural municipalities?”  
RQ2: If it is not effective, why not? 
d) Reasons related to the policy design at the national level 
e) Reasons related to the local implementation at the municipal level 
f) Reasons related to the households’ participation at the community level 
The investigation of the BF programme with the specific lenses of maximising 
effectiveness of the reach of the BF to the persistently poor in rural remote areas will 
also shed some light on important unexplored gaps in the literature related to the BF 
programme.  
No research has been conducted to verify whether the BF is reaching out to the 
persistently poor in rural remote areas; if the persistently poor in these areas are 
prioritised, given the limited funds for benefits; how remoteness affects the national 
and local implementation of the BF; and how remoteness affects household 
participation in terms of registration, compliance with conditionalities, collection of 
benefits and social control.   
This research looks at effectiveness in terms of both service provision and needs.  
This means that I will also analyse whether cash funds address the primary needs of 
the persistently poor; the effects of conditionalities for the persistently poor, who 
generally live in places with supply-side problems; and the costs of the programme 
for local administrations and beneficiaries in the heterogeneous rural spaces.  If the 
costs for the persistently poor are higher due to location, this should be taken into 
consideration in the policy design, mainly in programmes with conditions attached to 
benefit, like CCTs. 
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The originality of this research lies in three points.  Firstly, previous researchers have 
looked at chronic and persistent poverty and RRAs internationally; other scholars 
have analysed the BF, its targeting and implementation and household participation in 
the programme.  However, as stated before, no previous research has combined those 
issues.   
Secondly, I provide a broad analytical picture by addressing the research questions at 
the national, local and household levels.  I use mixed-methods to understand the 
overall quantitative trends, together with the non-observable variables or contextual 
processes uncovered by qualitative datasets.   
Lastly, given that we do not know much about chronic poverty in Brazil, I focus on 
persistent poverty and I use an innovative approach by combining different methods 
to identify locations that are remote rural and extremely poor.  I propose an integrated 
approach to study rural Brazil, including population density, location and linkages to 
urban centres.  This new method was necessary due to lack of longitudinal datasets 
and of surveys in RRAs.   
However, it is important to also acknowledge upfront the limitations of this thesis.  
This research does not cover all the beneficiaries of the Bolsa Família in Brazil; 
neither does it cover the whole rural population.  Given the lack of quantitative 
datasets for the rural chronic poor, this thesis does not aim to provide statistical 
generalisations or causality.  Additional studies would be needed to reinforce the 
findings.  Although this thesis may provide insights into the international debate, 
careful consideration must be given to assess the relevance and applicability of its 
findings.  
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3. METHODS: TYPOLOGIES OF RURAL MUNICIPALITIES, QUANTITATIVE 
AND QUALITATIVE DATASETS, SELECTION OF CASE STUDIES, AND 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The exclusion of many chronically poor people from official statistics both 
reflects and reinforces their position of marginality and vulnerability, 
often rendering them invisible, even to humanitarian organisations and 
their own governments. (CPRC 2005 p.15) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Although I recognise that there have been advances in poverty analysis in Brazil, 
there is little, if any, information on rural chronic poverty
52
.  This reinforces the 
invisibility of those who face severe and persistent deprivation.  To address this 
knowledge gap, I use a combination of methods aimed to answer the proposed 
research questions.   
Although I am aware that quantitative and qualitative research strategies make 
different and distinctive epistemological and ontological assumptions, I take the 
pragmatic position that these strategies are both “techniques of data collection and 
analysis” that social scientists can draw upon while investigating a phenomenon 
(Bryman 2004 p.463).   
Thus, I use quantitative methods alongside qualitative investigations, using statistical 
data while addressing the processes necessary to evaluate policies.  Quantitative 
analysis compares the participation rates and compliance with conditionalities of the 
rural poor in poor remote municipalities, with those in poor non-remote 
municipalities.  Qualitative analysis investigates whether location and national, local 
and household dynamics influence the quantitative result, and if so, how.  Section 
2.1.2 shows the historical association of extreme poverty and severe levels of 
deprivation in the Northeast of Brazil.  As a result, the focus of this thesis is in that 
region, with close to 80% of all municipalities analysed and all of the case studies in 
the Northeast of Brazil. 
                                               
52 Ribas and Machado (2007) have proposed a model for pseudo-panel data to analyse chronic poverty, 
based on the PNADs, but this model excludes rural areas because: (i) rural poverty is not comparable 
to urban poverty; (ii) lack of representative samples for rural households in PNAD; and (iii) “poverty 
in Brazil has become predominantly urban and metropolitan in recent years” (p.31).   
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As also justified in Chapter 2, my premise is that the persistently poor are 
predominantly those living in poor remote rural municipalities.  Of course, not all the 
persistently poor live in remote rural municipalities, and neither are all remote rural 
municipalities mostly comprised of the persistently poor.  However, I start my 
analysis with the spatial disadvantage realm for methodological purposes and without 
claims of causality, geographical determinism, or attempts to measure effect sizes.  
The first requirement, conducted in section 3.2, is to identify poor, rural and remote 
municipalities using a new typology.   Section 3.3 explains the quantitative research 
design and introduces the datasets.  Section 3.4 presents the qualitative research 
design and data.  Section 3.5 outlines the analytical frameworks and brings together 
methods and research questions.  This chapter has appendices, listed in section 3.6.   
3.2 Creating typologies: Poor Isolated Rural (PIR) and Poor Non-Isolated 
Rural (PNIR) municipalities 
 
3.2.1 Justification for the PIR and PNIR typology 
The main reason I created the PIR and PNIR typology is to shed some light on areas 
of the poverty research that may be little emphasised or under-investigated in the 
prevailing literature, which mostly relies on the National Household Surveys 
(PNAD).  PNADs present several limitations to studying chronic or persistent rural 
poverty: a lack of longitudinal information for the period analysed
53
, a lack of 
information representative of small municipalities, a lack of geographical variables 
that may influence socio-economic aspects of standards of living, and the problematic 
definition of rural areas in Brazil. 
The National Bureau of Statistics’ (IBGE) definition of rural areas is problematic at 
several levels.  First, urban areas are defined by municipal law and not by a national 
criterion such as population density, while rural areas are simply areas that are not 
urban.  There are legal allowances for larger “villages” and “non-urbanised areas of a 
city” to be statistically counted as urban.  This rural/urban definition confounds 
different types of location, providing an inaccurate picture.    
                                               
53 IBGE is designing the integrated system of household surveys (Sistema Integrado de Pesquisas 
Domiciliares), which aims to address the provision of socio-economic and demographic information to 
inform public policy, including longitudinal investigations. 
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Second, IBGE (2008b) classifies rural areas as:  
(i) Rural agglomeration of urban extension: rural areas closely connected to 
urban areas by up to one kilometre;  
(ii) Isolated rural agglomeration:  rural areas with a distance greater than one 
kilometre from an urban area.  This classification is subdivided according 
to the way the agglomeration is characterised (povoado, núcleo, lugarejos) 
according to the availability of services, local shops, churches and 
linkages with a major land owner;  
(iii) Rural areas excluding rural agglomeration: rural areas on the outskirts of 
rural agglomerations. 
IBGE takes into consideration services and distance when conceptualising rural and 
remote areas, but distance is the key concept that guides remoteness.  Service 
availability, combined with linkages to a major landlord, is a secondary concept, used 
only to subdivide isolated rural agglomerations.  Service availability is comprised of 
the existence of a local shop and two of the following services: school, health centre 
or a church.  
This characterisation is too generic, and therefore it is insufficient for the specific 
research proposed, not to mention that it still carries the historical vestige of linkage 
with a landlord as a characterisation of the space.  A kilometre is too a small measure 
to identify remoteness.  For a country as the size of Brazil, this is a large 
underestimation.  Furthermore, by ignoring the type of urban extension linked to a 
rural agglomeration, this classification fails to identify the role of the local 
administration in providing services.  It also does not differentiate between the 
availability of several services as opposed to just a few.   
Certainly, an isolated rural agglomeration with a school and a church, located more 
than 20 km away from the local town with difficult road access, cannot be compared 
with rural agglomerations with a number of schools and health centres sitting within 2 
km of the local town accessibly by paved roads.  Likewise, a rural agglomeration 
linked to the urban extension of a small municipality, cannot be compared to another 
type that is linked to an urban extension of a municipality of regional importance, 
even though the smaller one might have all the necessary services.   
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IBGE definition of ‘rural’ has the potential to gather information about very different 
types of rural areas.  If rural studies are based on the PNADs, serious consideration 
must be given to PNAD sampling method.  Research based on these 
conceptualisations should allow for its limitations, although these are often ignored.  
The method proposed here attempts to address some of these gaps, by positioning 
municipalities in relation to their rural populations and urban connections, and by 
attempting to understand the heterogeneity of rural municipalities based on poverty 
and remoteness levels.  Thus, I focus on a small group of municipalities which share 
similar characteristics of location, poverty and rural features.  The focus on 
municipalities is also justified through the role they play in BF programme 
implementation. 
However, some limitations are important to keep in mind.  Although I continue to use 
IBGE’s identification of rural and urban within municipality sub-divisions, I 
categorise municipalities as rural by the percentage of the population living there, a 
concept of ‘rural’ based on population density.  I have excluded natural reserves or 
indigenous areas, as these areas require a different analytical approach.  Geographical 
variables, such as low natural resources for small farming, are partially captured by 
rural and poverty variables.   
Due to data limitations, I did not include municipal-level service provision 
variables
54
.  Bird et al. (2010b) show that poverty in rural areas is more correlated 
with remoteness than with availability of facilities.  High poverty levels in remote 
rural areas may be associated with lower levels of service provision.  It is plausible to 
infer that remote places would have (i) lower access to public services, (ii) lower 
levels of specialised public services (which are mostly concentrated in urban areas), 
and (iii) more difficulty in accessing the already reduced level of service provision.  
I was also unable to differentiate among urban municipalities.  Different types of 
urban municipality (state capital, regional urban municipality or small municipality) 
may have different linkages and neighbourhood effects to nearby rural municipalities, 
but I believe ignoring this differentiation is not a major problem.  Broadly speaking, 
                                               
54 While I was conducting fieldwork, IPEA released a research report (Presença do Estado) with 
service variables at municipal level.  I was unable to include these variables for the proposed analysis, 
due to time constraints. 
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the closer a rural municipality is to a major urban municipality, the less likely the 
rural municipality will be defined as rural and poor.  As a consequence, the dataset of 
this thesis is confined to small poor municipalities in northeast Brazil with on average 
less than 20,000 inhabitants.  This follows the literature on extreme poverty in small 
municipalities of the Northeast (Osorio et al. 2011b). 
There is a possibility that different groups of people within the same municipality 
may experience different service accessibility, depending on their income or mobility 
levels.  This what has come to be known as the ecological fallacy (Commonwealth of 
Australia 2001 p.7), i.e. basing inferences about individuals solely on area-
characteristics
55
.  To avoid this, I combine geographical with socio-economic 
variables, as well as working with municipalities rather than households as the unit of 
quantitative analysis.  I also select only those municipalities with the highest poverty 
headcount, and I construct the remoteness variable by considering only the distance 
between municipalities, disregarding costs.  In that way, distance is the same 
independently of differences of income or transportation.  
Lastly, it is important to situate the typology used in this thesis within the overarching 
rural development policy discussions in Brazil.  The concept of “territory”, together 
with demands for democratic participation, devolution and sustainability, led the 
Ministry of Agricultural Development to propose an approach to policies – the Rural 
Development Territory programme
56
 – which considers multiple dimensions of the 
needs and inter-relations of the population within a territory (de Freitas et al. 2010).  
The idea that a group of municipalities can gather as a “rural territory” (“territórios 
da cidadania”) and have a dialogue with state and federal levels is a powerful tool for 
regional development and bottom-up policy innovations.   
Territory-level decisions are made by a Territory Collegiate that deliberates about the 
general needs of its municipalities.  It is primarily a political decision-making 
process, and both government and civil society representatives participate.  The 
                                               
55 These debates arose as a result of misleading usages of the Australian Bureau of Statistics’ SEIFA 
indexes (Socio-Economic Index for Areas) as proxies for individual socio-economic status. It is 
important to note that the fallacy is not relevant for this thesis because, unlike my proposed typology, 
SEIFA does not have geographical or area-based variables such as remoteness, road quality, or 
infrastructure. Instead, it aggregates individual-level variables (percentage) related to occupation, 
income, education, assets, housing, etc. See:  Australian Bureau of Statistics (2012,2013). 
56 Programa Nacional de Desenvolvimento Sustentável de Territórios Rurais (PRONAT). 
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methodology proposed in this thesis could be used as a tool to guide Collegiate 
analyses of poverty, remoteness, service provision and policy delivery.   
3.2.2 Information on geographical datasets 
There are two geographical datasets used to create the typology of municipalities: (i) 
the Map of Poverty and Inequality (MoPI), and (ii) the Digital Integrated 
Cartographic Base of Brazil at the Millionth Scale (BCIM, version 3.01).  
IBGE and the World Bank produced the MoPI in 2003.  Using the small area 
estimation method (Elbers et al. 2003) based on the 2000 Census and the 2002 
household budget survey (Pesquisa de Orçamentos Familiares), the MoPI estimates 
poverty levels by municipality.  Analysis of municipality-level data relies on small 
area estimation techniques because census data do not incorporate income measures, 
and household surveys, which do have income measures, are not representative of 
small areas.  The MoPI is the only dataset that estimates poverty levels by 
municipality with the geographical information required for my proposed typology of 
municipalities.   
As far as data quality is concerned, a relevant validation exercise was conducted by 
Demombynes et al. (2007).  They compared estimations of poverty and inequality 
rates in Mexican rural communities with their true value.  The authors found that, if 
location effects are not well captured in the underlying consumption models, the 
precision of the estimates is reduced, resulting in larger standard errors.  Bias could 
result either in an overestimation of poverty in non-poor communities or in an 
underestimation of poverty in poor communities (2007 p.17).  Thus, it is important to 
keep in mind that, if location variables are not properly identified in the Brazilian 
case, there is a possibility of bias by underestimating poverty levels.  The poorest 
municipalities chosen could be, in reality, even poorer. 
The second database, the 2009 Continuous Cartographic Base to the Millionth Scale 
(BCIM, version 3.01)
57
, provides an update of the MoPI transport network (roads, 
bridges, ports and rivers).  The original BCIM was produced in 2003, as part of the 
                                               
57 BCIM uses the same datum as the MoPI, the 1969 South American Datum – SAD1969. 
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United Nations’ Global Mapping project – an initiative of more than 120 countries to 
obtain sets of maps using the same scale (IBGE 2003).   
The BCIM relied on information for Brazil from the National River Transport 
Agency, the National Civil Aviation Agency, the National Land Transport Agency, 
and the Ministry of Transport (IBGE 2009b).  In terms of data quality, IBGE uses 
information on Global Positioning System, remote sensing, satellite images and larger 
scale maps to update the BCIM (IBGE & MPOG 2010).  I use the BCIM data as they 
were generated, without any changes in the scale (p.6). 
3.2.3 Identifying poor and rural municipalities 
 Poor municipalities 
The MoPI classifies poverty according to the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) index 
(Foster et al. 1984)
58
.  This index gives the proportion of the population whose per 
capita household consumption is equal to or below an assigned poverty line.  There 
are 20 poverty lines, including one poverty line specific to rural northeast Brazil, 
which is important for this research
59
.  
FGT varies from 0 to 1, the closer to 0 the less poor the population is.  The MoPI 
divides this variable into six categories.  I have arranged the six categories into three 
groups: low, medium and high poverty, I chose the latter group, i.e. the group with 
FGT above or equal to 0.57.  I used the geographic information system software 
ArcGIS to identify municipalities with high FGT poverty levels.  I will discuss the 
sub-categories of the high poverty level groups in Chapter 4. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
58 FGT α=0  
59 For details on the poverty lines, refer to the appendices to this chapter. 
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Table 4: Categories of the poverty variable 
MoPI  FGT Thesis category 
1. Low poverty 
(lower bound) 
0.05 – 0.15 Low poverty 
2. Low poverty 
(upper bound) 
0.16 – 0.29 
3. Medium poverty 
(lower bound) 
0.30 – 0.42 Medium poverty 
4. Medium poverty 
(upper bound) 
0.43 -0.56 
5 High poverty 
(lower bound) 
0.57-0.70 High poverty 
6 High poverty 
(upper bound) 
0.71 – 0.84 
Source: author’s categorisation based on MoPI. 
 
Two important considerations must be noted.  First, I analyse the BF programme 
using a different poverty dataset from the one the programme itself uses, i.e. the 
official statistics, which are mostly based on the PNAD and on income.  The MoPI, in 
contrast, uses information on consumption.  
I understand that different poverty measurements yield different poverty results, and 
so I will not calculate point estimates or targeting measures.  I will, instead, 
investigate trends in the programme participation rates across the years.  I will also 
investigate, in Chapter 4, potential problems on the use of PNAD to determine 
poverty lines for small municipalities.   
Second, the quantitative analysis uses consumption as a proxy for poverty, and 
consumption plus remoteness as proxies for long-term, persistent poverty.  However, 
as the literature suggests, chronic poverty is longitudinal and multidimensional, and I 
am unable to capture these aspects quantitatively.  Still, there is a significant literature 
discussing the long-term severe poverty that the rural poor in the remote Northeast 
face.  I also broaden the poverty definition by incorporating qualitative methods as a 
complementary approach to the quantitative research strategy.  
 Rural municipalities 
Taking into consideration issues of standardisation, I utilised the MoPI classification 
of rural and urban municipalities.  MoPI employs the urbanisation index to decide 
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whether a municipality is urban, i.e. the percentage of inhabitants in urban areas over 
the total population in a municipality.  A municipality is urban if the percentage of 
population living in urban areas is above 80%; it is rural, if the percentage is below 
50%; and it is transition if the percentage is between 50-80%.  Using a conservative 
approach, I only used municipalities defined as rural in this study. 
There are 5506 municipalities classified in the MoPI urbanisation index
60
.  Out of 
these, 2093 were rural and were 3413 urban (being 1786 transition areas).  If I add the 
poverty cut-off described in the previous section, out of the total 2093 rural 
municipalities, 397 are simultaneously poor and rural. 
Map 1 shows the first layer of poverty levels by municipality (shaded areas), with an 
additional layer shown by the location of the rural city centre or town hall (yellow 
points).  Map 2 isolates only the poor rural municipalities, the sub-group of interest to 
this research.  This map resonates with the rural poverty literature, in that it shows a 
difference between the rural poor North and Northeast on the one hand, and the rural 
rich South on the other (IFAD 2011; World Bank 2003).  
                                               
60 I imputed the classification of 23 national and state capitals as urban municipalities. 
 Page 86 of 356 
 
Map 1: Distribution of rural municipalities by poverty levels in Brazil 
 
 
Source: author based on MoPI. 
  
 Page 87 of 356 
 
Map 2: Distribution of poor rural municipalities by poverty levels in Brazil 
 
Source: author based on  MoPI. 
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3.2.4 Constructing the remoteness variable 
After identifying the poor municipalities that are also predominantly rural, I proceed 
with the inclusion of the BCIM dataset.  I do not calculate the distance between point 
A and B in a straight line to estimate remoteness.  Instead I refine this calculation by 
using the transport network (BCIM) and conduct a multimodal network analysis
61
.  
Map 3 shows the poverty levels (shaded areas) with the transportation network layer 
from the BCIM (grey lines).  Map 4 adds two layers: the urban municipality layer 
(black points) and another one with poor rural municipalities (yellow points).  Each of 
the following maps has an inset showing the municipalities of interest to this thesis, 
i.e. those located in the rural Northeast. 
  
                                               
61 Details of how I built the multimodal network dataset, including data clean-up and the feature 
dataset, are in the appendices to this chapter.   
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Map 3: Multimodal Network Dataset (roads and rivers network) with poverty levels 
 
Source: author based on MoPI and BCIM. 
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Map 4: Multimodal Network Dataset with predominantly rural and urban municipalities and poverty levels 
 
Source: author based on MoPI and BICM. 
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 The Network Analysis 
I conducted the network analysis based on Map 4.  The analysis takes into 
consideration a pre-set delimited path in order to find a combination of alternative 
routes between two places of interest.  The two points of interest are (i) poor rural 
municipalities, and (ii) urban municipalities.   
I identified the closest urban municipality to a poor rural municipality, following the 
transport network and a hierarchy of preferences I assigned (function closest facility).  
Paved roads were preferred over roads in the process of being paved, which are, in 
turn, preferred to unpaved roads.  Unpaved roads, roads without paving information 
and rivers have the same preference level.  In that way, the software followed the 
hierarchy of preferences when there is a choice between different roads and river 
networks
62
.  The software returned the distance in kilometres between these two 
points
63
.  
Map 5 shows the network analysis.  The yellow points represent the local town hall of 
a poor rural municipality and the black points the local town hall of an urban 
municipality.  The pink lines are roads and/or rivers linking these two points, and the 
grey lines are other existing networks.  I double-checked the output with information 
from the Brazilian Association of Highway by randomly selecting a sample of 
distances
64
.  The difference was considered acceptable, within a radius of five 
kilometres.   
  
                                               
62 For details on the network analysis, please refer to the appendix. 
63 22 out of 3413 urban areas had network connections higher than 5 km.  I disregarded these 
municipalities, which represent 0.64% of urban areas. 
64 http://www.abcr.org.br/geode/ accessed 20/02/2010. 
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Map 5: Shortest route between poor rural municipalities to urban municipalities 
 
Source: author based on MoPI and BCIM. 
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3.2.5 The PIR and PNIR typology 
The network analysis shows the distance in kilometres between the two points of 
interest, illustrated in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Distances of poor rural municipalities to the nearest urban municipality (Km) 
 
Source: author’s calculations based on MoPI and BCIM. 
The distribution is skewed to the right with distances representing more than 400 
kilometres to the nearest urban centre.  The average of the distribution is 47 km, and I 
use the cut-off point of 50 km.  Poor rural municipalities were considered isolated if 
the distance was equal to or above 50 km – PIR (Poor Isolated Rural); they were 
considered non-isolated if the distance was below 50 km – PNIR (Poor Non-isolated 
Rural)
65
.   
Of the 397 poor rural areas, 101 are classified as PIR, 283 as PNIR and 13 were not 
identified by ArcGIS, representing 3.27%.  Six of those unidentified rural 
municipalities had no road or river within a 5 km radius.  Seven of them had no urban 
municipality nearby
66
. 
                                               
65 I used ArcGIS  select by attribute\"Total_Km">=50 or "Total_Km"<50 
66 Some possible explanations for the six unlocated poor rural areas might be (i) that there is indeed no 
road close by and it is a very isolated, (ii) that there is a road but it was created after 2009, or (iii) that 
there are problems with the coordinate reference system.  The seven located poor rural areas with 
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Map 6 and Map 7 illustrate the resulting network analysis for PIR and PNIR 
municipalities.  A comparison of the maps illustrates the multimodal network analysis 
based on the distances of poor isolated and non-isolated rural municipalities from the 
nearest urban municipality. 
  
                                                                                                                                      
unlocated urban areas could be among 22 unlocated urban areas that were previously dropped.  See 
foodnote 63. 
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Map 6: Shortest route from PNIR to predominantly urban municipalities 
Source: author based on MoPI and BCIM. 
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Map 7: Shortest route from PIR to predominantly urban municipalities 
 
Source: author based on MoPI and BCIM. 
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3.3 Quantitative research design: datasets and data quality 
Research question one (RQ1) asks how effectively the BF programme reaches PIR 
and PNIR municipalities, by looking at participation rates derived from Cadastro and 
IBGE population estimates.  Research question two (RQ2c) investigates the 
compliance with the BF conditionalities, using datasets from the Ministries of Health 
and Education. 
3.3.1 Introducing the datasets 
 Research question one (RQ1) 
Cadastro is an administrative database created in 2001 (Decreto No.3877, 
24/07/2001).  In Brazil, incomes are calculated per month, either aggregated by 
households or calculated as an average of household income per capita.  Cadastro 
only registers households with (i) incomes per household up to three times the 
minimum wage, or (ii) incomes per capita of less than half of the minimum wage.  
MDS uses the Cadastro to determine household eligibility to social assistance 
programmes, including the BF. 
I contacted MDS in July 2010 and requested a snapshot of the Cadastro.  This 
snapshot is a cross-sectional database with the numbers of BF beneficiaries by 
households in each municipality in July and December from 2004 to 2009.  I merged 
the information from MoPI and BCIM with the Cadastro, based on the seven-digit 
unique municipality code, using ArcGIS and Excel 2007
67
.   
In order to calculate participation rates (RQ1), I added information on the total 
population of each municipality using STATA10, as this required more advanced 
computations.  IBGE estimates the yearly municipality population by numbers of 
inhabitants based on PNADs.  I used this information for the years 2004, 2005, 2006, 
2008 and 2009.  In 2007, IBGE conducted a population count (Contagem 
populacional).  Once again, these datasets were merged using the unique municipality 
code.   
                                               
67 I was careful to merge the files by creating a new variable in STATA to indicate different levels of 
merging outputs, which I inspected after each merge. 
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However, the IBGE population information is not comparable with the Cadastro, as 
the unit of the former is inhabitants and the latter is households.  In order to obtain the 
number of households per municipality, I constructed another variable using the 
average number of persons in a household per year.  IBGE publishes this information 
by state.   
It is important to mention that using the state average could bias the number of 
households in a municipality.  It may give an over-estimation for larger municipalities 
and an under-estimation for smaller municipalities (Marques 2005 p.14).  This 
produces an over-estimation of participation rates in PIR and PNIR municipalities, 
addressed in the next sub-section.  
 Research question two (RQ2c) 
I visited the Ministry of Education (MEC) and the Ministry of Health (MS) during 
my fieldwork in 2010 to request information on their compliance levels by 
municipalities.  The MS dataset (Datasus/Sisvan) has information from beneficiaries 
at two points in time, June and December.  I was able to obtain spreadsheets from 
December 2005 to June 2010.   This dataset had the unique municipality code, which 
I used to merge it with the master data.  
MEC’s dataset (Presença) is registered bi-monthly.  It has the reasons for low school 
attendance by municipality.  Each school registers school attendance per student bi-
monthly.  If a student has attendance below the required level, a field opens up for 
including the reason.  Although I obtained all reports from 2007 to 2010, I decided to 
use only information in June of each year.   In order to merge this data with the 
master data, I had to do several computations to derive the municipality code using 
Excel and STATA, detailed in the appendix.     
3.3.2 Data quality 
I was careful to merge datasets produced in the same month of a calendar year as 
much as possible.  IBGE produces its population estimates in July.  I specifically 
requested MDS for snapshots of the Cadastro in July.  MEC and MS datasets have 
information in June each year.       
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Although there are problems with using administrative datasets, it is important to 
recognise that Cadastro is the dataset utilised by the MDS to register and select the 
beneficiaries.  MDS has put in place several quality controls for Cadastro (further 
analysed in Chapter 5).  IBGE population statistics are used by the government to 
transfer funds to the municipalities.  MEC and MS datasets are used to cancel BF 
benefits.  Thus, there is a strong incentive for ensuring the quality of those 
administrative datasets.  
There are advantages and disadvantages to using administrative datasets.  The 
advantages are the cost-effectiveness of using census-like data, as opposed to running 
a sample survey.  The information in federal-based datasets is also consistently 
captured, as ministries have national directives prescribing how and when to input the 
information in the systems.  
The disadvantages in the use of administrative datasets are largely problems of data 
entry.  Inputs into these systems are made at the municipal level.  There may be 
inconsistency in coding between different technicians.  There could be registration 
errors, system errors and even fraud.  There is some qualitative evidence of under-
reporting cases of non-compliance in schools (Bastagli 2008; Rocha 2013).  There is 
also the problem of a potential mismatch between definitions of administrative 
datasets and those used by researchers.  Such differences are found in the MEC 
dataset, further detailed in Chapter 8. 
As for the population statistics, it is important to keep in mind its limitations, as 
illustrated in Figure 3.   
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Figure 3: Population of Brazil, 2004-2010 
 
Source: PNADs (2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009), Contagem Populacional (2007), Census (2010). 
 
The drop in population estimates in 2007 is due to the different methodology used in 
the population count.  This resulted in lower constitutional federal transfers
68
 to 
municipalities for the provision of social services.  Municipalities filed several 
lawsuits requesting that these numbers be corrected and adjusted (Watanabe 2008).  
The Brazilian Court of Audit (TCU) was requested to audit IBGE’s methodology, 
specifically for estimating the population and the municipal gross domestic product 
(TCU 2009a).  TCU found that IBGE’s methodology in general was satisfactory for 
population estimates, although unsatisfactory for cases with high migration flows
69
.  
This process resulted in several recommendations, which IBGE included in the 2010 
Census – the basis for the 2011 municipal estimations (IBGE 2011a). 
The possibility of error in estimates of participation rates in individual municipalities, 
led me to adopt three strategies to answer RQ1: (i) to compare participation rate 
trends instead of point estimates; (ii) to report participation rates by PIR and PNIR 
typologies, instead of individual municipalities, and (iii) to compare the participation 
rates by categorical poverty variables.  This is the core of the analysis in Chapter 4. 
                                               
68 This transfer is called  FPM (Fundo de Participação dos Municípios). 
69 This methodological problem is relevant to this thesis.  Municipalities resort to information that may 
produce uncertain statistics, e.g. difference between the number of births and deaths.  However, IBGE 
estimates disregard the flows of people across municipalities, and this has an impact on local 
administration.  As this thesis will show, populations in PNIR municipalities migrate to the nearby 
urban municipality to use its public services, while still residing in the rural municipality where they 
are counted for IBGE’s purposes.  This is not addressed in the population count that is the basis for 
federal transfer towards local service provision. 
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Another important issue to be outlined is the comparability of datasets.  I use the 
MoPI and BCIM to construct the remoteness variable and the typology of remoteness 
is unlikely to have changed over time.  I do not make comparisons between different 
administrative datasets.  Instead, I compare Cadastro participation rates and 
compliance rates against the typology.  Although I have snapshots of health and 
education compliances in periods of time that are similar, I do not compare health and 
educational datasets
70
.  All administrative datasets have municipality as the unit of 
analysis.  I see, therefore, no major issue of comparability.   
It is important to address briefly the treatment of missing values and outliers
71
.  A 
variable was considered to be missing (“.”) when there was no municipality code 
assigned to it in the MoPI merging file
72
.  Another type of missing variable consists 
of values such as 0 or 99.  Using the extended classification of missing variables in 
STATA 10, the first instance is referred to “.z” and the second as “.a”73.   
Exploratory data analysis demonstrated some potential problems with outliers from 
2004 to 2006
74
.  Cadastro quality for the first years of programme implementation is 
questionable, and IBGE population estimates have been contested.  Cadastro was not 
initially intended to be used for the BF, and some adaptation was required during the 
first phases of the BF.  The BF was based on previous programmes, bringing 
overlapping information into a single dataset.  Most importantly, the Cadastro was 
not constantly updated, and compliance with conditionalities was not thoroughly 
investigated, in the beginning of the programme (Soares et al. 2009 p.9).  This was 
confirmed during the fieldwork for this project.  Furthermore, TCU (2009a) has 
reported that IBGE population estimates are particularly problematic for 
                                               
70 Although the analysis of a combined education and health dataset is not attempted in this paper for 
methodological reasons, the interaction could yield interesting results. 
71 For more information on data management, description of variables and the exploratory data analysis 
of missing variables and outliers, please see appendices. 
72 Variables are missing because 58 new municipalities were created during these ten years.  The MoPI 
had, in total, 5507 municipalities, while the Cadastro dataset had 5565. 
73 In 2004, for example, 92 municipalities had missing values for BF participation rates, and 16 had 
missing values in 2005.  Although I was not able to use them for 2004 and 2005, I keep them in the 
dataset, as it is only to be expected that the BF would not have reached all the municipalities in Brazil 
at the beginning of its implementation. 
74 Outliers have been defined as “extreme values for a particular variable” (2007 p.45).  Although the 
definition of ‘extreme values’ varies, I define outliers using quartiles with a multiplier for the inter-
quartile ranges (IQR).  I divide outliers into two categories: potential outliers are observations that lie 
at 1.5 IQR, and problematic outliers are those at 3.0 IQR.  See Agresti and Finlay (2009) and High 
(2000). 
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municipalities with high migration flows, such as the small rural municipalities 
analysed. 
Thus, I decided to address the issue of outliers with yet another measure aside from 
group analysis.  Instead of excluding the outliers, I winsorised the dataset by setting a 
limit to the top and the bottom percentiles of the distribution.  This transforms only 
the value of the outliers and not of the whole distribution (Tukey 1962).  I arbitrarily 
chose to set the top limit as the 97
th
 percentile and the bottom limit as the 3
rd
 
percentile.   
The rationale for group analysis, like that of the outliers, followed quartiles 
distribution.  I clustered the municipalities according to their position in the quartiles, 
avoiding any conclusion about a particular municipality by comparing group trends 
across years.  
Lastly, this thesis does not make claims about causality.  There are several alternative 
explanations for any connections between remoteness and either participation rates or 
conditionalities.  For example, it is plausible to consider that households avoid living 
in remote areas because of the difficulty in accessing educational and health services.  
Thus, remoteness influences the migration of households which in turn influences 
compliance in the geographical area.  In this case, household characteristics are 
spatially correlated, but not-observed in the analysis.  There may be other factors not 
captured by spatial variables that are related to the heterogeneity of different regions 
or municipalities, such as regional and municipal differences in funding, municipality 
staff numbers, and so forth.  However, a spatial regression model that includes 
household, municipal and spatial characteristics is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Nonetheless, through the qualitative analysis it may shed light on some of the 
possible alternative explanatory variables necessary to conduct a spatial regression. 
3.4 Qualitative research design  
 
The qualitative research design involves the collection of three qualitative datasets to 
understand the effectiveness of the policy take-up and implementation from the 
federal, local and household levels.  The investigation of the effectiveness of the BF 
in reaching the rural poor in PIR- and PNIR-specific contexts requires the research 
 Page 103 of 356 
 
design of local and household levels to be structured around geographical location.  
This concern guides the selection of the case studies, the design of the samples, and 
the data collection.  
3.4.1 Selection of case studies 
Since this thesis aims to derive implications for public policies, my objective is to 
select typical case studies, or a representative type of rural municipalities, distancing 
myself from best or worst case studies (Seawright & Gerring 2008).  In order to 
identify the types of rural municipalities that have the most occurrences, I used the 
MoPI to obtain information about the central tendencies of the variables important for 
the BF and this research.  Thus, I selected case studies for each typology that were in 
the central range for income, education, health, poverty and remoteness
75
. 
Qualitative studies generally have a low variability of observations and small sample 
sizes.  Some mixed-methods researchers propose, as best practice, larger sample sizes 
(Baharona & Levy 2007).   Therefore, I have tried to address the issue of low 
variability by selecting four case studies, two cases representing PIR and two 
representing PNIR municipalities.  The use of four case studies may reduce the 
chance that the findings are a result of a specific situation found in only one 
municipality.   
In selecting the case studies, I excluded indigenous and Quilombola
76
 peoples.  MDS 
reports that the indigenous population was estimated around 2 million (MDS 2007b 
p.11).  Quilombolas are the descendents of escaped or freed slaves, with historical 
traditional ties to the land called quilombo (Art. 2 Decreto No.4.887, 20/11/2003).  
There are about 3,524 quilombolas.  In 2008, the BF reached approximately 19 
thousand quilombola families (Presidência da República 2009). 
Both peoples have priority in the selection process into the BF programme, as they 
have higher social vulnerability (Arts. 7,8 Portaria GM/MDS No.341,07/10/2008).  
Thus, their case study would produce different results from the analysis of rural 
                                               
75 I did not use the average BF participation as a selection variable, as it assumes that the BF is 
implemented everywhere and that the average distribution of the programme in the population will 
correspond to the average needs of the population.  This may not be the case.  See the Appendix 3F for 
details. 
76 Comunidades Remanescentes de Quilombos. 
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people in general.  In addition, these people require anthropological considerations, 
which are not part of the objective of this research.  The MoPI has information on 
indigenous peoples’ sites but no information on quilombolas’.  For the latter, I 
investigated whether there were any quilombolas nearby once the case studies had 
been selected. 
As illustrated in Map 2, the majority of the poor rural areas were located in the 
Northeast and North of Brazil but, as stated in section 3.1, this thesis focuses on the 
Northeast.  The probability of having a case study in the Northeast was higher than in 
the North due to the higher numbers of BF beneficiaries in the Northeast.  There are 
also higher numbers of indigenous peoples in the North.        
I intentionally selected case studies located in different states so that I could add 
variation to the interviews and to the local implementation processes.  Three of the 
four cases were in the semi-arid (sertão) region of the Northeast.   
Table 5 summarises the selection criteria and provides information on the case 
studies.  I have refined the distance variable in order to select case studies that 
approximate to the median of the distance distribution.  This aims to avoid case 
studies that are close to the cut-off point for PIR and PNIR municipalities, i.e. 50 km.  
Thus, by using the median as a rough guide, I selected case studies that are in the mid 
of the distribution.    
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Table 5: Selection of case studies, PIR and PNIR 
 PIR 
criteria 
  PNIR 
criteria 
  
Case study #  i ii  n nn 
Distance to nearest 
urban municipality 
>50 km  
(Median 72 km) 
91 69  <50 km  
(Median 25 km) 
23 24 
Distance to the 
state capital  
 740 779  284 210 
Median income R$151 - 302  
(US$65-131)(1) 
R$270 
(US$117) 
R$161 
(US$70) 
R$151 - 302 
(US$65-130) 
210 
(US$91) 
210 
(US$91) 
Education: 
age/grade gap  
61-75%  69 72 61-75% 63 64 
Education: Multi-
grade classrooms  
26-50  49 38 0-10  12 13 
Education:  
Literacy rates 
61-70% 66 61 61-70% 65 70 
Education:  %pop 
with less4yof study  
61-80%  60 70 41-60%  57 57 
Education: average 
years of study 
2.1 -4 2.92 2.17 2.1 -4 3.09 2.94 
Health: 
#beds/1,000 pop  
0 - 0.5  1.7 0 0 - 0.5 1.5 0 
Health: #medical 
positions/1,000 
pop  
0 - 0.5  
 
0 0 0 - 0.5  
 
0 0 
(1)Values as of 02/01/2002.  
Source: author’s calculations using MoPI and BCIM. 
 
PIR case studies “i” and “ii” have similar distances from state capital, i.e. 740 km and 
779 km respectively.  PNIR case studies “n” and “nn” follow the same pattern, i.e. 
280 km and 210 km from the state capital.  This result was unintentional, but it 
validated the methods utilised to construct the remoteness variable.  The same effect 
was observed in the distances to sub-regional urban centres.  PIR municipalities are 
further from sub-regional centres than PNIR municipalities.  This is important 
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because those sub-regional centres are reference points for public services like 
hospitals, specialised medical treatment and tertiary educational services. 
Another important geographical characterisation of PIR and PNIR municipalities was 
the structure of the roads surrounding these locations.  The PIR case studies had no 
major state highway cutting across them, but rather a side-road paved or recently 
paved leading to the rural municipality.  The selected PNIR municipalities, on the 
other hand, had a major highway linking them with neighbouring municipalities.  
Furthermore, PIR municipalities had neighbouring rural municipalities located further 
away than PNIR municipalities.  This is further explored in Chapter 7.  
 General information on case studies 
PNIR case study “n” 
This was the largest municipality visited, with a population of over 30,000 
inhabitants.  It is located in the semi-arid Northeast.  The typical vegetation is 
caatinga (scrubland).  Part of the municipality is located in the mountain range with a 
type of tropical forest vegetation, with palm trees such as the carnaúba and babaçu.  
The soil is mostly sandy and rocky.  
The region produces greens and other vegetables such as lettuce, onions, spring 
onions, beetroot, tomatoes, etc.  Fruits like passionfruit, papaya, mango, banana, 
avocado, coconut, guava, limes, oranges and water melon are also produced in the 
region.  Irrigation practices vary from localised (dripfeed and sprinkler) to manual 
irrigation using hoses.  Irrigation is also brought to the plantations using river pumps.  
However, interviewees were concerned about the unsustainable use of water for 
irrigation purposes, reducing the river basin, and the absence of rain during the rainy 
season.   
There are three types of agriculture practices.  There is subsistence farming (roça) 
involving the planting of corn, beans and manioc.  Then there are the smallholders 
who plant to greens and vegetables to sell in local fairs in this municipality and in 
those nearby.  Finally, there are the large farmers who plant mostly sugar cane which 
is processed and sold as sugar blocks (rapadura) and rum (cachaça), based on the 
traditional sugar cane mill (engenhos).  
 Page 107 of 356 
 
As well as the proceeds of agriculture, the municipality derives income from the 
services sector – commerce, banks, information technology and tourism.  No major 
industry is located in this municipality.  There are two banks – the Banco do Brasil 
and Bradesco – and some banking correspondents (e.g. lottery offices, post offices), 
where BF beneficiaries can withdraw their benefit.  There is no CAIXA. 
PNIR case study “nn” 
This is a small municipality with approximately 5,000 inhabitants.  It is part of the 
semi-arid region and the typical vegetation is caatinga along with cerrado 
(savannah).  The weather is generally hot and rainfall is sparse and scarce and only 
from March to September.  Soils are thin and poor, aside from the valleys.  
The majority of the rural workers plant corn, beans and palma (cactus palm); others 
harvest watermelon, pumpkins and grains.  Although the climate conditions are 
favourable for raising goats, there are few goats in this municipality.  Small farmers 
prefer to invest in cattle, despite being more expensive and costly to raise.  They feed 
the cattle with grass during the rainy season and cactus palm during the dry season.  
There is no municipal fair and they sell their production in nearby municipalities.  
Irrigation is mainly from rain, and wells and small dams supply water to households, 
even in urban areas; there is no piped water. 
The main revenue comes from either agriculture or sewing.  The closest urban 
municipality has a clothing production industry.  This affects the labour dynamic of 
this case study.  Services are not developed: no hotels, no industry, no banks, only 
one banking correspondent.  There is no CAIXA.  
PIR case study “i” 
This case study has around 12,000 inhabitants.  The selected municipality is not part 
of the semi-arid area although local soils have low natural fertility and high acidity.  
Interviewees reported that smallholders harvest corn, manioc and beans, generally for 
their own subsistence.  Other farmers engage in pig farming and cattle ranching for 
meat and milk production.  Small farmers have no complex system of irrigation, only 
the rain or a hand-held hose.  Some of the rural villages are not on the national energy 
grid (although they do have solar panels), and so they are unable to build any type of 
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irrigation system.  Some rural villages are also fishing villages, but commercial 
fishing is hampered by the lack electricity for preserving the fish. 
The municipality derives income mostly from cattle ranching and the two main 
municipal celebrations – the cattle ranch fest (vaquejada) and the corn fest.  These 
popular fetes also stimulate the local services, e.g. hotels and restaurants.  There is a 
weekly market where farmers sell their produce.  It is located in the main square, and 
there are little food stalls.  There is one Banco do Brasil in addition to one banking 
correspondent.  There is no CAIXA. 
PIR case study “ii” 
This municipality has approximately 14,000 inhabitants and it is part of the semi-arid 
country.  On the plains and in low areas, the soil is badly irrigated, is deficient in salts 
and has only medium fertility.  In higher areas, the soil fertility is average to high, 
despite being shallow and rocky.  Desertification is taking place in this location, 
making agriculture unsustainable for some of the population. 
Interviewees reported that farming is subsistence.  Farmers harvest corn, beans and 
manioc.  Some farmers also invest in livestock, mainly sheep and goats.  The majority 
of the producers are smallholders, although there are also some larger farms 
producing for commercial purposes.  
Income is derived mainly from agriculture.  There is a weekly market in which 
farmers sell their produce.  There is one private commercial banking Bradesco in 
addition to one banking correspondent.  There is no CAIXA.  
3.4.2 Sample design 
I conducted extensive fieldwork in two PIR and two PNIR municipalities.  Several 
interviews were not included in the final dataset, but they were instrumental to my in-
depth understanding of the local context.   
My choice of design strategies depended on the dataset.  To understand policy design 
and concerns at the federal level (RQ2a), I interviewed federal administration staff 
responsible for the BF programme.  Interviewing local administration staff (RQ2b) 
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and the households (RQ2c) within each municipality required a more complex 
research design approach, as explained below.   
 Dataset: local administration staff 
In deciding whom to interview among the local administration staff, I conducted 
purposive sampling (Ritchie et al. 2003a), i.e. interviewees were chosen based on 
their role in the implementation of the BF programme and grouped according to the 
location typology.  Purposive sampling allows maximum variation of roles (or job 
functions) and locations, and aims to identify themes that cut across different groups.  
The identification of central themes captures those features relevant for this analysis.   
Table 6 shows the design of the local administration purposive sampling.  The rows 
represent different job functions, and the columns represent different area allocations.  
In that way, the central themes of the RQ2b of implementation and remoteness cut 
across each case study (illustrated below). 
 
Table 6: Designing purposive sampling for local administrators 
 
 Isolated  
PIR 
Non-Isolated 
PNIR 
Local 
Administration: 
  
Job function   
   
 
 
 
Source: author. 
 
The study sample comprises 14 interviews in total, 11 interviews in social assistance 
centres and three interviews with banking correspondents, given their role in the 
distribution of benefits.  In some circumstances, there was more than one local 
administration staff member present, so there were19 interviewees who participated 
in the 14 interviews, as per Table 7 below.  
Theme: local implementation across job function -  
control for remoteness 
 
Theme: 
remoteness 
across PIR & 
PNIR  -  control 
for job function 
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Table 7: Sample matrix of local administration, according to type of jobs and location 
Local Administration job ISOLATED  
PIR  (# interviewees) 
NON-ISOLATED  
PNIR (# interviewees) 
Secretariat of Social 
Assistance 
1 1 
CRAS manager 1 2 
CRAS psychologist 0 1 
Social worker 1 1* 
Other CRAS staff (teachers, 
clerk) 
1* 2 
Cadastro coordinator  1 1 
Cadastro technical staff 2 1 
Banking correspondent 2 1 
Total 9 10 
* Also members of the BF Civil Society Council (ICS) 
Source: author. 
 
 Dataset: households 
This dataset consisted of interviews with parents to explore how remoteness might 
influence registration practices, knowledge of benefits, compliance with 
conditionalities, collection of benefits, and social control.   
Rural villages were chosen according to the PIR/PNIR typology.  The rural villages I 
am interested in are defined by municipal legislation differently from the way I am 
defining them for the purposes of this thesis.  Technically, the rural villages of this 
research are classified by IBGE (2008b) as “aglomerado rural” or “povoado”, and 
this is the terminology I referred to while collecting information.  For IBGE a 
“village” is the name of main town within a sub-municipal urban area called a 
“district” (distrito).  The English terminology adopted in this thesis, however, 
excluded small urban areas (distritos) from the sampling frame, even though these 
areas may still share some common BF household participation issues with non-
isolated rural villages.   
I categorised isolated and non-isolated rural villages according to the distance from 
the rural village to the main local town (henceforth “local town” – i.e. the main town 
from which the municipality derives its name).  In order to identify the geographical 
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location of rural villages within a municipality, I collected information from two 
sources: interviews with the president of the rural workers’ union about the different 
rural villages within the municipality; and first-hand data collection by driving around 
the municipality, recording the distance between the local town and the rural villages 
visited
77
.  With this information at hand, I was able to categorise the types of rural 
villages within a municipality.   
I then selected isolated rural villages in PIR municipalities and non-isolated rural 
villages in PNIR municipalities.  I intentionally selected cases within a municipality 
that would reflect most accurately the typology of isolated and non-isolated rural 
villages, i.e. villages that were the furthest away from and the closest to the local 
town, were the most likely to be included in this research.  I also selected more than 
one rural village in each location in order to cross-check the findings across rural 
villages within the same municipality.  Just as in their respective types of 
municipalities, isolated rural villages had difficult road access to the local town, while 
non-isolated rural villages had easy road access.  I worked in total with 10 rural 
villages evenly distributed across PIR and PNIR municipalities.  Table 8 shows the 
design of a purposive sample for this dataset.  
Table 8: Designing purposive sampling for households 
 Isolated rural 
village in PIR 
municipality 
Non-Isolated rural 
village in PNIR 
municipality 
Households    
   
 
 
 
 
Source: author. 
                                               
77 I recorded this information on protocol observations, as described in section 3.4.3 and Appendix 3G. 
Theme: local implementation across function 
– control for remoteness  
Theme: 
remoteness 
across PIR & 
PNIR - 
control for 
function 
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After selecting the rural villages to be researched, I had to identify and select 
households.  With the help of the president of the rural workers’ union, I was able to 
obtain details of the rural workers’ community leader of each rural village.  Most of 
the time, the president acted as a gatekeeper between me and the community, as 
represented by the village leader.  The village leader would either have received a 
message from the president, or he would contact the president before the interview.  
Although the interview with the village leader was usually not included in the 
household analysis in Chapter 8, it was instrumental for my acceptance by the 
community, and for providing in-depth insights into aspects of remoteness and the 
living conditions in these rural communities, as analysed in the Chapter 7.  
With the community leader’s informal approval of my visit, I was then able to collect 
household data, by interviewing families in their homes and using a snowballing 
technique.  My objective was to build a sample matrix of households with different 
criteria, based on age, literacy and location, as depicted in Table 9.  But before I 
explain the reasons for the different criteria, I outline below how I directed the 
sampling process so as to obtain as much variation as possible. 
There was no household sampling frame considered adequate for this research.  I 
decided not to use the local Cadastro for two reasons.  First, using an official 
government document during the interview could bias households’ responses if they 
perceived me to be associated to the local government.  Second, the Cadastro would 
not have any information on those eligible households who had not registered, and it 
is important to know this in order to find out how the BF reaches the persistently 
poor.   
In order to build a household sampling frame, I devised a household reference sheet 
to screen for households’ eligibility for the BF programme.  This sheet, along with 
housing maps for the villages, assigned an identification number to each household, 
and started each interview with a few quick facts, such as how many children they 
had, their ages and education levels, if they were beneficiaries, their benefit levels, 
etc
78
.   
                                               
78 See the household reference sheet at Appendix 3I. 
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In this way I was able to identify both the BF households and those households who 
were eligible but not beneficiaries.  The information on income was not always 
collected because I framed it as an optional open question for reasons of trust and 
rapport; nonetheless, it could be roughly deduced from such factors as the number of 
children and their ages, and the types of occupations households reported.  Given that 
I am not concerned with targeting accuracy in the selected case studies, and given, 
too, that this group has high income volatility, I consider this potential inaccuracy and 
lack of consistency acceptable for the purposes of this dataset, which is to understand 
how households participate in the BF programme.   
The household reference sheet supplied the information I needed to identify 
households for the study sample matrix, outlined in Table 9.  The household 
interviewing process, however, went beyond what was needed to fulfil the 
requirements for the sample matrix.  Even after I had already collected the 
information for the sample matrix, I would still continue the interview, or carry out 
extra ones, with the aim of thematic saturation (as described in section 3.4.5).  In 
addition, the interviewing process generated trust and understanding of my role 
within the community.  The more interviews, the more accepted I felt and the more 
households were at ease with my presence in the community.  There were also 
informal norms and values that I had to respect, such as personally talking to elder 
members of the community and taking time to listen to their stories.  These were also 
enriching for the in-depth knowledge they gave of the histories of those rural 
locations and of aspects of living there.  I conducted 54 household interviews in total, 
but I selected only 22 interviews for the study sample matrix, evenly spread across 
PIR and PNIR municipalities.   
Table 9 outlines the study sample matrix by the number of interviews in PIR and in 
PNIR municipalities.  The household selection criteria are BF participation, age and 
literacy.  Their purpose is to group similarities and compare differences.  As much as 
possible, I tried to assign one interview to each age and literacy group, according to 
participation in the BF programme (beneficiary and non-beneficiary) and to location 
(PIR and PNIR).  I was also careful to establish a balance of interviews within each 
case study, as identified by the letters in parenthesis.   
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Table 9: Sample matrix of households – criteria based on age, literacy and location 
  Beneficiaries Non-Beneficiaries 
Age Literacy PIR PNIR PIR PNIR 
25 years or 
less 
Less than 
4y 
0 2 (nn & n) 0 0 
More than 
4y 
1 (i) 0 1(i) 1 (n) 
26 to 40 
years 
Less than 
4y 
1 (ii)  1 (nn) 2 (ii) 1 (n) 
More than 
4y 
1 (i) 1 (n)  1 (i) 1 (nn) 
More than 
40 years 
Less than 
4y 
1 (ii)  1 (nn) 2 (i & ii) 1 (n) 
More than 
4y 
1 (i)  1 (n) 0 1 (nn) 
Total  5 6 6 5 
Note: The letters in parenthesis represent the four different case studies.  
Source: author. 
 
It is important to analyse BF participation separately because there are concerns about 
non-take up, the impacts of the programme, and the prioritisation of the poorest.  
Beneficiaries are defined as households that are part of the BF programme.  Non-
beneficiaries are defined more loosely, as households that (i) have never been part of 
the BF, (ii) were part of the BF but had their benefit cut, and (iii) only recently joined 
the programme.  I decided to include the latter group as non-beneficiaries because 
they can provide better recall of information about their situations before the 
programme.   
Households at different stages face specific challenges stemming from changes in 
family life-cycle and composition.  I have divided households into three age groups 
based on the household head’s age: (i) up to 25 years of age, usually families with 
younger children; (ii) between 25 and 40, families that usually have older and young 
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adult children; and (iii) above 40 (and before retirement age), older parents that have 
usually started assuming grand parenting responsibilities.   
I also categorised the households according to their literacy levels.  Although literacy 
is not part of the eligibility criteria for the receipt of benefits, it does affect the ways 
in which households gather information about eligibility, cancellation, and 
compliance with conditionalities, and this affects participation rates.  As a proxy for 
literacy levels, I have divided households into two groups: those whose heads have 
four years or less of study, and those whose heads have had more than four years of 
study.  This decision is based on two findings: that functional illiteracy is generally 
considered as less than four years of education (UNESCO 2006 p.156); and that rural 
education in Brazil lasts only four years (World Bank 2003).   
3.4.3 Designing research instruments and ethical considerations  
 Research instruments: 
Several instruments were required to conduct this analysis.  To find key thematic 
areas of investigation, I used topic guides which varied depending on which 
qualitative dataset it was being used for.  I also used field notes, protocol 
observations, household reference sheet (screening), service profiling
79
 and maps.   
Protocol observations were used to register the infrastructure and the material 
conditions I observed.  There were protocol observations for driving to rural 
municipalities and villages, and for schools, health centres and CRAS.  For each rural 
municipality and rural village, I would write down the road conditions and the 
kilometres to the town hall and to the nearest urban municipality.  In order to write 
the protocol observations, I personally interviewed school teachers, head nurses, 
community-health agents and social assistant secretariats and social workers.  I 
carried out 34 protocol observations. 
I got information about the services available, e.g. the access to and the existence, 
frequency and costs of public transport to schools and health clinics, in the household 
                                               
79 Except for the maps, these documents are included in the appendix.  The maps are not included to 
reduce any possibility of identification. 
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interviews.  Whenever I confirmed the same information from different interviewees, 
I stopped requesting it, as service provision should not vary in rural villages.       
I also used maps during fieldwork.  I would map households for identification 
purposes, and all trajectories from the local town to the rural village I visited.   
 Safety and ethical considerations 
I undertook various precautions regarding my safety and the safety of interviewees.  
For my safety, I kept a protected blog with information on the fieldwork itinerary, 
with dates that I updated frequently.  I also visited the area in the company of a 
driver.  This precautionary measure was very valuable, as we covered extensive 
territory (about 10 thousand kilometres driving plus some flights).  The company of a 
male driver proved to be particularly useful on arriving and leaving each rural 
community.  Due to land conflicts, I had to be careful when venturing into rural 
villages.  The president of the municipal rural farmer’s union acted as a gatekeeper in 
the case studies.  There had been reports of robberies in some North-eastern states 
and along highways.  In order to avoid those roads, I phoned the state highway police 
bureau in advance to inquire about road conditions and safety.    
As for the interviewees, I addressed their safety in various ways.  Although I recorded 
the majority of the interviews, I did not obtain any documentation that would identify 
the interviewee.  This created the confidence required to allow them to speak more 
freely.  I used password-protected files for storing the data, and I guaranteed 
anonymity for all interviewees.  This research received ethical approval from the LSE 
Research Ethics Committee.   
3.4.4 Preparation for fieldwork: the pilot study 
In September 2009, before I went to the field, I piloted the interview guides by 
carrying out 13 interviews at a local municipality.  This pilot experience proved to be 
extremely useful for improving the topic guides, broadening the number of 
interviewees, and ordering the data-collection phase.  It also helped me to understand 
the heterogeneity of the villages and small towns within a municipality, and led me to 
investigate isolated rural villages in PIR municipalities and non-isolated rural villages 
in PNIR municipalities.  
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The pilot also helped me to practice interviewing and to understand the importance of 
ordering the questions within an interview guide.  This was particularly important in 
the case of both the beneficiaries of the BF and non-beneficiaries.  I noticed that if I 
started the interview with direct questions related to the BF, the interview dynamic 
was cut short.  On the other hand, broad and narrative questions starting with the 
interviewee’s personal accounts would set a more casual, personal and intimate tone 
for the interview.  I was able to obtain more rapport with the latter approach and this 
led me to create the household reference sheet.   
Interviewing demands practice and this pilot study was pivotal.  A successful 
interview is the one that is an “apparently natural and almost casual conversation” 
(Gaskell 2000 p.40).  It took me several attempts to achieve this and I could only 
observe my improvement as I practiced.  After memorising the interview guides, I 
was able to re-order the questions so that they evolved naturally.  I developed the 
ability to perceive when the interviewees were at ease and unthreatened while I 
reassured them with eye contacts and body language.  
With the pilot, I reflected on the use of language differences and of moving between 
different levels of Portuguese.  When interviewing public officials, I needed to use a 
standard Portuguese, without regional expressions or mistakes and with a richer 
vocabulary.  While interviewing beneficiaries, I switched to a more approachable 
informal Portuguese with regional variations in tone.  It was also necessary to use 
their local language so that the questions would carry the same meaning for 
interviewer and interviewee.   
As a result of the pilot study, I decided to introduce the research instruments 
described in sub-section 3.4.3, in order to capture the in-depth contextual information.  
Furthermore, I requested the assistance of a more experienced researcher than myself 
to check a couple of my interviews.  This measure aimed to ensure the quality of the 
work. 
3.4.5 Data collection 
I interviewed the federal administration staff in September 2009, and also while 
conducting the case studies from February to July 2010.  I visited the four case-study 
sites from March 10
th
 to 30
th
, from April 12
th
 to 26
th
, and from May 18
th
 to June 26
th
.  
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I spent, on average, 14 days in each municipality, not counting the various long round 
trips by car and plane in order to arrive at the sites.   
I collected two types of data: naturally occurring data and generated data (Lewis 
2003).  Given that geographical location is an important aspect of this study, I 
collected data in its natural settings, using observation and participant observation 
approaches.  I wrote down my observations of occurrences and descriptions of places 
(“thick description”).  I also lived in the areas where the research was carried out.  
This helped me to build trust and rapport in these communities which had never 
received researchers before.  I was invited to a funeral, a religious celebration, to 
share meals/coffee with households, and to talk to one elderly member of a rural 
community.  These rich opportunities contributed to my understanding of how the 
context influenced people’s perceptions of their families and relationships, and of the 
programme, formal and informal institutions, and the state.  
The generated data were the interviews.  Primary data were collected through face-to-
face, in-depth and semi-structured interviews.  I attempted to avoid double negatives 
or double-barrelled questions when interviewing.  I avoided preambles and too 
abstract questions, focusing instead on simple, short and clear statements.  While 
listening to the interviewee’s responses, I probed in order to obtain detailed and 
specific answers to my questions.  
I interviewed federal and local administration staff at their workplaces, preferably in a 
private room.  I would first ask about their function and an explanation of their work 
routine, and then I would go into details of the BF operation.  More specific and 
sensitive questions would arise naturally later on, during the conversation after the 
interview tone was set.   
While interviewing households, I would first ask some factual questions, then open 
up some space for their life story, and finally I would ask about the BF and specific 
thematic questions.  The household reference sheet was used as a conversation start-
up, as factual questions are easier answer.  The reference sheet opened the dialogue 
between interviewee and interviewer, setting up the contextual scenario for more 
complex questions on programme participation such as juggling children’s school 
attendance with other household responsibilities.   
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I interviewed households in their home environment, providing me with yet another 
opportunity to collect observational data.  I was unable to have a separate room for 
interviewing.  In some cases, the husband or a neighbour wanted to observe what I 
was doing, and this snowballed to other interviews.  Any request for privacy in this 
community environment would have been counter-productive: cutting off my 
relations within the community.  As well, the paired (or triad) interviews provided an 
opportunity to note dialogue, reflections, and agreement in themes.  However, 
sometimes the quality of the recording was compromised as external noises made it 
difficult for transcribing.  I did not transcribe doubtful parts of the recording.  
Table 10 details the ways in which the interviews were registered, the total number of 
interviews, the range of durations of the interviews, and the total interview time.  
Informed consent was digitally recorded. 
Table 10: Dataset details 
  Total number 
of interview 
Duration of 
interviews 
(range h:mm) 
Total 
interview 
time 
(hh:mm) 
Federal 
administration staff 
database 
8 digitally 
recorded  
8 0:24 to 1:55 10:07 
Local 
administration staff 
database 
10 digitally 
recorded 
4 notes taken 
during 
interview  
14 0:45 to 1:26 10:00 
Households 21 digitally 
recorded 
1 notes taken 
during 
interview 
22 0:11 to 2: 28  60:57 
TOTAL  44  81:04 
Source: author. 
 
 Negotiating research relationships: 
Two strategies were used to negotiate access and to develop research relationships: 
one at the federal level and another one at the municipal level.   
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In September 2009 and from January to July 2010, I was a visiting scholar at the 
International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, an initiative partnered by the United 
Nations Development Programme and the Government of Brazil.  My position in this 
institution was very important in negotiating access to the key federal government 
staff responsible for the BF/Cadastro design, implementation and evaluation, and in 
organising one-to-one interviews with them. 
In the case studies I used the concepts of “corpus construction” and “saturation” 
(Bauer & Aarts 2000).  Corpus construction is a “systematic selection” process (p.20) 
intended to give public accountability to the research.  In order to build the corpus, 
Bauer and Aarts suggest: “(a) to select preliminarily, (b) to analyse this variety, (c) to 
extend the corpus of data until no additional variety can be detected” (p.31).  The 
latter step is saturation.   
I built the study sample systematically, working with two strands of interviewees.  
The first strand started at the municipal rural workers’ union, went from there to the 
local rural community leader, and ended at households.  The second strand started at 
the local administration of CRAS, from there to the Education and Health 
Secretariats, and ended at local school teachers and community health agents.  I was 
very careful not to use the local administration strand to generate a sampling frame of 
households, in order to protect households and to avoid any perceived links between 
me and the local administration
80
.   
I also asked to the president of the rural workers’ union about the main issues rural 
workers in a given municipality faced, and about the distribution of rural districts and 
villages in the area.  The president acted, most of the time, as a gatekeeper between 
the local community leader and me, as some of the rural villages were wary of 
outsiders.  With these two contacts (the president and the local community leader), I 
was able to knock on households’ doors, introduce myself and quickly screen their 
eligibility for the programme.  I used snowballing techniques to identify additional 
households.    
                                               
80 It was important not to be associated with the local administration as the fieldwork was conducted in 
the electoral year of 2010.    
 Page 121 of 356 
 
While conducting interviews, I analysed the variety contained in the sample in order 
to decide whether I needed to extend the interviews to another rural district or village.  
I approached saturation in the corpus when I started hearing similar accounts in 
different rural communities.  Saturation was also observed through the triangulation 
of the information about the implementation processes of the BF programme between 
beneficiaries and the local administration.  In each case study, I interviewed at least 
two rural communities within a municipality.  I am confident that the number of 
interviews and the time I spent in the field were adequate to obtain enough variation 
to draw implications for the PIR and PNIR municipalities I visited. 
3.4.6 Data analysis, validity, reliability and generalisability 
I carried out content and thematic analysis using a mix of NVivo codes and the 
framework method (Ritchie et al. 2003b).  I developed the coding frame with 
reference to the literature and including the predetermined themes of participation, 
remoteness and implementation.  This was updated after the pilot study.  Some 
interviews I transcribed myself, for others I had assistance
81
.  In both cases, each 
transcript was double checked while playing the recording and subsequently read 
several times.  I used NVivo to code the transcripts and to develop further codes.  
Then, I used the framework method to continue synthesising while retaining key 
ideas of interviewees.  Theoretical links and hierarchies were produced in a later stage 
of the data analysis (Ritchie et al. 2003b; Spencer et al. 2003). 
 Generalisability, reliability and validity 
The use of case studies in this thesis aims to establish possible inferential or 
analytical generalisations, but not representational generalisations, that is, those 
conducted with statistical analysis (Lewis & Ritchie 2003).  Generalisations are 
working hypotheses, not conclusions.  Inferential generalisation is utilised when the 
circumstances described in a case study could be inferred for another case study.  
Analytical generalisation happens when a specific case study enlightens the general 
theoretical debate.   
                                               
81 In the case of external transcribers, I secured confidentiality agreements ensuring consideration of 
research ethics. 
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I paid particular attention to issues of reliability, which is important for applied policy 
research.  I was careful to outline all the systematic approaches to data collection and 
analysis, I constructed a sample with large variations and saturation, and I covered the 
relevant ground during fieldwork with the four case studies and several interviews. 
I address validity with several comparisons and triangulations.  The comparison of 
findings among four case studies strengthens internal validity.  External validity was 
obtained through several triangulations:  triangulation of methods (quantitative and 
qualitative), triangulation of sources (observations and interviews), and triangulation 
through multiple analyses (federal, local and household levels).   
I did not pursue “communicative validation” (Gaskell & Bauer 2000 p.348), also 
known as respondent validation, where the researcher shows the transcripts and 
results to the interviewees, involving them in data processes and analysis.  I could not 
consider this validity criterion, as access to the municipalities where I did the 
interviews is too difficult for a follow-up visit.   
3.5 Analytical framework 
The analytical framework brings together all datasets and their relationship to the 
proposed research questions.   
RQ1 is addressed in the analysis of the relationship between the federal and local 
spheres of government, as both national policy prescriptions and local administrations 
influence the effectiveness of the BF in reaching the rural poor.  The reach of the BF 
is captured by the quantitative dataset in Chapter 4, and by investigating the national 
policy design (RQ2a), based on the federal qualitative dataset, in Chapter 5. 
The analytical framework illustrated below divides remoteness into two different 
types, analysed in detail in Chapters 6 and 7.  The first type, which I call inter-
municipality remoteness, is the kind of remoteness that lies behind the PIR and 
PNIR typology, that is, the distance of rural municipalities from the nearest urban 
municipality.  The second type of remoteness – the intra-municipality remoteness – 
relates to the distance between the rural village and the main local town with all the 
local administration apparatus.  The latter kind of remoteness is used to classify the 
rural village into either isolated or non-isolated.  Although the effects of remoteness 
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could be minimised by investments in infrastructure (road quality) and technology 
(mobile phones, internet), the classification is justified by the fact that the 
municipalities studied still lack adequate investments.  By analysing the two types of 
remoteness separately, it will be possible to address them differently, resulting in both 
short-term BF policy recommendations and long-term structural policy interventions. 
Analytical framework: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author. 
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implementation (RQ2b) is analysed in Chapter 6 in the context of these two types of 
remoteness.  I base this analysis on the local administration dataset. 
Households are also classified according to their location.  The types of remoteness, 
explored in Chapter 7, influence how households take-up services (RQ2c).  This 
analysis, conducted in Chapter 8, is based on the household qualitative dataset. 
Finally, across all different geographical locations there are different types of flows.  I 
use the concept of flows found in the literature on the geography of movement 
(Santos & Silveira 2004) and adapt it for this study.  Santos and Silveira believe that 
the density of spaces, both natural (forests, land, vegetation, etc.) and artificial (ports, 
roads, cities, etc.), presents a snapshot of the current situation, as well as giving 
historical accounts of that location.  Connecting the spaces together are movements of 
fast or slow flows.  These flows can be understood, either in the material sense, such 
as flows of transportation, or in the social sense of relationships, power and the 
division of labour.     
The thematic analysis of the interviews enabled me to separate these flows into the 
following categories: (i) flows of people, observed in migration patterns or household 
composition changes; (ii) flows of material and human resources linked to the local 
economy; (iii) flows of knowledge, represented by formal and informal access to 
information; (iv) flows of political influence, comprising networks that help or hinder 
access to opportunities.  These flows support parts of the argumentation of Chapters 
6, 7 and 8. 
3.6 Appendices 
Appendix 3A: The Map of Poverty and Inequality: the variable poverty 
Appendix 3B: The multimodal network dataset and network analysis 
Appendix 3C: Data management: identification of the municipality code in the 
Ministry of Education dataset 
Appendix 3D: Exploratory data analysis 
Appendix 3E: Description of variables 
Appendix 3F: Using the quantitative dataset to inform the selection of case studies 
Appendix 3G: Protocol observations 
Appendix 3H: Service profiling information 
Appendix 3I: Household reference sheet  
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4 BOLSA FAMÍLIA’S PARTICIPATION RATES IN POOR ISOLATED 
RURAL (PIR) AND POOR NON-ISOLATED RURAL (PNIR) 
MUNICIPALITIES,  2004-2009 
In terms of maximizing effectiveness, therefore, the real challenge lies in 
the problem of ‘how to reach the difficult to reach’ in our societies.  And 
this challenge contains a moral element when those who do not or cannot 
express their needs are the victims of diswelfares inflicted by society. 
Titmuss (1968 p.67) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter starts the analysis of the research question (RQ1) “How effectively does 
the BF reach the rural poor in remote and non-remote rural municipalities?” or 
to put it differently “Do BF participation rates in PIR municipalities differ from those 
in PNIR municipalities? Did the expansion of the BF from 2004 to 2009 reach more 
households living in areas that are comparatively poorer?”  It is plausible to consider 
that a programme could have higher participation rates in municipalities that have 
better infrastructure to identify and locate those in need more effectively.  Thus, I 
investigate this question by using the quantitative datasets described in the previous 
chapter, and analysing two trends:  
(i) The BF participation rate from 2004 to 2009, and 
(ii) The changes in participation rates according to poverty levels. 
It is necessary, however, to briefly review some concepts.  Effectiveness is 
understood as a policy achieving its objectives.  Several studies have calculated the 
effectiveness of the BF according to how well it reduces poverty and inequality.   
 Soares (2013 pp.156, 157), using PNAD microdata, calculated that in 2004 
the BF was responsible for a 2% reduction on poverty headcount (US$2 
purchasing power parity per day).  In 2009, the BF was responsible for a 0.9% 
reduction.  Impacts were higher in rural areas; and for children and for adults 
between 25 and 40 years, the BF reduced poverty by three to four percentage 
points.  It was also responsible for 14% of the reduction in inequality between 
1995 and 2009 (p.164).  
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 Hoffmann (2013), using the 2008-9 POF
82
, decomposed the GINI index by 
income source, and found that the BF is the source of income that contributes 
most progressively to reducing inequality, compared to labour income, 
pensions, social transfers and other sources of income (rent, donations).  
Concentration curves reaffirm this finding that the BF is the most progressive 
social protection transfer payment.   
 Soares et al. (2010b p.9), using 2004 and 2006 PNADs, showed that the BF 
was responsible for a fifth of the reduction in inequality during this period. 
 Using the 2007 PNAD, Rocha (2013 pp.155, 156) demonstrated that the BF 
reduced the poverty headcount by 3.3% in 2007, with a greater reduction in 
rural areas (11.3%)
83
.  According to the author, inequality fell from 0.599 in 
1997 to 0.538 in 2009 (p. 153).  Two-thirds of the fall in inequality (or 4.2 
percentage points) was due to income from employment, while transfers (BF 
and BPC) accounted for a reduction of 1.1 percentage points.  Although 
transfers represented only 1.3% of family income, they were responsible for 
18% of the fall in inequality in this period (p.153). 
As discussed in Chapter 1 and in line with Titmuss’ statement in the opening of this 
chapter, this thesis contributes to the debate by analysing the BF in terms of 
“maximizing effectiveness”.  It is important to state that the author (1968 p.65) 
understands “effectiveness” in two ways: (i) maximising the delivery of services that 
people cannot get access to without recourse to the state; and (ii) ensuring that social 
policies and services meet needs, sometimes articulated, other times not articulated 
(due to fear or stigma), and sometimes not even perceived (e.g. mental health 
services).  The hard-to-reach are also often unable to express their needs, “Yet they 
are often the people with the greatest needs” (p.66).  
Atkinson (1989 pp.191-193) suggested a number of reasons why people might not 
take-up a benefit in cash transfer programmes, and hence reduce the effectiveness of 
                                               
82 Pesquisa de Orçamentos Familiares (Household Budget Survey). 
83 Rocha, using the POF, derives 25 poverty lines and 25 extreme poverty lines based on the average of 
consumption baskets of low income families. For example, this researcher uses five poverty lines and 
five extreme poverty lines for the Northeast in 2004 (p. 188).  The lines range from R$36.67 (or 14% 
of the minimum wage, approx. US$12.73 in 2004) for the rural northeast, to R$90.72 (or 17% of the 
minimum wage, approx. US$ 31.50 in 2004) for Recife, per month per capita. For information on the 
exchange rate refer to BACEN (2014).  
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the programme by preventing it from reaching the whole of the intended population.  
Those reasons are: (i) choice; (ii) costs that reduce the effective value of the benefit; 
(iii) stigma; (iv) administrative errors; (v) lack of information, etc.  This author also 
asks an important question of effectiveness in take-up: even if households receive the 
benefit, to what extent does it address their needs?  
These considerations of “maximizing effectiveness” proposed by Titmuss and 
Atkinson lay the foundations of how I will address the concept of effectiveness 
throughout this thesis, as I have previously identified in Chapter 1.  
Participation rates are the percentages of households receiving the BF over the total 
number of households in PIR or PNIR municipalities.  The word “participation” is 
sometimes used as a synonym for take-up.  Potential beneficiaries need to actively 
participate in the process of claiming the benefit and undertaking means tests, so that 
the authorities can determine eligibility and grant the benefit.  
However, participation rates differ from take-up.  The estimation of take-up is 
complex: “[I]t depends on being able to identify those families who would receive the 
benefit if they were to claim, and this is not easy” (Atkinson 1989 p.190).  In contrast, 
the participation rate only refers to the percentage of people who are actually taking 
part in the benefit within a specific community, municipality, region or other 
geographical delimitation.  Calculating the BF take-up rate would have involved 
estimating the number of eligible families who were poor but had not claimed the 
benefit, whereas the BF participation rate is the number of actual BF beneficiaries as 
a proportion of the whole population.  It is important, too, not to equate either take-up 
or participation rates with the percentage of the population actually living in poverty.  
Take-up is an estimation of poverty based on programme’s eligibility thresholds, and 
these do not necessarily reflect poverty lines. 
Although there is no analysis of BF participation rates specific to PIR and PNIR 
municipalities, there is research comparing participation rates in rural and urban areas 
of different geographical regions of Brazil.  This could give a broad picture into 
which poor rural municipalities can be inserted. 
Using a representative sample of municipalities and data from various sources 
(PNAD, Human-Development Index and federal transfers), Marques (2005 pp.21-24) 
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found that in 2004 the largest number of BF beneficiaries were in northeast Brazil 
(69.1%), followed by the Southeast (19.1%), the North (8%), the Centre-West (2.4%) 
and the South (1.4%).  In the Northeast, the participation rate by municipality varied 
from 13% to 45%, the higher participation rate having been found in urban 
municipalities with up to 20,000 inhabitants and rural municipalities with up to 
100,000 inhabitants ( pp.16-17).   
It is important to note that Marques’ study is dated 2004, and the BF had not been 
entirely rolled out.  Assessment of participation rates that early may only reflect the 
rates of previous programmes that were brought under the BF umbrella programme.   
Using the 2004 PNAD, Bastagli (2008) conducted a regression analysis on the 
probability of programme participation according to location.  This analysis affirmed 
the fact that households in rural areas were more likely to receive the BF than 
households in urban areas.  According to the author: 
This effect increases for extremely poor households.  For the latter, the 
predicted probability of programme participation is 56.0% (compared with 
47.2% probability of participation for urban households holding all other 
independent variables fixed at the mean), while among poor households this 
probability decreases to 48.6% (against 42.7% for poor urban households). ( 
p.201).   
As explained in Chapter 3, PNAD includes rural areas of various municipality sizes 
and characteristics, following IBGE’s categorisations of rural areas by census sectors.  
It may be the case that rural areas located near metropolitan urban areas are more 
likely to receive the benefit than rural areas in small municipalities.  The 
methodology I use in this thesis will analyse BF participation rates in similar types of 
poor rural municipalities. 
The second analysis of this chapter conducted in section 4.4 concerns the changes in 
participation rates according to poverty levels.  This issue could be informed by the 
literature on the BF targeting efficiency.  
 Soares et al. (2007 p.2) show that, according to the 2004 PNAD, the BF has a 
59% under-coverage (or exclusion error), and 92% exclusion targeting (the 
ratio of non-beneficiary non-poor to the total non-poor).   
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 Soares et al.  (2007 p.3), using the ratio between the cumulative distribution of 
transfers and the cumulative distribution of pre-transfer income, show that, for 
the poorest10%, the BF does not perform as well as the CCT programmes in 
Mexico and Chile, but for the second quintile of the income distribution its 
performance is similar.  Overall, the BF is the best performer of the three 
programmes. 
 Reviewing the literature, Soares (2012a p.15) found that the incidence curve 
of the BF in 2006 showed a small deterioration from 2004, although the 2006 
incidence curve was still comparable to CCT programmes in Chile and 
Mexico. 
 However, some authors are concerned about the high BF exclusion error.  
Kerstenetzky (2008 p.14) said that an exclusion error of 59% is “a 
conspicuously high figure”. 
 Rocha (2013 p.126) conducted simulations using the 2004 and 2006 PNAD 
and poverty lines derived from the POF
82
 and found that the expansion from 
2004 to 2006 was not directed towards the extreme poor, as the potential 
impacts of transfers in households that were eligible but non-beneficiaries 
remained the same.   
 On the basis of an analysis of the 2006 PNAD supplement, Rocha (2011) 
estimated that there were still 3.4 million eligible households without the 
benefit, 1 million of them in extreme poverty (measured according to the BF 
administrative extreme poverty line).  The author cautioned that the 
improvement in the exclusion error was mostly due to increases in income 
earnings in the poorest families, instead of an improvement in targeting per se, 
as there was an increase in the inclusion error from 2004 to 2006.  
For the period analysed in this thesis, the expansion of benefit receipt happened 
mainly from 2004 to 2006, as illustrated in Figure 4 below.   
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Figure 4: BF expansion, 2003-2013 (households) 
 
Source:  Reprinted from Ministério do Planejamento Orçamento e Gestão (2013). 
 
2006 was an electoral year, and this deserves special attention.  The exponential 
growth in benefit allocation in the first half of the year may be a result of political 
favouritism.  TCU (2006) investigated this claim and concluded that the atypical 
distribution was due to delays in incorporating beneficiaries from other programmes 
into the BF, and to the decision to concede benefits in the first six months of 2006, 
before the electoral period starting in July.  TCU cross-checked the Cadastro data 
with the Electoral Tribunal database, and concluded that there was no association 
between the expansion of the programme and the mayor’s political party.   
However, TCU (p.259, item 3.5) acknowledged that, given that the BF reaches a high 
percentage of Brazilian households, it could potentially influence electoral ends.  
Hunter and Power (2007 pp.19, 20) showed that the BF did influence the voting 
behaviour of potential BF beneficiaries in the national election.  The authors point to 
a correlation between BF expansion in 2006 and vote swings to Lula in comparison 
with the 2002 election result.  They showed that Lula was able to control 78% to 85% 
of the votes in the oligarchic states of Bahia and Maranhão.  Zucco Jr’s research 
(2013) reinforced this analysis by showing that CCTs result in electoral rewards for 
the candidates, despite low rates of party affiliation and low results in sub-national 
voting preferences.   
This chapter is organised as follows.  Section 4.2 briefly describes some statistics 
relating to PIR and PNIR municipalities.  Section 4.3 illustrates the participation rate 
trends, and section 4.4 discusses these trends according to poverty levels.  In both 
sections, there are brief descriptions of overall trends, followed by descriptive 
statistics on rural and urban, PIR and PNIR municipalities, and macro-regional 
analysis.  Section 4.5 concludes this chapter.   
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4.2 Descriptive statistics on PIR and PNIR municipalities 
Table 11 illustrates the number PIR and PNIR municipalities by macro-region.  
Table 11: PIR and PNIR municipalities by macro-region 
 
Source: author based on MoPI and BCIM. 
 
Table 11 also shows that the majority of PIR and PNIR municipalities are in the 
Northeast of Brazil.  The other two important macro-regions are the North for PIR 
municipalities and the Southeast for PNIR municipalities.  Given that the Amazon is 
located largely in the North, where roads are fewer and protected environmental areas 
are concentrated, municipalities in the North have fewer connection points.  It is, 
therefore, reasonable to expect that this region would have a high percentage of PIR 
municipalities.  As for PNIR municipalities, Figure 5 below shows that the majority 
in the Southeast are located in the state of Minas Gerais.   
Figure 5 illustrates the distribution of PIR and PNIR by states.  Figure 5 shows that 
PNIR municipalities are concentrated in the states of Ceará (CE), Paraíba (PB), 
Pernambuco (PE), and Maranhão (MA).  PIR municipalities are mainly alocated in 
the states of Maranhão and Piauí (PI).  The Southeast state of Minas Gerais (MG) has 
a high incidence of both types.  
Macro-region PIR PNIR TOTAL
North 24 (23.76%) 5 (1.77%) 29 (7.55%)
Northeast 58 (57.43%) 246 (86.93%) 304 (79.17%)
Centre-West 1 (0.99%) 4 (1.41%) 5 (1.30%)
Southeast 18 (17.82%) 28 (9.89%) 46 (11.98%)
TOTAL 101 (100%) 283 (100%) 384 (100%)
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Figure 5: Distribution of poor rural municipalities by state and region 
 
Source: author based on MoPI and BCIM. 
 
Although Marques’ study (2005) did not focus on the poor rural municipalities, the 
descriptive statistics above confirm the significance of BF participation rates in 
municipalities of the Northeast of Brazil.   
In section 4.4, I categorise poverty into low, medium and high levels, as explained in 
Chapter 3, Table 4 (p. 84).  The high poverty level is then subdivided into a lower and 
an upper bound.  Table 12 shows how many PIR and PNIR municipalities there are in 
each of these upper and lower bounds.  Thus, the findings of sub-section 4.4.2 are 
merely suggestive, given how few municipalities there are in the high poverty, upper 
bound category.    
Table 12: PIR and PNIR municipalities by high poverty levels (lower and upper bound) 
 PIR 
TOTAL 
PNIR 
TOTAL  Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
2004 94 5 99 270 11 281 
2007 and 
2009 
95 6 101 271 12 283 
Source: author based on MoPI and BCIM. 
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4.3 Descriptive statistics on participation rates 
 
4.3.1 Participation rates in rural and urban municipalities 
Using the definition of rural and urban municipalities proposed in Chapter 3, Figure 6 
shows that municipalities that are predominantly urban have higher numbers of BF 
benefits.  In the case of participation rates, Figure 7 shows that municipalities that are 
predominantly rural have higher rates.    
These findings validate the findings of earlier work that demonstrated that the BF was 
a well-targeted CCT programme (Lindert et al. 2007; Soares 2012b), having higher 
participation rates in rural areas where there are higher percentages of households in 
poverty (IBGE 2008c; IFAD 2008).  However, it is important to keep in mind that, 
although the programme has higher participation rates in rural areas, this does not 
mean that there are more households in rural municipalities receiving the programme, 
quite the contrary. 
Figure 6: BF households in rural and urban 
municipalities 
 
Source: author’s calculation using MoPI, PNADs, 
Contagem Populational, Cadastro. 
Figure 7: BF participation rates in urban and rural 
municipalities 
 
Source: see Figure 6 for details.
Both figures show increasing trends that are in accordance to the literature.  Previous 
research showed that percentages of the BF beneficiaries started to increase from 
2004 and reached the target (henceforth, “quota”) of 11 million households in 2006 
(Lindert et al. 2007; TCU 2006).  From 2006 to 2008, the numbers of BF households 
stabilised once the national quota was reached.  In addition, in 2006 stricter 
monitoring of conditionalities started to result in some cancellations.  In 2009/10, 
there was another increase in the BF coverage to 13 million households. 
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The trend towards a slight reduction in participation rates after 2007, shown in Figure 
7 was more noticeable in rural municipalities.  This needs to be further investigated.  
Given that Figure 6 shows no decrease in BF benefits, this reduction in participation 
rates is most likely due to changes in the rural population.  But, how much of this 
change is the result of actual increases in the population, and how much is the result 
of the IBGE’s estimation methods? It is most likely a combination of both.  IBGE 
recognises the difficulties involved in the population projections used to estimate 
municipal population (IBGE & UNFPA 2006 p.11).  Considering that the dataset may 
have a bias towards over-estimating participation rates
84
, when rates start to decrease, 
there may still be a certain element of real population increase. 
 
4.3.2 Participation rates in Poor Isolated Rural (PIR) and Poor Non-Isolated Rural 
(PNIR) municipalities 
Figure 8 and Figure 9 show the total number of beneficiaries and the participation 
rates by PIR and PNIR municipality.  
                                               
84 The denominator of participation rates (the population estimates) per municipalities may be 
underestimated at two points: (i) the calculation of municipal populations (which is based on the 
average number of persons in a household per year and per state); and (ii) in areas with high migration 
flows. This has the potential to overestimate participation rates, resulting in an analysis based on trends 
and not on point estimates. 
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Figure 8: BF households in PIR and PNIR 
municipalities 
 
Source: author’s calculation using MoPI, BCIM, PNADs 
(2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009), Contagem Populacional 
(2007), Cadastro (2004 – 2009). 
Figure 9: BF participation rates in PIR and PNIR 
municipalities 
 
Source: see Figure 8 for details. 
 
Figure 8 shows that PNIR municipalities have more beneficiaries than PIR 
municipalities.  Figure 8 shows similar patterns of expansion as Figure 6: an increase 
from 2004 to 2006, followed by stabilisation from 2006 to 2009.  Therefore, the 
expansion of the programme in PIR and PNIR municipalities followed patterns 
similar to the BF expansion nationally. 
Taking into consideration participation rates, Figure 9 shows that PNIR 
municipalities have consistently higher participation rates than PIR municipalities.  
The consistently lower participation rates in PIR municipalities are prima facie 
evidence of problems in maximising the effectiveness of reaching out to the 
persistently poor.  This is a reason for concern.  According to the literature on chronic 
poverty (CPRC 2008b), spatial disadvantage and weak integration can be one of the 
causes for spatial poverty traps.  Thus, in RRAs such as PIR municipalities, there may 
be a greater need for the BF, as there are fewer job opportunities for the poor.  
Potential beneficiaries may have stronger incentives for claiming the BF, and yet 
participation rates in PIR municipalities are consistently lower than in PNIR.  In the 
next sub-section, I discuss the ways in which the participation rates in PIR 
municipalities are different from those in other types of municipalities.  This is 
followed by a discussion, in section 4.4, of participation rates and poverty levels, 
moving the account closer to a discussion of take-up rates. 
4.3.3 Comparisons across typologies and macro-region  
Figure 10 compares participation rates in PIR and PNIR municipalities with the rates 
in both rural and urban municipalities more generally.   
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Figure 10: BF participation rates by PIR, PNIR, urban and rural municipalities from 2004 to 2009 
 
Source: see Figure 8 for details. 
 
Figure 10 shows that PIR and PNIR municipalities have higher participation rates 
than urban and other rural municipalities.  This is a positive finding, as PIR and PNIR 
are a subset of the poorest rural municipalities, and higher participation rates are only 
to be expected. 
To analyse the macro-region, I focused on 81% of PIR municipalities, located in the 
North and Northeast, and on 97% of PNIR municipalities, located in the Northeast 
and Southeast.   
Figure 11 and Figure 12 compare participation rates in PIR and PNIR municipalities 
with those in other rural municipalities.  These figures were constructed considering 
the participation rate of each macro-region, given their population size, so, they 
cannot be added together.  
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Figure 11: Participation rates in PIR and rural 
municipalities in the North and Northeast of 
Brazil  
 
Source: see Figure 8 for details. 
 
Figure 12: Participation rates in PNIR and rural 
municipalities in the Northeast and Southeast of 
Brazil 
 
Source: see Figure 8 for details. 
 
Both figures also show the gap in participation rates between other rural 
municipalities and the PIR and PNIR municipalities.  Figure 11 shows a disturbing 
trend of the reducing gap between PIR municipalities and other rural municipalities in 
the North of Brazil (dotted purple and red lines).  From 2007 onwards, the 
participation rates in PIR municipalities are lower than the rural average.  In contrast, 
Figure 12 shows a constant gap between PNIR municipalities and other rural 
municipalities in the Southeast of Brazil across the years, with the participation rates 
of the PNIR municipalities consistently higher than the rural average.  
 In sum, (i) participation rate trends from 2004 to 2009: 
 The increase in the numbers of BF beneficiaries from 2004 to 2006, and again 
from 2009 to 2010, is a result of the federal government’s effort to reach the 
11 million and 13 million targets.  Urban municipalities have more households 
benefitting from the programme but rural municipalities have higher 
participation rates. 
 From 2006 to 2009, there were small variations in the numbers of BF 
beneficiaries, as the programme reached its 11 million national quota and the 
system to monitor conditionalities became effective.  It is difficult to 
determine whether the small reduction in the participation rates of rural 
municipalities after 2007 was due to population growth, or whether it was the 
result of a limitation in my methodology reflecting broader problems with the 
IBGE population estimates for small rural municipalities.  
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 PIR and PNIR municipalities have higher participation rates than other rural 
municipalities.  This finding is in agreement with other findings showing that 
poor households are well targeted by the BF, as there are higher levels of 
poverty in PIR and PNIR municipalities than in other rural municipalities.   
 PNIR municipalities have higher participation rates than PIR municipalities.  
Lower participation rates in PIR municipalities are a matter of concern.  The 
persistently poor that live in RRA have reduced livelihood strategies and 
lower livelihood diversification of income sources.   
 Higher participation rates in the Northeast for both PIR and PNIR 
municipalities confirm the good targeting of the programme on that 
historically disadvantaged region. 
 Lower participation rates in PIR municipalities may be an aspect of the lower 
participation rates in the North of Brazil.  Participation rates in that region are 
below those of other rural municipalities.  This is also a matter of concern. 
Considering that the BF expanded from 2004 to 2006 to reach the national quota, and 
that from 2006 to 2009 only small increments were allowed, it is important to 
understand the geography of expansion and whether the benefits expanded to areas 
that needed the most.  This is what I turn to next. 
4.4 Descriptive statistics on poverty and participation rates  
This section compares poverty rates and participation rates in order to find out how 
closely participation rates are associated with poverty levels (i.e. as a preliminary 
investigation of take-up rates).  I look at the poverty variables in two ways: as a 
continuous variable, with scatterplots, and as a categorical variable, with bar charts.   
There are several data constraints that preclude the investigation of take-up rates.  
Take-up rates require an estimation of the number of poor households, according to 
the BF threshold, in a given municipality.  This estimation involves calculating the 
number of poor that have registered and have not registered for the programme, hence 
they have not claimed the benefit.  The former can be estimated using datasets 
(cadastro, surveys) but the latter is an inherent problem of take-up analysis.   
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Estimating the number of eligible households who are not in the government’s radar 
screen is not an easy task.  Governments often try to circumvent this by increasing 
access to information.  However, this thesis points to evidence based on interviews 
with local administration staff (Chapter 6) and households (Chapters 7 and 8) that 
access to information is not the only problem the population these areas face.  The 
qualitative analysis will demonstrate that access to registration points, lack of 
documentation and migration patterns are some of the other problems when 
registering for the benefit.  One possible approach estimate the number of eligible 
households not registered for the programme is to conduct a sample survey of the 
population at risk (Atkinson 1989), but this has not been attempted for the specific 
interest group of this research, i.e. the rural poor living in rural remote areas.  
As for the calculation of the number of poor households registered at the Cadastro 
over time, an analysis of the take-up would require a series data points to assess 
whether families fit the programme’s eligibility and whether and when they receive 
the benefit.  Some of the limitations of this approach refer to the quality of 
the Cadastro information, recording errors, the potential variability in collection data 
methods and, most importantly, the limited access to series of Cadastro data points 
and restrictions of access to data on household and municipality levels.  The latter 
restrictions made this approach impossible to pursue for the purpose of this research. 
Researchers have opted instead to use PNAD estimations (Medeiros et al. 2008; 
Soares et al. 2009; Soares 2012a,2012b; Soares et al. 2010b).  But, again, this 
approach is not adequate for the population researched, as PNADs are not 
representative for this population.  Coverage and targeting based on PNADs are 
aggregated for Brazil or regional areas.  Therefore, analyses like those conducted by 
the prevailing literature were not pursued for the subpopulation analysed. 
Thus, I compare participation rates with poverty rates, as a preliminary investigation 
into the BF take-up rates.  This comparison also has data constraints and limitations.   
This section’s analyses of poverty are based on the MoPI.  As discussed in Chapters 3 
and Appendix 3A, the MoPI poverty headcount was calculated before the BF 
programme started and uses different methods and datasets than the BF programme.  
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Although this method is not strictly a take-up analysis, which is difficult to conduct as 
previously explained, it is a preliminary investigation into take-up rates in small rural 
municipalities of Brazil.  It is indicative of possible problems with take-up rates, 
while participation rates are compared with poverty levels.  It indicates how the 
programme expanded during this period, using 2003 poverty levels as a baseline.  
Aside from providing trends overtime, this method also enables a comparison 
between municipalities with higher or lower poverty incidence with the official BF 
number of beneficiaries over time.     
Another data limitation is that the MoPI poverty rates are measured as of 2004.  There 
is no updated small area estimation of poverty levels by municipality in order to 
compare the expansion of the programme with the changing poverty lines.  However, 
despite Brazil’s economic growth during this period, Brazilian research indicates the 
continuation of high levels of poverty in the municipalities analysed.  The 2010 
Census confirms that poverty levels in small municipalities in the Northeast of Brazil 
continued to challenge policy-makers (MDS 2011).    
The persistency of poverty in RRA is reaffirmed by international research.  Bird et 
al.(2010b p.11) question the claim that RRAs benefit from economic growth through 
spill-over effects and multipliers.  This, they argue, failed to happen.  Kanbur and 
Vernables (2005) argue that current inequalities in RRAs would most likely result in 
unequal growth, leaving these areas behind.  Therefore, based on the latest Brazilian 
Census and the international literature on persistent poverty in RRA, the premise that 
poverty have not varied significantly and continues to persist in the poorest small 
rural remote municipalities of the Northeast of Brazil is valid and plausible. 
Another data constraint relates to the calculation of population estimates.  As noted in 
Chapter 3, participation rates are based on estimations of the total municipal 
population, based on state average of number of persons in a household.  This 
approximation is unavoidable, as there is no annual population counting for small 
municipalities.   
Lastly, I avoid the comparison between the expansions of number of beneficiaries or 
of participation rates with the official municipal quota allocation.  Derived from the 
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national quota, the municipal quota was based on the 2000 Census and the PNAD.  
The objective of this section is to compare the distribution of benefits using other 
methods of calculating poverty than the PNAD, given its limitations already 
described in Chapters 2 and 3.  In addition, the national quota is limited by budgetary 
restrictions and, as such, it may not be the best proxy for the number of poor 
households.  In the next chapter, I extend the analysis of the PNAD’s limitations by 
conducting a detailed investigation on how the national quota was allocated to small 
rural municipalities.                
Taking the 2004 poverty levels and the participation rates in 2004 and 2009, Figure 
13 and Figure 14 consist of scatterplots marking the trends of participation rates by 
poverty levels with a fitted regression line
85
.  Each dot represents a municipality. 
 
                                               
85 The scatterplots are truncated at the top and bottom of the distribution by the winsoring process 
which sets limits to the top and bottom percentiles of the distribution.  For more details, refer to 
Appendix 3D. 
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Figure 13: BF participation rates by poverty, 
2004 
 
Source: author’s calculations using MoPI, PNAD (2004), 
Cadastro (2004). 
 
Figure 14: BF participation rates by poverty, 
2009 
 
Source: author’s calculation using MoPI, PNAD (2009), 
Cadastro (2009).
The scatterplots above show a generally positive relationship between poverty and 
participation rates, i.e. the higher the poverty the higher the participation rates.  
However, the distribution of municipalities around the regression line indicates that 
this relationship is rather moderate, although there have been improvements over 
time.  The moderate relationship means that the relationship between poverty and 
participation rates is not as direct as the BF eligibility criteria should have ensured.  
The plots show municipalities with a high incidence of poverty and comparatively 
lower participation rates, a finding that signals problems of non-take-up.  There is 
also a group of municipalities with high participation rates, even though they have 
only medium levels of poverty.  Although some fuzziness is only to be expected, 
given that the poverty figures are dated 2003, these figures do point to problems in 
take-up rates
86
.   
Figure 15 illustrates the analysis based on poverty and participation rates categories.  
It confirms the findings illustrated in the scatterplots.  Participation rates are 
categorised in quartiles of their distribution (Q1 or the lowest 25% of data and Q3 the 
                                               
86 There are caveats to the scatterplots.  There is some indication of heteroskedasticity, as high values 
of poverty are a necessary but not sufficient condition for high participation rates. This reinforces the 
case made by this thesis – that variables like distance may influence take-up rates. The error term may 
be spatially or serially correlated, i.e. error terms of observations in non-isolated municipalities may be 
correlated with nearby municipalities, or with observations from preceding years.  These caveats do 
not invalidate the findings displayed in the figures; rather, those findings underline the importance of 
this thesis.  Further analysis would require additional datasets with municipality-level variables, but 
that would move the analysis beyond the objective of this chapter.  Refer to Chapter 9, section 9.7, 
“Implications for future research”. 
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highest 25% of data).  The vertical axis shows the number of municipalities, and the 
horizontal axis the categorisation of participation rates into low, medium and high 
quartiles.   
Figure 15: Poverty by participation rates in 2004, 2007 and 2009 
 
Source: author’s calculations using MoPI, PNAD (2004, 2009), Contagem Populacional (2007),  
Cadastro (2004, 2007, 2009). 
 
Figure 15 confirms the positive relationship illustrated in the scatterplots.  It shows 
that the number of municipalities with low poverty rates is relatively higher in the 
group of municipalities with low participation rates, and the number of municipalities 
with high poverty rates is generally higher in the group of municipalities with high 
participation rates.   
Another interesting trend relates to the changes in group categories during the 
expansion of the programme from 2004 to 2009.  The expansion resulted in better 
allocation of benefits per poverty levels for municipalities with low and medium 
poverty rates.  Municipalities with low poverty rates reduced in importance in the 
medium participation rates group; likewise, municipalities with medium poverty rates 
reduced in importance in the low participation rates group.  The scatterplots show this 
improvement in take-up rates by the increase in the slope from 2004 to 2009, and by 
the dispersion of points around the regression line.  
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Nonetheless, there was only marginal improvement in those municipalities with high 
participation rates.  Figure 15 shows that there was a group of municipalities in the 
medium participation rates group with consistently high poverty levels.  The 
scatterplots show municipalities below the regression line despite high poverty levels, 
indicating non-take-up problems.  This means that there could be municipalities 
where eligible poor households (those with high poverty levels) were not receiving 
the benefit (medium participation rates).  This finding led me to undertake a further 
analysis to find out if participation rates varied according to location (rural or urban; 
PIR or PNIR; macro-regions).  This analysis takes up the remainder of this section. 
4.4.1 Poverty and participation rates in rural and urban municipalities 
Figure 16 to Figure 19 subdivide the dataset by rural and urban municipalities, 
illustrated with bar charts and scatterplots. 
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Figure 16: BF participation rates by poverty 
levels in urban municipalities 
 
Source: see Figure 15 for details. 
 
Figure 17: Participation rates by poverty in urban 
municipalities, 2004, 2009 
 
 
 
Figure 18: BF participation rates by poverty 
levels in rural municipalities 
 
Source: see Figure 15 for details. 
 
 
Figure 19: Participation rates by poverty in rural 
municipalities, 2004, 2009 
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Figure 16 shows that urban municipalities categorised with low poverty levels are 
concentrated in the group of municipalities with lower participation rates.  Similarly, 
areas with medium poverty levels have generally medium participation rates.  This 
relationship improves over time.  However, this is not the case for urban 
municipalities with high poverty levels.  Figure 17 illustrates municipalities with high 
poverty levels below the national regression line (i.e. with low and medium 
participation rates), indicating problems with non-take-up
87
.   
Figure 18 shows that rural municipalities are more concentrated around medium-high 
participation rates and Figure 19 visually represents this clustering by higher number 
of municipalities above the national regression line in 2009.  This reaffirms the 
literature that states how the BF has higher coverage in rural areas (Rocha 2013; 
Soares 2013). 
However, municipalities that have increased their participation levels in 2009 were 
primarily in the group of low-medium poverty levels.  This is observed by fewer 
municipalities with low and medium poverty levels below the national regression line 
and by their dispersion above the national regression line, indicating higher 
participation rates.  However, municipalities with high poverty levels – i.e. PIR and 
PNIR municipalities – are below the national regression line, indicating low and 
medium participation rates.  Thus, although rural municipalities are clustered around 
medium and high participation rates, this does not mean that rural municipalities with 
high poverty levels would have more take-up rates.  This is the focus of the next sub-
section. 
The literature has highlighted the possibility that BF has a rural bias that results in a 
higher risk of excluding the poor in urban areas (Bastagli 2008 p.205).  I found that 
participation rates in rural municipalities were clustered around the medium and the 
high categories (Figure 18), whereas participation rates in urban municipalities 
(Figure 16) were clustered around the low and the medium categories.  This may 
                                               
87 An analysis of non-take-up in urban municipalities, although important, is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
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initially indicate that municipalities that are predominantly rural may have higher 
likelihood of households receiving the benefit.   
However, my analysis was methodologically different from the prevailing literature 
and I must caution against identifying the results based on municipalities with those 
based on household characteristics (and vice-versa), avoiding the ecological fallacy.  
Inferences based on PNADs take into consideration the households’ census sector 
(smallest area) and not the municipality where the poor live.  PNAD inferences mean 
that households living in rural census sectors may have higher inclusion rates than 
those living in urban census sectors; independently of the municipality they are 
located. 
Higgins (2012) argued that the BF does not take into account spatial price differences, 
resulting in eligibility cut-off and transfer sizes biased towards rural areas.  This 
author proposed that the eligibility cut-off and transfer size be adjusted by spatial 
price differences.  I would recommend caution towards the author’s recommendation.  
Even though there are price differences for the five macro-regions, further analysis 
conducted in this thesis (Chapters 6, 7 and 8) revealed the heterogeneity of rural 
areas.  There will most likely be negative impacts on the persistently poor as a result 
of such recommendations.  
4.4.2 Poverty and participation rates in PIR and PNIR municipalities 
Figure 20 and Figure 22 show the analysis of the poorest rural municipalities (PIR 
and PNIR) by participation rates and poverty categories (including the lower and 
upper bounds of the high poverty category) for 2004, 2007 and 2009.  The different 
sizes of the circle areas in Figure 21 and Figure 23 are proportional to the distances 
from each poor rural municipality to the nearest urban municipality.    
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Figure 20: BF participation rates by poverty 
levels in PNIR municipalities 
Source: author’s calculation using MoPI, BCIM, PNADs 
(2004, 2009), Contagem Populacional (2007), Cadastro 
(2004, 2007, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: BF participation rates by poverty in 
PNIR municipalities, 2004, 2009 
 
Note PNIR municipalities: area of symbol proportional to 
the distance to the nearest urban municipality. 
 
 
Figure 22: BF participation rates by poverty 
levels in PIR municipalities 
 
Source: see Figure 20 for details. 
Figure 23: BF participation rates by poverty in 
PIR municipalities, 2004, 2009 
 
Note PIR municipalities: area of symbol proportional to 
the distance to the nearest urban municipality.
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Given that these municipalities are the poorest, their participation rates in Figure 20 
and Figure 22 should be grouped in the high category.  Although there are no PIR or 
PNIR municipalities in the low participation rate group after 2004, there is still a 
considerable number of these municipalities in the medium participation rate group.  
This is illustrated in Figure 21 and Figure 23 by the dispersion of municipalities 
below the national regression line.   
In Figure 20, PNIR municipalities show better allocation of benefits, not only because 
they have proportionately fewer municipalities in the medium participation rate 
group, but also because there are only a few municipalities in the extreme poverty 
level (upper bound) in the medium participation rate group.  Figure 21 shows that 
there were more municipalities closer to the national regression line in 2009 than in 
2004. 
This is not the case for PIR municipalities (Figure 22).  Not only can one find more 
PIR municipalities in the medium participation rate group if compared to PNIR, but 
PIR municipalities at the extreme poverty level are mostly located in the medium 
participation rate group.  The scatterplots (Figure 23) show more PIR municipalities 
than PNIR municipalities below the national regression line.  The results suggest the 
possibility of relative lower participation in PIR municipalities, by demonstrating 
problems with non-take up in PIR municipalities with high poverty levels in 2004 and 
2009.  This is most worrying.   
Another important issue is that problems with non-take-up are associated with 
distance to the nearest urban municipality (Figure 21 and Figure 23).  As already 
stated in the beginning of this section (Figure 14), the relationship between poverty 
and participation rates was moderate and the variable distance seems to be 
influencing this.  This is evidenced by the higher number of remote municipalities 
below the national regression line.  This finding confirms the hypothesis of this 
thesis, that it is more difficult to reach out to the persistently poor in RRAs.  Even 
though there was an improvement in take-up rates from 2004 to 2009 in both PIR and 
PNIR municipalities, remote municipalities had comparatively lower take-up rates.   
This sub-section complements the findings shown in Figure 9, of consistently lower 
participation rates in PIR municipalities, relating distance to participation rates.  
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Figure 20 to Figure 23 shows that non-take-up problems are more evident in PIR 
municipalities, and that distance (or weak linkages to urban municipalities) has an 
effect on take-up rates, despite high poverty levels. 
4.4.3 High poverty and participation rates categories by macro-region  
Figure 24 to Figure 27 show participation rates by poverty levels of PIR and PNIR 
municipalities, classified according to macro-region.  Further analysis by macro-
region should be undertaken with caution, as the sub-division by macro-regions 
reduces the number of municipalities in each PIR and PNIR category, as previously 
described in Table 11, p.131. 
 
Figure 24: PIR municipalities (high poverty) by 
participation categories, Northeast  
 
Source: see Figure 20 for details. 
 
Figure 25: PIR municipalities (high poverty) by 
participation categories, North 
 
Source: see Figure 20 for details. 
Figure 26: PNIR municipalities (high poverty) by 
participation categories, Northeast 
 
Source: see Figure 20 for details. 
 
Figure 27: PNIR municipalities (high poverty) by 
participation categories, Southeast 
 
Source: see Figure 20 for details. 
 
The Northeast (Figure 24 and Figure 26) have better participation rates according to 
poverty levels than other regions (Figure 25 and Figure 27).  Both PIR and PNIR 
municipalities in the North (Figure 25) and Southeast (Figure 27) are mostly in the 
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medium participation rate group, and the situation for these municipalities worsens 
over time.  Instead of these municipalities joining the ranks of municipalities with 
high participation rates, some of them moved down to join the group of medium 
participation rates.   
 In sum, (ii) changes in participation rate according to poverty level: 
 In general, municipalities with low poverty levels are concentrated in the low 
participation rates group; likewise, municipalities with higher poverty levels 
are concentrated in the higher participation rates group.  However, there is 
room for improvement, mainly in those municipalities with high poverty 
levels.  This is demonstrated by the way municipalities are dispersed around 
the regression line. 
 Urban municipalities allocate benefits according to poverty levels better than 
rural municipalities.  However, in 2009, they still had non-take-up problems, 
as shown by the fact that 42% of urban municipalities with high poverty levels 
still had low-to-medium participation rates.  This is demonstrated by the 
number of municipalities with high poverty that are below the national 
regression line.  The expansion of the programme from 2004 to 2009 clustered 
urban municipalities mostly in the categories of low-to-medium participation 
rates. 
 The expansion of the programme in rural municipalities from 2004 to 2009 
bundled up rural municipalities into groups with medium to high participation 
rates.  However, the expansion did not follow municipalities’ poverty levels.  
In 2004, 65% of rural municipalities with high participation rates had low and 
medium poverty levels, and by 2009, this number had increased by two per 
cent.  This means that the increase in benefit take-up happened primarily in 
areas with low and medium poverty levels.  Non-take-up problems remained 
in rural municipalities with high poverty levels, as some of these 
municipalities were in the group with only medium participation rates.     
 Considering the subgroup of PIR and PNIR municipalities, the relationship 
between participation rates and poverty levels is not direct, as shown in the 
scatterplots.   
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o PNIR municipalities have better distribution of participation rates 
according to poverty levels than PIR municipalities.  The reduced 
dispersion of municipalities around the national regression line in the 
scatterplots of PNIR municipalities, shows the improvements in take-
up rates by 2009.   
 However, some PNIR municipalities that are farthest from the nearest urban 
municipality have only medium participation rates.  This relationship is 
primarily observed in PIR municipalities, indicating that participation rates are 
influenced by distance to the nearest urban municipality. 
o  In the case of PIR municipalities, there is much to be improved.  Only 
53% of PIR municipalities in 2009 were in the group of high 
participation rates, leaving 47% of them in the medium participation 
rate category.   
 What is most concerning is that PIR municipalities show only a slight 
improvement in take-up rates across the years (represented by the unchanging 
dispersion around the national regression line).  The analysis suggests the 
possibility of relative lower participation in PIR municipalities, mainly of 
those with high poverty levels and the most remote ones – they continue to be 
below the national regression line.  
 The Northeast of Brazil has better allocation of BF participation rates for the 
group municipalities with high poverty levels than the North or Southeast, 
although some municipalities are still in the medium participation rate group.   
 PIR municipalities in the North of Brazil and PNIR municipalities in the 
Southeast have the worst distribution of benefits according to poverty levels.  
In the North and the Southeast, the majority of the PIR and PNIR 
municipalities with high poverty levels are clustered around the medium 
participation rate, and this majority has increased over time.   
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I start to investigate RQ1, i.e. the analysis of how effectively the BF 
reaches out to poor rural municipalities.  I look at the descriptive statistics of 
participation rates and trends of BF expansion by poverty levels from 2004 to 2009.  
This chapter follows the BF’s objective that participation rates should be higher in 
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places that have higher poverty.  Thus, areas with persistent poverty, such as the 
poorest rural municipalities located in RRA, i.e. PIR municipalities, should have 
higher participation rates than other types of rural municipalities.   
The analysis based on municipalities also provides an alternative assessment of 
effectiveness to the conventional use of household analysis and targeting indicators.  I 
specifically focus on the idea of “maximizing effectiveness” in order to understand 
how the programme reaches the hard-to-reach in PIR municipalities.  In addition, the 
municipality-based analysis adds a different dimension to the BF discussion, by 
recognising that local municipalities are important agents in identifying potential 
beneficiaries and facilitating the BF implementation.   
The general analysis reinforces the understanding that, on average, the BF is a well-
targeted programme.  Rural municipalities have higher participation rates than urban 
municipalities, although there are more benefits in urban municipalities.  PIR and 
PNIR municipalities have higher participation rates than the average participation 
rates of rural municipalities.  There was also an overall improvement in participation 
rates per poverty levels from 2004 to 2009.  This can be observed in the rise in the 
slope of the regression line and the moderately direct relationship between poverty 
and participation rates.     
However, there is some room for improvement.  There are a number of rural and 
urban municipalities with continuous high poverty levels that are located in the 
medium participation rate group, or below the national regression line.  This is a 
serious indication of non-take-up problems, meaning that there are poor households 
who are going without the benefit. 
Although rural municipalities clustered around the medium to high participation rate 
groups, this chapter shows that rural municipalities do not always allocate benefits 
according to poverty levels.  Even though living in a rural municipality may increase 
the likelihood of having benefits allocated to the population, a closer look at benefit 
distribution suggests that some of the municipalities do not have as good distribution 
of benefits per poverty levels as might be expected.   
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This is particularly the case for PIR municipalities.  The analysis suggests that PIR 
municipalities have had relatively lower participation rates than PNIR municipalities 
across the years.  This is worrisome.  Considering that the poor in PIR municipalities 
most probably live in persistent poverty, having less opportunity to diversify their 
livelihoods strategies, federal transfers like the BF are an important component of 
their household budget.  
Evidence indicates that PIR municipalities, mainly the ones located in the North of 
Brazil, have worse levels of BF participation rates by poverty levels.  PIR 
municipalities with high poverty levels and further from the nearest urban 
municipalities tend to be part of the group with medium participation rates.  This 
evidence demonstrates problems with non-take-up rates.  That there are eligible 
persistently poor who are non-beneficiaries in the worst-off municipalities, is a matter 
for concern.  Reduced BF participation rates in PIR municipalities exacerbates the 
predicament of persistent poverty in RRAs.   
The findings detailed in this chapter led me to inquire into the reasons for the lower 
take-up rates in PIR municipalities than in PNIR municipalities.  Among possible 
reasons I would suggest (i) that PIR municipalities, despite having high levels of 
persistent poverty, have reached their local quota of BF allocations (Chapter 5); (ii) 
that PIR municipalities, despite having high levels of persistent poverty, are unable to 
have higher participation rates due lack of implementation capacity (Chapter 6); and 
(iii) that PIR municipalities have fewer households who request to take-up benefits, 
either because persistent poverty levels are lower, or because households are unable, 
for reasons to be investigated, to claim the benefit (Chapters 7 and 8).   
These three suggested reasons laid the foundation for the remainder of this thesis, 
which examines why there are lower take-up rates in PIR municipalities.  The 
investigation of the nature of rural poverty in RRA, and an analysis that goes beyond 
income poverty, are themes that run throughout the thesis.  The reasons for and the 
calculation of the local quota, together with the selection mechanisms, are addressed 
in the next chapter, followed by subsequent chapters on the investigation of local 
implementation by municipalities, and households’ participation in the BF 
programme.  With this broader picture in place, I return to the question of the 
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effectiveness of the BF in reaching poor rural municipalities in the concluding 
chapter.  
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5 THE NATIONAL DESIGN: QUOTA ALLOCATION TO PIR AND PNIR 
MUNICIPALITIES AND SELECTION OF BENEFITS TO THE PERSISTENTLY 
POOR, 2004-2009 
 
5.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapter, I established that, although BF participation rates in PIR and 
PNIR municipalities are higher than the rural average, PIR municipalities have lower 
participation rates than PNIR municipalities.  They also have lower BF benefit 
allocation per poverty levels than the national regression line, indicating non-take-up 
problems.  Furthermore, the BF trends in PIR municipalities are worrisome as the BF 
participation rates of extremely poor PIR municipalities have deteriorated, moving 
from high to medium participation rates from 2004 to 2009.  More remote PIR 
municipalities are consistently below the national regression line.  The findings in 
Chapter 4 are important evidence that the BF benefit is not reaching some of the 
persistently poor whom it primarily intends to reach.   
In this chapter, I start by investigating some of the possible reasons for these findings 
in PIR and PNIR municipalities.  The main question I ask is (RQ2a): “What are the 
reasons related to policy design at the national level that prevent the BF 
effectively reaching the rural poor in PIR and PNIR municipalities?”  Figure 28 
below illustrates the conceptual links between this chapter and the previous one. 
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Figure 28: Conceptual links between Chapters 4 and 5 
 
Source: author. 
 
The national BF quota is referred to in the literature as a “target” or “goal”, but it is 
treated as a “targeting issue”, i.e. how the BF efficiently reaches the poor.  In contrast, 
I treat the BF quota as a “cap” on the number of benefits, and investigate the question 
of the extent to which this capped benefit effectively maximise its reach to the 
persistently poor.   
The national target of 11.2 million households was first established in 2004, revised 
in 2006, and increased in 2009 to 13 million, a figure it reached in 2011.  In 2014, it 
reached 14.1 million households (MDS 2014).  Although Brazil has reduced the 
number of people in poverty, as discussed in section 2.1.2, why has the BF target kept 
increasing?   
The literature (Soares 2012a; Soares et al. 2010b) has pointed out that there is a 
disconnection between the number of potential eligible beneficiaries registered in 
Cadastro, and the number of potential beneficiaries estimated by PNAD.  This 
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disconnection has created the “strange category of households: eligible but not 
beneficiary” (2012a p.6).  Soares et al. (2010b) say that this difference is due to the 
difference between calculations of the BF target based on PNAD, and the BF 
inclusion criteria for households to receive the programme for two years.  The cross-
sectional PNAD target calculations do not follow the longitudinal operationalisation 
of a poverty line based on the rule that beneficiaries must be assessed every two 
years
88
.   
Soares et al. use the 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007 Monthly Household Survey (PME)
89
 
to compare longitudinal and cross-sectional poverty estimates based on the PME and 
the PNAD respectively.  The authors conclude that the BF 2009 target would be 
around 19 million households on the basis of the longitudinal PME, rather than 13 
million, the figure based on the PNAD.  Therefore, the differences between the 
estimates based on the longitudinal data collections, the Cadastro and the PME, and 
those based on the cross-sectional PNAD, cast doubt on the accuracy of the poverty 
estimates used for the BF.  It also raises the question of whether policy makers can 
talk about a universal coverage that is based simply on fulfilling 100% of a 
questionable target, when there is evidence of beneficiaries who are eligible but who 
are not covered by the programme.  
Surprisingly, it is not clear exactly how the PNAD was used to estimate municipality 
quotas.  What are the implications of using the PNAD to allocate quotas for small 
municipalities? How was the expansion of the programme in 2004 and in 2009 
decided?  Were issues involving rural poverty or persistent poverty taken into 
consideration?  I will address these questions in this chapter. 
                                               
88 In fact, there is no such legal requirement.  The legislation says that families can stay in the 
programme if their income is below the eligibility threshold. If the family per capita income exceeds 
the eligibility cut-off point after a year on the programme, the family benefit can be cancelled.  The 
two-year “rule” is based on the two-year legal requirement for updating the Cadastro.  Families are 
only obliged to update their income profile every two years, resulting in a possible two-year stay in the 
programme. However, the fieldwork has demonstrated that some municipalities update their 
registration more frequently than every two years. Only in August 2010, Portaria No.617 created a so-
called “permanence rule” whereby a household can stay in the programme for up to two years if they 
voluntarily inform the local municipality about income changes, even if their income goes above the 
eligibility threshold.  However, if the information is a result of the local process of registration updates, 
then this rule does not apply. 
89
 Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego: covers metropolitan areas of Brazil. 
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Similarly, there is little public discussion about the selection process.  An in-depth 
analysis of how the legal prioritisation reflects competitive and mutually-exclusive 
claims of households is left unaddressed.  Once again, the existence of households 
that are “eligible but not beneficiaries” throws doubt on the selection process.  How 
were households selected from the pool of eligible households and in what order? Is 
this selection independent of the local quota or is it based on it?   
Thus, I subdivide the analysis in two questions: 
(i) Are the lower participation rates in PIR municipalities (as opposed to 
PNIR) a consequence of the way in which the BF national quota is 
calculated or allocated to small municipalities (section 5.2)?  
(ii) How is the selection process conducted? Does the selection process 
prioritise the persistently poor (section 5.3)?   
The two sections of this chapter, dealing with quota and selection, are inter-related.  
Given that there is a national quota that caps the number of households that can 
receive benefits, is it the case that PNIR municipalities (which are close to urban 
municipalities and may be comparatively well-equipped) receive more benefits at the 
expense of PIR municipalities (which are far from urban municipalities and less well-
equipped)?  Thus, in order to ensure that the programme is maximising its 
effectiveness in reaching PIR municipalities, it is important to consider questions 
about how the national quota is calculated, how it is distributed to municipalities, and 
how households are selected to receive benefits.  
5.2 The BF quota: official poverty numbers and quota allocation 
 
In 2003, the first BF national target of 11.2 million households was established using 
the 2001 PNAD (TCU 2006), with the aim of reaching this target within three years.  
In 2006, the quota was revised downwards to 11.1 million households using the 2004 
PNAD.  This revised target remained until 2008, with the important caveat that it was 
a “quota”, i.e. new families, although eligible, could only enter the programme when 
the old ones had left.  
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The fact that a new family could enter the programme only when there was a 
vacancy – i.e. when another family had graduated from the programme or when it had 
had its benefit cancelled – should not be ignored.  As previously stated, a quota based 
on estimating the number of poor using a cross-sectional survey such as the PNAD is 
questionable, potentially excluding eligible families.  It is not surprising that the 
Government has had to increase the national quota since the programme started. 
Soares (2012a) says that the total number of poor according to the various PNADs 
was 8.6 million and that the government decided to increase it to 11 million.  How 
this increase was calculated is not detailed in his article.  In addition, the author 
reports that from 2006 to 2008, the number of “eligible but not beneficiaries” were 
around 2 million households.  Rocha (2011) calculates that in 2006, this number was 
3.4 million households.  Soares et al. (2010b) bring to the debate the question of the 
income volatility of the poor, which the authors recognise is higher in rural areas.   
Due to the backlog of eligible households, the federal government decided to increase 
the national quota to 12.9 million households in 2009.  When I conducted my 
fieldwork in 2010, I interviewed several families who had been waiting for the benefit 
for several years before they got it that year. 
From interviews I conducted with staff at the federal level, I was able to identify two 
implementation phases during the period analysed: (i) the formulation of the BF and 
the expansion phases from 2004 to 2006, and (ii) the consolidation phase from 2006 
to 2009.   
The BF set-up phase includes: the creation of the new Ministry of Social 
Development (MDS); the revamping of the Cadastro; the construction of dialogues 
between different ministries, MDS and CAIXA; the federal government’s 
presentation of the BF as the flagship social-policy programme; the formalisation of 
the relationships between the BF ministry and others (portarias interminiteriais); and 
the formalisation of relationships with local municipalities (termos de adesão); and so 
forth. 
The second phase, which started in 2006, involved: the implementation of an 
instrumentality to monitor conditionalities; federal government monitoring of the 
quality of the national and local Cadastro; and the establishment of the IGD (Índice 
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de Gestão Decentralizada), a financial incentive for local administrations.  IGD is 
an index for calculating federal transfers to the municipalities based on their BF 
performance in relation to Cadastro quality and the monitoring of conditionalities.  
The index is based on (i) the proportion of valid registries
90
 versus the local quota; (ii) 
the number of updated entries; and the fulfilment of (iii) education and (iv) health 
conditionalities.   
This section is subdivided into four parts: the expansion of the programme from 2004 
to 2006; the national quota calculation and the municipal allocation; considerations of 
persistent rural poverty in the policy design; and the issue of universal coverage.  
 The BF rapid expansion: 2004 to 2006 
The BF did not start with an empty slate.  It brought together four different 
programmes from various ministries into the newly formulated MDS.  Therefore, 
there were already a number of beneficiaries previous to the BF, which were 
transferred to the BF.  These beneficiaries were from small predominantly urban or 
semi-urban municipalities in the Northeast of Brazil
91
.  
Lindert et al. (2007) highlight the rapid expansion of the programme from 2003 to 
2006, as one of the key features of the BF.  The exponential expansion, as shown in 
Table 13 below, is due to the incorporation into the BF of beneficiaries from previous 
programmes during those early years.  During the first phase, the BF target was 
comprised mostly of the beneficiaries of pre-BF programmes (programas 
remanescentes), who were located in the urban or semi-urban Northeast.  Information 
from the MDS shows that, up to June 2006, only 39.8% of BF benefits were those 
given to new families (TCU 2006 p.258). 
 
 
                                               
90 The BF legislation distinguishes between valid registrations (cadastros válidos) and eligible 
registrations (cadastros habilitados).  Valid registrations are completed household registration forms, 
which include documentary evidence of identification (national identity card, tax registration card 
(CPF), or electoral roll card).  Eligible registrations are valid household registration forms that fit 
under the cut-off for the BF benefit. 
91
 Information obtained from interviews az025 and az026. 
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Table 13: Yearly quotas and implementation of the BF 
Year % of the quota Total  BF households 
2003 32% 3.6 million 
2004 58% 6.5 million 
2005 77% 8.7 million 
2006 100% 11.1 million 
Source: Reprinted from TCU (2006 p.266). 
 
Furthermore, institutional arrangements were set up that integrated local 
administrations with the federal goals to implement and expand the programme.  The 
BF works as a partnership between federal, state and local governments.  Because of 
the levels of decentralisation in Brazil, established by the 1988 Constitution, the 
federal government created Joint Management Agreements (Termos de Adesão) 
among the different government levels, which assigned different BF functions to 
different administrative levels.  This model of programme management is called 
“decentralised management” (gestão descentralizada) and it facilitated the expansion, 
as it clarified the roles of each entity.     
 Quota calculation and allocation 
Calculations of the numbers of people in poverty depend on the choice of poverty 
lines and methods, a choice that reflects the complexity of the poverty concept.  This 
is particularly important when selective benefits are nationally capped and are based 
on means tests.  For the BF, the Brazilian government decided to base its estimates of 
poverty on the PNAD.  
Estimates of poverty based solely on income, such as those relying on the PNAD, are 
far from perfect.  Soares et al. (2010b) present evidence showing that estimations of 
the numbers of poor can vary depending on if they are measured based on cross-
sectional or longitudinal.  Given that the incomes of the poor are so volatile within 
and across years, estimating the numbers of the poor from cross-sectional surveys is 
not a very reliable method.  Thus, determining the number of BF benefits needed 
using the PNAD is questionable.   
Furthermore, the reliance on the PNAD to estimate the number of households in 
poverty calls for some methodological caveats.  The first BF target in 2003 was based 
on the 2001 PNAD, but at that time, and up to 2004, the PNAD sampled only the 
urban areas in the North of Brazil.  Thus, there is no information specific to the rural 
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areas, despite the fact that they are known to have high levels of poverty.  Moreover, 
these estimates were surprisingly revised downwards in 2006, even though the 2004 
PNAD was used.    
PNAD is representative for Brazil in relation to macro-regions, states and overall 
urban and rural census sectors, but not for small municipalities (IBGE 2010a).  These 
municipalities, called non-representative municipalities, are aggregated according to 
geographical proximity so that they are stratified according to population size.  In 
addition, there is the issue of estimating poverty numbers using population 
projections (Osorio et al. 2011b).  Projections for small rural areas represent a 
challenge for the Brazilian Bureau of Statistics (IBGE & UNFPA 2006).   
There is, therefore, a gap in the literature on how the MDS used the PNAD estimates 
to allocate the national quota to small rural municipalities from 2004 to 2010.  
Interviewees reported that how the national quota was allocated to the local 
municipalities was decided by MDS (SENARC), IPEA and IBGE (interviews az017, 
az018, az021, az025).  A first attempt to address this gap, based on interviews with 
key agents of the BF design, yielded interesting preliminary findings.   
First, there is the initial national quota.  Interviewees reported that the 2000 Census 
was already outdated in 2004 when the BF started, so the PNAD was the best 
methodological option to calculate updated poverty estimates.  In 2006, MDS 
reassessed their local quota allocations, basing them on the incomes of the poorest 
deciles as shown in the 2001 and 2004 PNADs.  These calculations were 
straightforward: given a national poverty line, PNAD information is used to estimate 
how many households are below such a poverty line nationally.  However, as I stated 
previously, using the PNAD to estimate poverty has methodological implications for 
the distribution of quotas to small rural municipalities, causing potential bias in the 
initial and subsequent calculations, as further detailed below.   
After the poverty has been estimated nationally, the national quota is allocated to the 
states according to these estimated poverty levels.  Given that PNAD is representative 
on the state level, this allocation is fairly accurate.  The national quota is distributed 
to the states according to each state’s incidence of poverty.  For example (Figure 29), 
if the incomes of the poorest deciles of a type “A” state were higher than the incomes 
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of the poorest deciles of a type “B” state in relation to the national poverty line, then 
state “A” would receive a lesser proportion of the national quota than state “B”. 
Finally, the state quota is distributed to the municipalities (the local quota) according 
to changes in municipality demographics, i.e. growth or decline in population 
numbers, although the exact dataset or datasets used to calculate these changes were 
left unanswered by interviewees.  For example, considering the state “A” and “B” 
above, municipalities whose population growth was above the state average would be 
allocated more quotas than those whose demographic changes were below the state 
average.   
As correctly pointed by one interviewee, and illustrated in Figure 29, there is a 
conflict between these last two steps in the allocation method.  Municipalities whose 
demographic changes were below the state average (municipality “d”), and who were 
located in a type “A” state, would lose quotas twice.  Similarly, municipalities whose 
demographic changes were above the state average (municipality “f”), and who were 
located in a type “B” state, would gain quotas twice.  
 
 
Source: author, based on interviews 
 
This method of allocation is based on two assumptions.  First, it assumes that there is 
an equitable distribution of poverty between municipalities within each state.  This is 
clearly not the case, as demonstrated by the differences in the incidence of poverty 
between the PIR and the PNIR municipalities (see Map 6 and Map 7 in pages 95-96).  
Second, distributing local quotas, not according to which municipality is poorer but 
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Figure 29: Distribution of national quota to local municipalities 
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according to demographic growth, assumes that poverty trends within a state follow 
demographic changes.  Both assumptions may have been necessary to operationalise 
the allocation of local quotas, but they are, nonetheless, difficult to justify. 
These assumptions give rise to several issues for PIR and PNIR municipalities.  
Given that PIR and PNIR municipalities are concentrated in the Northeast of Brazil, 
they are in states with poverty levels above the national average and, therefore, 
receive higher than average BF allocations.  However, PIR and PNIR municipalities 
have higher poverty levels than other municipalities in their own state.  Given that 
there is a documented trend for the past three decades of higher population increases 
in medium-sized municipalities (IBGE 2011b),  PIR would most likely be in the same 
position as municipality “e” in Figure 29 losing to other municipalities the quotas 
they won initially.  Thus, one important finding is the possibility that some PIR 
municipalities had their quota allocation reduced.  
I mentioned the possibility of quota reductions only in relation to PIR municipalities 
because the population dynamics are different in PNIR municipalities.  With the 
exception of the state of Bahia, the Northeast consists of dynamic areas of growth in 
traditional medium-sized urban municipalities(IBGE 2011b p.44).  Thus, given the 
location of PNIR municipalities, I can speculate that they would have had population 
increases due to their linkages with dynamic intermediary sub-regional urban 
municipalities, and hence would have received increased quota allocations. 
The influence of location and municipal capacity to qualify for the local quota is 
acknowledged by federal staff:  
Quite often, very poor municipalities have low coverage because they do not 
have the technical capacity to register households at the Cadastro … This is 
slowly being improved upon (az025). 
When I looked at municipalities and saw some of them with coverage of 
100%, 101%, I think that was first [a question of] municipality management, 
Cadastro management, … municipalities that visited families more 
efficiently in the beginning of the programme, they achieved higher 
coverage, let’s say that (emphasis added) (az024).  
The above statements underline two problems facing poor rural municipalities.  First, 
they reinforce the finding that lower participation rates or lower quotas in PIR 
municipalities, do not necessarily mean that there are fewer poor people.  Second, 
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some municipalities may not have the human and financial resources to ensure the 
coverage of isolated rural villages.  This hypothesis is further tested in Chapter 6. 
Thus the logic of the quota distribution does not favour PIR municipalities, for the 
following reasons: 
 The distribution of local quotas does not take into consideration the 
differences in the severity of poverty within states. 
 PIR municipalities may have their quota allocation reduced, despite high 
poverty levels, because their population numbers fall or fail to increase. 
 Because PIR municipalities are likely to have poorer implementation capacity, 
they may have lost out to municipalities with better capacity that were able to 
register potential beneficiaries quickly – further investigated in Chapter 6. 
 Lastly, isolated rural villages in PIR municipalities may not be as quickly 
registered as the poor living in urban areas of PIR municipalities, due to lower 
municipal capacity – also investigated in Chapter 6.   
From 2006 to 2009/10, there was no increase in the national quota.  For the 2009/10 
increase, interviewees reported that a new methodology to allocate the benefits was 
put in place.  This methodology used the 2006 PNAD, the 2000 Census and small 
area estimation techniques (MoPI) – the same methodology I am using for this thesis.   
Nonetheless, problems with the quota estimation are likely to persist, given (i) that 
benefits are capped nationally due to budgetary restrictions, (ii) that PNAD is still 
used to derive national poverty estimations, (iii) that there are still problems with the 
way local quotas are allocated; and (iv) that population migration is constantly 
happening.   This will result in ongoing operational difficulties and the need for 
frequent revisions of the estimations: 
We have the estimation, don’t we?  Because the municipality works with 
IBGE estimates, so they know what they have but we have some difficulties 
because some municipalities [say] ‘I don’t have all of this quantity that was 
estimated’ or ‘I need more than what is being given to me’.  Recently, we had 
a revision of the estimations (az017). 
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 Considerations involving PIR and PNIR municipalities in policy design 
As previously documented, the World Bank clearly recommended in 2004 that the 
overhauling of the Cadastro should involve special attention being paid to the 
location and poverty density of rural areas.  
Component 2: Strengthening the System for Identifying the Target 
Population (US$3.7 million in project costs including contingencies) … 
While the construction of the Cadastro Único sought to integrate household 
registries across the (previous) multiple programs in a very short period of 
time, there are several aspects of the system that could be improved.  To do 
this, Component 2 of the proposed project will support activities to strengthen 
the system for identifying the target population of the BFP [Bolsa Família 
Programme] and overhaul the Cadastro Único system in several key areas: …  
(b) revising the eligibility criteria for the BFP and the Cadastro questionnaire 
and data collection strategy, taking into account different local realities 
reflecting urban vs. rural settings (including population and poverty 
density) and diverse cultural, ethnic and racial characteristics of the 
populations (emphasis added) (World Bank 2004a p.2).  
This recommendation is in agreement with other research on rural poverty in Brazil 
(IFAD 2011; World Bank 2003).  But currently, the process of allocating quotas to 
municipalities gives no specific consideration to the type of municipality (rural or 
urban).  This was also confirmed in several interviews:  
So, look, in terms of rural or urban, there was never this differentiation, for 
example, I do not prioritise rural, I don’t, and I never will, I think it will never 
happen, I believe it will never have this differentiation, not this rule of 
prioritisation. (az021)  
So, I would not say that the BF had a clear rural and urban delimitation since 
the beginning, exactly because it had a trajectory of building the programme 
based on an already defined clientele,  a public that was a already mapped by 
previous programmes … The BF cut-off is income; it is not rural-urban 
location. (az026)   
 
 Achieving universal coverage in the long-term? 
Despite the methodological limitations of deriving poverty estimates from a cross-
sectional survey, Lindert et al. (2007 p.72) can still say that “[the] Bolsa Família has 
reached coverage targets that represent universal coverage of the poor”.  The sheer 
size of the programme in terms of the number of households it reaches, or the fact 
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that it covers all 5,565 municipalities of Brazil, is often confused with universal 
coverage.   
Many federal level administrators do recognise the limitations of the quota 
allocations, but argue that coverage will improve with time and a better understanding 
of the programme on the part of both local administrations and households.  Local 
administrations should be well-equipped to register poor beneficiaries after the initial 
years and after federal transfers based on their IGD.  Potential beneficiaries should 
have knowledge of the programme by now and would have registered for the benefit.  
As one of the interviewees said: 
But now we are in a second phase and I realise that with the extension of the 
BF, at least in the conceptual and theoretical point of view, we can achieve, 
with this volume of beneficiaries after the expansion, in theory, you would 
cover everyone, do you understand? (az024).  
But this argument is fallacious on several levels.  More coverage does not necessarily 
mean more targeting inclusion rates.  More knowledge of the benefit does not 
automatically translate into more registrations or updated registries.  Other reasons for 
lower registrations, such as system problems and measurement errors, are further 
explored in the next section and in Chapter 8.  
5.3 The selection “black box”: local quota, prioritisation and selection 
How to ensure that the poorest of the poor, the persistently poor, receive the benefit? 
Even if there are problems with the allocation of the national quota to municipalities, 
if there are systems in place ensuring that the poorest in a given location receive the 
benefit, issues concerning the total number of benefits may become secondary.    
The selection mechanism, however, is perceived by local administrators and the 
population as a “black box”.  To start the analysis, I subdivide this section into three 
parts (Figure 30): first I ask whether the local quota was used as a cap or only as a 
guide for benefit allocation; then I investigate whether the persistently poor were 
prioritised at the federal level; lastly, I analyse in detail the selection process, which 
also happens at the federal level.  
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Figure 30: Local quota, prioritisation and selection 
 
Source: author. 
 
5.3.1 The local quota: a cap or a guide? 
Interviewees had mixed views about the quota usage: sometimes it was understood as 
a cap, at other times it was used only as a guide.  The cap on the local benefits was 
mentioned in interviews with several federal administration staff involved in the BF 
programme.  
In such a municipality, let us suppose there are 100 thousand families, we can, 
then [based on the quota], include [only] another 50 (az023).  
there are 15 new benefit for this municipality, always following the estimates, 
which is our guide, as well as the financial information (az017 – emphasis 
added). 
The apparent confusion in the latter statement is due to the fact that the BF has a 
national cap, which must be respected due to budgetary allocations, but no specific 
regional target.  As a TCU report said: 
5.3.1 Was the LOCAL 
QUOTA used as a 
guide? 
YES → quota used as 
guide  
better-off 
municipalities may 
register more 
efficiently and may 
have more quotas 
allocated to them 
NO →  quota used as 
cap problem with 
poverty estimation for 
small municipalities 
5.3.2 In any case, was 
the poorest 
PRIORITISED? 
 Federal level→ 
national selection 
mechanism - 
legislation  
 Municipal level → 
local 
implementation 
(discussed in    
chapter 6) 
5.3.3 Federal admn role 
in the SELECTION 
process: 
Federal level → 
black box - who 
selects? How? Is 
there a queue?  
Municipal level → 
does not select 
beneficiaries 
…but the quality 
of the local 
Cadastro helps 
the selection. 
Better off 
municipalities 
may have better 
quality Cadastro 
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[TCU] was not able to find procedures that monitored the attainment of 
regional targets, but only procedures that monitored attainment of the national 
target of 11.1 million families (2006 p.278).   
The same report shows that in 2006 the difference in BF coverage varied from 268% 
in the municipality of Vera in the state of Mato Grosso, to 8.46% in the municipality 
of Itaubal in the state of Amapá (TCU 2006 p.247).  This percentage refers to the 
local quota i.e. families receiving the BF as a proportion of the number of estimated 
poor families.  The report shows unequal distribution of benefits within both 
municipalities and states:  
Bolsa Família expansion by geographical region was not carried out 
uniformly.  [This is due] to the concession of benefits above the estimated 
number of poor families in various states and municipalities of Brazil, while 
in other states and municipalities the coverage was below the estimated 
number (TCU p.277). 
SENARC emphatically stated in its reply to TCU that the local quota is not a cap: 
SENARC understands that poverty estimates should not be understood as a 
cap on benefits concession, once these estimates are not considered absolute 
(TCU 2006 p.282). 
Other research has found that the local quota is used merely as a guide.  Comparing 
the number of benefits (2006 Cadastro
92
) with the local quota (estimated from PNAD 
2001), Bastagli (2008 pp.120,121) shows that the number of benefits is higher than 
the quota, resulting in an “over-shooting” of the target.   
When I asked a key interviewee who took part in the BF policy design about the 
reasons behind the local quota, the interviewee reported: 
we carry out a recurrent update of the household information so that we can 
follow-up families.  The quotas have this rationale … and a little bit to help in 
the targeting, right? Since we know that there are 11 million households 
below the eligibility criteria, how are they spatially distributed? So that we 
would not find a situation in which a municipality has 200% of coverage and 
another one 50%.  Therefore, we created a certain restriction so that 
municipalities would effectively search who are the poor households in their 
geographical area, given a certain number of families.  Otherwise, they could 
do a less rigorous income analysis.  Thus, that was the idea, to try to distribute 
that national number to the municipalities (az025). 
                                               
92 Technically, the author uses the information from Folha, which is the Cadastro administrative 
record on cash transfer payments. 
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Using the local quota as a guide seems an adequate compromise given the potential 
difficulties of estimating the number of poor households in small rural municipalities, 
such as PIR and PNIR.  Nonetheless, such a use confirms my previous hypothesis 
that some municipalities may increase the number of their benefits at the expense of 
others (“taking the place of”).  Thus, this question of “over-shooting” the local quota 
needs to be addressed by monitoring the local quota for the prioritisation of the 
poorest and the selection of beneficiaries.  
5.3.2 Prioritisation of the persistently poor  
Considering that the national quota is a cap and the local quota is a guide, one 
question remains – how to ensure that the poorest households are prioritised?   
Interviewees reported that the prioritisation of the poorest is ensured by having a 
good local Cadastro.  The federal government, therefore, set up several procedures to 
ensure that local Cadastros were regularly and correctly updated.  There are several 
cross-checks conducted between different administrative databases.  Some are 
automatic; others are intentionally carried out.  Cadastro automatically warns the 
local Cadastro technician when there is contradictory information entered in different 
sections of the form, such as declared income and declared expenditures.  Cadastro 
also prompts when information is lacking or invalid.  CAIXA runs other checks, such 
as name, identification documents, filiation checks, etc.  The federal government 
cross-checks Cadastro information with other administrative databases, such as the 
Annual Social Information Database (RAIS
93
) and the Vital Records (CNF
94
).  RAIS 
has information on income through formal employment, and CNF records births and 
deaths nationally.   
Municipalities are also subjected to internal and external audits from the TCU and the 
Office of the Controller General of Accounts (CGU
95
).  Along with the other BF 
requirements, this reinforces the need to have an updated and a good quality 
Cadastro.   
Other tools to ensure the quality of local Cadastro are:  
                                               
93 Relação Anual de Informações Sociais. 
94 Cadastro  Nacional de Falecidos. 
95
 Controladoria Geral da União. 
 Page 172 of 356 
 
 
 a recommendation that the Cadastro entries of 20% of households should be 
made through households visits (Portaria No376, 16/10/2008, Portaria 
No177, 16/06/2011);  
 “active search”96, i.e. local municipalities actively reaching out to the poorest 
and registering them in loco; 
 several tools for communication between federal and local municipalities; and 
 the IGD financial transfers.  Two of the four IGD indicators, listed in section 
5.2, refer to the quality of the Cadastro, namely the number of registries 
updated within the past two years, and what proportion of the local quota the 
updated registries are.    
The World Bank recommended that geographical targeting should be carried out 
while registering families at the Cadastro (de la Brière & Lindert 2005).  Thus, areas 
with high poverty may justify registration in loco; whereas in areas with low poverty 
an on-demand application may be more suitable.  However, municipalities are 
autonomous entities, so it is up to them to decide how Cadastro registration will be 
conducted in their own territories, and whether they will use geographical targeting. 
Even when the local Cadastro is regularly updated and reflects the actual situation of 
the poorest, the policy design requires the prioritisation to be monitored at the 
national level in cases of competing claims.  This topic is indeed a “black box”.  Even 
senior BF researchers like Soares (2012a) are confused about prioritisation, leading 
him to state, “What is weird is that Bolsa Família has eligibility criteria and [but] not 
ordering criteria” (p.6).  However, the BF does have ordering criteria, as described 
below. 
The BF legislation first categorises households according to their social vulnerability 
levels (Portaria GM/MDS 341, 7/10/2008, art. 7): (i) households with child labour; 
(ii) households with forced work (modern day slavery); (iii) quilombolas peoples; (iv) 
indigenous peoples; (v) households living in states or municipalities with federal 
agreements concerning specific policies for BF beneficiaries (Decreto 5209, 
                                               
96 “Active search” means that the administration does not wait for potential beneficiaries to come to 
registration points at the local town.  The local government actively goes out and finds the most 
vulnerable families and registers them at the Cadastro.  This action is taken even further by the policy 
that has succeeded the Bolsa Família programme, called Brasil Sem Miséria. 
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17/09/2004, art. 12); and (vi) households that belonged to programmes prior to the 
BF (programas remanescentes).    
After MDS defines the number of families that will join the BF in a given month, 
there are three levels of prioritisation during the selection process.  The highest 
priority is given to families in the social vulnerability categories listed in article 7 of 
Portaria GM/MDS 341, 7/10/2008.  The next highest priority is given to 
municipalities with coverage lower than the calculated local quota (art. 8, §1).  The 
final level of priority is on the household level (art. 9).  The “concession of the 
benefit” is given first to (i) families with the lowest household income, then to (ii) 
families with the largest number of children from 0-17 years old (Portaria GM/MDS 
341, 7/10/2008, arts.8, 9).   
There are several points to be made about these prioritisations.  The use of computers 
is a growing trend, even in developed countries, such as the United Kingdom “digital 
by default” universal credit policy (Dwyer & Wright 2014; Seddon & O'Donovan 
2013; Spicker 2012).  Today’s British academics mirror Titmuss’ concern about what 
he called the “computermania”, and the unavoidable problems of moral values and 
equity imposed by selective policies (Titmuss 1987 p.137).  The BF selection process 
is one example of this unavoidable dilemma: how can one make a case that an 
individual in extreme poverty should be given priority over a poor family with a large 
number of children? Why should indigenous poor families be given priority over non-
indigenous extremely poor families? 
Another example concerns prioritisation according to geographical location and 
coverage  in relation to the local quota.  Although the quota is used only as a guide, 
and does not dictate the final number of benefits given to a municipality, its use as a 
prioritisation mechanism means that how it is calculated is extremely important.  
Even though it is very difficult to be certain when small municipalities, like PIR and 
PNIR, have had their local quotas under- or over-estimated, it is still the case that, in 
the event of competing claims of households with same level of income poverty and 
children, the benefit will go to the household living in the area with lower BF 
coverage.  
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Another important point to make is that new benefits are allocated to municipalities 
with low coverage, only then, they will be allocated according to lowest income per 
capita and highest number of children.  This could mean that more deprived 
households lose out to less deprived households.  If an extreme poor household “a” 
lives in a municipality whose quota has been reached and the household is not in one 
of the categories accorded top priority, this household may not receive the benefit.  
However, another household “b”, which may not be as poor as household “a”, may 
receive the benefit because they happen to live in a municipality with some empty 
places. 
It is important to note that, on the evidence of the legislation and the interviews, there 
is no “virtual” queue for the allocation of new benefit.  As well, it seems that 
municipal allowances for the inclusion of families change from month to month, with 
each new MDS monthly allocation of benefits to municipalities.  
Another consideration is the prioritisation of beneficiaries of pre-BF programmes 
(programas remanescentes).  This means that the beneficiaries of previous 
programmes were the first beneficiaries of the BF, if they met the BF eligibility 
criteria.  This is a very important issue for the purpose of this thesis, because two out 
of the four programmes were geographically targeted.  The Bolsa Alimentação (Food 
Voucher, Medida Provisória No. 2206-1, 06/09/2001) and the Bolsa Escola (School 
Grant, Lei No. 10.219, 11/04/2001) gave priority to the 14 States with the lowest 
Human Development Index.   
Tavares et al. (2009) suggested that the north-eastern states enjoyed better targeting 
because of better identification of the poor by local administrations.  Local officials 
can more easily identify and target the eligible population because the poverty gap in 
the Northeast is double the national poverty gap.  The authors also believe that the 
severity of poverty can create a strong incentive to register with the Cadastro.  
However, I would suggest that, considering that the BF list of beneficiaries was based 
on other programmes, and that those other programmes focused on the urban and 
semi-urban Northeast, targeting in the Northeast seems to be a consequence of the 
prioritisation rule (Portaria GM/MDS 341, 7/10/2008), rather than of better 
identification of the poor.  
 Page 175 of 356 
 
 
Another point to be considered is that the prioritisation process listed above does not 
detail how to resolve complex cases of competing claims.  For example: how would 
the selection system choose between a quilombola family living in a high-coverage 
geographical area, and a persistently poor family with a larger number of children 
living in low-coverage rural geographical area? 
There is, lastly, the process called “indication” (az017, az021), whereby particular 
families “jump in front of the queue”.  These are the families who fall within the 
categories of vulnerability listed in article 7 cited above (Portaria GM/MDS 341, 
7/10/2008), and their cases are decided judicially.  
Now, there is another process, which is called ‘indication’, what does 
‘indication’ mean? It means that these families, they receive BF benefits even 
when there is no quota left (az021). 
This reinforces the finding that article 7 takes precedence over higher levels of rural 
poverty such as those faced by the persistently poor in PIR and PNIR municipalities.  
Although it is sensible to address the historic social debt that Brazil has to the 
indigenous and the quilombolas population, it may not be adequate to do this using 
the BF policy and at the expense of other disadvantaged families.   
This sub-section has shown that, because of the priorities listed in the BF policy 
design, the selection process does not favour the persistently poor living in PIR 
municipalities.  Those priorities are, according to Portaria GM/MDS 341, 7/10/2008, 
in order: (i) “indication” and article 7 categories, which includes beneficiaries of pre-
BF programmes, mainly located in urban and semi-urban municipalities; (ii) 
municipalities with low coverage (art. 8 §1); and finally (iii) persistently poor 
households assessed for benefits on their income levels and number of children (art. 
9).  
Based on the above, one last and important remark to make in this section is to note 
that persistently poor households are competing for the benefit nationally.  When a 
household leaves the programme, the vacancy does not remain in the municipality 
where the former beneficiary lived.  Benefits are allocated first to areas with lower 
national coverage. 
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5.3.3 The role of the federal administration in the selection of the beneficiaries 
The selection of beneficiaries is a delicate issue in Brazil.  In a country with a history 
of corruption scandals, nepotism and political favouritism, the selection of 
beneficiaries is intended to be protected from political or other external influence by 
computerised algorithms and objective indicators,  hence its appearance as something 
of a “black box”.  Interviewees coined a couple of terms, “political-proofing” 
(blindagem política) and “bureaucratic insulation”, to describe attempts to carry out 
this intention during the first phase of the BF and the initial years of exponential 
expansion.  
so, you will never see, not at least until today, a mayor saying that he came to 
Brasília and used his/her political influence to negotiate an increase in the 
local quota for his/her municipality … you won’t see this … we do not 
receive lists of people nominated by deputies, senators, or whoever this person 
may be … unless the Judicial powers determine so … thus, there was, perhaps 
you could call it the BF ‘bureaucratic insulation’, which was fundamental.  
This means, the president guarantees the priority in resources allocation, the 
ministry reinforces this and guarantees isolation and political protection and, 
here, we have professionals working and, all of this together is what makes 
the programme successful for me (az019).  
However, what the above statement also says is that there was a “selective” political-
proofing.  Although there was no political influence in the day-to-day activities of 
programme execution, the overarching vision of the federal government, and even the 
personal role of President Lula, is very clearly acknowledged.  So the BF is likely to 
have had, during its policy design, (i) a top-down political influence on policy design, 
including several federal-level state bureaucrats; and (ii) a political-proofing from 
bottom-up demands from local government and administrators and, perhaps, even 
from local community representatives. 
It is important to discuss the circumstances in which the BF was consolidated, 
because they explain why the details of the selection process are not openly 
discussed, and more importantly, why the selection is centralised, computerised and 
de-personalised.  The local administration does not play any part in the selection of 
the beneficiaries.  Their responsibility is to keep an updated and truthful registry of 
the local households, preferably including the poorest whom they have identified 
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through an active search.  My interviews with local administrators showed that they 
do not understand how the selections are made.  
I really do not know how to give you this information, how they select the 
beneficiaries.  Because the selection, according to the law and everything else, 
is for the most vulnerable families, right? However, I think that vulnerability 
has to be looked upon as a whole, in the number of people in the household, 
right? Sometimes, we see a couple, recently married, that was registered and 
they got their benefit and then here comes a mother with five children, no 
husband, nothing, she doesn’t have the benefit (n006). 
It is interesting to note that although this local administration employee works with 
the BF, s/he does not know about the prioritisation rule. 
The selection workflow, pictured below, was described in interviews as an interaction 
between the MDS and CAIXA.   
Figure 31: Selection workflow 
 
Source: author based on interviews. 
 
It is important to clarify that communication between CAIXA and MDS about the 
selection process refers to quantities and not to individual households.  After the 
MDS tells CAIXA the number of spots available locally (the local quota), CAIXA’s 
software runs an algorithm that selects families according to the prioritisation criteria 
(described in the previous sub-section).  Thus, it is impossible for either the federal 
government or the local municipality to say when a household will receive the 
benefit. 
No, we do not have this visibility to know when a household will receive the 
benefit; neither has the municipality, nor the family, nor us.  Why is that so? 
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benefit for family A or B, but there are systematic processes that obey the 
rules of the Portaria [GM/MDS 341, 7/10/2008] (az017). 
The issue of “indication” of families is triangulated using the interviews between 
CAIXA and MDS.  CAIXA says that they receive two lists from MDS: one 
containing the external target audience (“indication”) listed in article 7; and the other 
one, the number of new benefits per municipality.   
The federal government, nonetheless, does not ignore complaints from local 
municipalities about the gaps in the selection process. 
but this process of declaring families eligible (habilitação) is very grey 
because you see we receive several official letters from municipalities asking 
why families are not being declared eligible and why they do not receive the 
benefit as there are still local quota available.  In this case we have two 
causes, the first is like you also have the problem within the local 
administration, they include the family and they believe that they do not need 
to do anything else with the registry data for that family.  So yes, in fact, we 
are not including in the programme a family whose registry is not being 
updated for 3,4,5 years.  No, we are not.  But at the same time there is 
something else, which is the following.  The municipality is conducting 
several updates in their local Cadastro and these updates are not necessarily 
being reflected for us here at MDS, so some families are not being considered 
eligible for the programme (az021). 
The above extract shows two sources of problems in the selection of families and the 
granting of benefits.  First, there is the possibility that the information in the local 
Cadastro is outdated.  Second, there is the possibility of system error that prevents 
the MDS from receiving the most updated list of beneficiaries.  The case studies 
presented in Chapter 6 consistently showed the difficulties in sending and receiving 
the Cadastro data.  This is most concerning as it means that there are PIR and PNIR 
municipalities with local Cadastros that are not copied into the national database, 
potentially leaving the persistently poor in rural poor municipalities without benefits. 
One possibility that this interviewee does not acknowledge outright but which can be 
inferred, is the implication of the indication process for the national quota.  Given that 
the indication process takes priority, these could be benefits that otherwise could be 
given to municipalities with quotas still filled.   
Finally, there is a procedural problem that could result in benefits not being 
distributed to the poorest.  Let us suppose that family “a” is the poorest family at the 
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Cadastro for a given month, and as such, they receive the benefit.  Once the family 
has the benefit, its eligibility is measured against the poverty line.  This does not 
necessarily indicate that the beneficiary family is still the poorest.  Other families 
could have registered at the Cadastro with lower incomes that family “a”.  Given that 
income-poverty is highly volatile, it is, therefore, difficult to guarantee that the pool 
of individuals selected over time is the same as the pool of the poorest households.   
 In sum: 
(i) Are the lower participation rates in PIR municipalities a result of the way in which 
the BF national quota is calculated, and how it is allocated to small municipalities? 
The analysis suggests that this is so. 
 The national quota is used as a cap and the estimates leave eligible households 
out of the programme due to lack of places. 
 The national quota is allocated to municipalities without any consideration of 
different levels of poverty within states, and poverty is worse in PIR and 
PNIR municipalities.  
 There are no geographical priorities for allocating the state quota to poor rural 
municipalities like PIR and PNIR. 
 PIR municipalities may have lost their quota allocation due to lower 
population growth, despite having higher poverty levels, with the result that 
their participation rates fall within the medium-range group. 
 The local quota is used only as a guide, so municipalities with better 
implementation capacity could have taken places that should have gone to the 
worst-off municipalities, such as PIR and PNIR municipalities 
(implementation capacity is further investigated in Chapter 6). 
 Thus, the analysis suggests that PIR municipalities may have had (i) a local 
quota lower than it would have been if intra-state poverty levels had been 
considered, and/or (ii) their BF benefits reduced in favour of other 
municipalities because of their lower implementation capacity.  Either or both 
of these effects could be behind the medium participation rates found in PIR 
municipalities.  
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(ii) Does the selection process give priority to the persistently poor, such as those 
found in PIR and PNIR municipalities? The analysis suggests not. 
 Prioritisation of the poorest depends on the quality of the local Cadastro, 
which also reflects the implementation capacity of the municipality. 
 The prioritisation process does not favour the persistently poor in PIR and 
PNIR municipalities.  There is no specific criterion for benefit allocation that 
gives priority to persistent poverty.  Instead, the policy design gives priority to 
indication, categories of social vulnerability, pre-BF programmes (article 7), 
and areas with low geographical coverage, before assessing households on 
their income and number of children. 
 The persistently poor are only considered for programme inclusion after its 
geographical area has been categorised as low coverage.  So neither the level 
of poverty found in PIR or PNIR municipalities, nor the level of poverty 
found in households, exerts priority in benefit allocation. 
 In the interviews, it was suggested that it is quite possible to have 
municipalities with quota numbers available, and eligible households without 
benefits. 
 Thus, given the prioritisation mechanism and the policy design, it is difficult 
to ascertain whether the selected beneficiaries are indeed the poorest of the 
poor. 
5.4 Conclusion 
This analysis of the RQ2a has suggested that the calculation of the national quota, the 
process of allocating the local quota, the prioritisation of households and the selection 
of the families may not maximise the effectiveness of the BF.  The policy design does 
not give priority to the persistently poor living in PIR and PNIR municipalities.  The 
quota allocation and the selection process may be behind the fact that PIR 
municipalities fall into a medium participation-rate category (rather than high 
participation).  It may also be the case that their benefit allocation is reduced by the 
fact that other municipalities have better implementation capacities, e.g. human 
resources, infrastructure, roads and transport. 
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This thesis asks for careful consideration of benefit allocation to PIR and PNIR 
municipalities and the persistently poor.  The chapter shows the complexity of 
applying national poverty estimates based on the PNAD income estimates, to PIR and 
PNIR municipalities.  Policy-makers must consider alternative ways to allocate the 
national quota to small municipalities, including poverty estimates based on 
indicators other than income measurements only.  I believe that multidimensional 
indices have a better potential to capture the deprivation aspects of the lives of the 
persistently poor than those based only on income.     
The analysis also details the complexities involved in means testing, selectivity and 
the use of computerised solutions to allocate benefits.  The government opted to de-
personalise services in order to avoid clientelism and historic levels of political 
favouritism, but this has been at the cost of excluding eligible beneficiaries.  As well, 
computerised solutions, as demonstrated by this chapter, hide other moral choices and 
equity concerns that are still problematic, even though they have been de-politicised.   
The detailed analysis of the prioritisation mechanism in the policy design shows the 
need for a radical transformation of the BF benefit into a truly universal coverage 
programme.  This would eliminate the category of “eligible but not beneficiary”.  It 
would also avoid political favouritism and decisions based on moralistic assumptions.  
It would maximise the effectiveness of the BF by ensuring that those who are eligible 
receive the programme.  
The fact that some of the rural poor in PIR or PNIR municipalities are receiving 
fewer opportunities to access the BF is of great concern.  For the persistently poor, 
the BF is an important social assistance benefit in areas where isolation and 
deprivation in all levels of life abound, and it is the only income support programme 
offered to able-bodied working-age population.   
Lastly, this chapter highlights how local implementation can influence the BF to 
reach the persistently poor in rural effectively.  As stated by Soares et al. (2010b p.4): 
Quotas, by imposing limits, also impose costs, thus forcing mayors to select 
only the eligible.  This argument, of course, presupposes that the poor or those 
acting for them are able to muster the necessary social control mechanisms at 
the local level.  It is a very questionable assumption and there is no empirical 
evidence that this in fact happens.   
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Thus, this is what I turn to next.  I focus the discussion of the next chapter on 
municipal-level analysis, followed by chapters on the household-level analysis.  
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6 THE ROLE OF LOCAL IMPLEMENTATION IN PIR AND PNIR 
MUNICIPALITIES IN EFFECTIVELY REACHING THE PERSISTENTLY 
POOR, THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATION STAFF PERSPECTIVE 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter highlighted the key role of local administration in ensuring that 
the persistently poor are effectively registered, keeping the Cadastro up to date, 
conducting active searches in remote villages, and correcting system errors promptly.  
An investigation of how PIR and PNIR municipalities implement the BF, from the 
point of view of the local administration staff, will add to the previous findings on 
possible reasons for the lower participation rates and the worse allocation of BF 
benefits in PIR municipalities. 
The central question of this chapter relates to RQ2b, “How does the local 
implementation influence the way that the BF effectively reaches the rural poor in 
PIR and PNIR municipalities?” To answer this question, I focus on two sub-
questions: 
(i) Section 6.3: How does remoteness influence the local administration 
infrastructure, and what impact does that have on BF participation rates? 
(ii) Section 6.4: How does the remoteness of the rural village influence the 
local implementation, and what impact does that have on BF participation 
rates? And does the local administration give priority to the poorest during 
the BF implementation? 
Although no study has analysed how remoteness affects the BF implementation, there 
are some general findings on BF implementation at the municipal level. 
Magalhães et al. (2007) examined the BF implementation in the early stages of the 
programme.  By comparing two case studies in Rio de Janeiro in 2004/2005, the 
authors observed that at that time there was not much knowledge of the programme; 
neither was there much training or coordination.  This resulted in inadequate 
monitoring of conditionalities and even failures to registered potential beneficiaries.  
The authors highlighted the fact that, in municipalities which lacked a tradition of 
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participatory representation, the role of the BF social council (ICS)
97
  in monitoring 
the BF was severely limited.  This was compounded by the lack of a clear 
understanding of the BF social council’s role.  Some of these problems are still 
present in the poor rural municipalities I researched, as explained in section 6.4. 
Bastagli (2008) examined the implementation of the BF in 2006 in four 
municipalities of the state of Minas Gerais.  The author found that, in the two poorest 
municipalities, there was only one registration access point at the local town.  This, 
the author said, “may pose a disadvantage for people residing at the outskirts of the 
town” (p.135).  Poor municipalities struggle to get sufficient household visits, as well 
as being faced with infrequent social council meetings and IT and system problems.   
The Brazilian Court of Audit (TCU) conducted several audits of the BF programme 
and the Cadastro.  The 2003 audit of the Cadastro, pre-BF implementation, identified 
areas where the central administration needed to focus, if programmes like the BF 
were to be implemented.  Important recommendations of that audit that are relevant to 
this research relate to regular updates of the Cadastro, training of local administrative 
staff, and the registration of vulnerable families in locations that are hard to reach.  
The report said that logistical and technical support should be given to local staff in 
accordance with the size of the municipality, and its demographic and technological 
diversity (TCU 2003).   
A subsequent TCU report (2009b), covering the years 2005 to 2009, shows an overall 
improvement from the first BF audit carried out in 2004 in terms of monitoring of 
conditionalities, programme information, distribution of benefits cards, online 
training, etc.  However, there is still concern over the lack of training for the social 
council.  My case studies also observed recurrent problems with the ICS municipal 
access to information, which affects Cadastro quality.   
Although these studies were conducted in the beginning of the BF implementation, 
their findings are similar to those of my research in 2010 in PIR and PNIR 
municipalities.  Despite gains obtained from the IGD, these federal transfers were not 
                                               
97 The BF social council (Instâncias de Controle Social) is a body that oversees the BF 
implementation, which includes ensuring that the BF reaches the poor.  ICS is comprised of an equal 
representation of civil society and government.  ICS is also responsible for monitoring the supply and 
the quality of education and health services. (Decreto 5209, 17/09/2004 art. 31). 
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enough to significantly reduce the implementation gap between poor rural 
municipalities and the research findings above-mentioned.    
Studies conducted in low and lower-middle-income countries may shed light on the 
effects of remoteness on poor rural municipalities in Brazil.  In Zambia and Malawi, 
Schubert and Slater (2006) found that limited administrative skills, and lack of 
guidance and supervision from federal ministries, made it difficult to implement 
conditional means-tested benefits.  Given these local constraints, the authors said that 
the administration of social cash transfers should be “as simple and as undemanding 
as possible” ( p.575).  In Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, Cecchini et al. (2009) 
highlighted the importance of an updated single registration to reduce clientelism and 
to improve targeting. 
This chapter is based on a thematic analysis of 14 interviews with 19 interviewees, 
and on protocol observations and service profiling, as described in Chapter 3.  The 
chapter is structured as follows.  Section 6.2 recaps the analytical framework 
presented in Chapter 3 and introduces the coding themes used to carry out the 
qualitative analysis.  Section 6.3 details the analysis of how remoteness influences 
local infrastructure.  Section 6.4 explores how rural village location affects local 
implementation.  Section 6.5 concludes this chapter.   
6.2 Analytical framework and coding themes 
I re-introduce the framework below for easy reference.  The sub-division of 
remoteness into intra-municipality and inter-municipality forms, as well as the 
understanding that across the geographical space there are flows of information, 
people, resources and networks, all of these are important elements explored in the 
qualitative analysis of this chapter and the chapters that follow.    
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Analytical framework: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author 
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The thematic analysis was conducted according to the codes illustrated in Figure 32.  
The local infrastructure represents the stepping stones for the local implementation.  
It cannot be assumed that some of the most basic local infrastructure like energy, 
computers and the availability of transportation are available in poor rural 
municipalities.  In the case of PIR municipalities, then additional strains are put upon 
the local infrastructure due to remoteness.  Although there are many themes related to 
BF implementation, I focus only on registration practices, Cadastro quality and 
information dissemination.   
 
Figure 32: Diagram of coding themes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author. 
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6.3 Local infrastructure: CRAS, human resources, roads and transportation 
There are three main themes under local infrastructure that I would like to address: 
CRAS infrastructure, human resources, and roads and transportation 
6.3.1 CRAS Infrastructure 
 Physical Infrastructure 
Interviews and protocol observations suggested that the need to create and 
institutionalise CRAS quickly, in order to attend to the growing demand of the BF 
expansion, resulted in establishing services in inadequate spaces.  For example, there 
are CRAS buildings without proper facilities (e.g. private interview rooms, waiting 
rooms) and others in inadequate locations (e.g. close to the mayor’s office, in 
relatively well-off suburbs).  
Only PNIR case studies reported their physical infrastructure to be “reasonably” 
adequate, with CRAS building in suburbs with high levels of deprivation, and even 
with the specialised social assistance service called CREAS
98
.  PIR case studies, on 
the other hand, reported problems even with basic physical infrastructure such as 
energy and water, and this impeded the functioning of the facility.  The lack of 
CREAS in PIR municipalities raises serious concerns about how to help households 
whose members have had their rights violated. 
 Service provision and opening hours 
All local administrators talked about how intra-municipality remoteness affected local 
implementation by reporting difficulties in physically reaching rural villages, mainly 
the isolated ones.  They also reported how households from isolated rural villages had 
problems in reaching CRAS.  The latter information is supported by the reports from 
households, analysed in Chapter 8.  
To make matters even more complicated, CRAS opening hours in some 
municipalities were limited, and this made it even harder for beneficiaries to attend 
                                               
98 CREAS – Centro de Referência Especializado em Assistência Social – offers services to families 
whose rights have been violated or who are under imminent threat.  
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the Centre.  Limiting working hours is against the rules of the BF, which states that 
“municipalities and the Federal District must keep fixed registration points in 
constant operation to register families or to update their registration” (Portaria No. 
177, 16/06/2011, art.5o).   
Reducing the working hours of CRAS has the potential to exclude the persistently 
poor living in rural remote villages, as it reduces their possibility of registering and 
updating their registration.  In addition, households living in remote rural villages 
have fewer transportation opportunities to get from their villages to the city.  They 
would incur higher costs to register, not only because of their location, but also 
because of the possibility of having to undertake the trip more than once. 
 Availability of CRAS vehicles 
Several interviewees emphasised the need for cars to reduce intra-municipality 
remoteness.  Without cars, it is difficult to reach the isolated rural poor, or even to 
conduct an “active search” in order to give priority to the persistently poor.  There 
were no cars available in PIR municipalities, and in PNIR municipalities there was a 
shortage of cars.   
PIR local staff used several coping strategies, such as requesting the mayor’s office 
for transportation during the registration periods, and visiting households using their 
own vehicles.  The lack of vehicles reinforces staff perceptions that social assistance 
is not given priority in local administration.   
The mayor’s office has one vehicle but it is often used by the Health 
Secretariat.  Between Health and Social Assistance, the vehicle goes to Health 
to assist a person [in critical need] (002ii - PIR). 
you would [try to] request a vehicle to visit a family, to organise a meeting, to 
take the service to a remote community, a community that did not even know 
about social assistance because we couldn’t go there.  We would only go 
whenever a car was made available; even so it was a headache to find one 
because no one saw it as important. ‘What are you going to do there?’ they 
would ask … we faced so much difficulty then I thought ‘we ought to have a 
car’ (011 nn - PNIR, reflecting on the situation prior to the car acquisition). 
 
 Page 190 of 356 
 
 
 Equipment 
Although both categories of municipality showed the need for additional equipment 
(computers, internet and office supplies), there was a difference in their requests.  PIR 
municipalities requested new equipment, whereas PNIR municipalities requested 
additional equipment.  Isolated municipalities are forced to work in worse conditions 
than those that are not isolated, as reported below: 
The internet is not good, we keep losing the internet connection, there are 
days when it doesn’t work at all, we stayed up to 11 days without internet 
because there is no option.  The municipality has one provider for the whole 
municipality, for the mayor’s office, for us, for everything.  Even in 
municipality “X” (nearest urban municipality), you don’t get internet – it is 
horrible.  There are municipalities that there is not even a LAN house because 
there is no internet there yet (012 i - PIR). 
The lack of internet or its poor quality represent a serious problem for the BF, 
because several operational procedures, including the registration of beneficiaries, 
access to benefit information and training, are conducted online.  PIR municipalities 
fare worse than PNIR.  
The new version of the Cadastro, which was implemented after my fieldwork, relies 
substantially on the internet.  Interviewees whose municipality was not ready to 
transition to the new system reported their concern with this issue.  At present, MDS 
offers two versions of the Cadastro system, because not all municipalities have 
transitioned to the full online version. 
There are links between problems with the internet and the poor energy infrastructure.  
Power outages interfere with filling out, updating or transmitting registration forms.  
This substantially affects the local capacity to implement the programme  
6.3.2 Human resources 
Human resources influence the local implementation capacity and the quality of 
service provision, and this has an impact on participation rates.  Training, staff 
turnover and types of contracts affect the implementation of daily activities, such as 
following registration procedures or solving technical issues.  An investigation of the 
human resources of PIR and PNIR revealed very crucial differences and trends 
described below. 
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 Training 
There was a general complaint about training or capacity-building in both PIR and 
PNIR municipalities.  Staff were either not officially trained at all, or had only 
recently been trained, despite having spent years in their job.   
Another complaint concerned the content of the training.  Interviewees reported that 
there was a need to have training related to problem-solving, especially Cadastro 
problems.  This scarce information flow through training impinged on the capacity of 
the local administration to reproduce BF knowledge and to attend the variety of 
household demands.  This, in turn, had an impact on participation rates. 
So, sometimes, we made a mistake not because we erred, do you understand? 
It is because we don’t know, since we have never had a formal training and 
what we read is what is available and not everything is made available online 
(012i - PIR). 
Staff cope with the lack of or limited training opportunities by arranging informal 
training with CRAS/BF staff in other municipalities.  Inter-municipality remoteness 
plays an important part in this coping strategy.  PIR municipalities resort to nearby 
local municipalities, whereas PNIR municipalities tend to have training in larger 
urban municipalities or even in the state capital.  The location of the informal training 
also has an impact on the quality of the information passed on.  State capitals or large 
urban municipalities, unlike small rural municipalities, have access to more up-to-
date information; they also have more exposure to everyday problems, and this helps 
with the development of various on-the-job skills.   
MDS has tried to address this issue by using distance education.  This strategy was 
implemented in 2007 and 2008 (TCU 2009b).  During this period there were four 
courses, attended by 9,550 local administration staff and in 1,648 municipalities.  In 
addition, there are videos and reading materials available online.  However, none of 
the municipalities I visited had taken part in distance-education courses promoted by 
the MDS.  However meritorious the MDS effort in promoting capacity building, 
structural problems with transportation and internet access persist, predominantly in 
PIR municipalities.  
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 Staffing and turnover 
My research uncovered general complaints about staff overload.  Staff can hold 
several positions at once, and this has an impact on the quality of their work.  This 
situation is compounded by irregularities in staffing.  Examples include one 
professional working for two different secretariats, another working for two 
municipalities, the “borrowing” of professionals from other secretariats to help during 
specific registration periods, and reduced opening hours of CRAS.  The problem is 
made worse in PIRs because there are fewer staff, resulting in fewer services 
provided by CRAS.  These findings raise questions about the costs of distributing 
national policy to local municipalities, and about the idea of using the BF as a 
platform for social and labour inclusion (“graduation agenda”).  
Another problem in these municipalities is high staff turnover, partly associated with 
the type of contracting practices, analysed below.  The data show that inter-
municipality remoteness influences the hiring process.  PNIR municipalities can hire 
professionals from nearby urban municipalities.  I interviewed several staff who lived 
in a poor rural municipality during the week and returned to their homes in an urban 
municipality on the weekends.  PIR municipalities are less attractive to staff due to 
reduced leisure facilities and fewer opportunities for professional educational 
advancement.  They attract fewer staff and have more difficulty in retaining them.  
Inter-municipality remoteness influences the flows of people in terms of hiring 
opportunities.  Proximity to the nearest urban municipality makes PNIR 
municipalities more attractive to qualified staff, who can work in the PNIR 
municipality during the week and return to the urban municipality during the 
weekend.  This means there is a constant and pendular flow (to-and-fro movement) of 
people over the geographical space.  PIR municipalities, as stated previously, are less 
attractive for professionals.  So those who work in these areas tend to leave the 
municipality only at certain times (extended holidays and vacations), making the 
flows in and out of a PIR municipality inconstant.  These flows seem like they were 
stationary, because people either stay within the municipality for long periods of time, 
or they stay away for long periods of time. 
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 Types of contracting 
Interviewees identified two types of contract in both PIR and PNIR municipalities: 
annual contracts and short-term contracts (there are also public servants, who are 
permanent employees).  Annual contracts are generally issued to those with 
professional positions at CRAS, such as psychologists, social workers, and teachers; 
whereas short-term contracts are generally given to those with short-term, specific 
tasks such as those required during registration periods.   
Although interviews with federal staff in Chapter 5 revealed attempts to de-politicise 
the BF programme by selecting beneficiaries at the national level, the influence of 
local politics still exists.  Public servants are transferred from secretariats when a new 
administration takes over;  annual contracts are renewed according to political 
agreement;  and flows of informal networks and political preferences subtly underline 
the BF implementation, given the uncertainty of contracting and the lack of policy 
continuation.  As one interviewee said: 
She [social worker] was working for the Social Assistance Secretariat but she 
was transferred to Health.  And she was the CRAS coordinator at the past 
administration but because of politics, you know how it is, she was transferred 
… they put me here [at CRAS] recently … I was at the Finance Secretariat in 
the past administration (013i - PIR). 
Another thing, we depend on [local] politics and contracts are given to people 
who are not [public servants] … I am a public servant as I undertook the 
public test for administration not for social assistance though but I am placed 
here …  There are another two public servants who are allotted here, the 
remaining staff are contractors.  These contracts are annual.  So, what 
happens, a contract like that already contributes for a job not well done, do 
you understand? We train one person, s/he gets it and when next year comes 
… the mayor can’t hire any more or something else, then another person is 
hired, it gets very tiresome … I am trying to teach one person to do a job then 
tomorrow it changes, there comes another person, this is very tiresome  (006n 
- PNIR). 
 
6.3.3 Roads and transportation: inter- and intra-municipality remoteness 
 Condition and length of roads 
The impact on participation rates of the condition and the length of roads is twofold.  
First, it has an impact on the municipality in its relation to the nearby urban 
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municipality (inter-municipality remoteness).  Second, it has an impact on the 
relationship between households and local administration staff (intra-municipality 
remoteness).   
As previously analysed, inter-municipality remoteness can influence municipality 
participation rates in terms of infrastructure (electricity and internet) and in terms of 
staff availability and training.  The fieldwork showed that all of these issues are worse 
in PIR municipalities.   
For example, one interviewee reported that, when a group of BF state administrators 
were training local administrators, they travelled as far as a nearby rural municipality 
but stopped short of visiting her municipality.  She said that later in a meeting she 
raised her hand and objected to this practice:  
those living in my municipality they are people, they vote, they have rights, 
they are citizens.  You knew that this municipality has no asphalt when you 
left the capital (002ii - PIR). 
Inter-municipality remoteness can influence the availability of the service provision 
necessary for the BF implementation.  Beneficiaries need to get their documentation 
at the CAIXA, a post office or a registry office (cartórios) in order to enrol in the 
programme, and these are services that tend to exist only in the nearest urban 
municipality.  Then, when they receive their cards, they need to register their 
password at the CAIXA.  Although the local administration sometimes sets up an 
arrangement with the CAIXA to come to the municipality, this is very much up to the 
local administration.  The more isolated the municipality, the more costly it is for 
beneficiaries to access CAIXA or any of the other necessary services.   
Intra-municipality remoteness also affects the implementation of the programme.  
Local staff in PIR municipalities reported difficulty in accessing isolated rural 
villages, whereas there was a systematic presence of CRAS in non-isolated rural 
villages.  Isolated rural villages were mostly connected via dirt roads in precarious 
conditions.  Interviewees reported that during the rainy season these rural villages 
could be cut off.  Non-isolated rural villages were easily connected to the local town 
by tarmac roads, generally alongside the state highway.  These two types of rural 
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villages require different implementation strategies on the part of the local 
administration. 
There is only one registration point at the rural village of xxx (non-isolated 
rural village).  The social workers go there on Tuesdays and they meet the 
demands of that rural community.  The demands of that village are met there 
(009nn - PNIR). 
Well, the biggest difficulty we have here is at xxxx (isolated rural village), 
right?  There are places with very difficult access there.  What do we do? 
What can we do to work with that community? We will put together a group, 
a team.  We will stay at least two months in that village with this team, right? 
And there we will provide motorbikes as it is easier for the team to visit each 
house, because we can’t leave one house without registration … We will 
register everyone, but we need to go to each house (014i – PIR).99  
The above quote shows that, although local staff in PIR municipalities may have 
fewer opportunities to visit isolated rural villages, it does not necessarily follow that 
staff visit fewer houses in the villages.  Considering that some rural villages can be 
spread out over different farms, staff may have to visit all houses in a low-density 
population area.  Reaching out to this population is highly costly for local 
administrations.   
 Transportation and transaction costs 
Although CRAS may find strategies for approaching rural communities, there are 
transportation costs borne by beneficiaries, and this is recognised by local staff.  
These are the costs people incur in going from their rural villages to the local town, 
CRAS, schools, health clinics and banking correspondents.  
There are also transaction costs associated with information-seeking and benefit 
payments that could be related to either intra- or inter-municipality remoteness.  
Beneficiaries need to go to CRAS
100
 to register and to obtain all sorts of information, 
i.e. whether their benefit has been awarded, why it was cancelled, why it was 
reduced, etc.  Sometimes, they need to go to schools and health clinics to find out 
what the situation of their children is and to regularise their compliance with 
                                               
99 Motorbikes are used because there are places that cars do not have access to. 
100
 Some CRAS have a separate building specifically for Cadastro. 
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conditionalities.  They also need to go to banking correspondents to withdraw 
benefits, or to CAIXA to register their passwords.   
There are interesting coping strategies to reduce these costs.  Beneficiaries tend to go 
to CRAS on the same day as the municipal market.  They get someone else to inquire 
about the arrival of their benefit card.  Evidence from the interviews shows that 
beneficiaries sometimes give their benefit cards to other beneficiaries to withdraw 
benefits on their behalf, even though this practice is illegal without a power of 
attorney
101
.  This was confirmed by interviews with banking correspondents. 
Intra- and inter-municipality remoteness affects the cost of beneficiary transportation, 
with implications for participation rates.  Households living in isolated rural villages 
have to allow more time for transport (which is often infrequent due to the remote 
location) to reach CRAS or CAIXA during their opening hours to deal with their 
benefit issues.  Assuming the average benefit value in 2009 - calculated as R$95.00 or 
US$41.00 (Soares et al. 2010a p.305) - and applying it to information in the 
qualitative dataset, estimated costs incurred solely on transportation varied from 7% 
to 59% of the benefit value in PIR municipalities, and from 3% to 21% of the benefit 
value in PNIR municipalities.  Due to remoteness, some beneficiaries may need to 
add lodging costs.  The isolated rural villages in which I carried out interviews had 
private transport up to three times a week to the municipal town hall.  But even on the 
days when there was transport, the transportation pick-up and drop-off can impose 
high opportunity costs.  Sometimes, a whole day is lost visiting these institutions.  
 In sum:  
(i) How does remoteness influence the local administration infrastructure, which, in 
turn, may have an impact on the BF participation rates? 
Although there were common problems faced by PIR and PNIR municipalities, such 
as staff overload, high turnover, insecure contracts and lack of training, PIR 
municipalities are comparatively worse off.   
In terms of inter-municipality remoteness: 
                                               
101 Art. 23 §2 Decreto No. 5209, 19/07/2004 states that CAIXA allows beneficiaries to give power of 
attorney to another person, as long as it is issued by the local municipality. 
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 PIR municipalities experience relatively worse physical infrastructure, and 
problems with internet provision, which is important for beneficiary 
registration.   
 PIR municipalities have difficulty in attracting and retaining qualified staff, 
resulting in higher turnover.   
 Training for PIR staff is not readily available.  They need to go to the nearby 
urban municipality or to the state capital, and this requires money and time.  
On-line training provided by MDS is difficult to get access to due to shortages 
of computers and unreliable internet provision. 
 Distance, infrequency of transport and bad road conditions to the nearest 
urban municipalities influence people’s access to the complementary 
institutions that are required for the implementation of the programme, such as 
CAIXA.  These institutions are generally not present in PIR municipalities.  
 Remoteness influences the flows of qualified staff, training, information-
sharing and institutional exchanges.  These flows tend to be inconstant and 
stationary. 
In terms of intra-municipality remoteness: 
 The lack of cars in PIR municipalities makes it difficult to cover all the rural 
villages within a municipality and to “actively search” for the persistently 
poor in remote rural villages.   
 Distance, frequency of transport and road conditions play a crucial role in 
increasing the communication between CRAS and households.   
Given the PIR local infrastructure detailed above, the onus seems to be on the 
persistently poor themselves to reach out to CRAS, and incur the costs necessary to 
overcome the intra- and inter-municipality remoteness.  It might be suggested that the 
incentive to enrol in the programme lies with the potential beneficiary; the poorer the 
potential beneficiary is the stronger the incentive to enrol.  However, this claim does 
not take into consideration that the persistently poor would also have to cope with 
various layers of transaction costs before any benefit is received, costs related to 
documentation, information-seeking, transportation, food and possibly even lodging.      
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The analysis, therefore, suggests that the local infrastructure under which PIR 
municipalities operate have the potential to result in lower participation rates and 
registration of the persistently poor.  
6.4 Local implementation: dissemination of information, registration and 
Cadastro quality control 
Building on the findings from the previous section, I look at the complex interaction 
between the remoteness of the rural village, i.e. intra-municipality remoteness, and 
local implementation.  I specifically analyse the dissemination of information, 
registration and quality control.   
6.4.1 Dissemination of information 
 Strategies 
CRAS uses television, radio, a car adapted with a loudspeaker, pamphlets, workshops 
and posters at the mayor’s offices to disseminate the BF information.  There is also an 
enormous amount of information given face-to-face, either when beneficiaries go to 
CRAS or when CRAS visits the rural villages.  In addition, school teachers and health 
workers are also BF-information disseminators.  And finally, there is the informal 
“word of mouth” when beneficiaries inform each other about registration, updating of 
the Cadastro, arrival of benefits, or reasons for cancellation.   
The data showed that isolation plays an important role in the type of strategy chosen.  
Isolated rural villages tend to be more associated with in loco strategies – e.g. the hire 
of a car with a loudspeaker or a visit of CRAS staff to that location.        
 The politics of informing the targeted population 
Often it is the local authorities who inform potential beneficiaries about details of the 
programme, and this can cause problems for BF staff when they have to correct this 
information.  As one local BF administrator said:  
There are people that don’t know the programme and inform beneficiaries … 
and when they [the beneficiaries] arrive here [at CRAS], they tell me ‘but so-
and-so told me that it is like that’.  Until you deconstruct this information, say 
that that information is wrong, or it is not completely right, it takes a lot of 
time.  We face this difficulty (012i – PIR). 
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In addition, local BF administrations report that information from the federal 
government puts an additional strain on the relationship with potential beneficiaries: 
we always blame the press … it is Lula, Lula and his staff, the president, the 
staff, when they send out a press notice, they don’t give any clarification 
about the rules, the criteria, the things, they only tell you that everything is 
good, you have a right to the benefit – there was even an ad that said 
‘everyone has the right to the BF’ … so when a woman hears that ‘everyone 
has the right’ she has a certain reaction (011nn – PNIR). 
And there is a constant request, all the time there are families asking us … ‘I 
saw at the television that the number of benefit increased’ … who has my 
benefit? … it must be that psychologist there …. (laughs) … so they come 
with this perspective, ‘hey, the television informed that the number of benefits 
increased, if they have, why haven’t I received mine?’ And ‘why only this?’ 
meaning the perspective of having more, of gaining more … and there are 
others who want to receive a benefit that they are not entitled to… it is very 
difficult, very difficult indeed (011nn - PNIR). 
Whether the dissemination of incorrect information is a conscious political tool, or 
simply an error, is difficult to say.  In any case, most of the targeted population in PIR 
and PNIR municipalities are functionally illiterate, and they may take the information 
given to them by the authorities at face value without conducting further checks.   
The TCU audits (2006) have highlighted the issue of the generality and imprecision 
of national political advertisements.  MDS has put a considerable amount of effort 
into responding with various information tools directed both to the local 
administration and to beneficiaries.  Among these tools are TV commercials, jingles, 
pamphlets, manuals, emails, weekly bulletins to targeted audiences (BF managers, 
social councils), and even radio soap-operas.  Although these practices have been 
going since July 2005, their use by local administrations is still restricted, and I did 
not see any in the poor rural municipalities I visited. 
 Lack of knowledge of the selection process – mistrust of beneficiaries 
Local administrations not only lack knowledge of the selection process, as reported in 
Chapter 5, but also of the timeframe for inclusion of beneficiaries.  This practice is 
costly for the persistently poor living in remote rural villages.  Since they have no 
indication of how long they should wait until a benefit is made available to them, 
potential beneficiaries have to keep going to the local CRAS.  They could phone 
MDS to inquire about their benefit, but this is difficult for them due to patchy mobile 
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coverage and limited landlines in isolated villages.  The rural poor in isolated 
communities face more costly consequences than those in less isolated circumstances, 
as they have higher costs of transportation, which also takes more time.   
Lack of knowledge about the selection process, plus the dissemination of incorrect 
information, are harmful for the relationship between the local staff and families.  If 
the local administration does not understand the “black-box” that is the selection 
process, neither do the potential beneficiaries.  The relationship is permeated by 
abuses and threats – a problem also raised by a TCU audit (2009b p.122).  
Yes, we have received threats … Once there were citizens with sticks to break 
all the computers and the girls embrace the computers (laughs) … They call 
us names, if we arrive with different clothing it is because we are stealing 
from the BF … because the mayor is the CRAS coordinator who is stealing 
their money – this is how they see us (008nn - PNIR). 
Me: Did you experience verbal aggression? 
Several times (013 I - PIR). 
 
So that you have an idea what it is to work with the BF.  We even have been 
threatened here. 
Me: Death threats? 
Like that.  Uh-hum.  If you don’t want it … somebody could come and shoot 
you if you don’t work correctly, do you understand?  So, I have been on the 
radio to clarify who is eligible for the BF, at council meetings, conferences 
but these people when someone speaks of money they think like this ‘I have 
the right, I want it, do you understand? By force’ and several municipalities 
have various problems like this (014i - PIR). 
 
6.4.2 Registration process and possible reasons for exclusion 
By “registration” I mean three different administrative actions: the registration itself 
(inclusão), the update (atualização) and the recertification (revalidação) of the 
Cadastro (Portaria No. 177, 16/06/2011).  Registration is the act of registering the 
household information at the Cadastro.  Recertification and update are both checks of 
the Cadastro form conducted every two years, at least:  the former is a confirmation 
that the existing information is unchanged; the latter is an updating of the form in the 
light of a modification of circumstances.  In this sub-section I analyse factors 
mentioned by local staff that affect the registration process, and that could possibly 
result in exclusion of the poorest.  These reasons are cross-checked with reports from 
households in Chapter 8. 
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 Knowledge of the programme during registration 
During the registration of a potential beneficiary, there are some practices that could 
affect the participation rate of a specific municipality.  One of them concerns the 
information given to beneficiaries during their registration.  If beneficiaries know 
about the eligibility criteria, they can understand whether or not their benefit has been 
incorrectly established.  If they know about the conditionalities, they can ensure that 
these are met.  
During my fieldwork, I observed that some health staff and CRAS managers did not 
know what the BF eligibility criteria were, and had little knowledge of the 
programme in general.  This is particularly troublesome given that they work with the 
BF target population.  BF staff reported that they did inform potential beneficiaries 
about education and health conditionalities during registration, but the more 
awareness local administration staff have of the BF programme details, the better 
informed potential beneficiaries will be.  Health staff and CRAS managers who are 
ill-informed about BF criteria can fail to issue warnings against cancellation for non-
compliance.  It can also mean that eligible people miss out on opportunities for 
registration. 
I also found evidence that the complexity of the programme affects the beneficiary’s 
understanding of the programme implementation.  This has several consequences, 
such as an increase in the transaction costs for beneficiaries who constantly have to 
go to CRAS to ask for information or to solve difficulties with eligibility and benefit 
payment. 
Given the complexity of the BF, the limited training and the high staff turnover, it is 
no surprise that the data show evidence of the dissemination of incorrect information.  
Staff in PIR municipalities have more difficulty in accessing information.  They have 
reduced exposure to training, to online materials and to the BF network of 
professionals.  Thus, location influences how knowledge is produced and reproduced, 
impacting on the local understanding of programme implementation. 
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 Lack of documentation 
The main reason highlighted by local staff for the possible exclusion of eligible 
families from the BF Cadastro database is lack of official documentation.  MDS has 
identified this problem and issued a note to all municipalities instructing them on how 
to proceed (MDS 2007a).  MDS recommends that, when the people without 
documentation are identified, the municipality either provide them with transportation 
to the registry office (cartórios), or bring representatives of the relevant institutions to 
issue documents in loco.   
Lack of documentation has an impact on participation rates because, without it, 
potentially eligible families are not even included in the Cadastro database in the first 
place.  Several documents are needed for a household head to register her/his family 
at the Cadastro.  The household head, generally the mother, must have her own birth 
certificate or identity card, as well as a tax file number (CPF
102
) or a national 
electorate card.  Household members should also have documentation, such as birth 
certificates, to be included in the registration form.   
The process of obtaining these documents is cumbersome.  Birth certificates can be 
obtained from the registry office until the child is 12 years old, or through a judicial 
process after that age.  This differs from countries where birth certificates can be 
issued by maternity wards.  The estimated difference between the number of births 
registered in maternity wards, and those registered at the cartórios, is more than two 
million individuals, who are invisible to the public policies (MDS 2007a).  Although 
there is no cost to obtain birth certificates from cartórios, some municipalities have 
no cartório.  This was the case in all of my case studies.  
As already mentioned, the household head needs to obtain either a CPF or a national 
electorate card.  The CPF is obtained either at a post office or at the CAIXA.  It costs 
R$5.70
103
.  If the mother is between 18 and 69 years old, she has to show her national 
electorate card in addition to her birth certificate in order to get the CPF.  Not every 
                                               
102 Cadastro de Pessoa Física 
103 R$5.70 (US$3.27 as of January 2010).  From 2012 onwards, the CPF has been free of charge if 
requested online. However, PIR municipalities have problems with internet provision. 
 Page 203 of 356 
 
 
municipality in Brazil has a CAIXA, although post offices are better distributed 
throughout the country.   
Some mothers may prefer to get the national electorate card instead of a CPF, since it 
is free of charge and it is a prerequisite for the CPF.  She has to go to an electoral 
registry office (cartório eleitoral) and present her birth certificate and some proof of 
address.  Valid proofs of address are telephone bills, water or electricity bills, and 
bank account statements.  This proof-of-address requirement can be challenging for 
the poor, especially in areas where housing arrangements are sometimes not formal, 
not to mention the difficulty in visiting an electoral registry office in another 
municipality.  
Local administrations do attempt to facilitate the documentation process.  They may 
arrange transportation to the nearby urban municipality, which has a CAIXA, a 
cartório, and/or an electoral registry office.  Other municipal administrations take 
one-stop stalls with them when they visit remote areas, where individuals can get all 
the documentation they need at once. 
Therefore, difficulties on the government side relate to the scattered dispersion of the 
services beneficiaries need to obtain their documentation.  On the beneficiary side, 
there may be a lack of valid proof of address, or a lack of money to cover the costs of 
documentation and transportation.  Thus, it is challenging for the rural poor to obtain 
all the documentation needed for registration at the Cadastro.  The challenge is even 
greater for those living in isolated rural villages.  
The administrators I interviewed also mentioned families who had lost their 
documentation.  In this case, reissuing their documentation, such as birth certificates 
or national identity cards, must be paid for and must be done at the original place 
where the birth was registered.  These two conditions are far from easy for the rural 
poor.  For a population that constantly migrates, as explained below, getting 
replacements for lost documentation may represent an enormous task.   
 Migration 
Interviewees mentioned migration as another reason for exclusion from the BF.  
Local administrative staff said that they believed that the migration pattern of the 
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rural poor had two consequences: (i) they cannot be located; and (ii) new migrating 
families do not immediately register in the areas they have moved to.  When families 
cannot be located, there is a strange result:  CRAS has unclaimed benefit cards.  The 
evidence points towards migration rather than an increase in family income, as these 
families cannot be located in the municipality they originally registered in.  In 
Chapter 8, I will analyse households’ life accounts of migration. 
 Limited quota 
Some of the local administrators also pointed to the fact that there is a number of 
“eligible but not beneficiaries” registered at the Cadastro.  Some of them had 
requested additional benefit allocation.  They reported being “embarrassed” by the 
eligible but not-beneficiary families who constantly seek information about the 
approval of their benefit claim (014i PIR).  As mentioned previously, there is already 
an element of mistrust in the relationship between local staff and households.  The 
fact that eligible households are not receiving their benefit increases the tension.  This 
finding supports the findings from Chapter 5 on how the local quotas are established 
and allocated between municipalities, and the consequent possibility that the local 
quota might not reflect the actual number of poor households.   
 Cadastro errors while registering 
In the case studies, there are reports of Cadastro software problems faced by the local 
administration while registering.  This has an impact on participation rates since 
potentially eligible households end up not being included in the national database, 
and not taking part in the benefit allocation.    
Problems pointed out by Cadastro technicians were related to processing problems, 
particularly the divergence between the local and the national databases.  
Interviewees reported that, sometimes when they updated forms locally, this was not 
reflected at the national level.  They reported several updates that had been lost, and 
said there was a recurrent need to check the update of registries.   
One interviewee reported a recurrent processing problem with an “invalid return file”.  
This involves a household registration form being put on hold due to system 
problems: the local administration sends the file to CAIXA but CAIXA is not able to 
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read it.  The problem is not only that CAIXA cannot read the file, but also that the 
local administration cannot make changes to it.  The household, meanwhile, has to 
wait until CAIXA can solve the problem.  This is worrisome, as potential eligible 
beneficiaries are completely out of the system without any social assistance support.  
The quote below shows that there are cases of potential beneficiaries waiting for more 
than a year for their situation to be solved. 
Since May 2009 we have had problems with the “return file”, meaning, we 
send the files but we can’t receive them back.  There was an error message 
saying ‘this document is not a valid return file’ ... but we still have forms of 
families that were updated last year and they are still there and we cannot 
make any changes … We spoke with CAIXA and they sent us their technical 
support … but according to them … this will only be normalised with the new 
system (006n – PNIR). 
 
 Local adaptation to registration practices 
Local variations in registration practices also have an impact on the priority given to 
the poorest and on participation rates.  Four are worth mentioning: (i) inconsistency 
in assessing the income of rural workers; (ii) the use of the BF social council as an 
approval body; (iii) the exclusion of family members when updating the Cadastro; 
and (iv) the influence of local politics in the registration process.  
The income of rural workers is by its very nature difficult to assess, and yet it is the 
basis of the means tests used to assess eligibility.  The rural poor generally do not 
enjoy the benefits of formal employment; they may grow their own subsistence food; 
and any formal income is seasonal.  All of this requires different procedures when 
assessing the monthly income of the rural poor.  Some local public servants write 
whatever value the mother states; others ask the mother to calculate an average of 
income per month; others tell the mother to inform them of the lowest income 
estimate per month.   
Inaccuracy is reflected not only by different collection procedures from different 
municipalities, but also by requesting that the poor estimate their own income – a 
highly volatile income in the case of the rural poor – which is then subjected to means 
test.   
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The case for moving beyond income indicators to assess poverty is strengthened 
when we consider how remoteness and geographical variables influence the 
possibilities of livelihood diversification for the persistently poor, as noted by these 
two very different statements: 
Generally, what do we do? This is very complex, really … the farms here are 
very small.  Here there is a period of drought, nothing that they plant grows.  
So, those that are poorest they are in farms that are really … [although] this is 
a self-declaration [of income], you see that under no condition they are lying, 
you know? Whatever they earn there, they can barely eat with it … if you 
need this [fruits, vegetables] in one of these farms, the majority of them, 
99.9% you will die, without counting the diseases.  Because you have no 
water, lots of them have no water, the water here is brackish, and it tastes bad 
because it is really salty.  So, they don’t have anything – it is really their 
manioc, the corn, which lots of times he loses his harvest.  Like this year, lots 
lost their corn and manioc harvests, only subsistence really, there is nothing 
they can use to earn money, there isn’t (012i – PIR). 
The people that are waiting for a place (at the BF), we put them in CRAS 
projects, but I will be very sincere with you, the majority of the population of 
this municipality is not the poorest of the poor, they are not starving.  
Obviously there are some, I am not going to say that there aren’t any, but it is 
very hard.  Because our municipality has various benefits … If you go to a 
farm, you will see the abundance of fruits, you won’t starve, you get a fruit 
and you will sell it at the market downtown, and you will succeed, you will 
earn your money.  It is not a city in which you can’t survive.  They plant a 
bean sprout and they harvest it … sell it and eat it, right? (007n - PNIR).   
Another local variation of the registration practice that stood out from the dataset is 
the use of the social council (ICS) as an approval body.  ICS has an important role in 
quality oversight of the programme.  Springing from the 1988 Constitution, which 
institutionalised the national councils, the BF social council follows the same 
tradition of democratic participation in elaborating, managing and overseeing the BF 
programme.  The social council at a municipal level represents an important 
achievement of modern Brazilian democracy.   
In this local practice, the council “approves” the insertion of the information of a 
particular family in the Cadastro, and if the council does not approve of it, the family 
is not registered.  This may be a mechanism for giving priority to the persistently 
poor and ensuring the quality of the information entered.  However, it is not legal – 
the eligibility threshold is not approval by the ICS, but rather the income cut-off.  
Interviewees reported that, in practice, the council gathered to “rubber stamp” the 
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Cadastro forms, rather than deciding whether to reject them or to give them priority.  
But whatever the reason, this local practice would result in longer waiting periods for 
the registration forms to be inserted into the local Cadastro.   
In relation to excluding family members from the system, one municipality reported a 
novel way of dealing with conditionality breaches.  Instead of allowing the family’s 
benefit to be suspended through the non-compliance with school conditionalities of 
one of its members, the local administration excluded this family member from the 
Cadastro.  This would make sense if this family member were living in another 
municipality and no longer linked to the household.  Even so, the family member is 
most likely a young adult still of school age who should, according to the programme, 
still be studying.   
However, instead of enforcing conditionality compliance and pushing this family into 
further destitution, the local administration staff flexibly adjust the programme, thus 
demonstrating an understanding of the family situation.  Enforcing compliance may 
not address the reasons why this young adult is not attending school.  This example 
uncovers several facets of household needs, further explored in Chapter 8, such as: 
the need for additional income; migration as an alternative livelihood strategy to 
diversify income; possible lack of interest in the educational system, etc.    
Some of the local staff I interviewed reported that they faced political pressure while 
updating their Cadastro database.  Although the BF mechanism was considered to be 
“politics-proof”, as reported in Chapter 5, the case studies shed light on the influence 
of local politics in the processing of updates.   
They [local authorities] even say ‘this [the BF] is from the government … 
what do you have to do with it? Why do you want to know about income?’ 
that is to say ‘let this supporter continue receiving the programme otherwise 
there will be problems’ and this is a problem, as I used to say, a problem not 
only with the opposition but also with those in government  because there is a 
very strong political culture here, right? There is a partisan question … 
sometimes a beneficiary gets a job and we block the benefit, then s/he comes 
to us aggressively, he goes to the mayor’s office complaining … There are 
people still with this mind-set, and we have suffered a lot with this (011nn - 
PNIR). 
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One of the strategies for Cadastro updates is to wait until the next political election 
takes place, so that beneficiaries and potential beneficiaries may have some sort of 
contracting with the local town hall or the mayor’s office.  
 Lack of prioritisation of the persistently poor living in remote rural villages 
This chapter reinforces the findings from the previous chapter on the lack of priority 
given to the persistently poor living in remote rural villages.  Interviewees said that 
the ICS was not involved in closely monitoring the registration process.  I did not see 
any evidence of local administrations conducting active searches to register the 
persistently poor.   
Furthermore, interviewees said that the expansion of the BF during the first years of 
implementation was directed towards the urban areas of rural municipalities.  The 
acquisition of means of transportation for registration in loco was possible only after 
years of programme implementation.  The persistently poor living in isolated rural 
villages were expected to get themselves to the local town to register.  Given all the 
difficulties in infrastructure, income, human resources and documentation listed 
above, the registration of the poorest in isolated rural communities was at best 
limited.   
Also, as documented in Chapters 4 and 5, the expansion of the programme in the first 
years resulted in higher rates of inclusion than in subsequent years as the national cap 
was reached.  Late registration of the persistently poor in remote rural villages in PIR 
municipalities could have resulted in reduced chances of benefit take-up. 
6.4.3 Quality control of the Cadastro 
 Quality control - prioritisation of the poorest 
As indicated by federal interviewees in Chapter 5, if the local administration has a 
good quality Cadastro, this can increase the chances of the persistently poor being 
registered and given priority when benefits are allocated.  As already demonstrated, 
such priorities do not happen during the registration process.  Other ways in which 
prioritisation can happen is through activities to control the quality of the local 
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Cadastro.  This can be carried out through home visits and an active social council 
(ICS).   
Home visits depend on staff and vehicle availability.  The legislation supports the 
view that home visits are the most adequate method to register potential beneficiaries, 
as they ensure that the information collected will be of good quality.  Home visits, 
nonetheless, are not carried out as often as required.  PIR municipalities have few 
vehicles and have more difficulty than less isolated municipalities in reaching out to 
remote rural communities.  
As well as using home visits to ensure that good quality information and the right 
priorities are entered into the Cadastro, other strategies used by local administrations 
are the use of health community workers during registration, and cooperation with the 
school council.  Community health agents live in rural communities and they know 
the financial situation of each household.  Some municipalities use their services 
during registration, and this may help to ensure higher quality recording of 
information on the Cadastro form.  The school council also works together with the 
local CRAS and BF administrators.  Whenever a pupil is absent from school, CRAS 
can immediately work with the social council, thus reducing the possibility of benefit 
cancellation.  
However, evidence supporting the above strategies is mixed.  Some BF local 
administrators actively engage with school councils, CRAS and the health agents, 
others don’t.  BF staff have pointed to the lack of information on the part of local 
health and education workers, as a factor making difficulties for social assistance 
when they need information about how to give priority to the persistently poor.   
Ideally, ICS should play both an active role – inspecting the BF, including 
identification of the poorest families – and a reactive role, when it is called to act 
upon complaints (Instrução Normativa No. 01, 20/05/2005).  However, I found that 
the ICS was performing both these roles with limited capacity, at best.   
In the case of the limitations on their reactive role, both ICS and BF staff reported 
that they received few complaints.  There is a possibility that complaints may be more 
difficult to lodge in remote rural villages with generally tight social cohesion and 
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intricate social relationships.  Having a good relationship with their community may 
be perceived as a very valuable asset and filing a complaint could harm this 
relationship.  This is further investigated in Chapter 8.  Other research has found that 
the municipal absence of a “civic tradition of social [democratic] participation” 
results in lower ICS participation (Magalhães et al. 2007).  The quotes below 
highlight local administration staff reporting that the population and ICS are afraid of 
retaliation by their peers and by local politicians: 
Everybody needs help, practically everyone here mainly from rural villages 
they need help, because this is a small municipality with difficult access to… 
so, it is difficult for people to file a complaint because everyone knows 
everyone… they come here and say ‘I am not going to put a complaint against 
so-an-so because I don’t want any trouble’, it is like this (005ii - PIR). 
(…) it is funny, because they say ‘oh… there are loads of people who receive 
[incorrectly] in my street’…. So I say ‘you can give their names, the name of 
your street, that we will investigate, if she does not have the profile, her 
benefit will be cancelled’, they say ‘oh but I won’t say it… I am not a snitch, I 
am not here to tell on people….’ (…) (012i - PIR). 
Me: what are they afraid of?  
They are afraid of politics… because the complaints are anonymous, nobody 
will know about it, but people are afraid of others going there, asking around, 
of fights… They are afraid of … of [losing] their work sometimes, do you 
understand?  Because you are not able to get another job, the source of 
employment here is the mayor’s office, so, they are tied to it… thus, it is all of 
this (013i - PIR). 
There are important themes in the quotations above.  The idea that “everybody needs 
help” shows how the supposedly “residual” BF benefits are perceived by the BF local 
staff.  “Help”, as opposed to “right” to minimum income, is a transitory state of need 
and, possibly, has close links to “hand-out” or assistencialismo.   
Another important consideration from the extract above is again the influence of 
politics.  “They are afraid of politics … of [losing] their work” (013i - PIR).  As I will 
argue in Chapter 7, living in a PIR municipality with reduced work opportunities, 
which are mostly based on political contracting, reduces any possibility of 
community participation.  Households are at the mercy of the favours of the local 
mayor’s office.   
In the case of ICS’ active role in implementing the programme, it appears that it is not 
being carried out.  The fieldwork found that ICSs do not conduct active searches to 
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find out if the persistently poor are receiving the BF benefit, they do not inspect the 
BF receipts, and they do not act as external bodies monitoring the implementation of 
the BF programme.   
In PIR and PNIR municipalities, where local politics plays an important role in the 
lives of its inhabitants, individuals are not able to exercise basic elements of their 
citizenship, their civil rights to start.  Civil rights, one element of Marshall’s concept 
of citizenship, entail freedom of speech and the right to justice (Marshall 1950).  
These elements are usually absent, as the quotes above show.  Thus, the power to 
exercise political rights and citizenship, through ICS is very limited.  Half the 
members of an ICS are from civil society, and half are from the local government.  I 
believe that the mere presence of government representatives may reduce even further 
the possibility that investigation of BF implementation practices will be independent.   
ICS participation in oversight of the BF is “minimal”.  Of course, there is a 
connection between this minimal participation in the BF oversight and the lack of 
understanding of their role because of the lack of training.  The current situation is 
such that: 
The Council’s participation here is minimal, it is very little, convenience, you 
know? It is like … they arrive, they need to approve this … so, the president 
speaks the most and says what needs to be done … so, the council is not very 
active, not indeed … It seems like they only have that mind-set of approving 
[what the president says needs to be done], not of inspecting (013i – PIR). 
It is important to note that in one of the municipalities, council members voiced a fear 
of retaliation from other members.  The current situation of benefit allocation is 
normally not questioned, but if it is, little changes, they say. 
 Unwitting cancellations 
Sometimes benefits are unwittingly cancelled due to system errors.  In these cases, 
expedient solutions are vital for ensuring the quality of the Cadastro.  Furthermore, 
system errors that fall under the category of cancellation are a matter of concern given 
that benefit cancellation results in food insecurity, financial insecurity, stress and 
reduced assets.   
 Page 212 of 356 
 
 
MDS has developed tools for the local administration to correct system or 
information errors.  Nonetheless, local administrations reported difficulties in dealing 
with the federal government.  There were problems getting through the helpline, and 
a lack of response to emails or official correspondence.  This results in long waits: 
The person comes here [to CRAS] asking how the request is and you … only 
ask her to wait, normally this is what we say, there is nothing else to say.  You 
wait too.  There are people waiting for a year… I cannot solve her case, I have 
already sent a formal letter to the federal government, I want to send another 
one, do you understand? I haven’t received their response yet.  So, this is what 
if I could improve upon I would.  There are some cases that you cannot solve; 
you depend on the federal government (014i -PIR). 
Look, I have problems [contacting the federal government] … because the 
telephones at the MDS, I can’t get through.  Whenever it rings, no one 
answers or they are always busy … the day that someone picked up the line, a 
very ill-mannered person answered the phone … I was trying to call for days 
and the time that I finally got through she mistreated me! … so, [the 
relationship] with Brasília, we don’t [have a good one] (012i - PIR). 
 
 Duplication of entries 
Interviewees reported that duplication of forms was one of the causes of cancellation, 
although this happened mainly during the first stages of the programme.  Duplications 
could be result from: (i) families enrolling in different municipalities; (ii) the same 
household member enrolling on more than one form; or (iii) the technician sending 
the form twice.   
This theme is associated with migration.  Families migrate to other municipalities and 
end up registering again.  Members of a family migrate in search of better education 
or work opportunities and end up living with a relative (or a divorced parent).  This 
relative ends up adding this member of family to their household.   
for example, she was living close to the municipality border.  So, she goes to 
the nearby municipality and registers there.  The benefits there are taking a 
long time to be granted, because there are people that only received now, after 
5 years … So, what does she do? She comes here and registers again.  Little 
does she know that the Cadastro is national, there is only one database … 
when she enrols there and here, there is duplication and then the benefit is 
released neither there nor here.  Her situation becomes even worse (014i - 
PIR). 
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Thus, for families that are in persistent poverty or in desperate need of the benefit, 
the strategy to register in various places may result in blocking the household’s 
registration altogether. 
 In sum: 
(ii) How does the remoteness of the rural village influence local implementation, and 
what impact does that have on the BF participation rates? And does the local 
administration give priority to the poorest during the BF implementation? 
 
Intra-municipality remoteness influences implementation practices at various levels:    
 Remote rural villages receive fewer visits of CRAS staff.  The persistently 
poor in remote rural villages have more difficulty in visiting CRAS at the 
local town.  The interaction of these two factors is a vital element in the flow 
of information concerning registration, eligibility, conditionalities, selection, 
and so many other important aspects of implementation. 
 It is very costly for CRAS to conduct frequent home visit in isolated rural 
villages in PIR municipalities.  This may result in lower quality Cadastro 
registrations, difficulty in conducting active searches, and less priority given 
to the persistently poor.   
 The persistently poor in remote rural villages of PIR municipalities would 
have more difficulty and higher costs to obtain the documentation required for 
registration.    
 Local administrators suggest that households are hesitant to file complains of 
incorrect benefit allocation, as they are afraid of retaliation either from their 
community or from local politicians.  One can speculate that the smaller the 
rural village is, the more hesitant households may be to be identified; and the 
more remote the rural village is, the more households depend on their 
neighbours for assistance.  These connections will be further explored in 
Chapter 8.  
The analysis indicates that the more remote the rural village is, the less likely that 
local administrators would keep an updated Cadastro, conduct local visits, and 
receive reports from incorrect benefit allocation.  The persistently poor living in the 
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remote rural villages of PIR municipalities may have less contact with CRAS staff to 
learn about the programme, and may have higher costs to obtain documentation.  
Therefore, it is very unlikely that PIR municipalities are able to give priority in their 
local implementation to the persistently poor living in remote rural villages. 
I also identified issues of concern in both PIR and PNIR municipalities: 
 the complexity of the programme results in additional local practices, which 
may not lead to improvements in registration or in giving priority to the 
persistently poor. 
 the influence of local politics can be seen in pressures for local staff not to 
update the Cadastro, and for households not to denounce non-eligible 
beneficiaries.  The local population is at the mercy of the favours from 
politicians in relation to employment contracts, as the mayor’s office is the 
main source of employment in both PIR and PNIR municipalities.  
 the mistrust between households and local administrative staff sometimes 
results in staff being abused. 
 the local administration has difficulty reaching the federal staff to solve 
Cadastro problems, and this results in longer waiting  periods for potentially 
eligible households. 
6.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I used a comparative analysis to investigate RQ2b, how the local 
implementation of PIR municipalities differed from PNIR municipalities, using a set 
of 14 interviews, protocol observations and service profiling.  This chapter builds on 
previous chapters that highlighted how important local implementation is to the 
understanding of the issues of participation rates and giving priority to the 
persistently poor.  
The interviews with federal government staff reported in Chapter 5 showed that there 
were concerns at the national level about the possibility that the persistently poor 
were not being given priority in the BF programme.  This chapter shows that the local 
administrations were having difficulty in implementing the BF programme in remote 
rural villages, mainly in PIR municipalities.  This chapter strengthens the previous 
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analysis, as the local administration point of view supports the previous findings: 
there is the possibility that the lower participation rates in PIR municipalities are a 
consequence of more efficient municipalities taking up some of the local quota that 
should have gone to PIR municipalities.  Thus, lower PIR participation rates do not 
necessarily mean that there are fewer poor households; nor does it mean that benefits 
are going primarily to the persistently poor. 
The analysis concludes that the geographical location of the poor rural municipality 
(inter-municipality remoteness), and the location of the rural villages (intra-
municipality remoteness), influence local infrastructure and local implementation.  
But, let me be clear, I am not saying that remoteness is the main factor driving lower 
participation rates.  There are several factors uncovered by this chapter that are 
associated with these levels of rates, such as reduced infrastructure, less technical 
capacity to deal with Cadastro problems, difficulties in conducting registration at 
remote rural villages, migration, etc.     
The analysis based on the framework of remoteness and flows paves the way for two 
types of policy recommendations.  Inter-municipality remoteness shows structural 
bottlenecks linked to the geographical location of PIR and PNIR municipalities, and 
these require long-term policy recommendations.  The local infrastructure limitations 
in terms of physical resources, human resources, linkages to urban areas and road 
quality are beyond the BF programme, however direct an impact they have on its 
implementation.  Overall, there is a need to broaden the policy analysis to include 
regional development initiatives, and to rethink the implementation of this 
programme for the persistently poor in PIR municipalities.   
Short-term recommendations address local BF implementation directly, and also 
intra-municipality remoteness constraints.  The need to address transport issues is 
urgent, as infrastructure is necessary to conduct more frequent actions and 
information dissemination in remote rural villages.  CRAS staff need to have a more 
visible presence in places where poverty is higher, such as in remote rural villages.  
Regular training and support of CRAS staff as well as ICS members would represent 
a significant asset for local implementation, in addition to increasing the feedback 
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between local, state and federal levels.  A review of the local administration 
contracting practices in Brazil is highly recommended to reduce reshuffling of staff. 
This chapter links with issues raised in Chapter 5, and provides a bridge to the 
discussion of the same issues on the household level in Chapters 7 and 8.  First of all, 
Chapter 5 demonstrated that the severity of poverty was not considered in the state 
quota allocation to small rural municipalities.  This chapter adds to these concerns the 
problem of measuring rural income, and whether using only declared income as a 
criterion captures the severe deprivation level of this specific group.   
Second, in Chapter 5, federal staff cited the local administration’s responsibility for 
searching for the persistently poor (“active search”), and for ensuring that the local 
Cadastro is updated.  This chapter shows how PIR and PNIR municipalities are not 
necessarily well equipped to conduct these procedures.  The costs of intra- and inter-
municipality remoteness are generally borne by households.   
Third, Chapter 5 shows that federal staff have given serious consideration to the 
quality of the Cadastro database.  That discussion also showed that local 
administration staff have pointed to the difficulty of receiving complaints, either from 
ICS or from households, about beneficiaries who should not be receiving benefits.  
There is a potential conflict between community participation and ensuring a quality 
Cadastro, further explored in Chapter 8. 
Chapter 5 also raised concerns about Cadastro errors and the possibility that eligible 
families might be excluded.  This chapter confirms the system problems, and adds 
further possible reasons why the eligible poor might be excluded, such as 
documentation and information problems.  It also uncovers issues with relationships 
between the various levels of government, such as the federal government’s lack of 
response to inquiries from the local administration, and lack of trust between local 
administrations and households. 
Interestingly, the fact that the BF selection happens at the federal level gives local 
CRAS staff more autonomy in implementing this policy, by enabling it not to fall 
prey to political pressures.  However, despite attempts at the federal level to make the 
BF programme “politics-proof” , this analysis shows that local politics interfere with 
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the efficient administration of the programme through other mechanisms, such as 
contracting practices. 
Of course, there are several benefits gained by Brazilian society through the BF.  
Never before have the uninsured informal working-age rural poor had public income 
support, although the BF is not a legal right.  The programme has also given more 
public emphasis to, and generated more debate about, the role of social workers and 
social assistance benefits in municipalities.  It has also pushed local administrations to 
invest in public services to cope with the BF implementation process, created links to 
other programmes, and provided opportunities for the population to address other 
needs.   
The interviews with local administration staff recorded in this chapter have shown 
that the ways in which the BF implementation is conducted, particularly in PIR 
municipalities, does not favour the efficient registration of the persistently poor; and 
neither does it give them priority.  Registering the persistently poor in rural remote 
villages is costly and not often conducted, although some of the local administrations 
do make an effort to do so.  In the following chapters, I will introduce the municipal 
context, as well as investigating how the persistently poor themselves take part in the 
BF implementation process.   
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7 “A LAND WHERE THE CHILDREN CRY AND MOTHERS DON’T SEE IT”: 
CONTEXTUALISING THE EFFECTS OF REMOTENESS ON THE LIVES OF 
THE PERSISTENTLY POOR 
 
If my son stops working [to study] his wife will die of hunger. (…)  Die! 
Because there is no other solution. (…) He can’t study [at night] because 
they live in a farm. (…) Here, there is this idleness.  Because, actually, this 
is what I am telling you, if it wasn’t for this Bolsa Família, people would 
feel sick… sick of starvation, believe me! Here, there is no solution for this 
place.  This is a land where children cry and mothers don’t see it.  Indeed, 
there is no solution! (045i NBEN). 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Isolation, abandonment, disregard and hopelessness were feelings were often 
expressed by the persistently poor living in the remote rural villages I visited.  The 
influence of location is captured in the above quotation, which represents households’ 
daily struggles: the mutually exclusive decision to work or get an education, the 
reduced number of job opportunities, the difficulty in attending school due to 
location, the need for government assistance to survive – issues tied up with the land 
in which they live.  
The statement in the title of this chapter highlights the sense of invisibility that 
permeates the lives of the persistently poor.  Local and federal governments do not 
“see” what is happening to the sons and daughters of this land.  At the same time that 
the persistently poor attempt to make ends meet by several means, they recognise that 
the solution does not rest entirely in their own hands.   
Before answering RQ2c in the next chapter, it is important to investigate to what 
extent location has influenced and continues to influence households’ lifelong 
decisions.  It is necessary to have an in-depth understanding of the context in which 
the programme operates.  Households’ decisions – contextualised in the place where 
they live – influence programme effectiveness and the success of programme 
outcomes.   
This chapter, therefore, provides a detailed account of the similarities and differences 
between the two types of poor rural municipalities and villages.  I investigate 
structural bottlenecks in the operationalisation of the BF programme in terms of 
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access to and provision of basic services, such as water, sanitation, education, health 
and transportation.  Thus, I address the following question “What is the context 
underpinning households’ participation in the BF programme in PIR and PNIR 
municipalities?” 
As addressed in Chapter 2, there is disagreement between, on the one hand, the 
proponents of CCTs (who argue that CCTs are specifically targeted to the persistently 
poor due to their long-term strategy for investment in children), and on the other 
hand, RRA experts (who point to the lack of public services in those areas).  Thus, 
this chapter empirically investigates the existence of the services needed to 
implement the programme for the persistently poor in RRAs in the Brazilian context.  
This analysis is relevant as the BF is targeted primarily to the persistently poor and is 
conditional on service attendance.   
Furthermore, there is a general claim that the benefits of enrolling in the BF 
programme outweigh the costs, given that the benefit is in cash and non-contributory, 
albeit conditional.  Plus, persistently poor households urgently need benefits like this 
one.  It may well be that the cash incentive is greater than the costs associated with 
registration for the programme.  However, this chapter and the next shed some light 
on some unobserved variables that precede the act of registration, as well as hidden 
factors that could potentially influence household compliance with the programme.   
This chapter is based on a qualitative analysis using household interviews, protocol 
observations, service profiling, field notes and maps.  I was able to draw overall 
comparisons between the ten villages I visited, grouped according to remoteness, as 
explained in the analytical framework in Chapter 3.  I present the findings of this 
chapter according to the two categorisation of remoteness: section 7.2  discusses the 
findings related to inter-municipality remoteness; and section 7.3 addresses the 
findings related to intra-municipality remoteness.  Section 7.4 concludes this chapter. 
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7.2 Inter-municipality remoteness: a municipal-level analysis 
 
7.2.1 Livelihood strategies, assets, trust and stigma  
The location of a rural municipality determines its soil quality and precipitation 
levels, and this has an undeniable effect on the lives of the rural poor.  Three of the 
four case studies were located in the semi-arid region, and lack of rain during the 
rainy season not only results in crop failure but also in unemployment for rural 
workers.    
Households are feeling the effects of climate change.  Interviewees reported that there 
had been a noticeable deterioration in soil and water conditions.  They had had to 
change the crops they planted and crop yields had been reduced.  They no longer 
grow what they used to.   
One household strategy to reduce vulnerability is to accumulate assets by investing in 
livestock.  This is recommended by the asset-building framework, which focuses on 
the importance of asset accumulation and consolidation as the way to exit poverty 
(Bebbington 1999; 2007a,2007b,2008).  However, for the persistently poor, 
accumulating assets is difficult.  The reported reasons are lack of rain to grow pasture, 
lack of food for the animals, and lack of facilities to enclose the animals.   
Opportunities to engage in small farming are also limited.  There are few 
opportunities to own small plots of land because of large inequality in land 
ownership.  In addition, farmers prefer to sell the larger plots, which are generally 
bought by outsiders (045i NBEN).   
There are also limited opportunities for informal working arrangements to farm 
somebody else’s land (e.g. dividing the cash crop between farmer and owner).  This is 
a consequence of the mistrust between rural workers and landlords, the result of a 
complex history riven by violent conflicts over land.  It is important to introduce 
some key elements in order to understand why informal working arrangements were 
limited in the areas studied.   
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Legally, the 1988 Constitution (5
th 
article) protects the right to private property, but 
at the same time it links that right to the “social function”104 of the land; thus, it is not 
an absolute right.  In addition, Brazilian law allows for the possibility of acquiring 
legal title to land through ‘adverse possession’ under conditions prescribed by the 
Civil Code (Código Civil Brasileiro), such as living and/or working on the land for a 
certain length of time.  
The relationship between landlords and rural workers, thus, is filled with mistrust, 
and the workers are stigmatised by landlords, who believe they are ‘adverse 
possessors’.  This was confirmed by first-hand accounts of farmers feeling 
embarrassed to ask to work informally on somebody else’s land.  Even if they do 
overcome their embarrassment, the resulting agreement is usually servile in nature.  It 
is based on the expectation of gratitude towards those who own the land and are 
“favouring” them.  Stigma, thus, is reinforced by the rural workers themselves 
through their sense of inferiority in this working relationship. 
PIR municipalities, with reduced opportunities for livelihood diversification through 
non-farm rural employment, should have higher BF participation rates than PNIR 
municipalities, although this was not what was found by the research reported in 
Chapter 4.  Even so, the conservative Brazilian media and society claim that the BF is 
a poverty trap, that it is an “alms grant”, and creates dependency and discourages 
work (Folha 2008,2013).  This is despite the fact that many areas have low 
opportunities for work. 
The ‘dependency’ discourse continues, despite evidence to the contrary.  For 
example, Teixeira (2010) shows that the average effect of the BF on the probability of 
working is nil, and that only a marginal reduction in the hours of work can be 
attributed to it.  Medeiros et al. (2008) argue that the average BF benefit represents an 
increase of 11% of the family income, which is not enough for a negative incentive 
towards work.  This chapter adds to this literature by showing that it is not the case 
that the BF discourages families from working.  On the contrary, there are structural 
reasons why there are limited possibilities for work for the persistently poor in the 
                                               
104 The social function of the land is understood as the adequate and productive use of the land, 
according to environmental law (Art. 9, Lei No. 8.629, de 25/02/1993).  
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remote rural villages of PIR municipalities, such as little or no access to non-farm 
rural work, poor soil quality, lack of irrigation, and little or no ownership of land.  
The Government of Brazil tried to address the issue of lack of assets raised by the 
“dependency” discourse by promoting microcredit.  This initiative is in line with the 
World Bank’s “productive role of safety nets” (World Bank 2009b,2012),  whereby 
the BF is supposed to be used as a minimum safety net to empower households to 
take on higher risks, resulting in higher earnings.  When I asked households whether 
they had ever used microcredit, I was surprised to find that the persistently poor, who 
mostly need these initiatives, did not want to take them up.  They considered that the 
risk involved in accepting them was too high.  The BF, for the persistently poor, does 
not seem to fulfil this productive role.  
This finding leads us to ask whether promoting micro-finance by itself is an adequate 
public policy for the persistently poor.  More appropriate policies would involve the 
integration of market-based microcredit initiatives with social assistance and rural 
development programmes (including technical assistance), but these other initiatives 
were non-existent in these municipalities.  Other considerations could involve an 
understanding of how geographical location affects market opportunities and flows of 
material and human resources.  There is a need to design policies specific to each 
region, which would also include communal infrastructure, such as pastures, pigsties 
and irrigation.   
7.2.2 The labour market 
In both PIR and PNIR municipalities, the high numbers of unskilled workers and the 
limited number of formal job offers creates an informal and precarious job market, 
resulting in high levels of vulnerability.  Labour is seasonal: farming activities during 
the rainy season, and non-farm livelihood strategies, such as bricklaying, sewing, 
house-cleaning, wood-chopping, during the dry season.   
PNIR municipalities have stronger links to nearby urban economies than PIR 
municipalities.  This is the impact of location on the labour market, particularly for 
non-farm employment opportunities.  
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Proximity to an urban municipality produces a constant flow of workers.  In PNIR 
municipalities, households reported that they migrated weekly to the nearest urban 
municipality for work purposes.  The local administrative staff of PNIR 
municipalities gave the same information, reported in Chapter 6.  Households, 
nonetheless, have the opposite migration flows.  Households work in the nearby 
urban municipalities during weekdays and return to PNIR municipalities on the 
weekends.  Unlike PNIR municipalities, PIR municipalities have reduced work-
related migration.  PIR households are mostly unable to travel weekly to nearest 
urban municipality to get a day job.       
Another rural-urban linkage effect of the proximity to an urban municipality is the 
strengthening of the local PNIR economy.  Interviewees send money back to PNIR 
economies, and this fuels local businesses.  There is also the increased participation 
of PNIR workers in the urban municipality’s economy.  The interconnectedness of 
these two economies is evident.  This is not the case in the economies of PIR 
municipalities, with less frequent flows of remittances.  
In PIR municipalities, households emphasised the role of political connections.  The 
lack of job opportunities (even for those with high-school degrees), the hi-jacking of 
local jobs by the political contracting practices, and the weak labour market 
conditions, make the situation of the persistently poor extremely difficult.   
There is no job offer here; the only job offer here is through the town hall 
(037i NBEN). 
Sometimes we know that the opportunities of some of the people here don’t 
compare to one of ours, they have it here and ours don’t, that hurts inside and 
you see one of yours that is hardworking with the possibility of succeeding 
here and s/he doesn’t ... it is hard, you see the risk that your son faces and … 
[the others] have no risk, the other has his monthly wage … because the other 
has a “step-father”, a “step-mother” ... it is hard, sister … here, who doesn’t 
know what it is to live here, never will (043ii NBEN). 
The weak links with nearby markets due to the isolated location of PIR municipalities 
result in reduced liquidity in the economy.  Interviewees reported that even if they 
had a job, this did not guarantee that they would get paid.  For example, an 
interviewee started her own bakery business, but she had to close it down due to lack 
of payments from locals, including the mayor’s office.   
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These findings again throw doubt on the claim that the BF causes dependency.  The 
persistently poor living in PIR municipalities have little access to job opportunities, 
so it is not the case that the BF creates dependency, or that BF beneficiaries are 
opting out of the labour market.  Furthermore, the findings also throw doubt on the 
claim that the persistently poor graduate from the BF through labour market 
inclusion.  The belief that the BF need support a family only temporarily until it finds 
its way into the labour market, is challenged by the job-market structure in areas of 
persistent poverty.   
7.2.3 Migration as a livelihood strategy  
In both PIR and PNIR municipalities, households use migration as a livelihood 
strategy.  However, migration patterns differed in types and frequency, resulting in 
different flows of people across space.  I was able to observe three types of migration 
flows: (i) work migration; (ii) family migration; and (iii) network migration. 
Work migration was partially addressed in sub-section 7.2.2.  The proximity of PNIR 
municipalities to urban areas enables weekly migration, whereas the isolation of PIR 
municipalities results in longer periods of out-migration in search of work.  The out-
migration of working-age household heads in PIR municipalities results in what Bird 
et al. (2002) call “residual populations” – of women, the elderly and children.   
The income of PIR families reported by interviewees mostly consisted of remittances, 
social transfers and social pensions.  It may not be entirely accurate to identify 
persistent poverty with areas where the residual population is largely the elderly.  
Researchers have found that the social pension acts as an “insurance against extreme 
poverty” (Osorio et al. 2011b p.49).  This statement uses the income threshold of 
extreme poverty to justify how social pension can be considered as an insurance, 
however, the remaining analysis of this chapter will demonstrate how factors other 
than income can also reduce living standards in PIR municipalities.  Social pensions 
in the rural isolated villages studied may still be an insurance against extreme income 
poverty, but the population still face the effects of severe and long-term persistent 
poverty. 
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The second type of migration flow is family migration.  PIR households tend to 
migrate more frequently, either going to a different rural village within the same 
municipality, or going to another municipality.  This migration pattern differs from 
that found in PNIR municipalities.  Household heads of PNIR municipalities are more 
stable in their migration patterns.  Either it was the previous generation who migrated 
to the area, or they themselves migrated to the area several years ago.   
Lastly, the third type is network migration to metropolitan areas.  The idea of “trying 
to make a go of it” in a major city is present in both types of municipality.  The 
content analysis showed that the distance to the metropolitan area was not the main 
factor driving rural out-migration, but instead (i) existing informal networks in the 
metropolitan area, and (ii) subjective links to the local community and land.   
Having an informal network in a major metropolitan area could cut down the 
household’s costs of moving and lodging.  Sometimes, however, these networks are 
also stretched financially and are unable to assist with the costs of another PIR 
member.  At other times, neither these networks nor the lack of opportunities in rural 
villages are sufficient reason to out-migrate.  Humans, as social beings, have links 
with community, family and the land in which they live.  Despite the hardship the 
persistently poor face, some people choose to remain living in rural villages.    
I was born here, my dad was born here, my granddad was 99 years old when 
he died, he was from here, son of this land.  This is a place that people that 
come from outside cannot understand why we love this place, because there 
isn’t much infrastructure, but this is a place that my family, my granddad, my 
dad, my mum, everyone was born here, it is a good place to live, it is a quiet 
place, a friendly place (036n BEN). 
PIR and PNIR municipalities have different patterns of migration flows.  PNIR 
municipalities have fast, varied and continuous flows of people.  Conversely, PIR 
municipalities have slow, erratic and intermittent flows.  These migration flows and 
the lack of local job-market opportunities have an impact on household composition, 
leaving residual populations in PIR rural villages when the whole family does not 
out-migrate in search of better opportunities.  
Migration undeniably influences BF implementation, affecting registrations, 
fulfilment of conditionalities, and updates of the Cadastro.  Households living in PIR 
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rural villages migrate more often than those in PNIR villages.  This results in 
uncollected cards, duplication of Cadastro entries, extended periods of school 
absences, and so forth.  It could even mean that the household’s benefit is cancelled.  
Its effects were discussed in several reports from both the local administrations 
(Chapter 6) and the households (Chapter 8).   
7.2.4 Transport to the nearest urban centre 
The availability of transport to the nearest urban municipality influences local BF 
implementation, as discussed in Chapter 6, section 6.3.3; and it also influences a 
household’s living conditions.  While PIR beneficiaries in my sample travelled 
between 90km to 130km to activate their cards in the nearest CAIXA, PNIR 
beneficiaries travelled between 30km to 40 km.  So PIR beneficiaries have to travel 
further distances and incur higher transportation costs, as well as being the most 
likely to live in persistent poverty and to have fewer job opportunities and less 
savings.   
Although interviewees in both PIR and PNIR municipalities regularly reported that 
services were lacking or of bad quality, the inhabitants of PNIR municipalities had 
better access to and greater variety of educational and health services in the nearest 
urban municipality than those living in PIR municipalities.   
there is no resource for me to go to university because it is very difficult due 
to transport issues … to go to university in municipality X [126km away] and 
to return home … The only faculty nearby is there, so one has to get transport 
from here to the local town, from the local town to municipality X ... 
[transport leaves] every day at 5pm and only returns at 1am  ... It is difficult to 
return to the village from the local town at 1am because of the road conditions 
[unpaved, unlit], even the roads do not help us to come to the village, you are 
driving around, you can see it (029i BEN). 
Reduced access to transportation in PIR municipalities and its higher cost 
demonstrates higher levels of vulnerability in these municipalities in relation to health 
services.  However, both municipalities are very disadvantaged in relation to 
specialised health services like neo-natal intensive care or surgery, as these services 
are offered only in regional urban municipalities.  In this case, distance is not the only 
key factor in health service attendance, but also whether or not the household has 
contacts in the town, i.e. network migration.    
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The BF literature doesn’t explore the links between rural and urban municipalities, 
although these links are very important for investigating the extent to which the BF is 
effectively improving access to social services.  As previously noted, BF 
implementation requires institutions like CAIXA or cartórios, and these are located 
in urban municipalities.  Health and educational services, beyond the conditional 
school attendance and pre-natal checks, require transportation to the nearest urban 
municipality or to a regional urban centre.  
7.3 Intra-municipality remoteness: a village-level analysis 
The themes discussed below show how the quality of local services, and their 
presence or absence, influence the daily lives of the rural poor and affect the 
implementation of the programme.  Intra-municipality remoteness has consequences 
on the flows of information, people and networks.  Remote rural villages have slow, 
irregular, less dense flows; and non-isolated rural villages have fast, regular, denser 
flows.  These flows reflect the backbone infrastructure of services.    
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7.3.1 Sanitation and housing  
 
Brazil is one of the ten worst countries in the world in relation to sanitation, with 
seven million Brazilians with no access to toilets and hence having to defecate in the 
open (de Albuquerque 2013).  Despite significant progress made in the past decade in 
sanitation, populations in the North and the Northeast of Brazil are still the most 
deprived.  Not having a bathroom at home is not only a humiliating situation, it also 
poses several health risks.  During a visit to Brazil, the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation said that, 
the low investment in basic sanitation results in high costs in public health, 
with approximately 400 thousand people admitted with diarrhoea in 2011 ... 
the majority of them were children between the ages of 0 to 5 (de 
Albuquerque 2013 item 5). 
This rural village is situated 70 km from the PIR town hall.  The distance 
between the PIR municipality and the nearest urban municipality is 
approximately 126 km.  The roads connecting the village to the town hall are 
unpaved and full of pot holes.  It took me three hours from the local town to 
arrive to this village. I was able to stay in the village for two weeks. There are 
no hotels; I stayed with a household, thanks to a previous relationship I built 
when I was at the local town.  This village is cut off from the local town 
during the rainy season.  The federal government provided each house with 
solar energy.  The previous local government built a brand-new health centre, 
which was currently not being used – neither doctors nor nurses were willing 
to live there. The school operates with little pedagogical support and I heard 
several reports about lack of free school meals.  Solar panels are not enough 
for a family to have a fridge, for the school to operate their 10 computers, or 
for the health clinic to have their vaccination room. There is no mobile signal 
in the region.  Private transportation to the town hall runs three times a week, 
leaving early morning and returning mid-afternoon.  Water is pumped from 
the river that runs close by.  The majority of the houses have no bathroom 
facilities.  Human waste is easily washed into the river.  The local health agent 
reported that the most common complaint relates to the drinking of 
contaminated water from the river.  The sight of mud houses, with the latest 
solar energy technology, along a beautiful but contaminated river, is 
disturbing.   
 
Box 1: Protocol observation and fieldwork notes of an isolated rural village, PIR municipality 
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Some villages have rubbish collections, although the rubbish is often tipped in 
inappropriate places.  In villages where there is no rubbish collection, households still 
burn rubbish, and this poses other types of environmental and health risks. 
The rural poor live in overcrowded houses with poor housing structures (see Box 2) 
and their property rights are insecure.  The majority of the interviewees reported that 
they owned their own houses, although contracts were informal and people did not 
have title deeds.  
Some rural workers still live as ‘residents’ (morador).  They are not tenants, but 
occupants of a house in the land where they work.  This is an informal arrangement 
offered by the landlord.  Residents usually do not pay rent, but they pay the housing 
bills.  They have no rights in the house and their continued occupancy is entirely 
dependent on the continuation of their work.  This type of housing arrangement does 
not depend on remoteness, but instead on the local labour conditions.   
It is also a highly vulnerable arrangement, encroaching on the rural workers’ private 
lives and their freedom to contract.  Interviewees often expressed uneasiness about 
living as residents, largely because of the mistrust between the landlord and rural 
worker mentioned in the previous section.   
Me: Do you mind living as resident? 
I don’t think it is bad, as the landlord is not one of those who are not here 
every day, right? But having our own little place is better, right? 
Me: What can you do at your place that you can’t do here? 
well … so many things … like, my husband when the landlord wants him to 
work he must go and if we have our own little place, I think he doesn’t need 
to.  He can work for whoever he wants to (038n NBEN). 
This type of living arrangement is indicative of the limited support for public housing 
in Brazil, as is the widespread reliance on living arrangements with family and 
relatives.  In 2003, the Government of Brazil increased the amount of housing 
subsidies in rural areas through CAIXA’s National Programme for Rural Housing 
(PNHR)
105
.  However, the PNHR has been criticised for the high home loan deposit 
required, and for the limited budget available for the programme (Rover & Munarini 
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2010).  During fieldwork, there was no report of PNHR houses among families 
interviewed. 
 
 
7.3.2 Fuel and electricity 
All the villages I researched had energy provided, some of them only recently 
connected to the grid.  This may be the result of the Federal Programme Electricity 
for Everyone (Programa Luz para Todos).  In 2013, this programme celebrated ten 
years of implementation with 15 million rural households connected to electricity 
(MME 2013).  Remoteness can have an impact on the type of energy provision.  The 
usefulness of the energy from solar panels is discussed in Box 1. 
Households rely on firewood and gas for cooking purposes.  For some households, 
firewood is easily found nearby; for others, the geographic characteristics of the area 
mean that finding and fetching firewood is not an easy task.   
Report from a 28 year-old mother (she is uncertain of her age) of five children, husband 
works in daily contracts (two days without working), less than 4 years of formal education, 
recent beneficiary of the BF, lives in an isolated poor rural village (039ii NBEN). 
 
Me: Do you have a toilet in your house? 
No. 
Me: and electricity? 
Yes. 
Me: So, do you have a fridge? 
No, no I have no white goods, nothing, nothing.  If you want you can walk in 
and see it.  I only have this old radio, that doesn’t even work properly and, 
well … I have this television, which is for the children. That’s how I hold 
them at home … 
Me: Do you pay rent? 
No, this [house] is mine, I bought it … but I will complain … I ask “for 
what?” I could have bought things for my children but I bought this house 
instead.  A house that … look … it needs roof, downspouts … the house is 
almost collapsing, it is even sinking … I didn’t buy a couch, I didn’t buy a 
fridge, I don’t have a cupboard, I don’t have anything … I have nothing … 
what I have is for sleeping and this television.  I took away money from 
eating, I took away from our mouths to buy this house for them. 
 
Box 2: Housing conditions - vulnerability of the persistently poor in PIR municipality 
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7.3.3 Water supply 
There is a vast need for improvement in the public provision of water services to rural 
municipalities and villages, particularly in the semi-arid region of Brazil.  Problems 
with water quality and the continuity of services were constantly reported.  Although 
the government has tried to scale up the “One million cisterns programme” from the 
Non-Governmental Organisation ASA Brasil
106
, there is still room for improvement 
(de Albuquerque 2013).      
All the rural villages I visited still lacked a reliable water supply.  There are two 
broad water-supply strategies: government-led or household-led.  The local 
government sometimes purchases water pumps and installs them in the local rural 
villages.  The fuel for the pump is usually dependent on the local administration.  The 
local administration may also purchase the service of a water-tank truck (carro-pipa) 
to fill the local school’s water tank, which is also used by all the households nearby.    
Household-led strategies are all dependent on their informal connections.  They 
generally walk to collect privately-owned water from dams or tanks.  However, 
households have different coping strategies depending on what they need the water 
for.  Better-quality water for the purposes of cooking and drinking is obtained 
differently from the water used for washing clothes, bathing or cleaning houses.  
Sometimes, they fail to obtain good quality water to drink and they use what is 
available to them.  One interviewee told me that their drinking water is popularly 
known as “chocolate water”. 
The type of water-supply strategy used seems to depend on remoteness.  Households 
in PIR villages tend to rely more on time-consuming household-led initiatives than 
the households in PNIR rural villages, who are more likely to receive government 
support.  Government-led strategies cost more to reach remote rural villages, and 
demand better logistics.  This means that the persistently poor in isolated villages 
spend more time fetching water for survival, in addition to fetching firewood.   
The rural poor lack safe drinking water, even though it is central to survival and to 
upholding basic human rights.  Without safe drinking water, there is the possibility of 
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falling prey to informal arrangements in exchange for water, possibilities that 
underline the unevenness of power in social relationships.  Sometimes this takes the 
form of exchanging votes for survival.  Once again, the hardship of persistent poverty 
in rural areas means a lack of dignified living conditions, potentially leading people to 
negotiate aspects of their freedom in order to meet basic needs. 
Box 3 and Box 4 compare isolated with non-isolated rural villages, using the 
households’ own words. 
 
  
Box 3: Water supply in non-isolated rural village, PNIR municipality 
Report from couple, 26 and 20 years old, small farmers, husband also works as woodchopper,  2 
children, receives the BF, less than 4 years of formal education, living in PNIR rural village (027nn 
BEN). 
 
Me: Where does the water come from? 
There are water tank trucks that fill the water tank at the nearby school.  People get 
it from there …  
Me: Is there always water there? 
Yes, there is, because the Army fills it in and nobody tells the Army what they can 
or can’t do. 
Me: and when wasn’t it filled by the Army … 
It was bad. It was worse. We always had water shortages. 
Me: How often do you go there to fetch water? 
Two, three times a day. 
Me: Is this water for your consumption, is it to drink? 
Yes, it is. 
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The fact that some households still have to fetch water may have some unintended 
consequences for compliance with the BF programme.  For the persistently poor, 
having to cope with the BF conditionalities of school and health attendance, on top of 
the need to fetch water and fuel and other daily household chores, puts additional 
strains on the family’s survival.  When children are at school, mothers cannot count 
on them for help with the daily household tasks.  The extra burdens imposed on 
Box 4: Water supply in isolated rural village, PIR municipality 
Report from 51 years old, mother of 11 children, husband is rural pensioner, small farmer, 
illiterate, non-beneficiary, living in PIR rural village (043ii NBEN). 
 
Here, we get water from the dam. The dam here, close by, we don’t drink or cook 
with this water, we are afraid of doing so because the majority of the people of 
the village bathe in the dam. So, there are people with good health, with ill-
health, there are people with all sorts of health.  Anyways, not everyone has a 
bathroom … When we get water from there, as people say, it is only to wash the 
necessary, and you don’t drink it or cook with it. 
Me: How do you do it then? 
When water tank trucks come they put water in tanks, so people who have a tank, 
like that girl who built one now, that’s where we get it from … But when we 
can’t get water to drink from tanks, the water is not very good to drink from, look 
at this water here, this is the colour of the water that we get from a mud hole from 
that road … this is the best mud hole on that road … it belongs to so-and-so land, 
who is the father of the lady who owns the local shop. 
Me: Does he charge anything? 
No, this one he doesn’t charge. We walk under his fence, fill in the pots and come 
back, then we have water to drink, as one can say, water that we can drink, even 
if it is thick, even if it is new it is from this mud hole.  If it is from the water-tank 
trucks we drink it normally, we fetch it from the neighbour who has a tank or 
from so-and-so, who has the goodness [of heart] to make available their water for 
us …  
Me: How do you fetch this water? 
We carry it in a tin.  My daughter carries a small blue barrel in her bike and I or 
my other daughter carries a water bucket on our heads.  
Me: How long do you walk? 
We cross the dam there … cross the road, go up and when it gets up there, there 
is a mud hole – this is the poor person’s life, sister. 
Me: About half an hour? 
About that. 
Me: How many trips per day? 
Sometimes we do it twice, three times a day… 
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women by conditionalities was also identified by Molyneux in her studies of the 
CCT programme in Mexico (2007,2008).   
7.3.4 Local commerce  
Given the distance to the local town, and the costs of time, price and logistics, the 
majority of the persistently poor in the isolated rural villages of PIR municipalities 
reported not shopping at the local town, despite the fact that goods were cheaper in 
the town.  They were more likely to buy their groceries from the local village shop, 
even though prices were higher.  These higher prices are the result both of 
transportation costs and of the local shop’s monopoly.   
Another important reason why the persistently poor in isolated villages shop at their 
local shop is the possibility of credit.  Although BF has helped beneficiaries to 
increase their credit in shops, some beneficiaries reported not being able to fully pay 
all the bills they had in their local shop.  Large numbers of dependents, limited 
alternative sources of income, and the meagreness of the benefit, all reduce the 
potential of the BF to have a positive impact on the lives of the persistently poor.  As 
one interviewee said: 
Yes, before people starved and today we can do something with this Bolsa 
Família, because it is the following, one can buy up to the limit s/he receives, 
right, or more, because … these shops there, we buy it from them but we 
don’t know, we don’t tell them if we will pay in 30 days, we don’t, and no one 
knows when we will pay too, right? Sometimes, some of us tightens our 
budget a bit and pay, others don’t and when it starts to tighten on the other 
side, they [local shop owners] turn their backs, until god blesses and soon we 
can turn around and face the shop owners and pay them, right? But here, 
economy runs on cattle ranging, this place is weak on jobs (045i NBEN) 
The quote above also shows the dynamics of debt repayment and the potential for 
stigmatisation.  The BF beneficiary may be stigmatised with the undesirable trait of 
not being a reliable buyer – a bad risk, resulting in discrimination and a lowering of 
self-esteem:  the interviewee says that shop owners “turn their back” on beneficiaries 
if their debt is carried over for months, and that beneficiaries cannot “face” them until 
the debt is paid.  It is, therefore, not surprising that in all the case studies there were 
reports of shops owners illegally keeping the BF cards and passwords, and using 
them to pay for people’s purchases.  Whether this was a way for the poor to 
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demonstrate their willingness to pay the carried-over debt, or whether it was a 
requirement by the shop owner to avoid undesirable unreliable clients, it indicates an 
uneven relationship between shop owners and BF beneficiaries.  Once again, the end 
result is that beneficiaries trade aspects of their freedom to meet their basic needs.  
The rural poor in the villages of the PNIR municipalities enjoyed certain benefits 
because of their location.  They often went to the town to buy their groceries, and 
they were able to ride their bikes and thus to save money.  Some of them were able to 
go to the nearest urban centre to purchase cheaper school material for the whole year. 
Comparing PIR and PNIR rural villages produces the following findings.  The 
heterogeneity of rural areas throws doubt on the assumption that the real value of 
benefits is higher for the rural poor than for the urban poor.  This may be the case for 
those living in non-isolated villages in PNIR municipalities;  but the persistently poor 
in PIR municipalities only have access to one local shop, and the prices of the goods 
they buy there are much higher than in urban areas.  Thus, policy suggestions like 
adjusting the transfer size taking into account spatial price differentials (Higgins 
2012) – based on the average price differentials for all rural areas of the Northeast – 
will most likely harm the persistently poor the most.   
7.3.5 Education services 
The schools in both PIR and PNIR municipalities had problems with their physical 
infrastructure and human resources.   Some of the schools had improvised teaching 
rooms in order to accommodate all students.  Only a few of them had sports ground 
or access ramps for students with disabilities.  However, there was a noticeable 
difference between PIR and PNIR schools.  If compared to schools in PNIR 
municipalities, schools in PIR municipalities have more under-qualified teachers and 
limited teaching materials (some books, CDs and DVDs).  They lacked basic 
infrastructure such as safety area for the children to play, fans, and proper pavement. 
In general, education services in PIR and PNIR municipalities do not go beyond the 
high-school years.  If they want to undertake tertiary education students must go to 
another municipality.  The implication for inhabitants of remote rural villages in PIR 
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municipalities is that advanced study is nearly impossible if they stay home, and the 
result is migration.   
Remoteness is even more of a problem for the persistently poor who rely on a nearby 
rural village for the first years of schooling (1
st
 to 4
th
 grades).  The town hall does not 
always provide transportation, and the persistently poor have to rely on bicycles or 
walking to get to school.  Although my interviews did not contain many cases of 
young children walking to school, there were some, and these children were very 
young.  This raises several concerns about their health and safety, as reported below:  
These little ones that live in that area, some of them their mother bring them to 
school, she rides her bike; others come by foot, they walk six kilometres by 
foot.  
Me: By themselves? 
By themselves, sometimes the mum brings them, but here in the region, there 
is an enormous difficulty with transport (029i BEN). 
When children reach the 5
th
 grade, they move to the local town schools, and the 
municipality generally provides public transport.   However, remoteness has an 
impact on the time spent on the bus.  Students from non-isolated rural villages spend 
less time on buses, and have alternative means of transport to school.  On the whole, 
though, rural education is still a matter of the first four years of schooling, although 
some rural village schools I visited did offer services beyond the 4
th
 grade.  This 
finding of the fieldwork reinforces the descriptive statistics of the 1990s, 2000 and 
2010 relating to rural education (IBGE 2008c,2010b; World Bank 2003).   
7.3.6 Health services 
Complaints about lack of or reduced services abound in the interviews.  This includes 
doctors, dentists, emergency facilities, ambulance, specialists, and basic service 
infrastructure.   
One starts working here, another one leaves and there are days without 
doctors, there are weekdays that there is no doctor.  I think that they think one 
only gets sick on Mondays, Tuesdays and Wednesdays, the other days no one 
gets sick.  I think that every day there ought to have doctors in countryside 
municipalities.  If someone gets sick they need to go to municipality X 
(regional urban municipality 68 km away).  To be seen there, one needs a 
referral from a doctor here.  If there is no doctor here, then it is difficult, right? 
(046nn NBEN). 
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These complaints about high turnover among health staff and about the practice of 
contracting doctors to work for only a few days a week, resonate with the local 
administration interviews in Chapter 6.   
Prenatal care and caesarean and premature births are particularly problematic for the 
population in these municipalities.  The persistently poor living in isolated rural 
villages of PIR municipalities face a stark dilemma:  
Me: Do you know cases of women dying on the road to municipality X (urban 
municipality126 km away) to give birth? 
Not that I know of, but of babies, yes, there are cases of babies dying because 
their time to be born has passed, these types of things (041i NBEN). 
The coping strategy most often employed by the rural poor involves informal 
networks of friends or relatives.  Visiting families lodge in their relatives’ houses 
while they are being treated.  Another strategy is to rely on traditional remedies to 
ease some of the symptoms of their diseases, so that they can “avoid leaving the rural 
village in a hurry” (032i NBEN).  I even interviewed an elderly midwife (parteira), 
who still delivers babies in the isolated rural village of a PIR municipality. 
Box 5 below shows how the persistently poor in a PIR municipality cope with the 
lack of health services in their local town. 
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Municipal health infrastructure has several implications for the BF implementation.  
First, it may take several days, or even weeks, to treat a sick child, depending on the 
distance and the disease, and this means lower school attendance.  Then, there are 
cases where the family needs to migrate temporarily to another municipality for 
treatment.  This could mean that the BF administrator has difficulty locating them, 
putting their benefit at risk.  Lastly, lower school attendance for long periods of time 
due to illness results in lower educational attainment.   
7.3.7 Influence of local politics on service provision 
The influence of local politics on staffing, contracting practices, and the 
dissemination of information were discussed in Chapter 6.  This influence on the 
delivery of public services is particularly strong in the remote rural villages of PIR 
Report from a 28 year-old, mother of six children, housewife and small farmer,  works for 
others too (farming),  less than four years of education, BF beneficiary, lives in an isolated poor 
rural village (030ii BEN). 
 
Me: So she went to municipality A [urban municipality at 588 km away]… 
There is no neonatal ITU in municipality B [94km] 
Me: So, for how many years does a doctor work in this village? 
One, two years …  On Mondays and Wednesdays. 
Me: What if you get sick the other days? 
There is the ambulance … [that] takes us to the local town and if needs be they 
take us to another municipality … Because X-rays, ultrasound, mainly X-Rays, 
because ultrasound you can do it at municipality C [38km], which is far, but 
nowadays access is easier.* But X-ray, only at municipality B [94km] …  
My sons have broken their bones four times … We had to arrange a car to 
municipality B, we had to hire a car. The smallest child broke twice and he had 
to undergo surgery.  Then, it was more difficult, he had to go to municipality D 
[206 km] … I cannot tell you how long it took us to get there, because there was 
no transport straight to D [206 km] … so, we hired a car and went straight to the 
local town … Since he broke very badly, from the local town we went to 
municipality B [94km], from B to D. 
Me: and you hired till B [94km], do you remember how much the car owner 
charged you? 
He didn’t charge us anything … we helped him at his farm so he didn’t charge 
us anything. 
 
* An asphalt road was recently built to connect the local town of this PIR 
municipality to the state highway. 
 
 
 
 
Box 5: Health infrastructure and transportation in a remote rural village, PIR municipality 
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municipalities.  The lack of a strong economy in these regions allows local elites to 
exercise political and social leverage.  These elites are elected on promises to attract 
financial and human capital, to strengthen the economy and to deliver services.   
Dentists don’t come here … only during election time.  They promise, then 
after a while, nothing changes, nothing has been fixed (032i NBEN).  
Interviewees said that when the mayor thinks that a certain rural village voted against 
him, there is a tendency to deprive them of services.  The favouring of political 
constituencies is not an unsubstantiated claim.  However, when this happens in 
remote villages, the persistently poor are particularly affected, given their high levels 
of vulnerability. 
it was like that, when this person was almost dying only then they would call 
the mayor for her/him to decide [whether or not to send the ambulance] … if 
you voted for the other party, you had to pay for private transportation 
yourself, this is how it works  (033ii BEN). 
This means that the poor try to cooperate with the local elite as a survival strategy, 
thus fuelling the unequal and clientelistic social relationships based on votes being 
exchanged for favours.  This was also mentioned by local administration staff 
(Chapter 6).  Household interviewees said:  
So, for example, in two years time if another mayor is elected in the place of 
this one … I will lose my job [as a teacher], because people that voted for the 
new mayor and the mayor him/herself will not accept that I remain in this 
place, unless I were a public servant [and not a contractor]  (029i BEN). 
Ideally, a social protection system would protect beneficiaries from having to enter 
into unequal contracts, bargaining aspects of their lives in exchange for getting their 
basic needs met.  Although the BF has started this process, there is still a long way to 
go to address the complex needs of the persistently poor.   
 In sum:  
What is the context underpinning households’ participation in the BF programme in 
PIR and PNIR municipalities? 
Location of the PIR and PNIR municipalities – inter-municipality remoteness – 
influences the set of choices households can choose from to effectively take part in 
the BF programme:    
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 Geographical characteristics, such as soil quality and precipitation levels, 
together with property ownership and informal farming arrangements, 
influence any possibility the rural poor might have of subsistence farming and 
asset accumulation.  These geographical and institutional factors influence the 
possibility that the BF can be used as a stepping-stone for people to take on 
larger risks and embark on higher return activities. 
 Because of their location, the rural poor in PNIR municipalities have more 
chances of migrating weekly to urban areas, and of enjoying opportunities for 
livelihood diversification and non-farm employment, than the persistently 
poor in PIR municipalities.  The latter are more reliant on political 
connections within their municipalities in their search for jobs.  The structure 
of the labour market and these locational factors influence the possibility that 
the BF beneficiaries will “graduate” from the programme through labour 
market inclusion. 
 There are differences in migration patterns and migration flows between PIR 
and PNIR municipalities, resulting in different population dynamics.  The 
persistently poor in PIR municipalities live in villages with residual 
populations, or recurrently migrate in the search for work opportunities.  They 
may be disadvantaged by this migration pattern and have their benefit 
cancelled because their details are updated less often in the Cadastro and their 
conditionality compliance is intermittent.   
 Transportation to nearby urban municipalities is more difficult for the 
persistently poor, and is a major reason for their reduced access to school and 
health services.  Transportation also has an effect on registration levels when 
people have to travel to institutions outside their rural municipality. 
Location of the rural village – intra-municipality remoteness – has an effect on the 
daily lives of rural poor:  
 The persistently poor living in the remote rural villages of the PIR 
municipalities are highly vulnerable due to few or no services such as 
sanitation, quality housing and access to clean water.   
 Local politics influences service provision, and this affects remote rural 
villages more severely. 
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 Dependence on local shops in isolated rural villages transforms the buyer-
seller relationship into an unsustainable and long-term contractual debt.  
Unequal power relationships result in stigmatisation, and in some 
beneficiaries handing over their cards to local shop owners.   
 Poor access to and quality of health and educational services, particularly in 
poor remote rural areas, reproduce the cycle of persistent poverty, resulting in 
lower levels of education and health. 
 Children in isolated rural villages spend lengthy periods travelling to meet 
conditionalities.  The conditionality aspect of the benefit may pose additional 
strain on the intra-household division of labour , because it reduces the 
possibility of children helping their mothers in household tasks, particularly in 
remote rural villages. 
 A child’s ill-health has a direct impact on school attendance through 
prolonged periods of absence.  In the case of a serious illness of someone 
living in a remote village, it is very likely that the family would need to 
migrate in the search for treatment.  This, too, has a direct impact on 
schooling outcomes; it could also lead to benefit cancellation. 
This chapter illustrates the many levels of deprivation the persistently poor live with, 
and hence the many reasons why they face long-term poverty, why it is likely that 
their poverty is inter-generational, why they are the hard-to-reach, and lastly, why 
general policy prescriptions are so difficult to implement in these locations.   
7.4 Conclusion 
This chapter also paints a picture of the context within which two of the main 
objectives of the BF should be effectively achieved.  Those objectives are: (i) access 
to public services; and (ii) providing enabling conditions to overcome poverty, most 
importantly persistent poverty.  The above analysis provides an understanding of why 
poverty in certain areas continues to be endemic and persistent.   
It questions the extent to which the current structures of education and health services 
contribute to the reduction of persistent poverty, and whether it is appropriate to 
impose conditionalities upon the persistently poor.  The structural conditions in which 
the BF operates in remote rural areas show how difficult it can be for beneficiaries to 
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cope with conditionalities.  The analysis in this chapter also highlights the possibility 
that it is the poor quality of services offered in areas of persistent poverty that 
contribute to the vicious cycles of poverty, stigmatisation and unequal bargaining 
relationships.  This analysis continues in the following chapter, based on households’ 
accounts of the programme.   
This chapter highlights difficulties inherent in another objective of the BF: the 
beneficiary’s “graduation” from the programme by exiting poverty.  The severe 
deprivation levels in which the persistently poor live show that the idea of the BF 
being a temporary relief is overly simplistic.  There is no understanding of the myriad 
of the long-term interventions needed to support poverty-reduction initiatives.   
Furthermore, the difficulties exiting poverty bring the discussion to another recurrent 
theme: dependency on the programme.  The findings indicate that the claim that the 
BF reduces participation in work, resulting in dependency, disregards a number of 
vital facts: the lack of work in these regions; people’s high levels of vulnerability and 
reluctance to engage in high-risk activities; and their labour-intensive unpaid 
household work in areas with reduced infrastructure.   
The comparison between remote rural villages in PIR municipalities and non-remote 
rural villages in PNIR municipalities shows the limitations of the income-only 
approach to understanding poverty, and the problems of treating rural areas 
homogeneously.  Although income and rural categorisation are important tools for 
analysing poverty and its distribution, policy prescriptions should not be based only 
on these approaches.  The differences in location affecting the infrastructure of 
services and flows of people, information, resources and networks, mean that families 
have strikingly different prospects in life, even though they are equally classified as 
extreme poor.   
Understanding the context in which the persistently poor live, complemented by the 
next chapter’s analysis on how they engage with the BF implementation, is 
fundamental to investigating how effectively the BF reaches out to the persistently 
poor in rural Brazil. 
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8 “LIVING LIKE BIRDS”: THE INFLUENCE OF REMOTENESS ON THE 
EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION OF THE PERSISTENTLY POOR IN THE 
BOLSA FAMÍLIA PROGRAMME – THE HOUSEHOLD PERSPECTIVE 
 
A father doesn’t want a bad thing for their children [rural work].  Here, 
where we live, it is quite horrible during the rainy season, quite horrible, 
very hard work (...) There is suffering for those who are not pensioners, 
those who don’t have a secured income, (...) they live in one place at one 
time, they live in another place at another time.  Sometimes they work in 
one place, for a month or two, and then when service ends, they look for 
another type of work.  Life is like that, we live like birds...  (034nn BEN) 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter complements the previous chapters by providing an overview of the BF 
implementation from the point of view of households.  The central question this 
chapter addresses is RQ2c “How do poor rural households effectively take part in 
the BF programme in PIR and PNIR municipalities?” To answer this question, I 
focus on two sub-questions: 
(i) Sections 8.2 to 8.6 “How do the persistently poor living in the remote rural 
villages of PIR municipalities, participate in the BF programme?” and, 
(ii) Section 8.7 “How do community-level mechanisms such as the ICS ensure 
that the persistently poor are given priority?” 
This chapter deals with the ways in which knowledge of the BF programme affects 
household participation in terms of registration, benefit allocation, compliance with 
conditionalities, and giving the persistently poor priority.  Across all these themes, I 
explore the effects of inter- and intra-municipality remoteness on the lives of 
households through their personal accounts.   
Official quantitative datasets are not helpful for uncovering the reasons for non-take-
up, non-compliance and non-participation.  Even finding the families is challenging, 
particularly those suffering persistent poverty and living in remote rural areas, with 
high migration patterns of those “living like birds”.  These are families who have not 
been entered into the system, or who have been entered but are later found to be 
missing.  
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Barrientos et al. (2005) make the case that social protection for the chronic poor 
needs to go beyond short-term risk management and a social safety net.  This chapter 
presents a deeper understanding of structural processes that underlie chronic or 
persistent poverty, namely, discrimination, residual populations, marginalisation, 
exclusion, and a highly fragile existence.  Social protection to address persistent 
poverty requires a long-term strategy. 
The chapter is structured according to the themes illustrated in Figure 33 below.  The 
themes in the circle represent aspects of programme implementation, and the themes 
outside the circle are aspects of social processes and structures referred to in the 
interviewees’ accounts of their lives.   
 
Figure 33: Diagram of coding themes: households’ participation in the BF programme 
 
Source: author. 
 
 
Most of this chapter is based on household interviews, service profiling and protocol 
observations, and I compare accounts according to household selection criteria (i.e. 
BF participation, age, literacy and location, as per Chapter 3, Table 9, p.114).  Section 
8.2 addresses registration and possible reasons for exclusion from the BF.  Section 
8.3 deals with the interviewees’ knowledge of the programme’s selection and 
cancellation procedures, and their perceptions of political influence on the 
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programme.  In sections 8.4 and 8.5 I use a mixed-methods approach to analyse 
compliance with education and health conditionalities in PIR and PNIR 
municipalities.  Section 8.6 discusses the strategies used to collect benefits, as well as 
the impacts of the programme.  Section 8.7 examines community participation, 
followed by the conclusion in section 8.8.  This chapter has one appendix. 
8.2 Registration strategies and reported reasons for exclusion 
 
8.2.1 Registration strategies 
The strategies mentioned by the local administration in Chapter 6 were confirmed by 
the households.  Households learned about the BF through school teachers, health 
workers and CRAS staff, and also through radio, TV and cars driving around with 
loudspeakers.  This analysis adds to this list informal “word of mouth” 
communication, the importance of which for the rural population is independent of 
age group or literacy level.  As an interviewee put it:  
One person talks about it here, another one talks about it there.  We listen to 
the radio that they are calling us to register.  Then we go (016n BEN). 
However, there are considerable differences between remote and non-remote rural 
villages, such as whether or not people are able to register promptly at the Cadastro, 
variations in the time it takes to register at CRAS and the costs of getting there, and 
the lesser working hours of the local administrations in PIR municipalities, as 
documented below.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Report from a beneficiary who recently 
received the programme in an isolated rural 
village, PIR municipality (041i NBEN). 
 
I went there but when I arrived there 
they told me that the man that works 
with the system only works in the 
mornings and I went in the afternoon, 
right? So, they asked me to return in the 
morning … [but] it is hard to leave the 
village [to get to the town]. 
 
Report from a beneficiary who recently 
received the programme in a non-isolated 
rural village, PNIR municipality (044n 
NBEN). 
 
Every month I went to the town. Every 
month, I went there to know whether 
my benefit has arrived. So the local 
officer would update my registration 
form. 
Me: Couldn’t you call the CRAS to 
know about your benefit? 
No, I had to go there every month. 
 
Box 6:  Comparison: households’ registration strategies according to location 
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As pointed out by the second interviewee in Box 6 above, there is a perceived need 
on the part of households to constantly make trips to the office seeking updates of 
their status.  This poses an additional strain for the persistently poor living in rural 
remote villages.   
In addition, it is important to emphasise that this perceived need for constant updates 
is a contradiction between policy design and policy implementation.  Although the 
BF design requires an update only every two years, household perception is that 
increasing the possibility of receiving the benefit requires much more frequent visits.  
This belief on the part of households, that constant updates may speed up the process 
of receiving the benefit, is encouraged by the local administration staff.  They have an 
incentive to increase the numbers of updated registration forms, since the 
municipality IGD financial transfer depends on it.   
So, every month, I went there to register.  Whenever I had time to register, I 
did it … It is good to register, who knows the benefit will be released faster?  
So, I would always re-register my card. (039ii NBEN). 
The lack of knowledge of how selection is made (see section 8.3), on the part of both 
households and local administrations, reinforces this emphasis on registration 
updates.  
8.2.2 Reported reasons for exclusion: lack of documentation, limited quota, stigma, 
and Cadastro-related reasons 
 Lack of documentation 
Surprisingly, lack of documentation, as indicated by local administration staff 
(Chapter 6, section 6.4.2), was only a superficial reason for programme exclusion.  
Underlying the lack of documentation were reasons related to age, transportation to 
institutions, and processing difficulties due to errors in the official documents 
presented at registration.  These three findings are closely associated with the 
household sampling matrix of age, location and literacy, respectively.   
When I analysed the interviews according to age, I observed that the rural poor tend 
to establish their households early in life.  There were a considerable number of 
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under-aged women who had started families early in their lives.  Teenage mothers 
are not able to obtain all the documentation for enrolling in the programme, and either 
they wait for their documentation, or they ask their husbands to enrol in the 
programme instead.  
This finding points to two unintended consequences of programme implementation.  
The first of these is that teenage motherhood poses a particular challenge to the CCT 
objective of building up the human capital of the persistently poor by increasing 
school attendance.  Several interviewees reported difficulties in reconciling education 
with child-rearing responsibilities, due to lack of formal (or even informal) child-care 
arrangements in rural areas.  Furthermore, young mothers reported the role of mother 
conflicted with that of student.  The social norm is that wives should not study 
because they have household responsibilities.   
There are times that the husband doesn’t allow [his wife to continue her 
studies] (032i BEN).  
I don’t have anything to say about my husband because lots of husbands after 
the wife has a child, they don’t allow her to continue her studies (029i BEN).  
This combination of these factors results in young mothers dropping out of school, 
reinforcing the combination of persistent poverty and low-education levels in rural 
areas.  Poverty, as described, is not only a matter of low income but also of social 
structures, institutions and norms that are mutually reinforcing.   
In the case of young mothers, the conditions under which they are raising their 
children prevent them from staying at school, and hence the conditionalities built into 
the programme are ineffective.  This example highlights the difficulties of applying 
CCTs to the persistently poor.  At the same time it brings to the fore the importance 
of changing the social norms, and the key role social-assistance intermediation and 
other supporting services (e.g. child care) play in programme implementation.   
The second unintended consequence of the way the BF programme is implemented 
for young mothers is its failure to promote another policy goal, that of female 
empowerment.  This was the intent behind the assigning of the cash transfer card to 
the female household head.  Giving the male control over the benefit creates the 
possibility of an intra-household gender power imbalance.  
 Page 248 of 356 
 
 
In the case of documentation, analysing the dataset according to inter- and intra-
municipality remoteness shows that the persistently poor in the PIR municipalities 
incur higher costs than the rural poor in PNIR municipalities in getting 
documentation.  The main documents needed to register for the BF (mentioned in 
Chapter 6) are acquired at different ages, at different official institutions and in 
different municipalities.   
Furthermore, some of the documents are free of charge, others aren’t.  For example, a 
birth certificate (certidão de nascimento), which is a copy of the birth registration 
(registro civil de nascimento) at the cartório, is free unless it is a reprint.  To get a 
free reprint, individuals need to write a statement that must be signed by two 
witnesses and delivered to the cartório that issued the document.  These two 
requirements, (i) written statements, and (ii) delivery to the same cartório that issued 
the document, are very difficult for the majority of the poor rural population, who are 
functionally illiterate and highly mobile.   
The issue of documentation is complicated for rural households living in both PIR 
and PNIR municipalities.  These complications demand immediate government action 
to simplify documentation practices in Brazil.  The Government of Brazil did pass 
legislation in 1997 to unify the identification cards (Law No. 9.454/1997), but this 
law has not yet been implemented.  
When I analysed the dataset according to education levels, the problem of incorrect 
information became even more obvious.  Illiterate parents or those with little 
education have strong barriers to understanding the cumbersome processes of 
obtaining several documents.  They cannot double-check the final document to ensure 
its accuracy.  Some of them are unaware of their children’s documentation problems 
until it is pointed out to them, and this results in psychological and material distress, 
as well as having implications beyond the BF registration process, as reported in Box 
7. 
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This mother reported her difficulty in finding out where to go, her reliance on the 
cartório staff for information about the next steps, her son’s trips to several 
municipalities without any result, her uneasiness at being in front of the judge and the 
prolonged situation of embarrassment of her son and her family within the 
community.  All of this information-seeking translates into an enormous cost of time, 
as well as the expense of transportation, lodging and loss of work opportunities.  For 
the persistently poor – living in the remote rural villages of PIR municipalities – this 
represents a vast expense. 
 Limited quota 
When I started the fieldwork, the government had recently increased the quota.  The 
effect of this increase was clearly noticeable in the sampling: interviewees had either 
been receiving the benefit for a long time, or they had just received it.  The high 
Box 7: Illiteracy and incorrect documents, isolated rural village, PIR  municipality 
Report from a 51-year-old, mother of 11 children, whose husband is a rural pensioner, small 
farmer, illiterate, non-beneficiary, living in PIR rural village (043ii NBEN). 
 
There is Danielle, who is currently unemployed because he is still fighting for his 
documents.  There was a problem with his birth certificate.  When he went to 
obtain his documents in municipality X  [urban municipality 770  km away] and 
only when he arrived at the cartório there, they said that he should seek the 
cartório here [in another municipality nearby] to fix this error that was made in 
his name at the cartório here, so that he can get the documents.  He is now … 19 
years old. … My husband went to register his birth certificate and asked to put the 
name of ‘Daniel’ and they put his name as ‘Danielle’. So, he is baptised with this 
name … when he went to school the boys called him ‘little girl Danielle’ so he got 
a bit rebellious and he complained to his dad that we didn’t find out that his name 
had an error, that it is written as a girl’s name. Because we don’t have any study, 
we can’t read, we never knew about this error, and it is with great difficulty … 
great anger that he continues living here.  
Me: Did he stop studying because of that? 
Yes, he did. The truth is the truth … he said ‘Mum, I can’t bear to be in the 
classroom with my name like this, I don’t accept this … I am a man and this is an 
outrage’.  … So, he went to get all the documents fixed at the cartório here and 
the cartório hasn’t released them.  … [The cartório informed us they have to go to 
the court and] the judge has to understand that we parents are not to blame … 
because we have no study, we can’t read, really who is at the computer, being paid 
to work, he/she should have known better … in any case, my son is traumatised. 
 
 Page 250 of 356 
 
 
proportion of beneficiaries who had all acquired new benefits around the same time 
also confirmed this hypothesis.  As an interviewee put it:     
because before mothers would register and they would receive the benefit 
within four, five years of registering.  Not nowadays, it is faster now, for 
example, you register here today and within a maximum six months it will 
arrive (029i BEN). 
This reinforces the view that there are still families who are “eligible but not 
beneficiaries”.  Therefore, one of the potential reasons for the exclusion of 
beneficiaries is the sheer limitation in the total number of benefits available. 
 Stigma 
Despite the growth of research in social psychology on stigma and how people 
construct stereotyped beliefs (Link & Phelan 2001), the stigma debate fell out of 
favour in the academic and professional circles of social policy.  Nonetheless, with 
the rise of social assistance in developing countries, mainly in the forms of targeted 
CCTs, there is a need to bring the stigma debate back into the social policy agenda.   
Although stigma is a complex phenomenon, it generally involves a distinctive 
attribute (a “mark” or a “label”) defined in terms of undesirable characteristics 
(“negative stereotyping”), which results in a discriminatory separation between “us” 
versus “them” (Link & Phelan 2001; Smith 2002; Titmuss 1974).  CCTs are prone to 
stigmatisation.  The poor are the recipients of “our” help, but they need it because 
they did not make the best decisions to overcome poverty.   
The potential for stigmatisation in CCTs has already been raised in Chapter 7, when 
the poor are those who cannot be trusted: they are ‘adverse possessors’(sub-section 
7.2.1), ‘bad’ risks (sub-section 7.3.4) and ‘dependents’ on the ‘alms grant’ (sub-
sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2).  Box 8, below, shows stigma as a potential reason for non-
enrolment, according to the beneficiary’s own words.   
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This woman, who told me that she suffers from discrimination because her husband is 
in jail, shows that her reluctance to deal with the application process and enrol is due 
to her uneasiness at the type of treatment that she might be subjected to.  The benefit 
is not an entitlement and the poor do not know how selection happens (further details 
in section 8.3).  This results in an unequal power relationship between the potential 
beneficiary and the local administration, and a hidden social expectation that the poor 
should not be “trouble makers” and should behave in a compliant way.  
 Cadastro-related reasons 
The household interviews confirmed previous findings that there are ways in which 
the Cadastro system itself is responsible for excluding households (Chapter 6, section 
Report from a 46-year-old, mother of two children (not living with her), completed primary 
education (year 8), husband who has just been put in jail, which obliged her to migrate back 
to the village where she grew up.  She is chronically ill, a non-beneficiary, living on the charity 
of family and friends, PNIR rural village (046nn NBEN). 
 
Me: Have you thought about registering for the Bolsa Família? 
She [health rural community agent] has talked to me about it … 
Me: Do you have all the documents? 
Yes, I do. 
Me: Do you know where to go? 
Yes, she told me where to go. 
Me: Why haven’t you registered for the Bolsa Família already? 
It is because we go through all the trouble of photocopying the documents, 
going there for it not to be approved. So, it is better to stay like I am now.  I 
have even thought that lots of people register and they are not selected, there 
are others that register and they have the luck to be selected. I don’t know if it 
is luck of what else … I say I won’t leave my house to go after it.  I won’t, if it 
is so difficult.  I am not patient enough to be waiting there … there are some 
people that attend us well; others don’t.  So, for me to be called up names … it 
is better I stay at home … because, you know, there are lots of places that 
attend us well, right? Well, because that person who needs something like an 
income, like from the government, that person thinks that we are people that 
are of a low level, just because that person receives a wage or the sorts, they 
think they are everything and above everyone, right? So, for me, this is not how 
things are solved, but there are lots of people that think like that. 
 
 
 
Box 8: Stigma in the registration process 
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6.4.2).  They uncovered two Cadastro functions that could result in the exclusion of 
households: the updating requirement, and problems with the household concept.   
Registration updates must be conducted, either when the income circumstances or 
family composition change, or every two years.  I have already demonstrated that 
intra-municipality remoteness has a negative impact on registration and the frequency 
of updates.  The persistently poor, who face higher costs to update due to location, 
may have their benefits cancelled when they fail to update their information. 
In the case of the household concept, MDS (2013) defines “family” in terms of 
“household”, which is defined in the BF legislation as a “nuclear unit comprising one 
or more people, eventually including others who contribute to or have their expenses 
covered by them, all dwelling under the same roof” (Portaria No. 177, de 
16/06/2011, art. 2).  The concept of household poses several problems: 
 Beneficiaries reported getting confused by the name of the programme, i.e. 
Family Grant (BF),not knowing that ‘family’ applies to any household.  This 
has meant that eligible potential beneficiaries do not register because they do 
not have a family, i.e. they do not have children. 
 Defining a household in terms of “dwelling under the same roof” causes 
problems, particularly for the persistently poor living in PIR municipalities 
who frequently out-migrate (“living like birds”).  In contrast to the rural poor 
in PNIR municipalities who generally migrate to a nearby urban municipality, 
the persistently poor of PIR municipalities cannot easily return to their home 
town.  This temporary migration can mean that they register again in another 
municipality.  If the local administration does not transfer the Cadastro 
registration carefully, this could result in the duplication of entries and the 
cancellation of the benefit. 
 Constant household changes and, most importantly, the movement of children 
in and out of different households, affect how family members are registered 
and how benefit is allocated within a household.  From my interviews I 
observed that there were variations in household composition: households 
headed by both parents; by single parents; by foster/adopted parents; and by 
the grandparents with or without the parents living there.  Children moved 
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from household to household, and the benefits associated with that particular 
child could become a source of controversy.  
 The nuclear concept of household treats every household member the same, 
even though different age groups have different needs.  People are particularly 
vulnerable at certain ages, such as single mothers below 25 years of age, 
especially if under-age, and those above 40 years but below retirement age.  
The latter group would most likely receive only the basic benefit and no 
benefit associated with children, as their children would generally be above 
school-age.  However, although the children are probably adults, it is unlikely 
that they are independent of their parents, especially those who were reported 
to suffer illness and joblessness.   
Although concepts like “household” may be necessary to operationalise the BF 
programme for targeting and means testing purposes, the findings show how complex 
human social relationships are.  Tying the members of a household down to a single 
place of residence, and homogenising the household needs of different life stages and 
different household compositions, means that policy implementation will be 
inadequate in certain respects, potentially excluding eligible beneficiaries.  The report 
below illustrates how the persistently poor try to solve Cadastro problems in the face 
of household changes, migration, inter- and intra-municipality remoteness, illiteracy 
and lack of trust. 
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8.3 The information problem: selection, cancellation, complexity and mistrust 
 
8.3.1 Reported reasons: BF selection and cancellation 
Some interviewees reported not knowing the reasons why they had not been selected.  
Others said that they had not received their benefit yet because, according to the local 
administrator, “they were waiting for a place to become vacant” (044n NBEN).  
Others said that their names “are in the queue, there are lots of people in line, one 
must be patient” (031nn BEN).  As stated in Chapter 5, however, even if a place in a 
given municipality becomes vacant, it does not automatically mean that the benefit 
will go to that same municipality.  Furthermore, there is no order, no waiting list for  
benefit allocation.   
Report from 51-year-old, mother of 11 children (four of school age), husband is rural pensioner, 
small farmer, illiterate, non-beneficiary, living in PIR rural village (043ii NBEN). 
 
I didn’t understand what a single registry (Cadastro) means; do you understand 
what I am saying? … [So,] I asked her [local administration] to look at the card 
and she said ‘look here, your card, look, there is a problem with your card.  It 
shows that you have a registration, you registered here and you registered at 
municipality A [770 km away].  It shows you changed municipality.’  … I said, 
‘no, I didn’t change this registration … it was my daughter’s school benefit’ [the 
daughter is living in municipality A with a relative].  So, I am going there 
[municipality A], since 2007, I went 4 times there to see if I could get it back … I 
said [to the local staff at municipality A] ‘for the love of God, I ask you, please 
request the transference of my cadastro registration to here because I was not to 
blame, I didn’t know, I didn’t understand … because really I can’t read, I don’t 
understand written things, if they messed it up, there is nothing I can do about it, 
because first they told me that there wouldn’t be any problems for me and now I 
have this big problem’ … I came back with hope because what else to do if you 
live in a place like this? Only one pensioner at home with so many children, with 
so many sons needing clothing, shoes, knowledge, to go to school and you without 
having the conditions to provide? … So with hope, listen well, 1 year has passed, 
2 years, 3 years … and nothing of my Bolsa família, nothing, nothing, nothing … 
[two months ago] my daughter went to register her family [there at municipality 
A] … She called me and said ‘Mummy … you are being deceived … your 
registration was never transferred from here, it is here’ … so I said ‘I will go 
there’.  I travelled to municipality A again … So, [back] here, I had to include [my 
sons/daughters] but given that the person [local staff ] had fooled me for all of 
those years, I no longer trust her. 
 
 
Box 9: Solving Cadastro problems in isolated rural villages, PIR municipality 
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Some of the reported reasons for selection related to registration practices, as 
explained in the previous section.  For example, some interviewees believed that the 
more current their registry was the quicker they would receive the benefit.  Others 
seemed to think that they would only register when there was a local call for 
registration, or even that they should never update the registration – in these cases, 
after two years, the registration is dropped out of the system.  So, although the family 
may still be waiting for selection, it may no longer be counted as a potential 
beneficiary. 
It has been three to four years [since I registered]. 
Me: And you never got it.  Do you know why? 
No, I don’t. 
Me: Do you know if you need to go there again [to register]? 
We [only] know when they announce it on the radio, right? They haven’t put 
anything so I haven’t gone there since then (040n NBEN). 
So, she [the local Cadastro technician] said ‘look, your Cadastro wasn’t for 
you to touch it, never, because, really, this is a single registry for your whole 
life, only after your death would someone take it over’  (043ii NBEN – 
household head account of why her benefit was transferred to another 
municipality, resulting in duplication of her Cadastro entry). 
As reported in Chapter 6, the selection process is also a black-box for the local 
administration, whose participation is limited to ensuring the registry is updated.  
Updating the registry is only necessary if the family changes their financial situation, 
if the household composition changes, or if the Cadastro form is older than two 
years.  However, household changes occur frequently in the lives of these families, 
and the persistently poor have great difficulty coping with the costs of constantly 
updating their Cadastro.  
Some interviewees said that the reasons for benefit suspension or cancellation was 
related to children’s attendance at school, but no one mentioned lack of compliance 
with health conditionalities as a reason for cancellation.  Hardly anyone mentioned 
receiving written warnings of possible benefit suspension; this is not surprising given 
the literacy levels of the target population. 
When I analysed the dataset by literacy levels, I could observe how important literacy 
is in dealing with BF bureaucracy.  Households with higher levels of literacy are 
better equipped to search for information beyond that obtained from local 
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administration staff, through the internet or pamphlets and other written sources.  
They are able to cross-check and examine references. 
On the other hand, household heads with little or no literacy rely on others for 
understanding how to navigate the Cadastro.   
He [local administration staff] swiped [the BF card], typed typed typed turned 
the computer around and said ‘do you see this?’ I said ‘I do’ then he said ‘It is 
not blocked’.  I don’t know [what I saw on the computer screen] I don’t know 
how to read, I don’t know anything (laughs) (045i NBEN). 
Such households have to trust the local administrator to navigate the Cadastro system 
on their behalf, they cannot double-check it, and they do not fully understand the 
complexities of the programme.  Therefore, although the potential beneficiary may 
have been given an opportunity to receive the BF benefit, their lack of education 
prevents them from fully exercising this opportunity, trusting instead in the power 
relationships and on their understanding of “what the other person said”.  When 
communication is not perfect, mistrust levels increase, as shown in Box 9 and in the 
following sub-section.   
8.3.2 Complexity of the programme and mistrust in relationships 
Relationships between local administrations and households can be difficult at times, 
as reported by both local administrations (in Chapter 6) and households.   
Households struggle to find out why their benefit has been cancelled, hampered by 
the structural limitations on their ability to acquire knowledge.  The complexity of the 
programme, with different parties involved in different aspects of programme 
implementation, exacerbates the cycle of mistrust, as reported below: 
I said ‘do you see this paper here? I got it now from the internet at the Rural 
Worker’s Union and at the banking correspondent, do you see it? How can 
you tell me that the internet is down?’ Another woman that was waiting in 
line said ‘yes … they are fooling us’ (045i NBEN). 
Households are also caught in a mismatch of the information from federal staff with 
that provided by the local administration staff.  Interviewees reported calling the 
federal 0800 line in Brasília and being told by federal administration staff that the 
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“problem was at the local town hall”.  However, when they went to the local town 
hall they were told that “the error is in Brasília”.   
So, we stayed always like this, we called one place they blamed the other 
(039ii NBEN). 
Searching for information to resolve pressing cancellation issues is another cost for 
persistently poor households.  The more remote a village is, and the less their access 
to the internet or other means of communication, the higher the cost of reaching a 
local administration or the nearest urban municipality to solve issues concerning the 
BF card, especially as it usually requires several trips.   
Box 10 illustrates the difficulties for the persistently poor in their search for 
information, and how low levels of literacy affect their ability to double-check 
information and to fully understand programme implementation.  This results in 
mistrust towards the local administration staff. 
 
Report from 63-year-old man, fisherman, wife is 49 years old, mother of 10 children (only one 
living with her, others live with the dad), less than 4 years of study, recently got their BF benefit 
back, living in an isolated rural village (045i NBEN). 
 
[husband] She spent 8 months without receiving it, right.  Then she spoke out there 
and she got her benefit in one month or two for later to be cut again.  Then she 
went after it … and they started to fool her, right? Fooling her, fooling her … then 
she said ‘I will break my card’ 
Me: Did you say that? 
[wife] I was spending too much [on transport] without having it, there was time 
that I owed 3, 4, 5 [bus] tickets. 
[husband] So I left the village here and said ‘give me your card’. I went to the 
town hall … [said to the local administration staff that my wife] goes to 
municipality A [urban municipality 126 km away], and there they say ‘no! Your 
card is not blocked. The problem is in your municipality, the town hall there’.  I 
come here and you say that the problem is there, at municipality A.  ‘What is this? 
Do you think you can fool me? I am not learned, I do not have any study, but I am 
sixty and something years old and it is not possible to be such an idiot. I am a fool 
because I can’t read but I am not an idiot. … Somebody is eating my benefit here, 
chap!’ … the woman goes there, swipe the card and nothing.  Where is the money? 
She goes to municipality A the money is in the account, when she arrives here you 
don’t release it. 
 
 
Box 10:  Mistrust and remoteness 
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8.4 Compliance with conditionalities: the quantitative analysis 
Conditionalities are a central part of the BF programme.  Therefore, it is important to 
understand how poor rural households comply with conditionalities, and whether 
remoteness imposes a constraint on households’ effective participation in the 
programme.   
In this section, I report the descriptive statistics on compliance with health 
conditionalities, and the reported reasons for non-compliance with education 
conditionalities.  In section 8.5, I explore the qualitative findings on possible reasons 
for non-compliance with conditionalities. 
8.4.1 Health conditionalities 
Health conditionalities are monitored twice a year.  This mostly involves following 
up on pre-natal and post-natal care, and the children’s immunisation schedule and 
their growth and development up to seven years of age (Lei No. 10.836, 9/01/2004, 
art 3o).   
The Ministry of Health has improved the coverage of preventive health care services, 
like the Community Health Programme (PACS
107
) and the Family Health Programme 
(PSF
108
).  These programmes take part in the BF health monitoring aspect.  In 2008, 
96.2% of municipalities had PACS, and 94.1% had PSF.  However, the percentage of 
the population within each municipality covered by PACS and PSF is still limited, 
comprising 60.4% and 49.5% of population monitored, respectively (MS 2008). 
In the municipalities I visited, community health workers from PACS reported 
compliance with conditionalities to the PSF Centres, who then reported to the 
municipal Secretariat of Health.  A technician would then enter the information into 
the Ministry of Health database.   
                                               
107 Programa de Agentes Comunitários da Saúde 
108
 Programa Saúde da Família, later called ESF – Estratégia de Saúde da Família 
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Overall, the Ministry of Health data indicated that BF families living in smaller 
municipalities (up to 100,000 inhabitants) had levels of monitoring from 2005 to 
2011 that were above the national average (MS 2011).  Figure 34 illustrates this. 
 
Figure 34: Percentage of households monitored by the Ministry of Health by municipality size, 2005-2011 
 
Source: adapted from MS (2011). 
 
Although the figure does not indicate whether these small municipalities were rural, 
urban, isolated or non-isolated, it does suggest that smaller municipalities can monitor 
beneficiaries more easily.  However, there may be factors other than the small size of 
the municipality behind the differences in monitoring levels shown in Figure 34.  
First, health monitoring is also closely associated with coverage of PACS and PSF 
services.  The above data may be capturing the effect of the coverage of these two 
programmes on the monitoring of families’ health.  Thus, it is possible that higher 
levels of monitoring are not related to the small size of municipalities, but rather, to 
higher coverage of PACs and PSFs.  According to MS calculations, municipalities 
with low PACs and PSFs coverage (<10%) were able to monitor only 59.0% of the 
BF families, while those with high coverage (>90%) monitored 80.3% (MS 2011 
p.8).   
Second, Figure 34 does not include information on the location of the remaining 
29.1% of BF families who were not captured in the monitoring system, totalling 
3,051,665 million families in 2011 (MS 2011 p.10).  There were attempts to visit 
15.5% (472,408) of these families in loco, but 92.5% were not located for the 
following reasons: the family had moved out (68.2%), the address was non-existent 
(1.2%), and other reasons (30.6%) (p.11).   
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The data I obtained from the Ministry of Health show the percentage of BF 
households monitored (Figure 35).   Technically, there is a difference between 
households monitored and those compliant with conditionalities.  However, I use the 
terms interchangeably because almost all households monitored are compliant.  The 
Ministry of Health reported that compliance with conditionalities among the 
households monitored between the second half of 2005 and 2008 varied between 
95.3% and 99.6% (MS 2009).  Figure 35 shows the average compliance with health 
conditionalities by PIR and PNIR municipalities, and compare them with rural 
municipalities.   
Figure 35: Monitoring of health conditionality by PIR and PNIR, 2005-2010 
 
Source: author using MoPI, BCIM, Datasus/Sisvan (2005-2010). 
 
Figure 35 shows an improvement in compliance across the years.  Although PIR 
municipalities are consistently below PNIR municipalities and the rural averages, the 
difference diminished from 2007 to 2009.  It is important to clarify the reasons why 
there is lower compliance with health conditionalities in PIR municipalities.  This is 
carried out with the qualitative analysis in section 8.4.  
The Ministry of Health (2009) identified some of the difficulties faced by the 
municipalities in improving the coverage and compliance levels.  Among the main 
difficulties were: time spent in system updates, lack of integration between different 
sectors and lack of knowledge of what the health conditionalities were.  In 2011, an 
analysis conducted by the Ministry of Health in municipalities with low levels of 
compliance showed that lesser compliance related to logistic problems like 
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insufficient typists and reduced internet connection, as well as to the high mobility 
of the monitored population (MS 2011).  Some of these reasons were also identified 
by this thesis. 
However, compliance with health conditionalities does not necessarily mean 
improved access to health services.  For example, the household may have to travel 
long distances (intra-municipality remoteness) every six months to comply with 
health conditionalities.  Mothers may still have problems finding specialised health 
care for premature babies (inter-municipality remoteness), such reported on Chapter 
7, section 7.3.6. 
Furthermore, good compliance does not necessarily mean improvements in the 
families’ health status.  Although complying with the children’s immunisation 
schedule is a significant achievement, good health involves wider issues than those 
specified in the conditionalities.  Monitoring children’s growth and development, for 
example, requires additional nutritional interventions and continuity of care if 
children are undernourished.  Two data points a year do not capture this. 
Inter- and intra-municipality remoteness has an impact on local service infrastructure 
(e.g. sanitation and provision of water, as described in Chapter 7), and this poses an 
additional strain on the health services.  Children still suffer from preventable 
diseases because of the lack of infrastructure such as sanitation and drinkable water.  
The qualitative analysis will address how households get access to health services, 
and how they perceive the quality of services provided.  
8.4.2 Education conditionalities 
Education conditionalities involve children’s school attendance.  Basic education in 
public schools in Brazil is free.  Children (6-15 years old) must have a minimum of 
85% of attendance and teenagers (16-17 years old) a minimum of 75% (Lei No. 
10.836, 9/01/2004, art 3).  School attendance is reported every two months to the 
municipal Secretariat of Education, who then informs the Ministry of Education.  
The Ministry of Education dataset registers reasons for low school attendance.  
Whenever students miss classes, teachers must be informed of the reason.  It is 
important to mention that I used data only for the younger children, excluding all 
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information on the older teenagers.  Rural education is still mostly concentrated in 
the initial four years of schooling.  Moreover, reduced school attendance of teenagers 
may relate to different types of service than the usual schools, such as night classes.  
The lack of classes at night does not necessarily mean that there is a lack of 
schooling. 
For programme implementation purposes, reasons for absence from school are 
classified into two different groups: those that are counted as non-compliance and 
those that aren’t.  Only reasons that result from family actions, such as lack of 
interest, negligence or work, are counted as non-compliance.  These factors flag 
families that require immediate follow-up.  Reasons that are beyond the family’s 
control, such as illness, death and lack of services or transportation, do not count as 
non-compliance (MDS 2010a). 
Figure 36 and Figure 37 show the absolute numbers of the main reported reasons: 
illness; negligence/lack of interest; shortage in supply of school services; factors that 
impede access to school; and “non-identified” reasons.  There are other reasons 
registered with the Ministry but not illustrated below, namely, suspension, pregnancy, 
homelessness, child labour, illness/death in family, violence, and “other”.  For a list 
of all declared reasons and their definitions, see the appendix to this chapter. 
Figure 36: Declared reasons for absence from 
school, PIR municipalities 
 
Source: author’s calculations using MoPI, BCIM, 
Presença (2007-2010).  
* Shortage in supply of school services includes disability 
services in 2009-2010. 
Figure 37: Declared reasons for absence from 
school, PNIR municipalities 
 
Source: see Figure 36 for details. 
* Shortage in supply of school services includes disability 
services in 2009-2010. 
 
I would like to add some caveats to these figures.  Given that they are based on an 
administrative database, the definitions of the reasons may not be the most 
appropriate for the purposes of this research.  For example, MEC defines “factors that 
impede access to school” as follows: 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
2007 2008 2009 2010
Illness Shortage supply
Access to school Not id
Negligence-Interest
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
2007 2008 2009 2010
Illness Shortage supply Access to school
Not id Negligence-Interest
 Page 263 of 356 
 
there are situations that impede student or various students from getting to 
school, such as floods, natural disasters, lack of transport, difficult 
transportation due to quality of roads (mud holes), urban violence and other 
calamities (MEC [n.d.]-a p.29).
109
 
This definition is very broad and lack of transport is only one of the reasons but it 
gives us an overall idea of the difficulties in reaching school, some of them sporadic 
(violence, natural disasters), others more long-lasting (lack of transport, bad roads).      
Figure 36 and Figure 37 show that student illness is one important reason for not 
attending school, although it has slightly reduced in importance over time.  However, 
negligence and lack of interest, two behavioural reasons, are a growing trend.  Quite 
surprisingly, though, there are a large number of reasons that are “not identified”.  
This could jeopardise the proposal that reasons for non-attendance be used to flag 
family needs for complementary interventions.   
Shortage of supply of school services (the purple dotted line) and access to services 
(red dotted line) do not seem to be a matter of concern, taking only the information 
contained in the Ministry’s database.  However, the dataset manual says that, for 
situations affecting more than one student
110
, such as the non-appearance of 
teachers/staff, problems with transport, or the non-provision of services, all students 
should be registered as attending school.  This requirement throws doubt on the 
quality of the data being registered, as well as on the possibility of using the 
information on the supply of services as a mechanism to improve public services.   
Moreover, as in the case of health conditionalities, simply registering compliance 
does not capture the costs to households of getting access to services, e.g. lengthy 
times time spent on school buses due to road conditions.  Again as in the case of 
health conditionalities, compliance does not mean services of better quality.  The 
following reasons for non-compliance with conditionalities – remoteness, 
                                               
109 MEC ([n.d.]-a p.28) defines the shortage of school services as follows: “this situation covers the 
possibility of the non-existence, in several municipalities, of primary and secondary schooling in the 
community, mainly in rural areas.  It also encompasses the possibility of lack of educational services 
for resettled communities.  Another situation which encompasses this item is the lack of schooling 
services for youth offenders.  Lastly, there is the lack of Youth and Adult Education (EJA)”. 
110 If these reasons affect the overall functioning of the school, the local authority must inform the 
Ministry of Education. The manual (MEC [n.d.]-b p.30)states that all students should be registered as 
attending if more than 50% of the month’s attendance was compromised.  
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“negligence/lack of interest” (behavioural) reasons and those unaccounted for, and 
service quality – will be discussed in the next section. 
8.5 Possible reasons for non-compliance with conditionalities: a qualitative 
investigation 
I divide this section in the following way: first, I address whether households know 
about the conditionalities; then I attempt to identify the non-identified reasons for low 
school attendance; and lastly, I investigate interviewees’ perceptions of the quality of 
services provided.    
8.5.1 Lack of information on conditionalities 
Households may fail to comply because they lack knowledge of the conditionality 
requirement.  There is mixed evidence on just how much beneficiaries know.  In a 
longitudinal evaluation study, De Brauw et al. (2011) found that while more than 
90% of respondents could correctly identify education and health conditionalities, a 
closer inspection revealed that 41%  believed that the BF had no education 
conditionalities, and 43% believed that it had no health conditionalities (pp.84,86). 
My fieldwork mirrors this finding – people understand that they must send their 
children to school in order to receive the BF, but what the conditionality entails 
exactly is not clear to beneficiaries.  Some people think that the children must have 
good grades to receive the benefit.  
No, they do not lose it [the benefit], but some of them have their benefit 
reduced.  The government has the possibility of reducing it.  They do not cut it 
totally; they only scare recipients a little bit so that next year they will pay 
more attention (029i BEN). 
There was no indication that parents knew how many times their children could miss 
a class before the benefit was cut.  They only said that children must always go to 
school.  This finding suggests households’ perceptions conflict with the programme 
design.  For the government, benefit cancellation is intended to have a “soft” or 
gradual effect on households, convincing them to comply but not penalising them.  
However, households believe the opposite.  They believe that not attending school 
will have an immediate impact on their benefit, unless absence is justified.  Their lack 
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of knowledge about how many times a child can miss school before a benefit is 
cancelled means that they feel obliged to make the children always attend school.  
The government discourse is not about penalising households, but beneficiaries’ 
perceptions differ substantially.  They are afraid of losing the benefit, a highly 
valuable benefit for the persistently poor. 
This feeling is capitalised by local administrations.  I triangulated reports from 
beneficiaries with those from local administration staff on the use of the benefit as a 
way of attracting households to school meetings or social assistance centres.  
Parents know more about school conditionalities than health conditionalities.  There 
are several possible reasons for this.  One of the BF conditionalities is attendance at 
school meetings.  As well, school conditionalities have a wider coverage than health 
conditionalities.  They include children from the age of six to the age of 17, while 
health conditionalities only include pregnant women and children up to the age of 
seven.  And finally, BF health conditionalities are often confused with another benefit 
called “maternity benefit”.  Thus, if parents do not associate the receipt of the BF 
benefit with the fulfilment of health conditions, this may result in one of the reasons 
for reduced health attendance.   
8.5.2 Uncovering the importance of education for households 
Figure 36 and Figure 37 show  that among the most declared reasons for absence 
from school are illness, “non-identified”, “negligence”, and “lack of interest”.  In this 
subsection, I report the findings on how important the rural poor perceive education 
to be.    
I used several questions at different points in the interview to probe for people’s 
perceptions of the importance of education
111
.  Asking parents for an account of their 
life-history included their level of education.  I asked about the reasons they stopped 
studying.  I further asked whether their experiences of reduced literacy had affected 
their lives, and if so, how.  Then, I analysed their responses to a hypothetical scenario, 
in which their teenage daughter or son wants to stop studying to contribute towards 
the household income.   
                                               
111 Due to time constraints, I was not able to analyse the perceived importance of health. 
 Page 266 of 356 
 
This analysis is limited to the parents’ views on the use of education and health 
services and to their parenting experiences, not the children’s.  It shows whether there 
are still any reasons for restricting their service take-up, and it provides insights 
informing the quantitative findings of the declared reasons for low school attendance.  
I divide the reasons for non-compliance into four categories: (i) financial reasons; (ii) 
labour markets; (iii) social reasons; and (iv) health and learning difficulties. 
 Financial reasons 
The financial importance of this programme for households that rely on agriculture is 
undeniable.  There is overwhelming evidence from the families themselves of the 
financial importance of the BF.  The difference the programme makes for the 
persistently poor means the possibility of fulfilling basic needs of food security.   
Before [the BF] it was like … I am not going to say that we were starving, no, 
but it was sort of like that (028n BEN). 
The importance of this social assistance benefit cannot be underestimated.  Parents 
reported that they dropped out of school because of dire poverty.    
My dad didn’t have the means to afford me in school or in anywhere else, so 
… [I started working]  (027nn BEN – This single father was 11 years old 
when he started working as a lumberjack).   
It was because, I had no childhood, do you understand? I had to go a 
neighbour and wash the dishes for eating, sweep the floor for eating (031nn 
BEN). 
Although the benefit gives some sense of security in the lives of children, there were 
some families who reported that the benefit was too little to meet their needs.  Single 
mothers and large families living in isolated rural villages had greater difficulty 
coping with the conditionality requirements.  Conditionalities oblige families to 
negotiate their children’s attendance with school principals so that their children can 
skip classes while the family undertake seasonal work in another municipality.  In 
that way, families are able to meet their income needs without losing the benefit.  
This type of bargaining is again to the disadvantage of the worst off. 
I continue to work, sometimes I ask the teachers, I say ‘well, you will have to 
allow me because you don’t give me what to eat and this card doesn’t support 
five children, it doesn’t.  Sometimes, they complain, sometime they give 2-3 
days [off school].  This week I went there [another municipality] and I spend 
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4 days working, harvesting beans.  So, I brought some beans [home] (039ii 
NBEN). 
The impact of the benefit in terms of food security is discussed in section 8.6.   
 Labour markets in rural areas 
In Chapter 7, sub-section 7.2.2, I presented the effects of inter-municipality 
remoteness on labour markets and flows of people, comparing PIR and PNIR 
infrastructures.  In this sub-section, I present the parents’ perceptions of how 
education affects their children’s entrance into the labour market in rural areas.   
Parents recognise the importance education would have had in their lives.  They 
believed that, if they had studied, they would have had better employment 
opportunities, including stable jobs, either in the local town or in another 
municipality.  There is a common belief that the children would be able to have a 
different life than the one they have now if they study.  The children would be able 
not to rely on agriculture.  
Those who study have a good job, they have more chances in life.  Now, those 
who don’t study don’t have much of a chance.  Don’t you see her case, she 
knows nothing.  So, she has no chance of finding a job, our children, we try 
our hardest for them to study, so that in the future, s/he would have a good 
job, a job that would earn a living wage, we put our children in school for this 
reason.  We wish them to have things or to be someone in life.  This is her 
wish and mine too  (044n NBEN). 
Parents reported their disillusionment about agricultural jobs, their discontent with 
rural work, and the harsh conditions of work, which they felt offered little reward and 
little pay.  These working conditions had a negative impact on their self-esteem, and 
they wanted their children to have a different fate from theirs, to “be someone in life”.  
They did not want their children to work in rural areas.  But for that to happen, their 
children needed to improve their level of education.  
Not working on the farm, because this is not a good job.  That they study 
more and go on to do something like IT, something more different.  Old farm 
jobs are not a line of work.  By itself it is not enough.  Not by a long shot … 
Like my husband, if you see what I mean.  How can he provide for me? There 
is no money, not even to buy some clothes (039ii NBEN). 
When I outlined to parents the scenario of their children dropping out of school to 
help them financially, all the parents emphasised the importance of studying.  At 
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worst, they offered a compromise of allowing work if the teenager would study at 
night.   
However, some households recognised the limitations of the local job market and the 
inadequacy of the rural education curriculum.  Studying “too much” may not result in 
getting a job locally.  They considered the costs and benefits of studying.  As one 
interviewee said:   
too much study is not worth much either.  When you find a job, it is not that 
good, you can’t find a job in the area [of study] (042nn BEN). 
This shows the complexity of calculating the returns to education in a highly insecure 
future, facing present food insecurity.  On the one hand, parents recognise that 
education is vital for increasing their children’s chances of getting a well-paid job; on 
the other hand, inter-municipality remoteness influences the local job market and 
creates a disincentive to study, reinforcing the cycle of persistent poverty in PIR 
municipalities.  As interviewee said “why study if you will end up holding a hoe 
handle?”112  The situation is different for PNIR municipalities with opportunities for 
non-farm employment for the rural youth.  The local labour market, therefore, is 
taken into consideration by households when they assess the importance of education.  
 Social reasons 
Parents’ reasons for dropping-out of education early are still valid today.  These 
include early household formation, type of household composition, and migration; 
these social events influence the possibility of schooling.   
The case studies showed a repeating pattern of early family formation: women’s 
underage marriage, followed by dropping out of school and child-rearing 
responsibilities.  Young men also dropped out early to support the family when they 
married early.  
Another important life event associated with the interruption of schooling is the 
continuous change in household composition.  I heard reports of parents who were 
abandoned while they were growing up, or whose parents died early, of children 
living with grandparents due to parent’s migration for work, of children growing up 
                                               
112 Statement captured during a protocol observation. 
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in households not headed by their own biological parents, etc.  Household dynamics 
have an impact on children’s ability to attend school and their emotional disposition 
towards learning.  As one interviewee reported: 
I was very little when my mother abandoned me, so I was under my father’s 
responsibility that left me with my step-mother.  Step-mothers are never like 
mothers.  So, I had to take care of myself (031nn BEN). 
Schooling in PIR municipalities is particularly badly affected due to parents being 
located in different municipalities.  Therefore, changes in household composition and 
migration could result in lower school attendance because of the impacts they have on 
the children’s lives.   
Although parents perceive education as important, they report being confronted with 
filial disobedience.  Parents say that, at a certain age, they can only advise their 
children.  This response may reinforce the hypothesis that older children/teenagers 
lose their interest in studying, as reported in “lack of interest” in section 8.4.   
This is a plausible hypothesis considering several factors, previously noted: the 
inadequacy of the school curriculum in rural regions; under-qualified teachers; lack of 
teaching materials; poor school infrastructure; limited opportunities to continue to 
tertiary education; and the local job market (among others).  Thus, the reporting of 
“lack of interest” should be understood in a broader educational context, which also 
includes supply-side deficiencies. 
 Learning difficulties and health problems 
Some parents reported learning difficulties as the reason they dropped out.     
I didn’t study because I didn’t want it … I was never able to learn.  I don’t 
know, there must be something inside my head that I can’t do it [can’t learn] 
(044nn NBEN).  
  
Parents reported their children’s long-term health issues as reasons for not going to 
school, such as lack of ophthalmologists or lack of money to purchase glasses.  I can 
also speculate other possible situations, such as the lack of ear-nose-and-throat and 
speech specialists, and the occurrence of attention deficit or hyperactivity disorders, 
or even of cognitive impairment related to malnutrition.  
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Me: So, why did your 13-year-old son take longer to start school? 
because … he has a sight problem.  They [the school] asked me to wait a bit 
longer to see if after he grew up if there was still a problem.  But he still cries 
a little when he studies … his eyes hurt. 
Me: Have you taken him to the local town? 
No, he never had an eye test (032i BEN). 
This particular rural village was a long way away from the local town.  Even if the 
mother had taken the child to the ophthalmologist, she would have not been able to 
purchase glasses.  Although the government has a free glasses programme, I also 
heard several complaints of this programme not reaching these municipalities.   
8.5.3 Investigating the quality of services 
People’s perceptions about the quality of the services may influence conditionality 
compliance.  It has been reported that, although conditionalities link households’ 
behaviour to the quality of the services offered, there is little or no policy feedback 
about improving public service provision. 
Overall, the households reported unfavourably on the quality of the health services.  
Even when local services were staffed, households still preferred to go to the town 
hall or the nearest urban municipality.  For specialised services, households went 
even further, to the nearest regional urban municipality, because there were no 
services nearby.  Again, it can be seen that inter- and intra-municipality remoteness 
impinges on the mobility and health outcomes of the persistently poor.   
As for school services, there are two worrying findings.  First, there is the recurrent 
complaint about lack of school meals.  When access to free school meals is sporadic, 
there is an additional constraint on the household budget, resulting in food insecurity, 
hunger and household distress.  As one interviewee said: 
It is not just sometimes but often that there is no school lunch … They come 
home and say ‘mum, there is no school meal’, sometimes they say ‘mum, 
make popcorn for us to take to school’, ‘Mum, give me some money to take to 
school’.  So, sometimes I curse.  I don’t even have the means to give them 
some money to take to school … Look, we can’t do it, we can’t make their 
breakfast for them to eat early and give them their school lunch for them to 
take to school! (039ii NBEN).  
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The second worrying finding is that the some of the children are exposed to 
environments that are not safe or protective.  There were reports of mistreatment of 
students by school authorities, such as physical punishment and verbal abuse.   
sometimes I receive a complaint and I go there [to the school].  They say ‘I 
will smack them’.  I say ‘you don’t need to spank them, just ground them’ 
(032i BEN). 
These findings are of great concern.  Conditionalities pressure parents to send their 
children to an environment that is not conducive to learning because the children are 
hungry and because there is a possibility of abusive interactions.  Furthermore, 
evidence from the interviews shows that parents will most likely not denounce the 
teacher or the school to the authorities, as this may result in straining their 
relationships, weakening their network of survival.  
In an environment without free school meals, intra-municipality remoteness makes it 
worse for the persistently poor.  There are fewer opportunities to change schools or 
teachers, as there is only one schooling option in a remote village.  If the children are 
older and go to school at the local town, they spend more time travelling without 
having eaten.  
 In sum: 
For the households interviewed, school and health services are perceived as 
important.  They want their children to “be someone in life” and for that they need 
education.  They understand the importance of vaccination.  Local officials enforce 
school attendance, and several health programmes require children’s immunisations.  
Thus, there is no evidence that households would choose not to claim the benefit 
because they wanted to avoid fulfilling the conditionalities.   
This is also demonstrated by the quantitative data.  Cancellations due to non-
compliance were only 4.5% on average between 2006 and 2008 (Soares 2012a p.11).  
So, what are the reasons behind non-compliance with conditionalities? Why would 
families risk losing the benefit?  Some of the findings from the qualitative 
investigation are summarised in Table 14 below. 
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Table 14: Possible reasons for non-compliance with conditionalities 
Possible reasons that households do 
NOT comply with conditionalities 
Does it lead to benefit cancellation? 
Lack of information on health 
conditionality. 
 
Yes, if not compliant. 
Early household formation
(1)
:  
* young women with child rearing 
responsibilities; 
* young men with a family to 
support. 
Yes, young parents tend to drop out of school. 
… but, young couples, depending on age and 
documentation, may be eligible to register and 
wait for their benefit. 
Teenagers may lose interest in 
studying due reasons detailed in 
sub-section 8.5.2
(1)
. 
Yes. 
Changes in household composition. Maybe: 
* yes, if children migrate and school cannot 
find whereabouts. 
* no, if children do not migrate and remain in 
school … but this affects their disposition 
towards learning. 
Health problems and learning 
difficulties
(1)
. 
Maybe: 
* yes, if children stop going to school. 
* no, if children still attend school.  
… but this affects their learning and 
development. 
Quality of education services
(1)
:  
* no free school meals; 
* mistreatment of students by 
school authorities. 
Maybe: 
* yes, if children stop going to school. 
* no, if children still attend school. 
… but deserves investigation to urgently 
address these complaints. 
Quality of health services
(1)
. Maybe: 
* yes, if it relates to health conditionalities, e.g. 
lack of vaccination due to difficult access. 
* no, if it does not relate to health 
conditionalities. 
… but potentially affects school attendance due 
to longer periods of school absence for 
treatment. 
Financial circumstances.  Maybe: 
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Possible reasons that households do 
NOT comply with conditionalities 
Does it lead to benefit cancellation? 
* yes, if families are required to work extra due 
to meagerness of benefit and precarious jobs 
(in-work poverty). 
* no, if they are able to work at different times 
than school hours or if they can negotiate an 
informal arrangement with teacher to work for 
certain number of days. 
Importance of education in rural 
areas. 
Maybe: 
* yes, if education is perceived to be not 
necessary for rural work. 
* no, if education is perceived to be necessary 
for local job market or as a long-term out-
migrating strategy. 
(1) The intra- and inter-municipality remoteness of PIR municipalities makes the situation of the persistently poor worse, leading 
to benefit cancellation for those who need it the most.   
Source: author. 
 
8.6 The benefit: collection, impact and adequacy 
 
8.6.1 Benefit collection 
The method of collecting benefits cannot be thought of as the simple act of 
households collecting the money.  Different institutions (CAIXA, banking 
correspondents and CRAS) play a part, and households must interact with them; and 
there is the background within which households exercise their decision-making as to 
when and how to collect their benefits.   
The effects of location and literacy are evident in the interviews.  The location of the 
rural village influences the effectiveness – i.e. the real value – of the benefit.  The 
more isolated a household is in relation to the local town, the more expensive it is to 
go to the town, and the less money is brought back to their homes.  As discussed in 
Chapter 6, sub-section 6.3.3, households in PIR rural villages could spend on average 
between 7% and 59% of their benefit on transport. 
So, even paying the ticket, my husband had to go.  He had to pay R$7 a return 
ticket.  So, when the benefit was R$15, he would return with around R$7 … 
Me: Would you still go? 
It is like that, even so he would get the benefit (033ii BEN). 
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Inter-municipality remoteness influences the extent to which households can resolve 
BF card problems at the CAIXA, which is generally located at the nearest urban 
municipality.  The persistently poor are, again, hit the hardest in terms of cost and 
lack of information.  Some households I interviewed had borrowed money to travel 
several times to the nearest urban municipality, only to come back with the BF card 
issues still unresolved.    
Strategies for collecting benefits varied according to remoteness.  The persistently 
poor reported that they: (i) used the free school bus; (ii) waited for two months so as 
to get more money all at once; (iii) paid someone to collect the benefit on their behalf 
(an option that cost less than if household decided to use local transport to town); (iv) 
hired a private car with a number of other people also going to the nearest urban 
municipality to deal with CAIXA issues.  In contrast, households in non-remote rural 
villages resorted to their bicycles or walked to the local town.   
Literacy levels also influenced the ways in which people collected their benefit at 
banking correspondents.  Higher literacy levels mean more independence in 
collecting the benefit, and more confidence in their social rights.  Literate household 
heads tend to protect their password by memorising it and typing it themselves, 
whereas illiterate household heads give their passwords to tellers to type for them.   
Me: Do you type your password at the banking correspondent? 
No, they, the teller there does it, because I don’t know how to read so ... 
Me: Do you let them do it? 
Yes (034nn BEN). 
Banking correspondent staff confirmed this and justified their practice by saying that 
some households have difficulty typing their passwords, and this could result in their 
card being blocked after the third attempt.  If that happens, the household head needs 
to travel to the nearest CAIXA at an urban municipality – a journey not easily 
undertaken. 
8.6.2 Impact of the programme 
A comparison between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries demonstrates the impact 
of the BF programme.  Non-beneficiaries informed me that they lacked food staples 
towards the end of the month.  Some of them reported going hungry or only having a 
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very little to get by.  Beneficiaries whose benefit had been cut reported that they now 
lived without essential staples at home.   
Households that don’t receive the benefit can only rely on informal networks for help.  
Charity and family assistance are both weak in remote rural areas, the former being 
sporadic and the latter being highly vulnerable themselves, with limited means to 
survive.  Given the fragility of this type of welfare support, these families reported 
going without.     
[wife] What could I have bought, my lovely, without money? … Nothing! I 
lacked everything. 
[husband] There was no money, so, everything went missing.  We had little 
food. 
Me: Did you eat what you planted? 
What we planted? There was nothing! So, during that time, I would grab my 
fishing rod, throw it over my shoulder and I would go down the hill to get 
some fish for us to eat, to ‘get by’, right? (045i NBEN). 
Subsistence farming is not a reliable source of food or income.  Agriculture is a high 
risk sector and, as explained in Chapters 3 and 7, the rural poor in both PIR and PNIR 
municipalities lived in areas where subsistence farming was precarious due to 
weather and soil conditions.  Furthermore, farmers could not grow a sufficient variety 
of food to secure their nutrition levels.  So, the idea that the rural poor can resort to 
farming and reduce their vulnerability levels, thus relying less on cash, takes no 
account of the conditions where some of the rural poor live.     
Because school attendance is seen to be the primary conditionality associated with the 
BF (sub-section 8.5), it is the constant reference point for reported expenditure.  
There is an attempt to symbolically associate expenditures with “keeping children in 
school”, although the main use of the benefit seems to be for food security.  
For the persistently poor, conditionalities impose a harsh dilemma.  The impact of the 
cash transfer is supposed to ensure that children attend school (so-called “substitution 
impact”), but it falls short of what is needed.  There is the need for school uniform, 
shoes, and notebooks.  Households reported having to choose between buying food 
and buying clothes. 
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No, I want them to continue studying.  But, I also want, I would like that they 
study and … that at least I can find a job that helps us buying clothes and 
shoes, because what is the point of them studying if I can’t buy clothes for 
them? When they go to school, people say ‘ah, these clothes you got are from 
the year before last year’, because of what I was saying to you, ‘you don’t 
have good shoes to go to school’.  It is not good to hear that from your son, it 
is not good at all (039ii NBEN). 
Beneficiaries reported additional school costs for photocopying, materials and school 
meals.  The fact that there are public policies with federal transfers to the school for 
some of these items, should raise a flag for further investigation.  
8.6.3 The adequacy of the benefit to the policy objective 
Let us suppose that the BF had only one objective – to fight poverty and food 
insecurity –this single objective is partially met, according to the persistently poor: 
so you analyse, six children studying, all the expense it is per month, so this 
here … this is not enough, it is only for the start, so we have to work because 
we can’t just wait for the BF, we can’t, right?  We need a pair of shoes, we 
need some clothing, we need a notebook, so many things, so this what we 
have is only a small help, but it helps a lot, it is a small help (036n BEN). 
The statement that the BF “is only a small help but it helps a lot” seems to be 
contradictory, but the contradiction is more apparent than real.  The idea that the BF 
is “a small help” is repeated continuously in the interviews, mainly due to the meagre 
amount transferred to families, insufficient to meet the needs of large families.  
However, “it helps a lot” because it is a regular and stable source of income, which 
they did not have before.  This statement also underlines the BF policy prescription 
that the BF is a “help”, it is not a “right”.   
President Dilma has tried to address the inadequacy of the benefit rate with two 
measures implemented with the Brasil sem Miséria programme: (i) by increasing the 
upper limit to five children, instead of three; and (ii) by creating another benefit to 
address the poverty gap of households in extreme poverty (Benefício para a 
superação extrema da pobreza).  The latter benefit is calculated as the gap between 
the household monthly income and the extreme poverty line.    
The interviews were conducted before these measures were implemented, and hence 
any impact would not show up in my data.  However, for at least two reasons the 
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impact of these two measures is likely to be minimal: (i) Why is the benefit capped at 
five children? If the aim is to provide access to public services, should families be 
given cash incentives only for the first five children to go to school? The sixth child 
or the eighth would also have costs in attending school.  Why should they be 
penalised? (ii) How low is the extreme poverty line against which the new benefit is 
measured?  
Table 1 and Table 2 (pp.63,64) show that the extreme poverty line is approximately 
20% of the minimum wage.  This minimalist critique of the absolute poverty line 
(generally measured in income and based on subsistence) has already been addressed 
by Townsend (1962) in his classic example of “drinking tea”.  Thus, in addition to the 
extreme poverty line being very low, it does not include needs beyond survival, such 
as “social needs” enables individuals to take part in the life in a community 
(Townsend 1985).  These social needs were also clearly documented during 
fieldwork: 
You won’t live only with those that live here [in the household], you have 
your visitors, you have people that relate to you besides your sons and 
daughters, because you will not live in a world only connected to your sons 
and daughters, only with your husband, of course you have to have your 
friendships.  You have your neighbours, if they don’t come from here … they 
come from further away, because you won’t be friends only with your 
neighbours, you have friends outside.  If they come you will not deny them a 
plate of food … The day she comes here and says I have no rice, no beans, no 
oil, no coffee, I swear to God, if I have it here we share it, we divide it, if 
anyone comes and I know s/he is in need, I will not have 4, 5, 6 packets of 
rice … I will not look at her/him and say ‘no’ … I will not deny it, we share 
and be whatever God wishes.  We eat together (043ii NBEN). 
The adequacy of the benefit for the rural poor in both PIR and PNIR municipalities is, 
therefore, questionable.  The policy design fails to address the specific needs of the 
persistently poor, who incur higher costs to obtain the benefit, have more family 
members dependent on the household head (both children and adults), and have less 
access market employment to earn other sources of income.   
However, as Atkinson (1991 p.38) cautions “It is not sufficient to say that the safety 
net could be made more effective by raising benefit levels.  One has to ask why in the 
past benefits have been inadequate”.   Indeed, raising benefit levels so that the BF 
becomes a “universal panacea” is not likely to be the most effective policy 
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recommendation.  But as this chapter shows, there is the need to understand the 
heterogeneity of the population targeted, and the several policy gaps that the BF is 
currently filling. 
The context in which the BF was created has considerable implications for its role in 
the overall Brazilian welfare state.  The BF started as a combination of different 
policies and continues to address different policy objectives.  At the same time that 
the BF policy objectives are ambitious (objectives at page 61), the policy instrument 
of choice – CCTs – is of a residualist social policy nature.  This contradiction mirrors 
the social context of the rights-based 1988 Constitution with the “restricted 
universalisation” and public-private provision of services.   
This contradiction is also noted in the combination of social policies that make-up the 
Brazilian social protection system: universal health and education systems, social 
pensions and the targeted BF, filling in the void left by the non-existence of other 
social protection programmes  In particular, the BF plays the role of: 
 income maintenance support: by addressing the vertical equity principle of 
protecting low-income families by providing a stable source of income;   
 (un)employment assistance: by targeting working-age households whose 
heads are in highly vulnerable working conditions – low paid and low skilled 
jobs in the informal sector; and 
 child support allowance: by addressing the horizontal equity of redistributing 
income according to the higher costs of raising children.  However, the BF has 
limited horizontal equity as it is restricted to three (or five) children per 
family. 
The ambitious policy objectives, together with the structure of the social protection 
system in Brazil, have meant that BF policy is not adequate to address all of its 
objectives.  Furthermore, it is being used to fill in the gaps left by the absence of other 
social protection policies that might address the needs of the families investigated.   
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8.7 Inspection mechanism and the persistently poor: the BF social council 
(ICS) and community participation 
The BF legislation establishes the ICS as a social council mechanism and 
“community participation” as tools for ensuring that the programme is effectively 
reaching those that need it (Lei 10.836, 09/01/2004, Decreto 5.209, 17/09/2044).  
Community participation involves citizen oversight of the BF implementation, 
combined with provision for individuals to denounce beneficiary households they 
perceive as not eligible for the benefit.  The Instrução Normativa No.1, 20/05/2005 
states the ICS functions, which I cite some below: 
Art 8, I, b) to identify potential beneficiaries of the PBF [Bolsa Família], 
mainly (…) those that are in extreme poverty, as well as requesting the state 
its registration; 
II, b) to request, with due justifications, to the local administration, the 
suspension or cancellation of benefits for families that are receiving the 
benefit without being eligible; 
III, a) to monitor the supply of local public services needed to fulfil the PBF 
conditionalities; 
IV In regards to complementary programmes, to follow and stimulate the 
integration and offer of other public policies that favour the emancipation of 
PBF beneficiary families, especially those who are not meeting the 
conditionalities …; 
VI, a) stimulate community participation for inspecting the PBF execution, in 
its administrative sphere. 
 
This “community participation for inspecting” the BF requirement is expanded in a 
manual for the ICS issued by the Office of the Controller General of Accounts 
(CGU): 
It is very important that every citizen takes on the task of participating in the 
government’s management, to monitor the usage of public funding through 
the activities of social control.  Only with society’s participation will effective 
control of public resources be possible.  This would enable more adequate 
usage of available financial resources (Controladoria-Geral da União 2010 
p.22). 
The MDS has a 0800 phone number for people to call and report irregularities.  These 
irregularities can also be reported to CRAS or to the ICS.   
In theory, these methods should help to give priority to the poorest by contributing to 
a better quality Cadastro.  ICS identification of those most need involves, not only 
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making sure that they are registered, but also making sure that the benefits are going 
only to eligible families.  This is partly ensured by excluding families who have been 
granted the benefit “by mistake”, and denunciations by a watchful public is one way 
of identifying those families, at least according to the official statements.  The 
outcome is supposedly a better quality Cadastro, which could potentially help to give 
priority to the persistently poor.  This sequence of events has already been reported 
by federal administration staff in Chapter 5 section 5.3.2. 
However, both the households and the local administrations (Chapter 6, section 6.4.3) 
reported that households were reluctant to denounce anyone at the ICS or at the local 
administration.  The vast majority of the interviewees said that they would not report 
an incorrect benefit allocation.  Few of the household heads said they would report, 
although:  
it would not change a thing.  People don’t pay attention; they don’t care about 
solving these things (042nn NBEN). 
Households interviewed give five reasons for the reluctance: 
(i) an assumption that relationships and informal networks will fill in the gaps 
left by the state and family; 
(ii) fear of the consequences; 
(iii) the understanding that different households have different needs; 
(iv) believing that denouncing someone is wrong; 
(v) a desire to distance themselves from the government. 
First, there are few services offered by either state or market in PIR and PNIR 
municipalities.  Thus, family, friends and other informal networks fill in the gaps in 
the provision of services.  They provide child care services, emergency transportation 
to the nearest hospital and other types of transportation, and so forth.  Life in a 
community not only contributes to a sense of belonging, it is also a major source of 
help.   
Me: What do you do if you get sick in early morning?  
We have to ask for our neighbour’s help … Then you ask the neighbour to go 
there (hospital). 
Me: Do they charge you? 
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No, it is based on friendship really … they don’t charge anything (040n 
NBEN). 
Households are afraid of the consequences of informing on someone.  For the rural 
poor, who cannot purchase private services, relationships matter most and represent 
one of the components of their survival strategy.  Others are afraid of retaliation.  In 
the same way that they could wrongly denounce people, they could also be the target 
of somebody else’s complaints.  Therefore, they should keep on good terms with 
everyone.   
Everybody knows everyone here.  No one would tell on others here … If 
anything happens you told on someone, that person would cut relationship 
with you.  This is how it works here.  It is serious.  You cannot be meddling 
too much in other people’s business.  Each person knows their own needs 
(029i BEN). 
imagine if I put a complaint about others and I need it, [they] think that I 
don’t, and look, my benefit is cut, God forbid … (030ii BEN). 
Households also recognise that there are many aspects of deprivation and 
vulnerability, that poverty is not only money-related.  They have an intuitive 
understanding of the limitations of the income poverty line.  As the interviewees said: 
“everyone that receives it [the BF], does so because they need it” (029i BEN); 
“everyone needs it” (028n BEN); “I don’t want it only for myself, everyone needs it, 
right?”(032i BEN).  
Fourth, denouncing someone to the authorities is perceived to be the same as doing 
something bad to people, or starting a vindictive process.  Some interviewees said 
that they did not know the material conditions of the other person’s private life, and 
that this may result in the possibility of causing them harm.   
No, I don’t have the courage to do it [put a in complaint].  I don’t like it … I 
find it an ugly thing to do (039ii NBEN). 
Lastly, households want to distance themselves from the work of the government.  
Households said that it was the local administration staff who conducted home visits 
and asked questions during registration, and they should have the knowledge to 
ensure that only those in real need are beneficiaries.    
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because when they [local administration staff] register us in the local town, 
they ask us what we have to do the registration.  So, they know who needs it 
and who doesn’t, right? (027nn BEN). 
we here, we don’t work for the Government, we don’t (045i NBEN). 
Again, the importance of community relationships is given priority.  Given that there 
are high levels of mistrust between the households and the local administration staff 
(Chapter 6, section 6.4.1 and Chapter 8, section 8.3.2), households may not want the 
community to perceive them doing the government’s work for it.   
8.7.1 The observed impact of community participation in targeted programmes 
During fieldwork, I observed how much discomfort households have with 
denouncing families that are receiving the programme without being eligible (at least, 
as they see it).  Communities are tied by links of friendship, favours, debts and 
reciprocity, and targeted benefits to the poor seem to affect the social fabric of a 
community.  
If the community is strongly united, the institutional mechanisms set up for the BF’s 
“community participation” will most likely not be used.  This is especially the case in 
poor rural municipalities, where people’s dependence on others is strong, and where 
the state’s presence and private opportunities for job creation are limited.   
For communities that are not closely united, “community participation” through 
denouncing has the potential to create conflict and to fuel discrimination and social 
division.  Households did report that they thought that benefits were being allocated 
to not-so-poor households, when there was a poor household that they knew of that 
was not receiving one.  Given that the BF is not a universal benefit, and not based on 
entitlement, families understand that there are limited BF places, but they are 
reluctant to denounce anyone.   
Although households can easily identify extremely poor households, accurate 
identification of the not-so-poor households may be prone to errors, as the extract in 
Box 11 shows.  The calculation of benefit eligibility is complex.  Level of income is 
not the only condition for receiving the benefit.  There are complex rules for benefit 
allocation (section 5.3) and there must also be a municipal vacancy.  The fact that 
there is no direct link between the exit of one family and the entry of another is also a 
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source of confusion for households.  The spiral of further social division within 
communities, and mistrust between the local administration and the community, is set 
in motion.   
 
 
Targeted benefits to the poor reinforce the stigmatisation in the local community.  
Making the benefit targeted should mean that the poorest are given priority in receipt 
of the benefit.  The national cap, the complexity of the programme, and problems 
with targeting and take-up rates result in poor families being excluded from the 
programme.  Every family who receives the benefit, then, can be seen to be taking the 
place of another family, perhaps even one who needs it more.  Beneficiary families 
should be the helpless, the voiceless, those who do not have a pension, and not those 
with anything that indicates they might be a little bit better off than those living in 
abject poverty.   
Moreover, targeting itself reinforces the stigmatisation of the poor by society.  For a 
beneficiary to continue receiving the benefit, they must continue to live in poverty.  
Thus people have to live their lives fitting into the categorisation of the targeted 
beneficiary – so that, if they fulfil the conditionalities, they indeed “deserve” to be 
helped.   
Report from the wife of a pensioner, non-
beneficiary, PIR municipality (043ii NBEN) . 
lots of people want to help me, 
[others] think that this pension he 
receives, for lots of people, they can’t 
understand what it is to have a large 
family in a place like this, imagine 
this, that little pension he receives per 
month, would it be enough to cover 
everything with abundance? There is 
scarcity … because you can see here 
my condition … here, I didn’t even 
have enough to build my own 
bathroom.  
 
Report from a beneficiary, PIR municipality 
(033iiBEN). 
for example, if you were a pensioner 
and you had the BF card, the other 
person doesn’t have the card and she 
supports her family with farming.  She 
needs more than you, who are a 
pensioner and have a card, and she 
doesn’t have one. Why? … So, she 
goes after you to talk … she doesn’t 
have the card and you are a pensioner 
and have a card.  
 
 
Box 11: Community participation and community ties 
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 In sum: 
(i) How do the persistently poor, who live in the remote rural villages of PIR 
municipalities, participate in the BF programme? 
Remoteness, understood as part of the background in which households live their 
daily lives, plays a very important role in determining the opportunities available for 
households to effectively take part in the BF programme implementation.  
The persistently poor living in the remote rural villages of PIR municipalities face 
more challenges than those in PNIR municipalities in registering for the programme, 
obtaining their documentation, and making Cadastro updates.  Inter- and intra-
municipality remoteness has an impact on the households’ ability to collect their 
benefits, to correct Cadastro errors, to go to CAIXA at the nearest urban 
municipality, and to fix improper cancellations.   
Inter- and intra-municipality remoteness means lower real value of the benefit 
received, lower quality of schools and health services, reduced opportunities to 
diversify their livelihood options, and fewer opportunities to engage in specialised 
education or health services.  The constraints imposed by the scant infrastructure 
impede the flows of information, resources, people and networks.   
Reduced information flow, the complexity of the programme, and the limitations 
imposed by intra-municipality remoteness and low literacy, fuel mistrust between 
local administration staff and households.  This has negative impacts on (i) the 
possibility of local administration staff understanding the particular needs of 
households, and (ii) households’ opportunities to effectively take part in the BF 
programme or in other complementary programmes and policies run by the municipal 
social assistance.   
The quantitative analysis shows that poor remote rural municipalities have lower 
levels of compliance with health conditionalities.  The education dataset showed that 
illness, negligence/lack of interest, and ‘unidentified’ reasons were the main reasons 
recorded for low attendance at school.  Issues that should have signalled the need for 
supply-side interventions were not adequately identified during the period analysed.   
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The findings in these municipalities raise a couple of issues, requiring further 
investigation.  First, the large number of ‘unidentified’ reasons throws doubt on the 
effectiveness of conditionalities as a flagging tool to identify family needs and trigger 
complementary interventions.  Second, the lack of service identification means that it 
is unlikely that conditionalities are being used as a mechanism to expose the need for 
supply-side interventions.   
In the qualitative analysis, households’ narratives point to financial and non-financial 
factors that might be barriers to their compliance with conditionalities.  The BF 
addresses only the former factor, not the latter.  The non-financial factors identified 
by this study, relate to knowledge, perceived importance of education and quality of 
services.  Inter- and intra-municipality remoteness seems to influence the quality of 
services and the opportunity and ability for households to take-up education and 
health services.   
The fieldwork found some possible examples of the ‘non-identified’ reasons for low 
school attendance, such as: household composition, household changes, health 
problems, learning difficulties, mismatch between school curriculum and rural job 
market, and quality of services.  These reasons may also relate to the teacher’s 
reporting of parent’s “negligence” or “lack of interest”.  Remoteness can only 
exacerbate those reasons.  Persistent poverty generates multiple factors that schools 
could find difficult to identify or to report only one of those factors.  But, let us 
suppose that there is indeed the single growing cause of negligence/lack of interest: 
conditionalities are, then, insufficient to enforce continuous attendance.  Furthermore, 
some of these reasons may be reported by the school using the conditionality system; 
others, such as service quality, may not. 
Reports on lack of school meals and the mistreatment of children in education 
environments raise serious concerns about whether society is compulsorily exposing 
these children to such environments, through the use of conditionalities.  
Reconsidering the use of conditionalities and addressing the roots of these complaints 
must be a priority for the Brazilian government.   
(ii) How do community-level mechanisms, such as the ICS and household 
participation, ensure that the persistently poor are given priority? 
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Participation of the local community should increase the quality of the local Cadastro 
by ensuring that benefits are not allocated to ineligible households, and by making 
sure that the poorest are registered.  This chapter found that there is limited potential 
for this kind of participation in communities with strong ties, thus reducing the 
possibility of giving priority to the persistently poor.   
Households living in communities with close social ties reported that they avoided 
denouncing anyone to the authorities, because of the importance of informal 
networks, the possibility of retaliation, the wrongness of the act, the intuitive 
understanding of the multifaceted aspects of poverty, and the need to distance 
themselves from the type of work that the local administration does, if they were to 
continue living in the community.   
However, in communities without close ties, community participation has the 
potentially harmful effects.  Denouncing other households reinforce discrimination 
and stigmatisation and encourage social division.  
8.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I analysed how households take part in the BF programme and 
whether they do so effectively or not.  I began by investigating how the persistently 
poor register for the programme, meet the conditionality requirements, collect the 
benefit, and search for information.  I also discussed possible reasons why poor 
households might be ineligible, and why eligible households might be excluded 
(problems of non-take-up).  Persistently poor households become ineligible if they do 
not meet conditionalities or if they lack documentation, such as happens in cases of 
early household formation.  If household composition changes, the movement of 
children into and out of different households and schools has an impact on benefit 
allocation, potentially leading to cancellation.  Reasons reported by eligible families 
included not registering for the benefit due to stigma, and having difficulties with 
information and administration requirements.  Examples of the latter included 
confusion about the household concept, difficulties in correcting their records at the 
Cadastro (and thus not being considered), and unwittingly letting their registration 
drop out of the system.  For the persistently poor living in the remote rural villages of 
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PIR municipalities, location reduces the information flow and increases transportation 
costs, making administrative issues more difficult to deal with. 
This chapter also analyses the question of whether the BF effectively meets the needs 
of the persistently poor.  Based on their own life accounts, the persistently poor who 
live in the remote rural villages of PIR municipalities indicated that the programme 
did not effectively address their severe needs.  The multiple deprivations imposed by 
location that the persistently poor face – remoteness, scant infrastructure, impeded 
flows of opportunities, resources, information and networks – require a specific set of 
policy considerations.  If on top of that, one adds another layer of severe deprivations 
at the household level – low literacy, ill-health, low-paid employment, frequent 
household changes, migration – the claim made by CCT proponents, that these 
policies are intended primarily for the persistently poor, is hard to sustain.   
Assessing the effectiveness of the two components of CCTs (cash transfer and 
conditionalities) against the policy objectives highlights the need for substantial 
reconsideration.   
The primary policy objective of the cash transfer is to address poverty.  The adequacy 
of the benefit for different household situations (age, composition, number of family 
members) was an issue raised by several interviewees.  Although families reported 
they had more access to staple foods, the persistently poor still suffered 
embarrassment and shame.  Poverty goes beyond the need for food, it also includes 
interactions riddled with constant negotiations around charity, favours and help.  As 
well as food, people need clothes and shoes for themselves and their children, and a 
life of dignity and respect in their social relationships.  
The justification for targeting cash transfers is that they can be directed to those who 
have the most need.  The analysis shows how deleterious the effects of targeting are 
for social relations.  This is shown by the stigmatisation of the beneficiary poor, who 
are expected to fulfil the conditions and not have the material goods that the rest of 
the community has.  The selection process, based on means testing, generates mistrust 
in relationships within the community, and between households and local 
administrations.    
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Another BF objective is to build on human capital by improving children’s access to 
health and education services, through the use of conditionalities.  However, 
conditionality compliance does not mean better access to, or better quality of, 
services.  Issues of inter- and intra-municipality remoteness, scant infrastructure and 
scarce human resources throw doubt on the quality of education and health services 
available at present and its future effects.  The persistently poor living in remote rural 
villages are the most likely to be harmed by the imposition of conditionalities.  
Furthermore, improving the quality of education and health does not involve 
preconditions; it involves more investment in these sectors.   
Lastly, there is the objective of graduating beneficiaries from the programme by 
exiting poverty.  Persistent rural poverty needs to be addressed in so many ways that 
what is required goes well beyond the capacity of the programme.  Analysing the 
impact of the benefit on the lives of the persistently poor, shows the limitations of 
CCTs for addressing their needs.  Persistent poverty requires a long-term political 
commitment to finance policies that would go beyond social safety nets and 
temporary provision, and mostly importantly, would be based on social solidarity and 
recognition of the need for redistribution to households and geographical areas.    
In the concluding chapter, I bring together the findings of the thesis in relation to how 
effectively the BF reaches out to the rural poor in PIR and PNIR municipalities.  I 
also outline implications for future research and policy. 
8.9 Appendix 
 
Appendix 8A: Reasons for low school attendance, Ministry of Education  
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9 CONCLUSIONS, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
RESEARCH 
This life is difficult, but it was the one that God gave me,  
what else can I do? (015ii NBEN) 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis provides an analysis of whether the BF “maximises effectiveness” 
(Titmuss 1968 p.65), i.e. if the Bolsa Família (BF) is effectively reaching out to the 
persistently poor in rural areas.  The BF was the main social policy from 2004 to 
2009 during the research for this thesis, and it continues to represent a key role in the 
Brazilian social protection system.  It is one of the very limited options available to 
the persistently poor for coping with life’s adversities, as the above quotation 
indicates. 
Given the data limitations to study chronic poverty in Brazil, I work with the premise 
that persistent rural poverty is predominantly located in remote rural villages, in what 
I have called Poor Isolated Rural (PIR) municipalities.  This premise is based on 
studies on chronic and persistent poverty and chronic poverty in rural remote areas 
(RRA), and on national studies of the geographical distribution of persistent poverty, 
as discussed in Chapter 2.  I compare PIR municipalities – local administration staff 
and households – with their counterparts in what I have called Poor Non-Isolated 
Rural (PNIR) municipalities.  In these municipalities, I also researched the rural poor, 
who are also highly vulnerable, but who live in a different kind of geographical 
location: still in rural villages of poor rural municipalities, but close to a local town 
which, in turn, is closely connected to a nearby urban municipality. 
Both PIR and PNIR municipalities are among the poorest rural municipalities in 
Brazil.  These are municipalities with the highest number of poor households and 
with most of their population living in rural areas.  This combination of high poverty 
levels and rural inhabitants means that these types of municipalities are likely to have 
high numbers of extreme poor.  They are also mostly located in geographical areas 
known historically for their association with long-term and severe poverty, i.e. the 
semi-arid region of the Northeast of Brazil.  These conceptual and empirical links 
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reinforce the methodological choices I made to conduct this inquiry into persistent 
rural poverty in Brazil.  
Although I understand the limitations of this typology (see section 9.6), neither the 
lack of available data nor the imperfections derived from my attempts to identify the 
persistently poor, should be allowed to impede our research efforts.  The tentative 
nature of this inquiry requires a qualitative methodology, and in fact such a 
methodology comprised three-quarters of the research effort.   
Given its innovative methodology and the fact that this is a little explored field of 
research in Brazil, the research involved conducting several cross-checks to find out 
whether the typology indeed produced information about persistent poverty.  This 
was examined and confirmed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.  Persistent poverty and the 
circumstances surrounding it were described in detail in local administration staff 
reports of public services and their observations of the local conditions of life, and in 
individual life history accounts of long-term and inter-generational experiences of 
severe poverty from the poor themselves. 
In Chapters 1 and 2, I say that this thesis investigates the following questions: 
 
RQ1:  “How effectively does the Bolsa Família reach the rural poor in remote 
and non-remote poor rural municipalities?”  
RQ2: If it is not effective, why not? 
a) Reasons related to the policy design at the national level 
b) Reasons related to the local implementation at the municipal level 
c) Reasons related to the households’ participation at the community level 
 
Chapters 4 to 8 provide an in-depth empirical examination of these questions using a 
mixed-methods approach on three levels of analysis: federal administration, local 
administration and household.  This chapter puts together the main findings and 
policy implications, as well as suggesting areas for future research. 
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9.2 RQ1: How effectively does the Bolsa Família reach the rural poor in 
remote and non-remote poor rural municipalities? 
 
I used a number of quantitative administrative datasets to answer RQ1.  These 
descriptive statistics were the initial approach to addressing this question, and the 
basis on which the decision was made to pursue further investigation.  In the case of 
BF participation rates by PIR and PNIR municipalities from 2004 to 2009, the 
findings from this quantitative analysis were mixed.   
On the one hand, PIR and PNIR municipalities were found to have, on average, 
higher participation rates from 2004 to 2009 than rural municipalities overall.  This is 
a positive finding as PIR and PNIR municipalities are among the poorest of rural 
municipalities.  This finding (using participation rates and the municipality as the unit 
of analysis) confirms that of the BF literature, that the targeting of poor households is 
good.   
On the other hand, however, although PIR municipalities have higher participation 
rates than the average of rural municipalities, they have lower rates of participation 
than PNIR municipalities.  This is consistent throughout the years.  Furthermore, PIR 
municipalities in the North of Brazil have lower participation rates than the average 
of the rural municipalities in that region.  
I carried out another quantitative analysis comparing participation rates to poverty 
levels – i.e. take-up rates, using fitted regression lines and quartiles of distribution.  
One would expect that higher levels of poverty would translate into higher 
participation rates and that, over time, coverage would be higher in areas with higher 
levels of poverty, given that the programme was expanding.  
The analysis showed, however, that the relationship between participation rates and 
poverty is not as direct as might be expected.  This is demonstrated by the dispersion 
of the municipalities around the regression line.  Some rural municipalities with high 
levels of poverty, such as those found in PIR and PNIR, had only low or medium 
rates of participation, i.e. they fell below the national regression line.   
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This finding indicates non-take-up problems for poor rural municipalities.  It raises 
the question of whether more efficient municipalities may be “taking the places” of 
less efficient municipalities.  Given the national cap on the number of benefits, it is 
likely that PIR and PNIR municipalities have medium rates of participation, not 
because they have only medium levels of poverty, but because their programme 
implementation is less efficient.  This is explored in RQ2b. 
The situation for the persistently poor in PIR municipalities is even more troubling 
than their situation in PNIR municipalities.  There are higher proportions of PIR 
municipalities than of PNIR municipalities in the medium participation rate group, 
including most of the municipalities in extreme poverty (upper bound).  This is 
shown by the relatively higher number of PIR municipalities below the national 
regression line, including many with high poverty levels.  Remoteness also relates to 
low take-up rates.  The more remote PIR municipalities are consistently below the 
regression line.  Moreover, there has been a deterioration over time of participation 
rates in PIR municipalities in the North of Brazil.  These quantitative analyses of 
participation rates and take-up rates showed that PIR municipalities fared worse than 
the comparison group of PNIR municipalities, indicating that there is a problem with 
lower take-up rates in PIR municipalities. 
This finding urges caution in accepting the conclusions of the literature on exiting the 
BF that uses the PNAD and treats rural areas homogeneously.  Averaging across all 
rural areas hides the worse-than-average outcomes for the rural poor living in remote 
areas.  PNAD has no information that might represent the situations of the chronic or 
persistently poor living in PIR municipalities.     
9.3 RQ2: If not effective, why not? 
The quantitative findings discussed above suggested several possible reasons for the 
lower participation rates per poverty levels (i.e. take-up rates) in PIR municipalities.  I 
investigated these possibilities using qualitative methods: 
  (RQ2a – national level) Perhaps PIR municipalities have lower participation 
rates because they have met their local quota allocation and have effectively 
reached out to the persistently poor.  To test this, I investigated: 
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i) how the policy design allocated the national quota to PIR and PNIR 
municipalities; and 
ii) how the policy design ensured that the persistently poor were given 
priority during the national selection, considering the limited number of 
benefits at the national level. 
 (RQ2b – municipal level) Perhaps PIR municipalities have lower 
participation rates because they are unable to reach out effectively to the 
persistently poor, due to deficiencies in their local implementation.  To test 
this, I investigated: 
i) whether the location of PIR and PNIR municipalities influenced BF 
implementation; and 
ii) how the local administration ensured that the persistently poor were given 
priority in BF implementation. 
 (RQ2c – household level) Perhaps PIR municipalities have lower 
participation rates because there are fewer household requests to take-up the 
BF programme.  Either there are indeed fewer persistently poor living in PIR 
municipalities, or the persistently poor are unable, for reasons to be 
investigated, to take part in the programme.  In the latter case, the BF is not 
effectively reaching out to the persistently poor.  To test this, I investigated: 
i) whether the persistently poor were able to participate effectively in the BF 
programme, and if so, how; and 
ii) how the local mechanisms ensured that the persistently poor were 
participating effectively. 
RQ2a) Reasons related to the policy design at the national level 
The analysis, based on eight interviews with federal government staff, as well as on 
document analysis, has three main findings as explained below. 
First, the calculations for the national quota are based mainly on the PNAD,  while 
the allocation of the national quota to small municipalities is based on a comparison 
between the 2000 Census and the annual PNADs.  Interviewees reported that this 
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method disadvantages PIR municipalities in the local quota allocations in two ways: 
(i) by not taking into account the diversity of intra-state poverty levels in allocating 
local quotas (this disadvantages both PIR and PNIR municipalities); and (ii) by 
distributing local quotas according to population growth – this results in PIR 
municipalities having their local quota redistributed to other municipalities within the 
same state because of their lower population growth
113
.  This suggests that the policy 
design of the national quota allocation to local municipalities hinders the principle of 
maximising effectiveness, because it means that the persistently poor in PIR 
municipalities are most likely exposed to lower allocations than they should receive, 
given their levels of poverty.    
Second, the analysis suggests that, during the initial years of the BF implementation, 
the local quota was used only as a guide.  Although this could be seen as a positive 
finding, in fact municipal capacity influenced participation rates.  This again 
disadvantaged PIR and PNIR municipalities, given their lower municipal capacity.  
This reaffirms the hypothesis that PIR and PNIR have their quota “taken up” by more 
efficient municipalities.  Thus, neither the local quota nor the take-up rates 
necessarily reflect the total number of poor households in a municipality.  The 
influence of municipal capacity on participation rates is addressed in RQ2b.     
Third, the policy design for the selection of beneficiaries does not give priority to the 
persistently poor.  Even if the local quota reflected the number of poor households, 
the selection process does not ensure that it is the persistently poor who receive the 
benefit first.  The order of priority for benefit allocation does not take into 
consideration persistent poverty, rural poverty, or geographical areas with high levels 
of poverty (PIR and PNIR).  Benefits are allocated in the following order: (i) 
indication processes and social vulnerability categories listed in Article 7 (Portaria 
GM/MDS 341, 7/10/2008), which includes recipients of pre-BF social assistance 
programmes, mostly in the urban and semi-urban Northeast of Brazil; (ii) 
municipalities with low coverage against the local quota (article 8, §1), which 
                                               
113 The rural-urban linkages of PNIR municipalities mean that they are likely to have higher population 
growth than PIR municipalities.  The growth of medium-sized municipalities in Brazil can result in a 
positive neighbourhood effect in PNIR municipalities.  This deserves further quantitative investigation 
(section 9.7). See IBGE (2011b). 
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disadvantage PIR municipalities; and (iii) households with low incomes and high 
dependency ratios (article 9), not necessarily the persistently poor.   
Together, these three findings suggest that the policy design at the national level does 
not effectively maximise its potential to reach the poorest municipalities, like PIR and 
PNIR, or the persistently poor households, whatever their geographical location.  The 
policy design of the BF is particularly inappropriate to reach out to the persistently 
poor living in remote rural municipalities. To start with, in PIR municipalities 
disadvantaged by a comparatively lower allocation of the local quota, the persistently 
poor have less chance of being allocated benefits; then, if the municipal capacity to 
run the programme is inefficient, the persistently poor have less chance of getting 
registered; and finally, even if the persistently poor are able to enrol and they are in 
competition for the benefit, the selection process does not necessarily give them 
priority.  
The fact that there are a number of eligible families, registered at the Cadastro, but 
without the benefit is most worrisome.  Based on the findings above, there is a 
possibility that the poorest of the poor may not be receiving the benefit primarily 
intended to reach them. 
RQ2b) Reasons related to the local implementation at the municipal level 
I use primary data collected from 14 interviews with local administration staff in four 
case studies to answer this research question.    
The municipal-level analysis shows that remoteness does influence local 
infrastructure, and hence, BF implementation.  Inter-municipality remoteness – i.e. 
the distance between PIR/PNIR municipality and the nearest urban municipality – 
influences local infrastructure, human resources and transportation.  Intra-
municipality remoteness – i.e. the distance of the rural village from the local town – 
influences the dissemination of information, registration, and the quality of the 
Cadastro.  The more remote a municipality or a rural village, the more difficult it is to 
obtain qualified professional staff, the lower the quality of services, and the higher the 
transportation costs. 
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On top of the challenges posed by remoteness, which gives the analyst a “picture”, 
there is imposed another layer comprising flows, a geography of movement.  It is in 
these flows, underpinned by remoteness and infrastructure, that the BF is 
implemented (as per the analytical framework in section 3.5).  The flows of 
information, people, resources and networks in PIR municipalities are sporadic, 
alternating with no movement at all.  This is shown by the reluctance of qualified 
professionals to stay very long in PIR municipalities, and the restricted dissemination 
of information and knowledge limited by the scarcity of training and infrequent 
home-visiting in remote villages.  PNIR municipalities, on the other hand, have both 
a higher volume and a higher frequency of flows.  This is shown by the constant 
movement of qualified staff in and out of the municipality to work during the week 
and return home during the weekend, by the easier access to training in urban 
municipalities, and so forth.  
This analysis suggests three conclusions.  The first conclusion is that reduced 
infrastructure and implementation capacities can result in lower participation rates, 
despite high levels of poverty.  Local staff from poor rural municipalities, particularly 
PIR municipalities, reported that they were not being well equipped to implement the 
BF programme effectively.  They also complained about the effects of inter-
municipality remoteness on the frequency of training, the likelihood of employing 
qualified staff, basic CRAS infrastructure and equipment, and staff turnover.  They 
also complained about the lack of policy consistency due to local political 
interference in contracting practices, or the reshuffling of public servants.  Local 
infrastructure influences on how local administration staff is able to overcome intra-
municipality remoteness and reach out to the persistently poor living in rural remote 
villages.  
The second conclusion is that, in PIR municipalities, the limited infrastructure and 
flows of information, resources, people and networks, make the implementation 
process slow and costly, reducing the possibility of effective inclusion in the BF 
programme of the persistently poor living in rural remote villages.  The findings 
above raise serious doubts about whether local staff from PIR municipalities are able 
to ensure that the persistently poor are effectively registered for the programme at the 
Cadastro.  Staff in PIR municipalities are unable to conduct frequent visits to remote 
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rural villages to disseminate information on the programme, to enrol potential 
beneficiaries at the Cadastro, to “actively search” for the persistently poor, or to 
conduct home visits.  They have limited access to training and to the internet, and are 
less likely to solve Cadastro issues promptly.  Staff have also reported that there is 
limited community participation in the BF social council (ICS), the function of which 
is to ensure the poorest are enrolled in the programme. 
The third conclusion is that late registration of the persistently poor could have 
resulted in reduced chances for taking up benefits, as the majority of the benefits were 
already allocated by the time they were able to enrol.  Local staff from PIR 
municipalities reported that, during the initial years of the BF programme, expansion 
happened primarily in the urban areas of rural municipalities.  Staff from both PIR 
and PNIR municipalities reported that, during the initial years of the BF 
implementation, CRAS lacked basic infrastructure in the form of cars, computers, 
professional staff and adequate buildings.  This indicates that the persistently poor 
living in isolated rural villages were expected to register themselves at the local town, 
and this happened only to a limited extent.  Another important fact to keep in mind is 
that from 2004 to 2006, the BF programme had a steep growth of participation rates, 
but that this tapered off once the national cap was reached. 
Overall, the municipal-level analysis indicates that poor rural municipalities, 
particularly PIR municipalities, do not have sufficient local infrastructure to 
effectively maximise BF implementation in its efforts to reach out to the persistently 
poor.  Thus, there are barriers to the BF implementation in rural remote areas that 
reduce the effectiveness of the BF in these locations.  This can result in lower 
participation rates despite high levels of poverty, and in less emphasis on ensuring 
that the persistently poor take part in the programme. 
RQ2c) Reasons related to the households’ participation at the community level 
The analysis based on protocol observations, service profiling, field notes, maps, and 
22 household interviews evenly spread between the four case studies suggest that PIR 
municipalities have lower participation rates than average, but that not all possible 
beneficiaries already receive the benefit.  Rather, the lower participation rates are due 
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to the fact that the persistently poor, for the causes reported below, are unable to 
effectively take part in the programme.  There are five main findings. 
First, the in-depth understanding of the structural context of remoteness and of 
reduced flows limit the choice set and life prospects of the persistently poor 
households.  Public services, if present, are limited and of questionable quality.  
Employment opportunities are mostly informal and require negotiations that reinforce 
power differences and stigmatisation.  Migration is often a livelihood strategy used by 
the household head to cope with limited income (i.e. “living like birds”), but this also 
shows how family living may be limited for those in poverty.  This chapter shows 
why the persistently poor are the “hard-to-reach”.  As Galbraith (1958 p.257) said: 
“Poverty is self-perpetuating because the poorest communities are poorest in the 
services which would eliminate it”. 
Second, this thesis reports the accounts of the persistently poor in relation to: the 
effect of inter- and intra-municipality remoteness on obtaining their documents; BF 
registration and Cadastro updates; collecting benefits; opportunities to engage with 
CAIXA or with specialised education and health services; and their search for 
information, including solving problems with Cadastro.   
Third, remoteness has a direct impact on the real value of the benefit received.  The 
persistently poor living in remote rural villages of PIR municipalities spend more of 
their benefit in transportation costs, and in the local shops because of the higher 
prices.  They are also more likely to incur higher costs for specialised health and 
education services, and for correcting benefit-card errors at the Cadastro or CAIXA.   
The fourth finding from the quantitative analysis of MEC and MS datasets is that the 
BF is not addressing the needs of the persistently poor.  In the first place, PIR 
municipalities have lower than average compliance with health conditionalities.  The 
qualitative analysis uncovered the following possible causes for this lower 
compliance: limited municipal capacity to monitor the compliance (Chapter 6); lesser 
health infrastructure in PIR municipalities (Chapter 7); the time required in the 
transportation to health clinics; less information available about health 
conditionalities than about education conditionalities; the low quality of health 
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services; and the use of services elsewhere than in their local municipality (Chapter 
8). 
Then the education datasets illustrated a growing trend of unidentified reasons for low 
school attendance in PIR municipalities.  In addition to unidentified reasons, there is a 
higher number of negligence/lack of interest reported reasons in PNIR municipalities 
for low school attendance.  The fieldwork uncovered some reasons that could have 
been included in the ‘unidentified’ category.  Some of these reasons were financial, 
but there were others that are not addressed by the cash transfer benefit, such as 
household changes, household composition, health problems, learning difficulties, a 
mismatch between rural work and school curriculum, and the quality of services.  
‘Lack of interest’ could be the result of several factors, such as a mismatch between 
education and the rural job market, problems with the quality of educational services, 
the influence of remoteness on rural youth perceptions of their livelihood options, 
health issues, and changes in life circumstances (household changes, migration, etc.) 
that influence a student’s disposition towards learning.   
Furthermore, the investigation of conditionalities throws doubt on the claim that 
CCTs are the best way of addressing chronic or persistent poverty because they build 
on education and health outcomes of children.  The analysis of households shows that 
the persistently poor have a multitude of needs that require other services in addition 
to cash transfers.  It also shows how inadequate the benefit is for highly vulnerable 
families, such as single mothers with large families, and people of workforce age with 
chronic illnesses.  Furthermore, structural conditions explored in Chapter 7 show how 
difficult it is for the persistently poor living in remote rural villages to comply with 
conditionalities.  And what is most worrisome is that, even if the persistently poor do 
comply, the chances are that they will remain in poverty, given the meagreness of the 
benefit to address short-term needs and the poor quality of the services to develop 
long-term opportunities.  
This analysis also exposes the lack of emphasis on supply-side interventions, 
normally hidden by the emphasis put on household compliance.  The poor data 
quality, demonstrated by the large numbers of ‘unidentified’ reasons given for poor 
school attendance, mean that education conditionalities are unlikely to serve as 
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flagging mechanisms for families in need of social assistance services, or for the state 
to improve supply-side interventions.  
The fifth finding from the qualitative analysis of interviews with households is that 
aspect of the policy design that promotes community participation through the 
monitoring of the BF implementation (including of benefit allocation) is unlikely to 
ensure effective implementation of the programme.  This aspect is supposed to be a 
form of democratic decentralisation through community participation that would be 
beneficial for the implementation of the BF programme, because correcting 
programme inefficiencies by denouncing incorrect benefits would ensure that the 
poorest would receive the benefits.  But combining community participation 
mechanisms, either through ICS or individual denouncing, with targeted benefits has 
very different outcomes from those envisaged by the programme’s planners.  In 
close-knit communities, there is little likelihood that anyone will be denounced; 
whereas in communities without strong ties, denouncing reinforces stigmatisation, 
discrimination and social division.  However, the BF selection process (as explained 
in Chapter 5) does not necessarily mean that one incorrect benefit allocation that is 
cancelled will result in the inclusion of the poorest family in a given municipality.  In 
neither case is it likely that surveillance of benefit households by the general 
population will ensure that the poorest receive the benefits. 
The five findings above suggest that the BF is not maximising its effectiveness in 
reaching out to the persistently poor in rural remote areas, as a result of both 
inappropriate design, such as the use of conditionalities for this population, and 
barriers that household face to effectively enrol and participate in the programme.  
Some of the persistently poor are not able to take part in the programme at all, due to 
problems with registration, compliance with conditionalities, Cadastro problems, etc., 
while others, who are beneficiaries, are not having their basic needs met.  The 
persistently poor who live in the remote rural villages of PIR municipalities are likely 
to incur higher costs to take part in the programme than those living in close 
proximity to the urban municipality.  Higher costs mean less money brought back to 
the villages to meet their own needs.   
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I started the analysis of this thesis with the concept of maximising effectiveness, i.e. 
whether the main social policy from 2004 to 2009 reached those who are in most 
need, the persistently poor.  Throughout the chapters that followed the concept of 
effectiveness was analysed from different point of views – from the national 
perspective, the local administration perspective and, in this last RQ, the households’ 
perspective.  The concept of effectiveness for households is analysed according to 
how the programme addresses some of its stated objectives: (i) fighting poverty; (ii) 
promoting access to services; and (iii) providing an exit out of poverty.  In another 
words, effectiveness is assessed according to how the programme is effectively 
meeting the needs of the persistently poor.   
According to the persistently poor interviewed, without the BF “people would feel 
sick, sick of starvation” (045i NBEN), but the BF “is only a small help, but it helps a 
lot” (036n BEN).  So, “we have to work because we can’t just wait for the BF” (036n 
BEN), because “it is not enough.  The money … I pass by the local shop and leave it 
there” (039ii NBEN).  Other needs are left unmet “because what is the point of them 
studying if I can’t buy clothes for them?” resulting in shame, embarrassment across 
generations, “When they go to school, people say ‘ah, this clothes you got is from the 
year before last year’ … It is not good to hear that from your son, it is not good at all” 
(039ii NBEN).  But “what else to do if you live in a place like this?” (043ii NBEN).   
The persistently poor living in the remote rural villages of PIR municipalities indicate 
that, even when they are beneficiaries, the programme does not effectively address 
their severe needs.  
9.4 Thesis summary 
This thesis’ main conclusion is that the design of the programme is inappropriate for 
rural remote areas and that there are barriers to the implementation of the BF in these 
areas that reduce the effectiveness of the programme.  This is demonstrated by the 
following evidences derived from the empirical analyses.  First, despite higher levels 
of BF participation rates in poor rural municipalities than the average rates in rural 
municipalities, the BF has lower participation rates in PIR municipalities than in 
PNIR municipalities.  The findings suggest the possibility of relative lower 
participation (or lower take-up rates) in PIR municipalities, especially in the poorest 
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and the more remote of them.  Second, the policy design for municipal quota 
allocation, for BF expansion, and for selecting the households, have most likely 
reduced the chances of effectively maximising participation rates in PIR 
municipalities, and the chances of giving priority to the persistently poor.  Third, the 
municipal-level analysis showed that PIR municipalities are not well-equipped to 
effectively maximise BF implementation to the persistently poor in remote rural 
villages.  Fourth, the persistently poor living in the remote rural villages of PIR 
municipalities reported their difficulties in registering for the benefit, in constantly 
updating their registries, in complying with conditionalities and in collecting benefits.  
They also indicated that the BF does not effectively address, or only partially 
addresses, their material and social needs.  Finally, this thesis shows how persistent 
poverty is produced and reproduced through the interplay of households with socio-
economic-political institutions, norms, locational factors and geographical flows.  
Thus, the BF programme does not maximise its effectiveness in meeting the needs of 
the persistently poor that require the long-term social policies aimed at overcoming 
the structural causes of persistent poverty in severely deprived geographical areas.   
9.5 Originality 
This thesis is an original and multidisciplinary approach to understanding how 
effectively the BF reaches out to the persistently poor.  In the first place, this thesis 
uses innovative methods to identify potential areas of persistent rural poverty in 
Brazil.  It also involves a hitherto unexplored analysis of the BF taking into account 
persistent poverty in rural areas and remoteness. 
To my knowledge, there is no quantitative longitudinal dataset investigating chronic 
or persistent poverty that is representative for small rural municipalities.  Thus, this 
study proposes the investigation of persistent poverty, addressing parts of this 
knowledge gap, and being the first to use the following methods: 
 Following on from the existing theoretical and empirical research into chronic 
and persistent poverty, remote rural areas and rural development, I used maps, 
with geographic coordinates, to categorise municipalities based on levels of 
poverty, urbanisation and remoteness.  I created a typology of two categories 
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that I used throughout the thesis: Poor Isolated Rural (PIR) and Poor Non-
Isolated Rural (PNIR) municipalities. 
 The multidisciplinary analytical framework looked at policy in the context of 
locational factors and geography of flows, and would enable policy makers to 
consider short- and long-term policy recommendations.  The method, 
combined with the analytical framework, could be used as an alternative 
policy tool for the analysis of rural and social development programmes.   
 The lack of studies on persistent poverty and remoteness in Brazil meant that I 
had to conduct several levels of qualitative data analyses to verify the 
typology and to cross-check the quantitative findings.  Thus, I conducted an 
extensive qualitative fieldwork at three-levels of analysis (national, municipal 
and household-levels).  The originality, in this case, is the combination of 
several levels of qualitative datasets with a quantitative dataset based on 
various administrative data and geographic information system maps. 
The analysis of the BF programme is also innovative for the following reasons: 
 As far as I know, there is no study that investigates the intersection between 
persistent or chronic rural poverty and remoteness in Brazil. 
 As far as I know, there is no BF study that investigates policy implementation 
in the context of (i) persistent poverty, (ii) remote rural areas, or (iii) the 
intersection between persistent poverty and rural remote areas. 
 Previous research investigating rural poverty and the BF has been based on 
poverty estimates derived from the Census, PNAD or Cadastro.  This thesis 
uses different methods, given the limitations of these datasets (as explained in 
Chapter 3), and contributes to the body of literature on the BF programme 
with results produced by these different methods.   
 To my knowledge, there is no BF research that empirically combines the 
investigation of rural-urban linkages and their influence on rural poverty and 
on the implementation of the BF programme.   
 The investigation of these linkages created the terminology of inter- and intra-
municipality remoteness, used to investigate how the locations of rural 
villages and the locations of rural municipalities influenced programme 
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implementation.  Such a study on the BF, to my knowledge, has also not been 
conducted before.  
 The thesis provides innovative insights into the BF policy recommendations 
regarding the heterogeneity of poor rural municipalities (PIR and PNIR 
municipalities), and the heterogeneity of remoteness (inter- and intra-
municipality).   
9.6 Limitations 
This thesis is about only a small sub-set of rural municipalities – the poorest.  The 
findings are confined to this sub-set and do not invalidate findings from other studies 
based on household surveys and censuses.  The findings, however, do suggest caution 
in interpreting what surveys and the Census say about rural areas, especially treating 
them as a homogeneous group.   
The typology of PIR and PNIR municipalities was constructed using the following 
variables: poverty headcount; higher percentage of the municipal population in rural 
areas; and distance to the nearest urban area.  The ‘distance’ variable is unlikely to 
have changed substantially during the period analysed, 2004-2009.  I constructed it by 
taking into account the distances between a PIR or a PNIR municipality to the nearest 
urban municipality according to the network of transportation, instead of a straight 
line.  However, there are some limitations in relation to the ‘poverty’ and the ‘rural’ 
variables.  Although PIR and PNIR municipalities are likely to be still in these 
categories, as the most updated Census continues to indicate high levels of 
deprivation and poverty in rural areas of the Northeast of Brazil (Chapters 2 and 3), 
the poverty estimates dated from before the BF programme.  The MoPI needs to be 
updated to reflect current estimates for small municipalities.  As for the definition of 
rural areas, given that it falls under the municipality law, it is not standardised.  It also 
carries the assumption that the main local town is necessarily urban.    
That the persistently poor are those predominantly living in remote rural villages of 
PIR municipalities is a premise only.  Obviously, not all the persistently poor live in 
PIR municipalities, and not all inhabitants of isolated rural villages are necessarily 
poor.  I try to overcome this limitation by systematically working in comparative 
terms (PIR and PNIR), and by looking at trends (participation rates from 2004 to 
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2009) instead of measuring point estimates.  I was also very careful to investigate 
four rural municipalities, and to design the qualitative sample in such a way as to 
ensure variety and extensive fieldwork.  This geographical limitation, however, could 
also be perceived as a methodological strength, considering that it situates persistent 
poverty within structural rural-urban linkages and areas with low geographical and 
human capitals, an unexplored debate for BF analysis in Brazil. 
Research on persistent poverty and remote rural areas, and the overlap of social 
policies in these areas and for this population, are unexplored fields.  This means that 
the knowledge generated by this thesis will most likely need to be reassessed as 
research in these areas develops and the body of evidence grows. 
Policies like the BF are not rigidly set and can benefit from feedback about 
implementation mechanisms.  This means that research on public policy, like that 
reported in this thesis, is limited by its very nature, by the constant need to update 
collected information, and by constant policy adaptation.   
9.7 Implications for future research 
 
9.7.1 Persistent poverty and rural remote areas in Brazil 
While this thesis presents the case that persistent poverty is closely associated with 
remote rural areas in Brazil, this is still an unexplored topic.  Further studies could 
reinforce the strength of this association, using other programmes, methods and other 
disciplines.  The current government focus on eradicating extreme poverty in Brazil 
should not ignore persistent poverty.   
The examination of persistent poverty in this thesis does not capture poverty 
dynamics quantitatively.  I tried to circumvent the lack of data by employing several 
methods and different layers of information, such as quantitative mapping and 
datasets, geographical analysis of remoteness and links, and qualitative accounts of 
geographical flows, household life-histories (including inter-generational poverty), 
and contextual in-depth analysis.  
However, it would be valuable if chronic and persistent poverty were studied using 
longitudinal panels containing both households and geographic characteristics.  
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Special consideration should be given to small rural municipalities and their 
geographical location.  There are several questions that require multivariate 
regression analysis, including spatial regression, for example:  
 To what extent is chronic and persistent poverty in the remote rural areas of 
Brazil a result of socio-economic, municipality or geographical factors?   
 How does the proximity to urban municipalities contribute to poverty levels in 
rural municipalities? 
 Do the chronic or persistently poor tend to concentrate over time in areas with 
low geographical capital or are those areas becoming more depleted over time 
due to the concentration of chronic or persistent poverty? 
 How much do geographical variations influence the depletion of assets and 
capital, hence deepening poverty?   
 How much does the lack of municipal services influence spatial segregation?  
There are a number of additional tests that I would like to run in the future to assess 
how the typology of PIR and PNIR municipalities would vary with different 
measures and different variables, for example:  
 calculating population estimates using the 2010 Census, rather than the 
PNADs; 
 comparing PIR with PNIR municipalities using other poverty indices (Human 
Development Index, poverty gap, square poverty gap); 
 including municipal-level variables, such as funding available, levels of 
federal transfers, service provision and land distribution; 
 including other geographical variables, such as soil quality, rainfall, soil 
erosion; 
 overlaying remote sensing information to analyse PIR and PNIR 
municipalities according to desertification levels. 
9.7.2 On the Bolsa Família programme 
The findings of lower take-up rates in municipalities with high poverty levels suggest 
that there were some PIR and PNIR municipalities that were less equipped to 
effectively implement the BF programme during the initial expansion years.  
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Although I build this case through RQ1, RQ2a and RQ2b, this hypothesis deserves 
further investigation.  One way to carry out an alternative analysis would be to match 
the information from the Cadastro dataset monthly with the municipality typologies, 
their local quotas and poverty levels.  This would give some indication of how take-
up rates changed through the years according to allocated local quotas and the 
municipal poverty levels registered at the Cadastro.  It would require substantial 
government clearance. 
The findings reported in Chapter 5, showing how the BF national quota was allocated 
to local municipalities, came mostly from interviews with key federal administration 
staff.  There is limited research on the topic although this is a well-known area for 
state bureaucrats.  Research generally acknowledges the use of PNAD as the source 
of the national quota, as well as the use of geographical targeting by municipalities.  
How the allocation is conducted, and what mechanisms are used to check that 
geographical targeting happens, are questions that deserve more research.   
How the selection process happens is another area that requires more investigation.  
The selection process analysed in Chapters 5, 6 and 8 is still a black-box, and requires 
more research and greater transparency.  Even though it is outlined in the legislation, 
it is not readily comprehensible (it was, I confess, a challenge for me).  The selection 
criteria need to be methodically assessed by independent researchers, so that policy 
makers are aware of the trade-offs that happen in benefit allocation priorities.   
The lack of studies in these two areas (local quota allocation and the selection 
process) made it difficult for me to cross-check the accuracy of what the federal staff 
reported.  But that doesn’t diminish the importance of this topic, nor does it invalidate 
this initial attempt to trace how these two processes were conducted from 2004 to 
2009.   
9.7.3 Wider research agenda 
I base my main findings mostly on four case studies (Chapters 6 to 8).  Although this 
thesis draws policy implications from only four case studies, I do so in order to 
address the main justification behind CCTs: that they are intended to reduce chronic 
and persistent poverty by promoting human capital development.   
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Given this justification, there is an urgent need to conduct more research investigating 
whether CCTs do have an impact on levels of chronic and persistent poverty, given 
the popularity of CCTs with the governments of developing countries.  I would also 
argue that this research should include comparisons with the effects of unconditional 
cash transfers, so that the effects of conditionalities on the chronic and persistently 
poor can be adequately assessed.  
This thesis also calls attention to two other issues: (i) relying on “the law of averages” 
through the homogeneous treatment of rural areas and poverty; and (ii) measuring 
policy “success” only in terms of costs, efficiency and short-term outputs.   These two 
concerns were already signalled by Townsend and Titmuss, respectively: 
Social and economic truths can often be blurred or concealed in inquiries 
which depend on an over-assiduous application of the law of averages 
(Townsend 1962 p.218).  
The objectives of social services (from university education to social work) 
are not to make profits and to administer prices – unlike private markets … 
what is success for a mental hospital? … Success for the hospital may mean 
more demands on other agencies (Titmuss 1974 pp. 51, 52 , 53). 
 
While I acknowledge the importance of averages for policy prescription, poverty 
analysis would benefit more from disaggregation of the data, especially when 
investigating extremely disadvantaged groups.  It can also benefit from the integrating 
effects of a multidisciplinary approach, such as including geographical spatial 
analysis in working with remote rural areas, to investigate the geographical placement 
of services, say, in the light of temporary migration flows, etc.   
Evaluation studies of public policies tend to focus on the maximisation of the use of 
public funding through the most efficient allocation of benefits.  Although I also 
recognise the importance of efficiency, policy prescriptions with this rationale work 
with short-term outputs.  When evaluators focus exclusively on efficiency, there is the 
possibility of missing the point of the resulting synergies between policies and of 
expecting efficient policy outcomes from groups that may require long-term policy 
“investment”.  Moreover, the effective outcomes of social policies that interact with 
each other are difficult to measure accurately (if they can be measured at all).  
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9.8 Policy recommendations: beyond cash transfer for the persistently poor 
The policy recommendations below are timely for several reasons.  Social assistance 
in Brazil is still under consolidation, and programmes like the BF are part of the 
electoral and political debates, as they are not a guaranteed right.   
It is true that Brazil has recently lived through a period of unprecedented reduction in 
poverty and inequality, due to the combination of modest economic growth, labour 
market and social policies, including the BF.  However, even after this initial 
reduction, there were still nine million Brazilians living in extreme poverty in 2009 
(Osorio et al. 2011a p.7).  In other words, after reducing the numbers of those “easy 
to assist”, Brazil is now left with the “hard to assist” poor, i.e. the chronic or 
persistently poor, those “hardest to reach”.  
In 2011, in an effort to address this, President Dilma Rouseff  created the new Brasil 
sem Miséria (Brazil Without Poverty) programme as a way of focusing on fighting 
extreme poverty.  This programme incorporates the BF at its core.  However, MDS 
acknowledges that three challenges remain: (i) to promote the “active search” in order 
to identify families that are excluded from public services; (ii) to improve the 
“graduation” agenda (exit strategy) by promoting labour market inclusion policies; 
and (iii) to improve the quality of public services.  This thesis addresses these 
challenges and it can contribute to this debate with its investigation of ways in which 
the BF can be improved upon to address the needs of the persistently poor.   
Researchers have suggested that chronic poverty requires different policies from 
transient poverty, focusing on redistribution, structural bottlenecks and access to basic 
services (CPRC 2005; Hulme & Shepherd 2003).  This is certainly the case.  Thus, 
instead of narrowly focusing the targeting on the extreme poor, as proposed by Brasil 
sem Miséria, I propose the opposite.  This is at first sight a counter-intuitive strategy, 
but to reach the persistently poor, it is necessary to broaden the benefit base.  For the 
persistently poor living in rural remote areas, the use of targeting, together with the 
national cap and conditionalities, would harm them the most.   
The analysis of intra-municipality remoteness and flows suggests the following short-
term policy implications for the BF policy implementation: 
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 improvement in local municipal capacity, including priority given by the state 
and federal government to municipalities with high levels of poverty, and 
more resources, both in-kind and services, to those localities; 
 continuation of the MDA’s logic of rural territories, but with geo-referencing 
of services and additional concepts of linkages and flows; 
 revising practices of contracting and reshuffling local staff; and 
 auditing of educational programmes in remote rural municipalities such as the 
free school meal, and establishing mechanisms to ensure that resources are 
reaching schools; 
The analysis of inter-municipality remoteness and flows suggests the following long-
term structural policy recommendations: 
 exploring synergies between the BF and rural development programmes;  
 focusing on land redistribution and land titling policies; 
 returning to regional development strategies; 
 improving water distribution, water quality and sanitation in poor rural 
municipalities and villages; and 
 improving the quality of roads and transportation. 
Of course, there are no simple answers to the persistent poverty problem.  Above all, 
policies involve trade-offs, and these depend on political feasibility.  A good starting 
to address both the BF policy implementation and design point would be: 
 identifying the PIR type of municipality, mapping the geographical flows of 
service provision, and paying more attention to how policies are implemented 
in these municipalities; 
 constructing a policy framework that takes into account RRAs in Brazil;  
 focusing on the quality of education and health services; and 
 reconsidering the use of targeting, the national cap and conditionalities, 
mainly for the persistently poor living in rural remote areas.  
Although this thesis specifically investigates the persistently poor living in rural poor 
areas, the policy recommendations above represent a move towards transforming the 
BF into an unconditional universal rights-based programme.  If demanded by 
 Page 311 of 356 
 
Brazilian society, unconditional programmes could still have school and health 
requirements monitored by local municipalities and reported to the national level.  
This, however, has a different mentality from the current BF programme, focused on 
improving supply-side services and individualising social assistance services, rather 
than on targeting and conditionalities. 
9.9 Long-term social policy goal: CCTs for the persistently poor in rural areas? 
With the expansion of CCTs in developing countries and the post-2015 development 
agenda, this thesis is timely and relevant.  The structural causes of the continued 
exclusion and marginalisation of the population living in RRAs, undermine the case 
for using CCTs as a long-term social policy strategy for addressing chronic and 
persistent poverty.  
The current narrative for CCTs is that they are cost-efficient, redistributive and 
especially suitable for the persistently poor.  This thesis shows that, although cost-
efficient (costing less than one per cent of GDP), they do not necessarily maximise 
effectiveness in reaching out to the persistently poor in rural areas - both in terms of 
effective delivering public services and in meeting the beneficiaries’ social and 
economic needs-, that redistribution is questionable, and that they are unsuitable for 
the persistently poor, due to policy design and implementation barriers.  This is 
specially the case of the persistently poor in rural remote areas, where services are 
non-existent, difficult to access or of low quality.  Furthermore, CCTs reinforce social 
division and stigmatisation.   
For the persistently poor to have a different life perspective, adequate income and, 
also importantly, services are necessary.  Otherwise, the persistently poor are denied 
their right to full membership in society, inequality is normalised, corrupt practices 
are pervasive, and persistent poverty is legitimated as a by-product of individual poor 
choices.  Although the market, families and civil society have their own roles to play, 
there is need, too, for an effective welfare state, for social redistribution between 
households and regions, and for social solidarity.  Meanwhile, we keep hearing the 
question: “This life is difficult, but … what else can I do?” (015ii NBEN) 
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Chapter 3 Appendices 
 
Appendix 3A: The Map of Poverty and Inequality: the variable poverty       
This appendix is a brief methodological overview of the Map of Poverty and 
Inequality (MoPI), and the methods used to calculate poverty and to estimate it in 
small areas (or municipalities).  I first explain how poverty lines were defined and 
calculated, followed by how poverty was estimated for municipalities.    
Poverty lines based on the Household Budget Survey (POF) 
The MoPI poverty lines were based on household consumption, using the 2002-2003 
POF (IBGE 2008a).  The extreme poverty line was calculated using the minimum 
daily food intake according to the World Health Organisation method measured in 
per capita calories in relation to age, gender, location, body mass, height and level of 
activity.  After estimating the calories consumed per capita by each subgroup 
(urban/rural, region and so forth), IBGE identifies a reference group to determine the 
minimum income required to meet the minimum food requirements.  The 
identification of required minimum income was constructed based on 81 mobile 
quintiles (0%-20%, then 1%-21%, etc.).  The reference group was the first mobile 
quintile with the lowest total income per capita to satisfy on average the estimated 
calories required.    
As for the poverty line it was calculated using both food and non-food items.  Given 
the difficulties in estimating non-food items, IBGE uses a multiplier of the extreme 
poverty line.  The multiplier for rural areas (1.75) differs from that of urban areas 
(2.00).   
After the income poverty thresholds were calculated (totalling 40 lines: 20 poverty 
lines and 20 extreme poverty lines), a small-areas estimation method was used to 
estimate poverty and inequality in Brazilian municipalities.   
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Municipality poverty estimates: the small-areas estimation method 
Generally, a detailed profile of poverty index by municipality or any other small area 
is difficult to obtain.  Information on income or consumption is generally non-
representative for small areas (e.g. the 2002-2003 POF), and data that are 
representative for small areas do not have information on income or consumption 
(e.g. the 2000 Census).   
The MoPI follows the method proposed by Elbers, Lanjouw and Lanjouw (2003), 
which estimates household consumption per capita using household-level and 
municipality-level covariates, together with a combination of regression models and 
Monte Carlo simulations.  There are three steps to this method: (i) data analysis to 
identify comparable variables; (ii) regression analysis based on these common 
variables found in both the Census and the POF; and (iii) simulations to identify 
welfare measures point estimates and their confidence intervals, in order to account 
for differences in the characteristics of households and municipalities.   
Poverty was measured using the FGT index.  Although the MoPI informed FGT with 
different α values (0,1, 2), I use α=0 or the poverty headcount index.  I consider the 
headcount index appropriate, as I compare poverty with BF participation rates. 
Particularly interesting for this thesis is the fact that the MoPI takes into account 
regional differences.  The MoPI divides the Northeast into rural and urban 
geographical areas with calorie intakes that differ according to demographics and 
anthropometric information.  The Northeast of Brazil, where this thesis is primarily 
focused, has many different consumption standards and market prices.  This dataset 
regionalises the measurement of poverty in Brazil, a country with large regional 
differences.  
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Appendix 3B: The multimodal network dataset and network analysis 
As explained in Chapter 3, section 3.2.4, I conducted a multimodal network analysis 
in order to construct the remoteness variable and to build the PIR and PNIR 
typologies.  This appendix is a step-by-step technical description of how the network 
analysis was conducted.   
The MoPI provided information on the main roads (for 1997) and river networks (for 
2000).  Because this information was neither comprehensive nor updated, I combined 
the MoPI with the Digital Integrated Cartographic Base of Brazil at the Millionth 
Scale (BCIM, version 3.01), released in 2009.  Both maps (the MoPI and the BCIM) 
use Brazil polyconic projection and 1969 South American Datum (SAD69).  With the 
information on roads and rivers updated, I was able to construct multimodal network 
datasets. 
With the multimodal network datasets, I created the variable remoteness by 
calculating the distance between two points via a series of alternative networks, such 
as metro, trams, roads, rivers.  This thesis used the transportation system of roads, 
bridges and rivers as constitutive parts of the multimodal network.  It is important to 
mention that inhabitants of the North and Northeast of Brazil still use the river 
networks as a means of transport.   
Appendix 3B is organised as follows.  First, I detail how I cleaned-up the dataset.  
Then, I describe how I built the feature and multimodal network datasets.  Finally, I 
outline the specifications of the network analysis. 
Cleaning up the data 
Geodatabases have three types of datasets: raster data; feature classes; and tables.  
This thesis only uses the last two types.  For the multimodal network dataset, I used 
feature class files.  Feature classes can be represented as points, lines, polygons and 
annotations (or texts within the maps).   
The information in the MoPI uses the following types of feature classes.  
Municipalities were represented by polygons that followed the municipalities’ 
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geographical and legal delimitations.  Municipality town halls were represented by 
points within the municipality polygon.   
BCIM represents Brazilian ports as multipoint feature files, i.e. as a clustering of 
points around a specific area.  The multimodal network dataset does not accept 
multipoint features, so I converted from multipoint to one single point
114
.  The point 
indicates where the port is located on a map. 
BCIM represents roads as line features.  These line features also have information on 
the types of roads, such as (i) paved, (ii) being paved, (iii) unpaved, or (iv) without 
paving information.  With this information, I was able to create a hierarchy of 
preferences for classifying the roads, which affected the remoteness variable in terms 
of time spent for transportation.  Considering that the time spent from point A to 
point B will differ depending on the type of road, it is important to indicate to the 
software that it should give higher priority to (i) paved roads than (iii) to unpaved 
roads, for example.  The hierarchy was structured as follows: paved roads had higher 
priority over roads being paved, which, in turn, had higher priority over unpaved 
roads or roads without paving information.  In order to do so, I created a variable and 
populated it with the following VBA script: 
Dim temp_variable as Integer 
if [cd_tipo_pa] = "Sem Informação" then  
temp_variable= 3 
elseif [cd_tipo_pa] = "Não Pavimentada" then  
temp_variable=3 
elseif [cd_tipo_pa] ="Em Pavimentação" then  
temp_variable=2 
elseif [cd_tipo_pa] ="Pavimentada" then  
temp_variable=1 
endif  
Hierarchy = temp_variable 
 
Technical details: creating the feature dataset 
The feature dataset merges the different feature classes from MoPI and the BCIM into 
one dataset.  The following technical details inform the specifications of the feature 
dataset I created: geographic coordinate SAD69 and NGG 1977 South America; 
                                               
114 I used Toolbox\Data Management\Feature\Multipart to Singlepart 
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default tolerance of ArcGIS; XY default tolerance of 0,00000000898312 degrees; z 
tolerance of 0,001 and M tolerance is 0,001 unknown units.   
Creating the multimodal network dataset 
The feature dataset provided the information required for the creation of the 
multimodal network dataset.  I assigned networks to two groups, one for roads and 
another one for rivers.  This means that ArcGIS understands that there are two types 
of alternative networks to choose from when considering going from point “A” to 
point “B”.  The roads network included roads, tunnels and overpasses.  The rivers 
network included ports, rivers, ferries and ferry docks.  I assigned the connectivity 
between these networks in such a way that a road would connect to another road or a 
river only at the end of the line (“end points”), unless there was a port where the path 
could diverge from road to river, or vice-versa.  It is clear, then, that the river and 
road networks could be used to complement each other.   
I assigned no elevation in calculating travelling time.  This means that the effect of 
driving in hills and valleys was not taken into consideration in computing distances.  I 
also allowed for global turns, which means that turns are allowed whenever the “end 
points” – the edges of types of features – do not connect.  For example, the software 
creates a turn, even if there is no immediate connection between a road and a port.  
This may underestimate distances, as roads may connect differently than the global 
turn.  
In the multimodal network dataset, I created two new attributes for deciding the 
shortest route between two points of interest while running the network analysis.  
First, I created a cost-attribute named “Km”, whose value was identical to the length 
of the corresponding road or river (variable md_extensao to two decimal points) 
(IBGE 2009a).  Then, I created a hierarchy attribute, adding rivers to the previous 
hierarchy.  Rivers were given the same preference level as unpaved roads and roads 
with no paving information.  In that way, ArcGIS could use a hierarchy of options in 
choosing between an advent of various levels of roads, as well as between roads and 
rivers.   
Below is the full specification of the multimodal network dataset: 
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Name: BCIM301Transport_ND2 
Type: Geodatabase-Based Network Dataset 
 
Sources:  
Edge Sources:  
    ST_HIDROVIA_LINHA_ND2 
    ST_PONTE_TUNEL_ND2 
    ST_RODOVIA_H_ND2 
    ST_TRAVESSIA_LINHA_ND2 
Junction Sources:  
    Travessia_ponto_ND2 
    porto_Point_ND2 
 
Connectivity:  
 Group 1:  
 Edge Connectivity:  
      ST_PONTE_TUNEL_ND2 (End Point) 
      ST_RODOVIA_H_ND2 (End Point) 
      ST_TRAVESSIA_LINHA_ND2 (End Point) 
     Junction Connectivity - Transfer Groups [2]:  
      Travessia_ponto_ND2 (Honor) - Transfer Groups [2] 
      porto_Point_ND2 (Override) - Transfer Groups [2] 
    
Group 2:  
     Edge Connectivity:  
      ST_HIDROVIA_LINHA_ND2 (End Point) 
     Junction Connectivity - Transfer Groups [1]:  
      Travessia_ponto_ND2 (Honor) - Transfer Groups [1] 
      porto_Point_ND2 (Override) - Transfer Groups [1] 
 
Turns:   <Global Turns> 
 
Attributes:  
Km:  
    Usage Type: Cost 
    Data Type: Double 
    Units Type: Unknown 
    Use by Default: True 
    Source Attribute Evaluators:  
      ST_HIDROVIA_LINHA_ND2 (From-To): Field - [md_extensa] 
      ST_HIDROVIA_LINHA_ND2 (To-From): Field - [md_extensa] 
      ST_PONTE_TUNEL_ND2 (From-To): Field - [md_extensa] 
      ST_PONTE_TUNEL_ND2 (To-From): Field - [md_extensa] 
      ST_RODOVIA_H_ND2 (From-To): Field - [md_extensa] 
      ST_RODOVIA_H_ND2 (To-From): Field - [md_extensa] 
      ST_TRAVESSIA_LINHA_ND2 (From-To): Field - [md_extensa] 
      ST_TRAVESSIA_LINHA_ND2 (To-From): Field - [md_extensa] 
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    Default Attribute Evaluators:  
      Default Edges: Constant - 0 
      Default Junctions: Constant - 0 
      Default Turns: Constant - 0 
   
Hierarchy:  
    Usage Type: Hierarchy 
    Data Type: Integer 
    Units Type: Unknown 
    Use by Default: True 
    Hierarchy Ranges:  
      Primary Roads: up to 1 
      Secondary Roads: 2 - 2 
      Local Roads: 3 and higher 
    Source Attribute Evaluators:  
      ST_HIDROVIA_LINHA_ND2 (From-To): Constant - 3 
      ST_HIDROVIA_LINHA_ND2 (To-From): Constant - 3 
      ST_PONTE_TUNEL_ND2 (From-To): Constant - 1 
      ST_PONTE_TUNEL_ND2 (To-From): Constant - 1 
      ST_RODOVIA_H_ND2 (From-To): Field - [Hierarchy] 
      ST_RODOVIA_H_ND2 (To-From): Field - [Hierarchy] 
      ST_TRAVESSIA_LINHA_ND2 (From-To): Constant - 3 
      ST_TRAVESSIA_LINHA_ND2 (To-From): Constant - 3 
    Default Attribute Evaluators:  
      Default Edges: Constant - 0 
      Default Junctions: Constant - 0 
      Default Turns: Constant - 0 
 
 
The network analysis: closest facility 
In network analysis more generally, the function “closest facility” is used to calculate 
the time or distance to the nearest hospital (facility) for incidents like road accidents.  
I have adapted this function to this research by defining “incident” as the location of 
the poor rural municipality, and “facility” as the location of the urban municipality,  
thus, enabling the software to calculate the “closest” urban municipality to a given 
poor rural municipality.   
Details on the specifications of the software calculation are as follows.  For distances 
between the facilities and the incidents, I have determined that there is no curb 
approached.  This means they can be approached from any side (right or left) of the 
road or river.  I set the tolerance (or the distance) to identify facilities and incidents 
within five kilometres, i.e.  ArcGIS links the road or port to a certain urban or rural 
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municipality if it comes within five kilometres of it.  I set the analysis to find only 
one urban municipality for each rural poor municipality.  Locations that ArcGIS 
could not identify, even considering the five-kilometre range of tolerance, were 
ignored.  I have not determined any default cut-off value, so a facility could be a long 
way away from an incident.  Lastly, the calculations included the use of the hierarchy 
attributes described previously (paved roads > roads being paved > unpaved 
roads/without information/rivers).    
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Appendix 3C: Data management: identification of the municipality code in the 
Ministry of Education dataset 
 
Merging the datasets 
The data management of the quantitative analysis used several administrative datasets 
in various formats (GIS, dta, spss, xls and html), and the analysis used a number of 
different types of software (ArcGIS 9.2, STATA10, SPSS16.0 and Excel 2007).  
Hence, there is a need for this appendix to explain how I derived the code from the 
municipality characteristics.   
Given the need to merge databases several times, I was careful with every merge.  For 
all datasets except the Ministry of Education dataset, I had the unique identifier code 
for the municipalities.  I conducted the first merge of the master data using this code 
in two different software packages (SPSS 16.0 and STATA10), and compared the 
results.  I used STATA to conduct the remainder of the analysis.  In STATA, I used 
the code _merge(newvar) to produce a new variable  identifying observations that 
were merged, those that were present only in the master data, and those that were 
present only in the using dataset.  I checked the missing variables by running cross-
tabs and other commands, such as “assert” and “inspect”.  When changing the 
variable from string to numerical, I was careful to produce two other variables to 
check the result.  I kept the original variables (labelled as “source”).  More 
information, including STATA commands, can be produced upon request. 
The Ministry of Education (MEC) dataset 
In order to populate the MEC dataset with the unique municipality identifier code, I 
used information from the MoPI dataset.  The MoPI had the following variables: code 
(unique municipality identifier), state, and name (of the municipality).  The MEC 
dataset had the variables state and name.  I created a new variable (state_name), 
combining the string variables state and name.  This variable was also used as a 
unique identifier, because no two observations were the same, given that each 
municipality had its full name.  I created this variable in both datasets (MoPI and 
MEC).  I then populated the MEC dataset with the field code by comparing the 
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state_name variables in one dataset with those of the other (see details below).  After 
the MEC dataset had been populated with the code variable, I was able to proceed 
with the merging of the MEC dataset with the master data, as outlined in the previous 
section. 
Details for the computations to derive the state_name municipality are as follows (in 
Excel): 
1. With CONTROL+FIND, I deleted all accents, e.g. transforming Ç into C;  
2. Using function UPPER, I capitalised all strings of state and name; 
3. Using the function CONCATENATE, I created the variable state_name; 
4. Using the function VLOOKUP, FALSE, I matched the variable state_name in 
two spreadsheets based on the MEC and MoPI datasets, to populate the MEC 
spreadsheet with the variable code from MoPI; 
a. The command FALSE means that Excel matches state_name exactly.   
b. Close matches were not assigned any value for code.  I did not drop these 
cases.  
Table 15 indicates the number of MEC observations in the master data: 
Table 15: Number of PIR and PNIR observations per year 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 
PIR (N=101) 88 98 101 101 
PNIR (N=283) 237 264 278 280 
Source: author’s using MoPI and BCIM. 
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Appendix 3D: Exploratory data analysis 
 
Missing values 
Missing values take the form of “.”, “.z” and “.a”.  When the original dataset has 
missing values as “.”, I used the same form.  Some of the values were assigned to 
missing, during the merging process.  This happened when the merging dataset did 
not have the same number of municipality as the master dataset.   
I used the “.z” and “.a” codes when the “0” and “99” codes in the original dataset 
indicated “missing” variables.  If the original dataset had “0” or “99” as values for 
observations, I took care to double-check whether these numbers were indeed values 
of 0 or 99, or whether they were codes for missing values.  For example, the 
Datasus/Sisvan dataset has 0 and 99 values, and I have kept these as values, not as 
missing values.  Enforcement of the monitoring of the BF began in 2006, and it is 
reasonable to assume that, prior to that date, a 0 value meant there was no monitoring.  
This is confirmed by the fact that there is a substantial reduction of the number of 0 
values over time, indicating that monitoring has started to take place.  I have kept 99 
as a value when it is followed by decimal points (e.g. 99.01; 99.75).  In these cases, 
99 is clearly not being used for missing values.    
Exploratory Data Analysis: Treatment of outliers  
The exploratory data analysis revealed problems with the dataset.  Aside from some 
observations that were clearly implausible or even impossible (e.g. values > 100%); it 
was sometimes difficult to ascertain whether the true data were really skewed, or 
whether they were a result of errors at the inputting, reporting or calculation stages.  
It is important to remember that the Bolsa Família from 2004 to 2006 brought 
together beneficiaries from other programmes and other databases.  This can lead to 
error.  In addition, I cannot verify the quality of the other databases added to the 
Cadastro.   
It could be that the high number of outliers from 2004 to 2006 is a reflection of a poor 
quality Cadastro.  It is documented in my interviews and the literature (Soares 2012a) 
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that the Cadastro dataset was not constantly updated during its first years, and it was 
therefore “messy”.  As a result, in 2006 the federal government began to transfer 
funds to local administrations, via the IGD (Índice de Gestão Decentralizada), for the 
purpose of partially paying the administrative costs of running the programme.  The 
IGD is a performance-based financial incentive with four indicators, two relating to 
the monitoring of conditionalities, and two relating to Cadastro quality.  So the high 
number of outliers in the data for the years 2004 to 2006 could be a reflection of a 
poor quality Cadastro.   
Lastly, I would like to acknowledge that the number of outliers could also be the 
result of errors in calculating the participation rate.  Problems with the population 
estimates as part of the denominator of the equation have already been explained in 
Chapter 3, sub-section 3.3.2 and in Chapter 4, footnote 84.  
Table 16 illustrates the range of the variable “participation rate” from 2004 to 2009, 
using “municipality” as the unit of analysis. 
Table 16: Range of the variable participation rate (non-winsorised), 2004-2009 
Year Minimum  Participation 
Rate (%) 
Maximum Participation 
Rate (%) 
2004 .0083658   63.54296   
2005 .3544287 83.75954    
2006 1.001381   198.676   
2007 .3036876   85.94781   
2008 .1976006   82.25311   
2009 .1981599 90.30988 
Source: author’s calculation using MoPI, BCIM, PNADs (2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009), Contagem populacional (2007), 
Cadastro (2004 – 2009). 
 
The ranges of the minimum and maximum participation rates give us some idea of 
how implausible certain values are.  The minimum participation rate for the years 
2004 to 2009 is 0.008% in 2004, and the maximum participation rate is the 
impossible value of 199% in 2006.  The minimum participation rates from 2004 to 
2009 are extraordinarily low, i.e. well below 1% (except for 2006).  Although these 
minimum ranges could be hypothesised to belong to rich municipalities with few 
households in the programme, these results strongly suggest the need for further 
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investigation.  I define outliers using quartiles and a multiplier for the inter-quartile 
ranges (Agresti & Finlay 2009; High 2000).   
Figure 38 shows various box-and-whisker plots and outliers.  There are large numbers 
of outliers in the years 2004 to 2006.  From 2007 onwards, the number of outliers is 
significantly reduced (as expected). 
 
Figure 38: BF participation rates (non-winsorised) by poverty, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2009 
 
 
 
Source: see Table 17 for details. 
 
High (2000) suggests dividing outliers in two types: potential and problematic.  
Potential outliers are those observations above or below the 1.5 inter-quartile range 
(IQR), and problematic outliers are those of 3.0 IQR.  Table 17 shows the numbers of 
observations classified as potential outliers, and those classified as problematic.  It is 
worth noting the considerable improvement in the distribution.  From 2007 onwards, 
the data show zero missing values and a considerable reduction in the numbers of 
outliers.  
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Table 17: Number of problematic and potential outliers, BF participation rates, 2004-2009 
 Potential Outliers  Problematic Outliers 
2004 105 3 
2005 25 0 
2006 10 2 
2007 2 0 
2008 3 0 
2009 4 0 
Source: see Table 17 for details. 
 
It is worth investigating whether the outliers are randomly allocated, or whether the 
high participation rates are consistently occurring in the same municipalities.  If the 
latter is the case, it is plausible to think that this could represent a rare event, i.e. a 
very poor municipality with a very high level of participation in the programme.  And 
indeed, analysis of the problematic outliers reveals municipalities with consistently 
high participation rates over two or more years.  There is, therefore, the possibility 
that these outliers are legitimate cases of high participation rates, meaning they are a 
non-outliers – a type I error, or a false positive. 
The problematic results in 2006, where two municipalities had participation-rate 
values of 166% and 198% indicate problems with the data.  These results could be a 
combination of the exponential increase in BF benefits in 2006, and the problems 
with municipality population estimates already identified (Chapter 3, sub-section 
3.3.2).  Comparing the 2006 participation rates of these two municipalities with the 
rates in the preceding and following years, shows the participation rate trends 
returning to normal levels, i.e. they no longer belong in the outlier group.   
Instead of excluding outliers, I decided to winsorise the dataset.  Winsorising a 
dataset imposes a limit on the top and bottom percentiles of the distribution.  I chose 
the 3
rd
 and 97
th
 percentiles.  I decided to keep outliers in the dataset as municipalities 
with high participation rates, where poverty levels may also be high, are the central 
theme of the research question investigated in Chapter 4.   
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Appendix 3E: Description of variables 
Descriptive statistics for continuous variables: 
Variable Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Poverty (FGT)
(1)
 5501 0.41 0.15 0.05 0.84 
BF participation rates (PR), 2004 (%)
(2)
 5409 11.37 9.52 0.86 34.89 
BF PR 2005 (%) 5485 20.09 11.89 3.54 46.13 
BF PR 2006 (%) 5501 29.76 16.32 5.88 63.04 
BF PR 2007 (%) 5501 29.17 15.32 5.91 58.07 
BF PR 2008 (%) 5501 27.50 14.85 5.35 55.59 
BF PR 2009 (%) 5501 26.54 14.54 5.01 54.06 
Distance/ remoteness (km)
(3)
 384 47.43 64.85 1.62 766.77 
Health conditionalities, Jun 2005 (%)
(4)
 5501 10.37 24.83 0 100 
Health conditionalities, Dec 2005 (%) 5501 40.78 38.69 0 100 
Health conditionalities, Jun 2006 (%) 5501 48.10 37.78 0 100 
Health conditionalities, Dec 2006 (%) 5501 42.29 35.05 0 100 
Health conditionalities, Jun 2007 (%) 5501 49.20 31.65 0 100 
Health conditionalities, Dec 2007 (%) 5501 52.95 30.85 0 100 
Health conditionalities, Jun 2008 (%) 5501 65.99 24.32 0 100 
Health conditionalities, Dec 2008 (%) 5501 64.89 25.52 0 100 
Health conditionalities, Jun 2009 (%) 5501 70.99 20.55 0 100 
Health conditionalities, Dec 2009 (%) 5501 74.40 19.21 0 100 
Health conditionalities, Jun 2010 (%) 5501 76.24 18.40 0 100 
Sources: (1) MoPI; (2) PNADs (2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009), Contagem populacional (2007), Cadastro (2004-2009); (3) 
MoPI, BCIM; (4) Datasus/Sisvan (2005-2010). 
Descriptive statistics for poverty: 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Poverty general 5501 0.41 0.15 0.05 0.84 
Poverty RURAL 2093 0.41 0.16 0.06 0.84 
Poverty URBAN 3408 0.40 0.15 0.05 0.82 
Poverty PIR 101 0.62 0.06 0.57 0.84 
Poverty PNIR 283 0.62 0.04 0.57 0.81 
Poverty Other (not 
PIR/PNIR) 
5117 0.39 0.15 0.05 0.82 
Poverty, North 449 0.44 0.13 0.15 0.84 
Poverty, Northeast 1786 0.55 0.09 0.14 0.81 
Poverty, Centre-West 446 0.40 0.10 0.1 0.81 
Poverty, Southeast 1665 0.33 0.13 0.05 0.76 
Poverty, South 1155 0.29 0.10 0.07 0.56 
Sources: MoPI and BCIM.  
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Appendix 3F: Using the quantitative dataset to inform the selection of case 
studies  
As explained in Chapter 3, sub-section 3.4.1, I used the quantitative dataset (MoPI) to 
inform the selection of the four case studies, with the aim of identifying typical case 
studies (Table 5, p. 105).  I used variables related to the BF programme, such as those 
related to income, education and health.   Median income influences the number of 
beneficiaries potentially eligible for the programme.  Education and health indicators 
give information on the level of access and service provision, portraying the 
infrastructure against which beneficiaries need to comply with conditionalities.  
Providing a picture of a typical case study in order to analyse the BF implementation 
and its impact in PIR and PNIR municipalities, then, involved selecting case studies 
that fell within the central tendency of income, education and health indicators. 
The choice of outcome indicators was dictated by their availability in the dataset.  
Table 18 outlines the criteria used to select case studies for PIR and PNIR 
municipalities.  This appendix outlines the descriptive statistics of these outcome 
indicators by PIR and PNIR municipalities.  These indicators, by themselves, provide 
very useful information about the conditions in which the BF operates in poor rural 
municipalities. 
Table 18: PIR and PNIR criteria for case study selection 
Indicators PIR criteria PNIR criteria 
Median income R$151 - 302  R$151 - 302 
Education: age/grade gap  61-75%  61-75% 
Education: Multi-grade classrooms  26-50  0-10  
Education:  Literacy rates 61-70% 61-70% 
Education:  %pop with less4yof study  61-80%  41-60%  
Education: average years of study 2.1 -4 2.1 -4 
Health: #beds/1,000 pop  0 - 0.5  0 - 0.5  
Health: #medical positions/1,000 pop  0 - 0.5  0 - 0.5  
Source: author using MoPI, BCIM. 
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Distribution of median income in PIR and PNIR municipalities 
Figure 39 shows the sampling distribution of median household income in PIR and 
PNIR municipalities.  The data indicate that the average median household income in 
both PIR and PNIR municipalities is around two minimum wages.   
Figure 39: Distribution of median income by PIR and PNIR municipalities, 2000 
 
Source: author’s calculations using MoPI and BCIM. 
 
The distribution of PIR municipalities shows a higher frequency below the threshold 
of two minimum wages, as well as a longer tail.  The inequality in Brazil makes it 
possible to have rural municipalities defined as poor on a poverty headcount (PIR), 
which simultaneously have a comparatively higher median household income.     
Distribution of education outcome indicators in PIR and PNIR municipalities 
The MoPI provides information on five education indicators based on the 2000 
Census:  
(i) age/grade gap: the percentage of students per grade (or year of study) 
who are older than the age recommended by the IBGE, according to the 
ages students should be in 1
st
 to 8
th
 grades if they started school at seven; 
(ii) multi-grade classroom: the number of schools with only multi-grade (or 
multi-level) classrooms; 
(iii) literacy rate: the percentage of literate adults (above the age of 15), 
defined by the IBGE as those who self-report that they are able to read or 
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write a simple note, and those who learned to read and write but have 
forgotten, and those who can only write their name
115
;  
(iv) average years of study: calculated for individuals over 15; 
(v) percentage of the population with less than four years of study: also 
calculated for individuals over 15. 
The Figures below show the distribution of these indicators per type of poor rural 
municipality. 
 
  
                                               
115 This indicator may not be reliable due to its conceptualisation.  Although individuals 15 years or 
over should have concluded the eight years of basic education (recently increased to nine), the 
measurement of literacy does not reflect the number of years of study.  In addition, “literacy” includes 
the bare minimum standard of knowing how to “write” their own names or, as I heard it described 
during fieldwork, how to “draw” their own names. 
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Figure 40: Distribution age/grade gap by PIR 
and PNIR municipalities, 2000 
 
Source: author’s calculations using MoPI and BCIM. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 41: Distribution of multi-grade 
classrooms by PIR and PNIR municipalities, 
2000 
Source: see Figure 40 for details.
 
Figure 42: Distribution of literacy rate by PIR 
and PNIR municipalities, 2000 
 
Source: see Figure 40 for details. 
 
Figure 43: Distribution of average years of study 
by PIR and PNIR municipalities, 2000 
 
Source: see Figure 40 for details. 
 
 
Figure 44: Distribution of the population with 
less than four years of study by PIR and PNIR 
municipalities, 2000 
 
Source: see Figure 40 for details. 
 
The above distributions provide evidence that the education outcome indicators in all 
PIR municipalities are worse than those in PNIR municipalities.  This substantiates 
the premise that PIR municipalities, with weaker links to urban municipalities, have 
higher levels of deprivation. 
It is important to point out that I was not able to select PNIR case studies that would 
fit the distribution of the multi-grade classrooms and all of the other indicators.   I 
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reached a compromise by selecting two PNIR municipalities with two and three 
additional schools with multi-grade classrooms.  I believe that this does not represent 
a major problem, because the range of distribution of multi-grade classrooms varies 
from 0 to more than 100.  I was also not able to select case studies that fitted the 
distribution for the PIR “i” population with less than four years of study.  However, 
the percentage of people with less than four years of study in this population was only 
slightly less than the bottom threshold (60.4% and 61% respectively). 
Distribution of health outcome indicators in PIR and PNIR municipalities 
The MoPI provides information on two health indicators based on the 2000 Census:  
(i) beds per thousand inhabitants: number of hospital beds, either public or 
private, per thousand inhabitants in a municipality;  
(ii) medical positions created: number of positions created for doctors in 
health clinics and hospitals, public and private, per thousand inhabitants in 
a municipality.  
The Figures below show the distribution of these indicators per type of poor rural 
municipality.   
 
Figure 45: Distribution of hospital beds per 
thousand inhabitants, PIR and PNIR 
municipalities, 2000 
 
Source: see Figure 40 for details. 
Figure 46: Distribution of medical positions 
created per thousand inhabitants, PIR and PNIR 
municipalities, 2000  
 
Source: see Figure 40 for details. 
 
Although both figures show that PIR municipalities fare worse than PNIR, there are 
some limitations to the indicators and their definitions.  These indicators reflect the 
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availability of health services per thousand inhabitants, but they do not show the 
health status of the population, like other indicators such as child mortality
116
.    
The number of hospital beds provides information on the infrastructure of the health 
sector in both public and private hospitals.  However, this is not an accurate 
indication of health resources for those who depend only on public hospitals.  As for 
the number of medical positions, the fieldwork found that the IBGE measure may be 
double-counting the doctors who work part-time in more than one municipality, thus 
providing an inaccurate measurement of the coverage of the population by health 
services. 
 
  
                                               
116 I was not able to include child mortality indicators because the 2003 MoPI does not have this 
information by municipality, but aggregates it into meso-regions. The problem with using the meso-
region information is that it represents an average of child mortality, thus abolishing any distinction 
between PIR and PNIR statistics, deemed important for this research. 
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Appendix 3G: Protocol observations 
 
 Protocol observation: driving to rural areas 
Date: ____/_____/_______ 
Municipality:____________District/Povoado:__________________ 
Typology:   PIR   PNIR 
ID: OP/RA/_____/______ 
While driving to the rural areas, observe: 
Road Conditions: 
 
Distance from city (CRAS) to rural areas: 
          Min (entrance to rural areas): 
          Max (farthest house):   
 
Distance from rural areas to rural school:  
       Min (closest house): 
       Max (farthest house): 
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Protocol observation: interview in schools 
Date: ____/_____/_______ 
Municipality:____________District/Povoado:__________________ 
Typology:   PIR   PNIR 
ID: OP/SCH/____/______ 
While interviewing principals/teachers schools, note:  
School Name:  
        Public  State                 Private                      Public Municipal 
 
Infrastructure – physical space: 
Building: 
Sports ground: 
 
Infrastructure – classroom (chairs, table, blackboard): 
 
Infrastructure – accessibility: 
Hygiene/bathrooms: 
 
Ask about: 
Infrastructure – lighting and ventilation: 
Electricity: 
 
Telephone: Y  N                          Fax: Y   N                          Computers: Y  (#...)  N        
Internet : Y  N 
 
Security :  
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Library : 
Pedagogical materials :  
 
Number of children per class : 
Number of teachers? 
______Men                              ______Women 
______hours/week                  ______ Public staff or contractor 
Educational level: Graduate (   )  High school (    )   Finishing graduate studies(    ) 
Does the school take part in the Food Acquisition Programme (Programa de Aquisição 
de Alimentos para Atendimento da Alimentação Escolar – PAA)? [This question aims to 
find out if the school purchases food from the local producers] 
(     ) Yes   (   ) No 
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Protocol observation: interview in health centres 
Date: ____/_____/_______ 
Municipality:____________District/Povoado:__________________ 
Typology:   PIR   PNIR 
ID: OP/HC/____/______ 
While interviewing head nurses at health centres, note: 
 
Health Centre Name:  
Opening and closing times: 
Accessibility for rural people: 
Information on location neighbourhood: 
        Rural H. Centre                Hospital                 Urban Health Centre 
 
Infrastructure – physical space: 
Building:  
Seating area: 
 
OBS (hygiene, etc): 
 
Ask about: 
Estimated waiting time ___________   estimated number of visits per day____________ 
Complete Programa Saúde da Família staff ? Yes or No 
(  ) # doctors:  (   ) # GPs (   ) # Specialist  
(   ) # dentists (   ) # nurses (   ) # nurse technician (    ) # community health agents 
(   ) # beds (   ) # ambulance (   ) # computers (   ) internet connection 
(    ) local distribution of free medicine (    )  Free milk distribution programme (PAA-
Leite) 
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Protocol observation: interview at the Social Assistance Centre (CRAS) 
Date: ____/_____/_______ 
Municipality:____________District/Povoado:__________________ 
Typology:   PIR   PNIR 
ID: OP/CRAS/__________ 
While visiting CRAS, note: 
CRAS Name:  
Location:       Rural               Urban 
Opening and closing times: 
Accessibility for rural people: 
Information on location neighbourhood: 
 
Infrastructure – physical space: 
Building: 
Rooms: 
Seating area: 
Ask about: 
Computers: 
Cars (   )    Motorbikes (   ) 
Internet (connection speed above 512 kbps): 
 
Staffing numbers: 
(    )  Coordinator:  (   ) Graduate level?  (  ) Public staff/contractor (    ) Previous 
experience? 
(    )  Social assistant: (   ) Graduate level?  (  ) Public staff/contractor (    ) Previous 
experience? 
(    )  Psychologist: (   ) Graduate level?  (  ) Public staff/contractor (    ) Previous experience? 
 (    ) #Technicians: (   ) Graduate level?  (  ) Public staff/contractor (    ) Previous 
experience? 
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Appendix 3H: Service profiling information 
Date: ____/_____/_____ 
Municipality:____________District/Povoado:__________________ 
Typology:   PIR   PNIR 
ID: HH/______/____ 
 D
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School 
1
st
 to 5
th
 grades 
6
th
 to 9
th
 grades 
 
  Public 
Private 
Paved 
Being paved 
Dirt road 
  
School - High school   Public 
Private 
Paved 
Being paved 
Dirt road 
  
Health   Public 
Private 
Paved 
Being paved 
Dirt road 
  
CRAS   Public 
Private 
Paved 
Being paved 
Dirt road 
  
Distance to their work   Public 
Private 
Paved 
Being paved 
Dirt road 
  
Where do they collect 
the benefit? 
 
      
Post office 
 
      
CAIXA 
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Appendix 3I: Household reference sheet  
Date: _____/___/_______ 
Municipality:____________District/Povoado:__________________ 
Typology:   PIR   PNIR 
ID: HH/_____/_____ 
Name (optional):              Age:                                                   Occupation:  
Married?  Y   N               Does the husband live at home?      # sons/daughters:  
Education level: 
 
Registered at Cadastro:                                                     Since when?  
Do you receive the BF?                                                     Since when?  
Amount of the benefit: 
If not registered, why not?  
Do you have the BF card?                                                  [Mark if I have seen it: ___]  
Are the children’s vaccination cards up to date?  
Water:                   Rubbish collection:  
Sanitation:     Cook with (gas/firewood):  
Electricity:     Livestock: 
Own house/rent/morador?   # people/house: 
Any pensioner?Y N  How many?   Est. Income: 
 
Ask about children: 
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CHAPTER 8 APPENDIX 
Appendix 8A: Reasons for low school attendance, Ministry of Education 
Below is listed all the declared reasons for low school attendance.  The Ministry of 
Education (MEC) periodically updates these reasons.  I also list the 2010 reasons, as I 
have information up to that date.  This information is based on the system user-
manual version 4.6 (MEC [n.d.]-b).   
 
Student’s illness: including reasons to preserve health, such as post-partum periods.  The 
school can request a doctor’s letter in case of doubt.  If illness is reported constantly, the 
school must involve the local health clinics in the specific case. 
Family’s illness or death 
Shortage of supply of school services: children’s education, Youth and Adult specialised 
education (EJA), high-school services, schooling services for resettlements, etc. 
Factors that impede access to school: e.g. floods, calamities, lack of transportation, urban 
violence. 
Lack of supply of school services for persons with disabilities or special needs: this 
includes lack of specialised teachers and lack of transportation 
Finished high school 
Suspension 
Youth and Adult specialised education (EJA): some of the EJA courses do not have an 
attendance requirement.  
Pregnancy 
Homelessness: the school must inform local child protection services and CRAS. 
Parents’ negligence: the school’s perception of the importance of education for families.  
The school must conduct parent-teacher meetings to raise awareness of the importance of 
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education. 
Child labour: it is illegal for children below the age of 14 to work.  It is the school’s legal 
duty to inform the authorities, and failing to do so is a criminal offence. 
School has not said what the reasons are: school does not know the reasons for low 
attendance.   
Reason not listed: school must attach a short description of the reason for low school 
attendance. 
Violence, discrimination and aggression at school: including cyber-bullying. 
Youth employment: according to the Brazilian legislation, the starting age for work is 16.  
From 14 to 16 years, teenagers can work as apprentices. 
Exploitation, sexual abuse and domestic violence: the school must inform local child 
protection services. 
Lack of interest or motivation: only registered after-school counsellors have identified this 
as the reason for low school attendance.  School services must act promptly as there is a high 
risk of drop-out. 
Drop-out 
Need to care for family members: including parents, sons/daughters or relatives.  The 
school must inform local child protection services and CRAS. 
 
 
 
